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Ten years of CMEA legal conference 
J. SZILBEREKY 
President o f the Supreme Court 
The introductory part of the paper deals with the significance of the socialist economic 
integration and with the nature of Council of Mutual Economic Aid (further on: C M E A ) . It 
refers to the results achieved in the social and economic development of the member-countries 
o f C M E A but also to the problems arisen in the recent years. 
In respect o f the improvement of efficiency of co-operation, the accomplishment of the 
Complex Program adopted in 1971 as well as the realization of long-range complex objective 
programs of co-operation developed since then are of fundamental importance. All these 
require the suitable provision for the organizational and functional conditions of C M E A . 
Therefore, the establishment of the legal foundations of the socialist economic integration, the 
building up and perfection of the regulation are important means belonging to the system of 
condit ions of the integration. The appropriate legal mechanism may constitute suitable 
assistance to the efficient functioning of the economic integration. In order to build up the legal 
mechanism of C M E A , at the end o f 1969 a permanent organ of C M E A , the Legal Conference 
o f the member-countries was established. In the past 10 years this Conference considerably 
contributed by the means of law to the structural building up and to the development of the 
functioning of the socialist economic integration. Development methods of legal foundat ions 
are as follows: elaboration and adopt ion of normative acts regulating the economic and 
scientific-technical co-operation, regulation of the order of the litigation, harmonization and 
unification of the national legal norms, establishment of general legal norms. The forms of this 
latter are the agreements between the countries as well as the recommendations of C M E A 
organs to the countries. 
Chapter 15 o f the Complex Program defines the most important tasks of the legal work. 
The paper treats the work hitherto d o n e according to the system of Chapter 15 of the Complex 
Program. 
The hitherto displayed legal activity comprises the fo l lowing fields: 
—Elaborat ion of recommendations for harmonization of the national economic plans 
and of the investments relating to some objects of c o m m o n interest. Elaboration of legal 
norms concerning the field of the specialization of production and the co-operation. 
Elaboration of statutory provisions for the co-operation in the scientific and technical research 
work.—Elaborat ion of principles relating to the liability o f the countries .—Taking measures 
for the harmonization of national legal norms relating to the economic and scientific-technical 
co-operation of economic , technical and other organizations established by the member-
countries.—Further development of the General Condit ions of Delivery (1968) between the 
organizations of the member-countries o f C M E A . Further development of the system of 
norms relating to the liability o f the economic organizations in case of a failure or faulty 
performance of obligations. Elaboration of model-rules relating to the foundation and to the 
condit ions of activity o f the international economic organizations o f the member-countries o f 
C M E A . — Q u e s t i o n s relating to the legal protection of inventions, trademarks and designs as 
well as elaboration o f model-contracts o f l icence.—Elaboration of an agreement relating to the 
arbitration in legal disputes arising in the course of economic co-operat ion.—Elaborat ion of a 
treaty on the legal posit ion and the immunity of the inter-state economic organizations active 
in a definite field of co-operation. Provisions for the exchange o f legal experiences and 
informations. 
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According to the paper, the survey of the work indicates that the activity displayed in 
ten years by the Legal Conference o f C M E A serves with good results the provision for legal 
conditions of the co-operation o f the member-countries. 
I. The significance of the economic integration of socialist countries increases. 
Thir ty years after the establishment of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (further 
on: CMEA) it is obvious that the member-countries of C M E A have developed 
qualitatively new economic relations. This economic community differs from all other 
international economic groupings since it is based on voluntary principle, on mutual 
advantages, on the aid, and it does not constitute a supra-national organization, is not 
directed against the interests of any non-member country and it does not impede the 
economic relations of its member-countries to any other country of the world. 
Since the foundation of the socialist economic community considerable results 
have been produced. This fact is proved by the social and economic development of the 
member-countries of CMEA. 
In the last decade the economic development of the member-countries of CMEA 
can be considered significant as compared either to the world economy or to any other 
regional economic grouping. Thir ty years ago the C M E A member-countries 
manufactured 17.8 per cent of the industrial production of the world, today this share 
amounts to 33 per cent. The industrial production per one person has increased on 
world scale by 3.2 per cent during these thirty years. This increase has been threefold in 
the member-countries of C M E A as compared to the above world average. The 
progress in the agriculture and in the food production is also significant. The 
production per one person has increased in the last twenty years on world-scale by 7 
per cent, whereas in the C M E A countries by 31 per cent. 
The most important fact is, however, that the socialist international labour 
division has promoted to the possibilities of the development of socialist economic 
system within the individual countries. The productivity has increased, the production 
structure has been modernized and the living standards of the inhabitants of CMEA-
countries not only increased but—where differences were to be found—also 
approached to each other. 
Beside the above-mentioned results surveyed schematically, there are also 
problems in the economy of all socialist countries. In 1980 the agricultural production 
declined in some countries. The increase of national income achieved the planned 
value only with difficulties. In consequence of these there are still many tasks to be 
solved, especially in view of the present situation having evolved at the world market. 
The most important is now the encouraging of the co-operation for increasing the 
efficiency of economy. From this point of view, the enforcement of the Complex 
Program adopted in 1971 at the 25th Session of CMEA as well as the realization of 
complex long-range objective programs of co-operation elaborated since that time are 
of fundamental importance. 
These objective programs promote the systematic development in the most 
significant economic branches—such as energy, production of raw materials, machine 
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industry, agriculture, food industry, transport. Thereby also the interests of the 
member-countries of C M E A are efficiently served.1 
2. The realization of the Complex Program requires the suitable provision for 
the organizational and operational conditions of CMEA and the development of 
working methods. 
It is well known that the law is defined by the social conditions, the law is 
therefore secondary as compared to the economy. At the same time, however, the law 
is relatively independent, it has its own structural rules, institutional system and 
sanction system. All these relate also to the legal regulation of economic relations. The 
law has, therefore, an important role in the settlement and management of economic 
processes, in the solution of the evolving conflicts. Accordingly, the establishment of the 
legal foundations of socialist economic integration, the development and perfection of 
legal regulation are important means belonging to the system of conditions of integration. 
The appropriate legal mechanism may be a suitable help to the efficient functioning of 
economic integration. 
The legal mechanism of socialist economic integration may be systematized in 
several ways, its legal institutions are of several types. The legal regulation is diverse 
considering its object, its form, moreover, its legal nature.2 
The aim of the legal basis, of the legal system is, however, uniform; that is the 
promotion and ensuring of economic integration and scientific-technical co-operation 
by the specific means of law. 
3. In order to establish and develop the legal mechanism necessary for the 
organization of economic relations of member-countries of C M E A in December 1969 
the Legal Conference of the member-countries, as a permanent organ of C M E A has 
been called into existence. 
It is obvious that even before the establishment of the Legal Conference—i.e. 
before 1969—there already was a legal activity displayed with the CMEA and 
important documents and rules were elaborated. It is enough to refer e.g. to the 
Charter of C M E A or to the system of legal norms of liability for the economic 
obligations of organizations of the member-countries, to the General Conditions of 
Delivery of Goods on the sale of goods between the organizations of the member-
countries, etc. 
It is also a matter of course that after the Legal Conference has been established, 
other permanent organs deal also with legal questions, especially the Committee of 
Scientific-Technical Co-operation, the Permanent Committee of Foreign Trade, the 
Permanent Committee of Currencies and Finance, the Permanent Committee of 
Leaders of Patent Offices, etc. The speciality of the arising legal questions justifies in 
1
 Cf. MARJAI, J.: 30 éves a KGST (30 years of CMEA), Közgazdasági Szemle, 7-8/1979. 
1
 GRINGOLZ, I. A.: A KGST tagországok szocialista gazdasági integrációja jogi mechanizmusának 
tökéletesítéséről (On the improvement of the legal mechanism of socialist economic integration of the 
member-countries of CMEA) Magyar Jog, 2/1973. 
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given cases the procedure and attitude of these special committees and other organs of 
CMEA in legal questions. 
The Legal Conference has been, however, since its establishment, the permanent 
special legal organ of CMEA having in a certain sense general competence which 
during the past ten years significantly contributed by the means of law to the 
organizational extension of socialist economic integration and to the development of its 
activity.3 
4. The most important tasks and directions of the work to be done for further 
developing the legal bases of the co-operation of the member-countries of C M E A are 
defined in Chapter 15 of the Complex Program.4 
The legal bases of the co-operation are further developed in the following 
manner: 
a) the drafting and adopt ion of normative acts regulating the economic and 
scientific-technical co-operation between the member-countries of C M E A 
and between their economic and other organizations as well as the activity of 
international economic organizations of the member-countries; 
b) the regulation of the methods and order of settlement of disputes arising in the 
co-operation; 
c) the harmonization and unification о/ the corresponding national legal norms. 
One of the most important duties is the development of a general legal system 
providing for the most favourable legal conditions of the progress of socialist 
economic integration. 
For this purpose, the member-countries of CMEA agreed upon to draft the 
general legal norms and conditions of the co-operation between these countries in the 
following fields: 
a) the harmonization of the national economies and, within it, the harmoniza-
tion of investments of objects of common interest; 
b) the specialization of production and co-operation; 
c) the co-operation asserting itself in the field of scientific and technical 
researches and, within it, the transfer and application of scientific-technical 
documentation and information, technological assistance and delegation of 
experts; 
d) the legal position of organizations and enterprises established by the 
interested countries on the territories of the CMEA member-countries. 
The forms of the above-mentioned general legal norms and conditions are the 
conventions of the countries, as well as the recommendations of C M E A organs for the 
member-countries. 
3
 SZÁSZ, I.: A KGST integráció jogi mechanizmusa (Legal mechanism of the integration of CMEA), 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 4/1979. 
4
 KALENSKY, J.-KOHOUT, A.: A KGST tagállamok nemzetközi gazdasági integrációjának jogi 
kérdései (Legal questions of international economic integration of the member-states of CMEA), Magyar 
Jog, 12/1972.; USENKO, T. J.: A szocialista gazdasági integráció jogi vonatkozásai (Legal relations of the 
socialist economic integration), Magyar Jog, 5/1974. 
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The activity of the Legal Conference may be summarized in the system of 
Chapter 15 of the Complex Program as follows: 
4.1. The draft ing of statutory provisions is necessary for the harmonization of 
national-economic plans and of investments of objects of common interest (Complex 
Program, Chapter 15, para 2). 
For the investigation and elaboration of the above-mentioned questions a 
working group has been established which prepared in 1976 a report summarizing the 
legal questions of the co-ordination of national-economic plans and a report in 1977 
which dealt with the legal questions of common planning of the individual industrial 
branches and production types of the interested countries.5 
The reports contain general provisions defining the notions of the co-ordination 
of plans and the common planning, of the subjects participating in the co-ordination 
and planning, moreover, they contain some dispositions on the organizational-legal 
questions of the work to be done in this field. The Legal Conference approved these 
two reports and the Secretariat of CMEA forwarded them to the Committee of 
Planning Co-operation of CMEA. 
Since the CMEA-organizat ions elaborated the long-range co-operation 
programs, an exchange of opinions on the legal character of these programs took place 
in the framework of the Legal Conference. According to the commission of the 
Council, the Secretariat of C M E A notified the Committee of Planning Co-operation 
of CMEA and the working organs of this Committee that according to the point of 
view assumed by the Legal Conference it would be expedient to endue the objective 
programs with the same legal form as the Complex Program adopted at the 25th 
Meeting of the Session of CMEA, i.e. they would be accepted in form of C M E A 
recommendations. Essentially, this has turned into practice since that time. 
4.2. The drafting of legal norm is necessary for the co-operation developing in the 
field of specialization of production and of the co-operation (Chapter 15, para 2). 
In the framework of the Conference a report surveying the legal questions 
relating to the formation of contracts on the specialization of production and on co-
operation has been elaborated. 
The provisions contained in the report define the subjects of contractual 
relations of the specialization of production and of the co-operation, their structure 
and nature, they deal with the contractual partners; with the form and order of 
contracts; with the liability of partners in case of faulty performance of obligations 
undertaken in connection with the contract on the specialization of production and on 
co-operation. Some provisions relate to the question which substantive laws shall be 
considered decisive for the relations of parties resulting from such contracts how the 
litigations shall be judged, etc. 
5
 KÁLMÁN, GY.: A népgazdasági tervek KGST országok közötti koordinációjának jogi kérdései ( Legal 
questions of the co-ordination of national-economic plans between CMEA-countries), Magyar Jog, 
11/1976.; GEORGIEV, G.: A KGST tagországok közös tervezésének jogi problémái (Legal problems of the 
comrçion planning in the member-countries of CMEA), Magyar Jog, 5/1977. 
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The report was approved in the 65th meeting of the Executive Committee; the 
Executive Committee has recommended to the member-countries of CM E A to see that 
their economic organizations take into account the provisions of the report in question 
with the formation of contracts on the specialization of production and on co-
operation to such an extent as held necessary by the states themselves. At the same 
time, the Executive Committee entrusted the C M EA organs to take into consideration 
in their activities the provisions of the said report, and to apply the provisions of the 
report in the practice. 
The working group of the Legal Conference completed the draft of the General 
Conditions of the specialization of production and of the co-operation between the 
organizations of the member-countries of C M E A . 
The draf t of General Conditions was submitted to the 17th meeting of the 
Council and was approved by it. 
The Executive Committee of C M E A approved the draft in January 1979 and on 
the strength of its recommendation the normative document containing the general 
conditions of the specialization of production and of the co-operation between the 
organizations of member-countries has entered into force by January I, 1980 in the 
member-coun tries.6 
In accordance with the decision of the Legal Conference the investigation of 
legal questions of interstate relations connected with the specialization of production 
and with co-operation between the member-countries of C M E A has also been started. 
4.3. Elaboration of general legal norms and conditions for the co-operation in the 
field of scientific and technical research (Chapter 15, paras 2 and 5).7 
In October 1972 the Executive Committee approved the document on 
"Organizational-methodical, economic and legal bases of the scientific-technical co-
operation between the member-countries of C M E A and of the activity displayed in the 
framework of CMEA-organs, relating to this field" prepared by the Committee for 
Scientific-Technical Co-operation of C M E A . 
The general provisions of the document define the order of consultations in 
respect of the scientific-technical policy, of the scientific-technical prognostic co-
operation, of the planning and basic forms of the co-operation in the field of scientific 
6
 Soós, L.: A KGST gyártásszakosítási és kooperációs szerződések normatív szabályozásának 
kérdései (Problems of the normative regulation of contracts on the specialization of production and co-
operation in CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 10/1976.;SZILÁGYI, L.: A KGST tagországok gazdálkodó 
szervezetei közötti gyártásszakositás és termelési kooperáció jogi alapjainak fejlődése és a soron következő 
koordinációs feladatok (Development of the legal bases of the specialization of production and the 
productive co-operation between economic organizations of the member-countries of CMEA), Magyar Jog, 
4/1979.; JUHÁSZ, J.: A KGST tagországok szervezetei közötti termelésszakosítás és kooperáció általános 
feltételei (General conditions on the specialization of production and co-operation between the 
organizations of member-countries of CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 10/1979. 
7
 SCHÖNFELD, G.: A tudományos-műszaki eredmények átadásának jogi problémái a KGST 
tagállamok tudományos-műszaki együttműködésének keretében (Legal problems of the transfer of scientific-
technical results in the framework of the scientific-technical co-operation of CMEA-countries), Magyar Jog, 
5 / 1 9 7 6 . 
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and technical research, of the budgeting of such research works, as well as those of the 
conditions of the transfer and application of the scientific-technical results. 
The Committee for Scientific-Technical Co-operation of C M E A has been 
charged to complement, if necessary, the document on the basis of experiences gained 
in the scientific-technical co-operation. 
In order to develop further the general legal system of scientific-technical co-
operation between the member-countries of CMEA, several documents have been 
drawn up in the framework of the Legal Conference. 
In 1975, the Legal Conference approved the draf t of model-conditions of 
contracts relating to scientific research, planning-constructing and experimental works 
to be carried out on the basis of the co-operation, as well as the draft of the model-
contract relating to the above-mentioned works. In 1977, the Conference approved the 
draf t of an interstate model-agreement and that of the contract relating to the 
establishment of the temporary scientific-technical collective, as well as of the common 
laboratory (department). These drafts were deliberated by the Committee for 
Scientific-Technical Co-operation of C M E A and at its recommendation, the 
Secretariat of C M E A forwarded these draf ts to the member-countries for using them 
at their discretion. 
These documents are not of normative character, the organs and organizations 
of the member-countries of CMEA, however, apply them in the practice. 
In accordance with the decision of the Legal Council the work is continued for 
developing further the legal regulation of the activity displayed in the co-ordination 
centres dealing with the assigned scientific and technical questions. 
Several problems of the technical assistance and those of the delegation of 
specialists were also regulated. 
4.4 Elaboration of principles relating to the liability of states, establishment of the 
methods and order of settlement of disputes arising possibly between the countries in 
connection with the liability (Chapter 15, para 3). 
The working group investigating the questions relating to the liability of states 
elaborated the "Condit ions of liability resting upon the states on the strength of 
economic and scientific-technical co-operation agreements" in accordance with the 
decisions of the Executive Committee and of the Legal Conference. The Legal 
Conference having deliberated this draft, submitted it to the 71 th meeting of Executive 
Committe. The Conditions in question were approved by the 29th meeting (June 1975) 
of the Session of C M E A on the basis of the proposal of Executive Committee. 
The provisions of the above-mentioned documents are not yet applied in the 
practice. That question is first to be settled to which types of agreements should the 
Conditions of Liability of States be applied. 
The special working group considering the problem of the liability of states also 
dealt with such proposals according to which in the framework of C M E A an 
international arbitration court should be established for the settlement of disputes 
arising from the mutual obligations. In the course of the preliminary study of the 
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question the experts of the member-countries came to the conclusion that the 
elaboration of questions connected to the liability of states has not yet reached the 
phase when other methods and order than those applied in the present practice of 
member-countries would be justified for the settlement of disputes.8 
4.5. Measures: a) for the development of contractual relations and co-operation 
between the economic, technical and other organizations established by the member-
countries; b) harmonization of national legal norms relating to the economic and 
scientific-technical co-operation activities of such organizations, as well as the unification 
thereof by the interested countries (Chapter 15, para 4). 
In accordance with the commission of the 72th meeting of the Executive 
Committee, the Legal Conference elaborated and submitted for deliberation in June 
1976 to the Executive Committee its report in which the work done between 1970 and 
1975 in the field of the further development of the legal bases of the co-operation was 
summarized; at the same time, the Conference submitted also its proposals relating to 
the legal questions to be outlined in the period between 1976 and 1980 of the economic 
and scientific-technical co-operation between the member-countries of CMEA. These 
proposals are contained in a draft-list enumerating the most important questions to be 
studied or elaborated in the next five years. 
Item 10 of the above-mentioned list envisages the periodical study of national 
legal norms the harmonization or the unification of which by the interested countries 
would produce favourable legal conditions for the further intensification of the co-
operation of CMEA-countries.9 
The Legal Conference decided in its 15th meeting upon the comparative 
investigation of the following national legal norms: 
a) secondary legal norms to be applied to contracts under the effect of General 
Conditions of Delivery accepted in CMEA; 
b) elaboration of a working program for the compilation of terminological 
dictionary of the most important legal notions most frequently used in the 
legal documents of CMEA; 
c) legal norms to be applied to contracts entered into in the field of economic 
and scientific-technical co-operation; 
8
 KOLOSOV, J. M.: Anyagi felelősség a KG ST tagállamok közötti gazdasági kapcsolatokban (Liability 
in economic relations of the member-states of CMEA), Magyar Jog, 3-4/1975.; KÁLMÁN GY.: A KGST 
tagállamok anyagi felelőssége gazdasági kötelezettségvállalásaikért (Liability of CMEA-countries for their 
assumption of economic obligations), Jogtudományi Közlöny, T/1972, 11/1974. 
9
 SEIFFERT, W.-ZIMMERMANN, В.: A KGST tagállamok jogszabályainak közelítése és a 
jogösszehasonlító kutatások (Harmonization of statutory provisions of the member-countries of CMEA and 
the studies in comparative law), Magyar Jog, 8/1974.; GRINGOLZ, I. A.: A KGST tagországok 
jogszabályainak egységesítése és közelítése a szocialista gazdasági integráció folyamatában (Unification and 
harmonization of statutory provisions of the member-states of CM EA in the course of the socialist economic 
integration), Magyar Jog, 4/1976.; RAJSKI, J.: A jogközelítés és jogegységesítés a KGST keretében 
(Harmonization and unification of laws in the framework of CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 7/1977.; 
VÖRÖS, I.: Konferencia a nemzetközi jogrendszerek egyes területeinek harmonizálásáról a KGST-ben 
(Conference on the harmonization of some fields of international legal systems in CMEA), Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 6/1979. 
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d) in connection with the foundat ion and activity of international economic 
organizations, legal norms to be applied in the country of the headquarters of 
such organization; 
e) rules of the conflicts of laws significant with respect to the economic and 
seientific-technical co-operation. 
The Legal Conference designated the co-ordinator of each subject, i.e. the 
delegation of one country. It fixed the first subjects as well as the program of study and 
the deadlines. Accordingly, the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic has 
compiled—on the basis of remarks and ideas obtained from the delegations of other 
countries—a questionary for the comparative investigation of some secondary 
national legal norms to be applied with the contracts under the effect of General 
Condit ions approved in CMEA. In accordance with the commission, this questionary 
was reconciled early in 1979 in order to render able the countries to elaborate the 
national materials on the basis of the questionary. Relying thereupon, the designated 
delegation will compile its proposals to be generalized. 
A working program was proposed for the compilation of a terminological 
dictionary of most important legal not ions most frequently used in legal documents of 
C M E A . These proposals were deliberated in the 16th meeting of the Conference. The 
Conference decided to deliberate again this question in 1981. 
The comparative study of legal norms to be applied for contracts concluded in 
the field of economic co-operation, as well as the study of the norms of the conflict of 
laws being significant with respect to the economic and scientific-technical co-
operation between the member-countries of C M E A had to be commenced in 
1979-1980 in accordance with the plans. 
4.6. The countries will further develop the "General conditions of the delivery of 
goods between the organizations of CMEA member-countries" (General Conditions of 
Delivery of 1968 of CMEA), "General Conditions of Erection of 1962 of CMEA " and 
"General Conditions of Technical Assistance (Service) of 1962 of CMEA ". The 
countries take concrete measures for developing further the normative system defining the 
liability of economic organizations in case of failure or inadequate performance of the 
undertaken obligations (Chapter 15, paras 5 and 6). 
In 1974, the Legal Conference made proposals for the modification and 
completion of General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of 1968 of C M E A . The 
Executive Committee approved in its 69th meeting the above-mentioned proposals 
and the necessary modifications and completions were accordingly made. Thereby the 
improvement of unified legal regulation of relations in the field of sale of goods 
between the economic organizations, as well as the increase of liability stipulated for 
the failure or inadequate performance of obligations were rendered possible.10 
1 0
 HONTVÁRI, M.: Kártérítési felelősség a minőségért az Altalános Áruszállítási Feltételek körében 
(Liability for damages for the quality of goods in the General Conditions of Delivery), Magyar Jog, 4, 
5/1972.; VIDA, S.: A műszaki fejlesztő tevékenység eredményei és az ASzF (The results o f technical 
developing activity and the General Conditions of Deli very), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 10/1973.; SZÁSZ, I.: A 
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The Permanent Committee for Foreign Trade of C M E A dealt with the further 
development of the General Conditions of technical service of machines, equipment 
and other articles delivered by the organizations of CMEA-countries, of the General 
Conditions of Erection and of the General Principles of supply with spare parts of 
machines and equipment delivered in the trade between the member-countries of 
C M E A and the Yugoslav Socialist Federal Republic. The above-mentioned document 
was approved by the Executive Committee in 1973. 
4.7. For the sake of legal regulation of relations in connection with the foundation 
and activity of international economic organizations, the interested member-countries of 
CMEA elaborate and take the necessary measures (Chapter 15, para 7). 
In 1970- 1971 a working group of the Conference dealt with these questions and 
elaborated the relative proposals. 
The results of the study of these questions are contained in the report of the Legal 
Conference. In its 53th meeting, the Executive Committee approved the reconciled 
parts of the report which then became the basis of the elaboration and taking of 
necessary measures, and within it, of the elaboration of normative acts relating to the 
foundation and activity of International Economic Organizations. 
The Conference elaborated the "Model-rules relating to the conditions of 
foundation and activity of international economic organizations in the member-
countries of C M E A " and submitted them to the Executive Committee. 
The "Model-rules" were approved in the 61th meeting of the Executive 
Committee. The Executive Committee took the position that the member-countries 
would take into consideration the "Model-rules" with the foundation of international 
economic organizations and with the elaboration of the suitable normative acts within 
the countries to the extent deemed expedient. 
The deeds of foundation and other documents of the international economic 
associations and international companies were elaborated on the strength of the report 
compiled by the Conference and considering the "Model-rules". 
The Legal Conference and other organs of C M E A continued the complex study 
of questions relating to the foundation and activity of International Economic 
Organizations.11 
KGST Általános Szállítási Feltételek (General Conditions of Delivery of CMEA), Budapest, 1974, p. 419.; 
SZÁSZ, I.: A KGST Altalános Szállítási Feltételek felelősségi rendszerének továbbfejlesztése (The further 
development of the liability system of the General Conditions of Delivery of CMEA), Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 3/1976.; VOJTASEK, P.: A KGST tagállamok szervezeteinek felelőssége az áruszállításokra és 
szolgáltatásokra vonatkozó külkereskedelmi szerződésekből származó kötelezettségek megszegéséért 
(Liability of the organizations of CMEA-countries for the violation of obligations originating from foreign-
trade contracts relating to the delivery of goods and services), Magyar Jog, 9/1977. 
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 KALENSKY, P.: A nemzetközi gazdálkodó szervezetek jogi problémáihoz a KGST országokban (TO 
some legal problems of the international economic organizations in CMEA-countries), Magyar Jog, 
3-4/1975.;FICZERE, L.-SÁRKÖZY, T.: A KGST országok nemzetközi gazdálkodó szervezeteinek alapvető jogi 
kérdései (Fundamental legal problems of international economic organizations of CMEA-countries), 
Budapest, 1978.; SÁRKÖZY, T.: A KGST országok nemzetközi gazdálkodó szerveinek társulási jellegéről (On 
the association character of international economic organizations of CMEA-countries), Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 4/1977. 
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The Legal Conference composed the "Uniform provisions relating to the 
foundation and activity of international economic organizations" on the basis of the 
"Model-rules" and of other documents drawn up in the CMEA-organs and of 
proposals. The Executive Committee approved the "Uniform provisions" in its 74th 
meeting not as normative document but as recommendation. 
Relying upon the previously compiled and in the CMEA-organs approved 
documents, the Legal Conference carried the model-document on the working 
conditions of employees of International Economic Organizations. 
4.8. The interested countries continue to study and elaborate the questions of co-
operation in the field of legal protection of inventions, trademarks and designs (Chapter 
15, para 8). 
The legal questions of the co-operation in the field of legal protection of 
inventions, trademarks and designs and, within it, the possible forms of co-operation 
in the field of licence and know-how trade were first studied in 1970. The established 
working group prepared proposals relating to the legal questioNs of inventions, 
designs and trademarks protected and used in the course of the specialisation of 
production and of the co-operation. 
In 1971, the Council of leaders of Patent Offices of the C M E A member-countries 
has become a CMEA-organ. Since that time the dealing with the questions relating to 
the legal protection of inventions, trademarks and designs has been the duty of this 
Council. In the framework of the Legal Conference the drafting of model conditions of 
the formation of licence contracts relating to inventions, designs and know-how was 
continued. 
In 1974, the Legal Conference approved the general model contracts of licence, 
as well as the complementary conditions of transfer of scientific-technical results not 
containing inventions and know-how, the model licence-contract for know-how 
transfer, the model licence-contract for the transfer of scientific-technical results free of 
charge and the model licence contract relating to trademarks, all elaborated by the 
working group.1 2 , 
According to the Conference, on the basis of experiences gained in the course of 
the application of the model licence-contracts, it seems to be expedient to control 
subsequently the practical application of the documents in question and correspond-
ingly, possible completions and modifications might be elaborated. 
4.9. The member-countries take harmonized measures for developing further the 
activity displayed in the framework of the foreign-trade arbitration organizations of the 
12
 VIDA, S.: A KGST országok védjegyjoga egységesítésének néhány kérdéséről (On some questions of 
the unification of trademark laws of CMEA-countries), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 12/1972.; LONTAI, E.: 
KGST törekvések a licencia szerződések feltételeinek egységesítésére (Endeavours in C M E A for the 
unification of the stipulations of the licence contracts), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 12/1975.; BOBROVSZKY, J.: 
A tudományos-műszaki eredmények jogi védelme a szocialista gazdasági integrációban (Legal protection of 
scientific-technical results in the socialist economic integration), Budapest, 1978. (Reviewed by BÉRCZI, I., 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 8/1979.) 
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countries and, for improving the order of settlement of disputes between the economic 
organizations of the countries arising from the agreements and contracts (Chapter 15, 
para 9) 
In order to study the questions contained in the above-mentioned provisions of 
the Complex Program and in the decisions of the Executive Committee, a special 
working group on arbitration was founded. 
The results of the study of questions are contained in a report; this report was 
approved in the 5th meeting of the Legal Conference and was submitted to the 
Executive Committee together with the draft of the "Treaty relating to the settlement 
of civil law disputes resulting from the economic and scientific-technical co-operation 
in the course of arbitration". 
The Executive Committee approved the Treaty in its 56th meeting and at its 
recommendation, the member-countries of C M E A signed it in May 1972 and then 
ratified it.13 
"The uniform statutes of the procedure of arbitration courts active at the 
chambers of commerce of the member-countries of C M E A " were elaborated and, 
submitted by the Legal Conference, they were approved by the Executive Committee. 
The Legal Conference followed with great attention the proposals made for the 
elaboration of uniform rules for the invalidation of decisions of arbitration courts. 
4.10. The countries promote the mutual legal consultations, the exchange of 
experience and information of their organs, organizations and institutions in the course of 
their economic and scientific-technical co-operation, they favour the introduction of the 
national legal norms regulating such activities of such organizations (Chapter 15, para 
10). 
In the 4th meeting of the Legal Conference several measures were agreed upon 
concerning the mutual legal consultations, the exchange of information, materials and 
experiences between the foreign-trade arbitration organs of the member-countries of 
C M E A . The Conference decided that the delegations should take measures in order to 
publish extensively the decisions of arbitration courts and other information 
concerning the activity of foreign-trade arbitration organs. 
It was agreed upon that the delegations of the member-countries hand over 
directly to each other upon request the texts of laws important with respect to the 
economic and scientific-technical co-operation of member-countries as well as the 
texts of other normative acts, and the delegations themselves agree upon the method 
thereof. In accordance with the effective agreement, the member-countries send each 
other every year the list of publications in which they enumerate the papers dealing 
13
 RÉVAI, T.: A KGST államok szervezetei közti jogviták elbírálásáról (On the settlement of disputes 
between organizations of CMEA-countries), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 9/1970.; NÉVAI, L.-RÉVAI, T.: A 
KGST tagállamok Kamarai Választott Bíróságainak hatásköréről (On the competence of Arbitration Courts 
at Chambers of Commerce of member-countries of CMEA), Magyar Jog, 12/1972.; BRATUS, SZ. N.: A 
választottbíráskodás és a nemzetközi gazdasági együttműködés (Arbitration jurisdiction and international 
economic co-operation), Magyar Jog, 9/1973.; ÚJLAKI, L.: Polgári eljárás a KGST tagországokban (Civil 
procedure in the member-countries of C M E A ) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 10/1978. 
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with the legal questions of economic and scientific-technical co-operation of member-
countries of CMEA. 
5. In addition to the drawing up of questions treated in Chapter 15 of the 
Complex Program, a significant part is taken in the work of Legal Conference by the 
work done in the interest of the further development of normative CMEA-documents— 
under the commission of the Executive Committee (Complex Program, Chapter 16, 
para 3). On the strength of decisions adopted in the Session of the C M E A and taking 
into consideration the experiences gained with the application of the given documents, 
the Legal Conference, with the collaboration of the CMEA Secretariat, prepared the 
modification of the Charter and Convention of CMEA. The Council treated in a 
report the improvement of the efficiency of CMEA-recommendat ions and sum-
marized, similarly in a report, the results of the studies in connection with the question. 
6. On the strength of the decision taken in the 78th meeting of the Executive 
Committee of CMEA, the Legal Conference worked up the draf t of the document on 
the legal status, privileges and immunity of interstate economic organizations functioning 
in the particular field of co-operation. The Executive Committee of C M E A approved 
the draft in its 95th meeting and the agreement was signed in December 1980. 
7. Liability and guarantees, insurance and indemnity with respect to the damage 
caused by radiation accident taking place during the delivery of burnt out nuclear fuels. 
The Executive Committee of C M E A approved in its 83th meeting the 
Regulation of safe carriage of burnt out nuclear fuels originating f rom atomic power 
plants of the member-countries of C M E A and instructed the Legal Conference to 
elaborate and to submit to the Executive Committee the draf t of the document 
regulating the liability and guarantees, the insurance and indemnity with respect to the 
radiation accident taking place during the carriage of burnt out nuclear fuels. 
The preliminary draft of the above-mentioned document was finished in 1978 in 
the framework of the Council. The draf t of the Agreement will be finished presumably 
in 1980-1981. 
8. The Legal Conference deals with the proposals of the C M E A Secretariat 
directed to the further development of the activity displayed in the framework of the 
Legal Conference of CMEA. 
The related decisions of the Conference set the most important course of the 
further work, the measures intending to improve the planning of the work, as well as 
the measures ensuring a better control of the fulfilment of the working plan and of the 
decisions. It determines the measures to be taken by the Conference for the 
acceleration of the preparation and deliberation of questions. The Conference 
approved the motions aiming at the modernization of its Statutes, to be submitted to 
the Executive Committee. 
9. The survey reveals convincingly that the Legal Conference of C M EA has done 
wide-ranging and significant work in ten years. This work has effectively contributed 
to the favourable legal conditions of the co-operation of member-countries, and to the 
development of socialist economic integration. 
I Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 
1 4 J. Szilhereky 
Совещанию представителей стран-членов Совета Экономической 
Взаимопомощи по правовым вопросам — десять лет 
Й . С И Л Б Е Р Е К И 
В вводной части статьи автор занимается значением социалистической экономической 
интеграции и характером Совета Экономической Взаимопомощи (в дальнейшем: СЭВ). Автор 
ссылается на результаты, достигнутые в общественно-экономическом развитии стран-членов СЭВ, 
а также на те проблемы, которые возникли в последние годы. 
С точки зрения повышения эффективности сотрудничества основополагающим является 
исполнение принятой в 1971 году Комплексной Программы, а также осуществление разработанных 
с тех пор долгосрочных комплексных целевых программ сотрудничества. Все это требует 
надлежащего обеспечения условий организации и деятельности СЭВ. Таким образом важнейшими 
средствами, входящими в систему условий интеграции, являются создания правовых основ 
социалистической экономической интеграции, осуществление и совершенствование регулирования. 
Соответствующий правовой механизм может быть подходящим помощником эффективного 
функционирования экономической интеграции. С целью развития правового механизма СЭВ в 
конце 1969 года был создан постоянный орган СЭВ — Совещание стран-членов по правовым 
вопросам. За истекшие 10 лет Совещание — посредством его правовых средств — значительной 
мере содействовало организационному развитию социалистической экономической интеграции и ее 
функционированию. Способами развития правовых основ являются: разработка и принятие 
нормативных актов, регулирующих экономическое и научно-техническое сотрудничество; регули-
рование порядка разрешения возникающих спорных вопросов; сближение и унификация соответ-
ствующих национальных правовых норм; создание общих правовых норм. Формами этих 
последних являются соглашения между странами и рекомендации органов СЭВ для стран. 
В разделе 15 Комплексной Программы установлены важнейшие задачи правовой работы. 
Автор в свете 15 раздела Комплексной Программы рассматривает деятельность Совещания по 
правовым вопросам с его создания. 
Правовая работа в рассматриваемый период распространилась на следующие области: 
— Разработка рекомендаций для координации народнохозяйственных планов и капиталов-
ложений по отдельным объектам, представляющим взаимной интерес. 
— Разработка правовых норм по вопросам сотрудничества в области международной 
специализации и кооперирования производства. 
— Разработка правовой нормы относительно сотрудничества в области научных и техничес-
ких исследований. 
— Разработка принципов материальной ответственности государства. 
— Принятие меры к сближению национальных правовых норм, регулирующих деятельность 
созданных странами-членами хозяйственных, технических и других организаций в области их 
экономического и научно-технического сотрудничества. 
— Дальнейшее развитие общих условий поставок товаров между организациями стран-
членов СЭВ (1968 г.). 
— Дальнейшее совершенствование системы норм, определяющих материальную ответствен-
ность хозяйственных организаций за неисполнение или ненадлежащее исполнение обязательств. 
— Разработка единообразных положений о б учреждении и условиях деятельности междуна-
родных хозяйственных организаций стран-членов СЭВ. 
— Разработка вопросов, связанных с правовой охраной изобретений, товарных знаков и 
промышленных образцов, а также типовых условий лицензионного договора. 
— Разработка конвенции о разрешении арбитражным путем гражданско-правовых споров, 
возникающих в ходе экономического сотрудничества. 
Подготовка соглашения о правовом статусе и привилегиях межгосударственных экономи-
ческих организаций, функционирующих в определенных областях сотрудничества. 
— Обеспечение обмена опытом и информацией по правовым вопросам. 
По мнению автора статьи изучение указанной правовой работы свидетельствует о том, что 
десятилетняя деятельность Совещания представителей стран-членов СЭВ по правовым вопросам 
успешно служит обеспечению правовых условий сотрудничества между странами-членами. 
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Zehn Jahre alt ist die Beratung des RGW 
für Rechtsfragen 
J . S Z I L B E R E K Y 
Der einleitende Teil der Abhandlung befaßt sich mit der Bedeutung der sozialistischen 
Integration und dem Charakter des Rates für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (im weiteren: RGW). Es 
wird auf die in der gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der RGW-Länder erzielten 
Ergebnisse und auch auf die in den letzten Jahren aufgetauchten Schwierigkeiten hingewiesen. 
Aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Erhöhung der Wirksamkeit der Kooperat ion ist die 
Durchführung des im Jahre 1971 angenommenen Komplexprogramms, sowie die Realisierung der 
seit dieser Zeit geformten langfristigen komplexen Kooperationszielprogramme grundlegend. All das 
erfordert die entsprechende Sicherung der Organisations- und Funktionierungsbedingungen des 
R G W . Dementsprechend ist die Schaffung der rechtlichen Grundlagen der sozialistischen 
Wirtschaftsintegration, der Ausbau und Vervol lkommnung der Regelung ein in das Bedingungssy-
stem der Integration gehörendes wichtiges Mittel. Der entsprechende rechtliche Mechanismus kann 
ein fähiges Mittel der wirksamen Funktionierung der wirtschaftlichen Integration sein. Für den 
Ausbau des rechtlichen Mechanismus des R G W kam Ende 1969 das ständige Organ des RGW, die 
Beratung für Rechtsfragen zustande. Sie trug während der letzten 10 Jahre, mit ihren rechtlichen 
Mitteln, bedeutend zum organisatorischen Ausbau und zur Entwicklung der Funktionierung der 
sozialistischen wirtschaftlichen Integration bei. Die Methoden der Entwicklung der rechtlichen 
Grundlagen sind die folgenden: die Ausarbeitung und Annahme der die wirtschaftliche und 
technisch-wissenschaftliche Kooperat ion regelnden normativen Akte, die Regelung der Beurteilungs-
ordnung der auftauchenden Streitfragen, die Annäherung der entsprechenden nationalen Normen, 
ihre Vereinheitlichung und die Schaffung allgemeiner Rechtsnormen. Die Form dieses Letzteren sind 
die zwischenstaatlichen A b k o m m e n und die Empfehlungen des R G W an die Mitgliedländer. 
Abschnitt 15 des Komplexprogramms bestimmt die wichtigsten Aufgaben der Rechtsarbeit. 
D ie Abhandlung behandelt demnach die bisherige Arbeit der Rechtsberatung im System des 
Abschnitt 15 des Komplexprogramms. 
Die bisherige Tätigkeit auf diesem Gebiet erstreckt sich auf die folgenden: 
— Ausarbeitung der Empfehlung zur Abst immung der Volkswirtschaftspläne und der 
Investitionen im Zusammenhang mit einzelnen Objekten von dem gemeinsamen Interesse 
Ausarbeitung von Rechtsnormen für die Kooperat ion auf dem Gebiet der Produktionsspezialisierung 
und der Kooperation. — Ausarbeitung von Rechtsnormen zur Kooperation auf dem Gebiet der 
wissenschaftlich-technischen Zusammenarbeit . — Die Ausarbeitung von Prinzipien bezüglich der 
materiellen Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten. — Verfügungen zur Näherung der durch die 
Mitgliedstaaten geschaffenen die kooperative Tätigkeit der Wirtschafts-, bzw. der technischen und 
sonstigen Organisationen berührenden nationalen Rechtsnormen. — Die Weiterentwicklung der 
Allgemeinen Bedingungen für Warenlieferungen ( A L B / R G W 1968). — Die Weiterentwicklung des 
Normensystems der materiellen Verantwortlichkeit der Wirtschaftsorganisationen im Falle der 
Nicht- oder nicht gehörigen Erfüllung von Verpflichtungen. — Die Fertigstellung von Musterbedin-
gungen für die Bildung und Tätigkeit der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen des RGW. 
Die Ausarbeitung der Fragen des Rechtschutzes von Erfindungen, Warenzeichen und Gebrauchsmu-
stern sowie die Best immung der Musterbedingungen der Lizenzverträge. — Die Ausarbeitung der 
Konvent ion über die Schiedsgerichtliche Entscheidung von Zivilrechtsstreitigkeiten, die sich aus 
Beziehungen der wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlich-technischen Zusammenarbeit ergeben. — Die 
Fertigstellung des A b k o m m e n s bezüglich des Rechtsstatus und der Privilegien der auf bestimmtem 
Gebiet der Zusammenarbeit tätigen zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisationen. — Sicherung des 
rechtlichen Erfahrungs- und Informationsaustausches. 
Die Abhandlung zieht die Folgerung, daß — wie es aus diesem Überschau hervorgeht — die 
Arbeit der Rechtsberatung des R G W in den vergangenen zehn Jahren die Sicherung der rechtlichen 
Bedingungen der Kooperat ion zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten erfolgreich förderte. 
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Regulation of contractual relations 
and possible ways 
of its development in the legal system 
of the CMEA 
I. SZÁSZ 
Head of Department 
Ministry o f Foreign Trade, Professor of Academy of Foreign Trade (Budapest) 
On the basis of a survey o f the recent development of inter-company civil law relations 
within the legal system of co-operat ion between the C M E A countries, the author puts down 
that a manifold system of the uniform regulation o f civil law relations has been established in 
the course o f the last 25 years. Taking into account the specific features o f the individual legal 
institutions established in the field of civil law relations, resulting from the inter-state 
collaboration of the member-countries, and the degrees of development o f commodity-money 
relations, the organization of inter-company collaboration made a g o o d progress, and these 
relations may be promoted efficiently, depending on the development of monetary relations of 
these countries. 
As regards the legal arrangements laid d o w n in conventions, recommendations, 
systems of dispositive legal regulations, and recommended model statutes which came into 
existence in various spheres of economic relations at different dates, present differences, being 
partly justified and partly casual, unjustified or, even, unnecessary. So, the continued 
development of civil law relations within the legal system of co-operation between the C M E A 
countries is an important task in order to ensure the development of the unified systems of 
norms in mutual harmony to each other, and to provide for uniform legal rules in an 
increasingly broader field of collaboration. 
When the lines of further development are laid down, the idea o f elaborating the general 
part of a uniform law of obligations took shape, with a view to ensure the unity of the system of 
norms, and this idea found several supporters in the legal literature. The problems of this 
course are analyzed, with the conclusion that, taking into consideration the specific features of 
the present and probable future development o f the collaboration in question, the 
development of the system may be reached, instead o f elaborating the general part of the law of 
civil obligations, by the joint application of the measures listed below. 
— T o survey all normative regulations with a view to secure that the achievements o f the 
development o f other normative systems should be reflected in them. 
—It should be made accepted, as a rule, that the achievements o f the promotion of the 
development of a distinct system o f norms should be reflected in the other systems of norms 
simultaneously. 
— T h e general conditions o f building and planning should be elaborated thus to 
complete the regulations of the most important actual economic relations by uniform laws. 
—The legal institutions which used not be regulated by the parties in international 
practice, e.g. conclusion of contracts, prescription, etc. should be excluded from the said 
regulation schemes. Similarly to the 1972 convention on arbitration, these could be subjected 
to a regulation comprising the entire field of economic relations. 
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—The various, and unified, types of obligations should be developed continuously, in 
accordance with practical requirements, and on the basis o f the experiences obtained from the 
survey of the relevant rules of the member countries in the field o f the law of obligations, laying 
emphasis upon harmonizat ion and unification. 
The effects o f the efforts o f the C M E A countries in respect o f the unification of the law 
upon the law of international trade and the relations between these efforts and the universal 
unification of the law are examined, and the possibility o f constituting a harmony is confirmed. 
Finally, s o m e problems of particular significance are dealt with, such as the 
requirement of an explicite regulation concerning interpretation and the applicability o f the 
applicable law, the problem of the regulation of how state decis ions as acts relieving from 
responsibility may be taken into consideration, and the causes o f the insufficiency of sanctions 
for non-fulfilment. 
1. The regulation of contractual relations in civil law preceded any other field of 
regulation within the legal system of C M E A co-operation; accordingly, this regulation 
and its development has maintained a decisive significance in the improvement of the 
legal system of economic collaboration between the C M E A countries, up to the 
present time. 
The very first forms of collaboration between the member-countries appeared in 
the field of the exchange of goods in foreign trade, and they started to develop as soon 
as 1949, i.e. the year of the establishment of the CMEA. Under the conditions of the 
cold war, the socialist development of the demolished economies of the countries 
concerned had then no alternative indeed, i.e. the development could be imagined 
exclusively on the basis of a close economic co-operation of the countries on the way to 
build up socialism. 
The countries which committed themselves to the socialist planned economy 
fitted their mutual foreign trade, serving the promotion of their national economy, into 
their national plans of the economy. This foreign trade became a reliably planned and 
safe source of the import of raw materials, semi-finished and finished goods, industrial 
and agricultural products, needed to keep in operation their economy, and permitted 
the establishment of export markets at the same time, required for the development of 
the economy, compensating thus the imports by the export of commodities produced 
by the national economy. 
In accordance with the needs of the economy, the systems of economic 
management of the member-countries, and the methods of the economy-organizing 
activity of the state, enforcing themselves in all countries concerned, the mutual 
deliveries were laid down in bilateral inter-governmental agreements concluded by the 
member-countries. The contracting governments took the obligation in the said 
agreements that their enterprises will deliver the commodities listed and in volumes 
laid down in the so-called contingent lists. The provisions of the said agreements were 
not executed, however, in administrative channels f rom the very beginning on, but 
within the system of civil law relations between the respective enterprises, making use 
of the system of the means of contractual relations. 
The obligations of the governments did not concern the actual delivery of goods 
and commodities; instead, they obliged themselves to enforce their organizations 
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appearing as the subjects of civil law, i.e. enterprises in the majori ty of the cases, to 
conclude contracts serving to realize the trading relations as provided. This means that 
actual deliveries got realized within a system of contractual relations, and the 
contracting parties figured as subjects of civil law. Nevertheless, the contractual 
relations referred to above showed several specific features which had to be taken into 
consideration for the civil law regulation of the same. In fact, the system of means of 
the civil law has been based on the supposition of the existence of market relations, and 
the full efficiency of these means appears only under market-based economic 
conditions. As for the relations between the enterprises of the member-states, these 
enterprises were subjected, however, to an obligation of contracting which was 
enforced through the state administration system of the individual country concerned, 
even if it could not be enforced through the system of civil law. Several substantial 
elements of contracting were thus fixed in advance, e.g. the volume or, in some cases, 
also the quality, of the goods to be delivered, and the price in an indirect way as well. 
Depending on the degree of development of the respective inter-state money relations, 
it had to be taken into consideration furthermore that, in case of a breach of the 
contract, it was not possible, in general, to make recourse to an alternative source of 
supply, and an efficient system of financial sanctions could not be enforced either. 
The regulation of civil law relations had to be thus established with the due 
consideration of the specific features mentioned above. In view of this, the question 
presented itself whether or not was it correct to organize the relations concerned within 
the system of civil law and making use of the system of means of civil law. It seems, 
however, that it was the correct way from several points of view. Thus, the contractual 
relations gave an efficient frame to inter-enterprise relations from the very beginning 
on, corresponding to the system of links built up between the individual enterprises 
within the various member-countries, and they contained elements of civil law 
responsibility also from the initial time, even if their effects were of a limited nature. 
Besides, the technical structure of contracts, comprising the contractual specification 
of the content of liabilities gave the best possible form of the precise determination of 
the rights and obligations, and the organization and regulation of economic relations; 
doubtless to say, it was a better model than arrangements through an administrative 
system within the framework of public law. 
At the same time, the development of economic relations, the exchange of goods 
and commodities, and the furthering of international monetary and financial relations 
constituted a basis for the promotion of the contractual model, with an increasingly 
richer and more widely established system of institutions, permitting to serve the 
proper functioning of economic relations. This development could be well witnessed 
over the recent period of time, covering more than thirty years, and the prospected 
development of technical, scientific, and economic collaboration is proceeding in the 
same direction. 
2. The specific features of trade relations, mentioned above, justified the 
compulsory unification of the content of the contracts in the widest possible range f rom 
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the very beginning on. Under the system of compulsory contracting and taking into 
consideration that, within the conditions of compensated trading, the enterprises of a 
given country were sellers and buyers to the same extent, it would have been unjustified 
to allow differences e.g. in respect of responsibility, beyond the specific features of the 
commodities concerned. It would have been easily understandable namely that a 
system in which the enterprises of a given country, acting as sellers, ought to have 
accepted quite different conditions than in the position of a buyer, would have implied 
unjustified advantages or disadvantages for the totality of the enterprises concerned. 
Similarly, the actual economic, market, and financial relations of that time did not 
justify lengthy negotiations of contracting as well. 
It was the situation outlined above that brought into existence the establishment 
of general conditions of the delivery of goods and commodities with a compulsory 
effect. At the beginning, these rules were laid down in bilateral systems as part of inter-
governmental agreements. As a result of multilateral negotiations between the 
member-countries, the General Conditions of Delivery of the CMEA were constituted in 
19581 (CMEA G C D of 1958). Instead of being compulsory general conditions, these 
rules appeared as a legal regulation, integrated into the legal systems of the member-
countries, duly promulgated, and being decisive for the relations concerned. On a 
world-wide scale indeed, this document represented the very first step toward the 
constitution of a uniform law bearing upon sales in foreign trading or, as regards their 
field of application, even to a broader range, enforcing within a given area and with an 
actually broad field of practical application. It is worth mentioning that the said rules 
still represent a unique achievement in the actual world-wide process of the unification 
of law. 
The General Conditions of Delivery of the CMEA from 1958 were completed by 
bilateral agreements2 in respect of problems which were not considered by the member-
countries to be regulated in multilateral f rames but had a given significance, 
nevertheless, in the regulation of bilateral trade relations. Representing a uniform law, 
1
 Published in Hungary by the Instruction No. 5/1958 (Kk. É. 4.) K K M of the Minister for Foreign 
Trade. For more details, cf. KEMPER, M.: Liefervertrag, Montagevertrag, Kundendienstvertrag im 
Außenhandel der RGW-Staaten, Berlin, Staatsverlag der D D R , 1967. 
2
 They were improved later, parallel to the development of the General Conditions of the Delivery of 
Goods. For the time being, the bilateral supplementary agreements in force, concluded by Hungary, are as 
listed below: 
— Hungarian-Czechoslovak bilateral agreement, promulgated by the Decree of the Minister for Foreign 
Trade No. 3/1973 (X. 18.) KKM; 
— Hungarian-Cuban bilateral agreement, promulgated in Annex No. 2. of the Decree of the Minister for 
Foreign Trade No. 10/1975 (XII. 21.) KKM; 
— Hungarian-Polish bilateral agreement, promulgated by the Decree of the Minister for Foreign Trade No. 
5/1969 (VI. 29.) KKM; 
— Hungarian-German (Democratic Republic) bilateral agreement, promulgated by the Decree of the 
Minister for Foreign Trade No . 2/1969 (II. 2.) KKM; 
— Hungarian-Soviet bilateral agreement, promulgated by the Decree of the Minister for Foreign Trade No. 
6/1976 (IX. 28.) KKM. 
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enforcing itself for international trading transactions within the given area, the 
General Conditions of Delivery of the C M E A from 1958 became thus the initial point 
for a large-scale uniform regulation of civil law relations. This process of development 
was substantially promoted by the Complex Programme of the CMEA 3 , determining 
the main tendencies at the same time, and putt ing into the foreground the development 
of the legal institutions of CMEA co-operation within a uniform legal system.4 A 
special emphasis has been laid in this system on the promotion of civil law relations 
and, within this sphere, on civil law liability and the strengthening of sanctions in case 
of a breach of contract. The development of the General Conditions of Delivery from 
1958 resulted in the establishment of the General Conditions of Delivery constituted in 
1968.5 This document represented an important step of progress in building up civil 
law liability; besides, it contained a uniform regulation of prescription, too. This 
regulation was incorporated into the legal system of most of the member-countries by 
means of acts or at a similar high legislative level. Within the frame of development, as 
provided by the Complex Programme, the General Conditions of Delivery of the CMEA 
from 1968/1975 were codified6 as a result of the promotion of the system of liability, 
dealing with the rules of liability in the frames of an independent system. The 
subsequent improvement of this system presented the 1979 wording of the General 
Conditions of Delivery of the CMEA from 1968/1975? 
3. The rules of contracting and prescription were first regulated together by the 
General Conditions of Delivery within the system of the international unification of 
the law. Earlier, the said problems were regulated, within the unification of the law of 
the international sale of goods, in the form of separate conventions, such as the 
U N I D R O I T and the Hague Conference (uniform acts from 19648), and the 
U N C I T R A L (Convention on Prescription f rom 1974"). The Vienna Convention on 
the international sale of goods from 1980, with a step forward, gave already a complex 
regulation, although the possibility of separate application was left open.10 
3
 COMPLEX P R O G R A M M E , destined to extend and improve subsequent collaboration and 
develop the socialist economic integration of the member-countries of the CMEA; Chapter 15. 
4
 Cf. CAC, И.: Правовой механизм интеграции в рамках СЭВ. Acta Juridica, 3-4/1980. 
5
 Promulgated in Hungary by Law-decree No . 35 of 1968. For more details, cf. SZÁSZ, I.: A KGST 
Altalános Szállítási Feltételek (General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods of the CMEA). Budapest, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1 9 7 4 . WAONER H. KRETZSCHMAR, D.: Die Allgemeinen Lieferbedingun-
gen des RGW. 1968. Berlin, Staatsverlag der DDR, 1 9 7 0 . ; РОЗЕНБКРГ, M . Г . : ОУП СЭВ 1968. Года XII 
6
 For more details, cf. CAC, И.: Общие условия поставок СЭВ. Moscow, Yuritchesskaya 
Literatura, 1978. 
7
 Promulgated in Hungary by Law-decree No . 23. of 1979. 
8
 Uniform act on the international sale of goods and uniform act on the conclusion of contracts 
regulating the international sale of goods. A publication of the International Trade Law Bureau of the 
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce. 1972. 
* Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods. New York, United Nations 
Conference on Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods, 20 May to 14 June, 1974, 
Official Records (A/CONF. 63/15). 
10
 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Article 
92. United Nations General Assembly, (A/CONF. 97/18). 
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Rules realizing the unification o f l a w in the field of substantive law and law of 
procedure as well as substantive law and conflict o f l a w norms—as a unique system— 
were first laid down also in the General Condit ions of Delivery. 
4. The General Conditions of Delivery present a specific system of liability, 
taking into consideration the nature of the relations between the enterprises of the 
member-states.11 Within this system, the broadest remedy for a breach of contract is 
granted by penalty, as a lump sum for damages, this latter being enforced depending 
on the development of other institutions of integration-based relations, asserting 
themselves in the sphere of economy. This development and its actual phase of 
progress are expressed in given fields by the possibilities and rules of the alternative 
enforcement of penalty and damages.1 2 
The institution of rescission should be also mentioned, placed within the features 
of economic relations, with the regulation of the restriction of rescission in case of a 
breach of contract , appearing in the form of faulty performance.1 3 
5. The range of the relations regulated by the General Condit ions of Delivery 
increased substantially with the augmentation of the number of member-countries of 
the CMEA. In line with multilateral and bilateral regulation, special regulations 
appeared too, resulting principally from the distant geographical situation of a given 
member-country, in the form of multilateral regulations affecting, however, only the 
trade of the distinct country in question, by excluding the enforcement of specified 
rules, ensuring the possibility of a different regulation,1 4 or containing a multilateral 
agreement with an explicitly different regulation.1 5 
6. The legal regulation as laid down in the General Condit ions of Delivery 
surpassed the range regulating the relations of the member-countries of the C M E A in 
several respects. The relations of the CMEA member-countries, on the one hand, and 
China, Korea, and Vietnam (not a member-country earlier), on the other hand, were 
established, essentially, on the basis of the General Conditions of Delivery, mainly of 
their 1958 form. 1 6 
11
 Among others, cf. SzÂsz, I.: A KGST Altalános Szállítási Feltételek felelősségi rendszerének 
továbbfejlesztése (Improvement of the liability system of the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods of 
the CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 3/1976.; HONTVARI, M.: Felelősség a minőségért a nemzetközi 
adásvétel körében (Liability for quality in international sale); Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 
1979. Part III, Chapter 2.; VÖRÖS, I.: A késedelem szabályozása a KGST 1968. évi ÂSZF-ben és a 
választottbirósági gyakorlat (The regulation of delay by the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods of 
the CMEA from 1968 and the practice of arbitration) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1/1969. 
12
 Cf. e.g. the 1979 wording of the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods of the CMEA from 
1968/1975, paragraph 85, indent (4), and paragraph 86-A. 
13
 Cf. the 1979 wording of the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods of the CMEA from 
1968/1975, paragraph 2 -A, paragraph 31, indent (8), and paragraph 75, indent (7). 
14
 As regards the People's Republic of Mongolia, and taking into consideration the specific features 
of its economic development, problems related to damages should be regulated by means of bilateral 
agreements. (Resolution of the Standing Committee of the CMEA from June 5, 1975, item b). 
15
 Multilateral agreement between Cuba and the other member-states of the CMEA, promulgated in 
Annex 1. of the Decree of the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Trade No. 10/1975 (XII. 21.) KKM. 
16
 A külkereskedelem hatályos jogszabályai (Legal rules in force in the field of foreign trade), 
Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1965. pp. 319., 326., 330. 
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As regards the general conditions of the delivery of goods, applicable in case of 
the respective stipulations of the parties, elaborated jointly for the relations existing 
between the entreprises of the CMEA member-countries and Finland, they took as 
model also the system of rules and the arrangements of the General Condi t ions of 
Delivery of the CMEA countries, taking into consideration, as a matter of fact, the 
differences resulting from the structure of the economic relations and the specific 
features of the two systems of norms.17 (Initiative steps with a view to constitute 
conditions of delivery of this type were taken also by other countries maintaining 
contractual relations with the CMEA.) 
General conditions of delivery, as elaborated within the f rame of the 
collaboration between chambers of commerce of some C M E A member-countries and 
the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce, recommended for application, reflect also the 
enforcement of the solutions provided by the General Condit ions of Delivery of the 
CMEA. 
Several stipulations of the conventions concluded in the field of the universal 
unification of law, first of all in the f r ame of UNCITRAL, bear the effect of the 
General Condit ions of Delivery of the C M EA. This influence is, of course, particularly 
apparent when earlier achievements, such as the Hague Conventions from 1964, are 
compared to conventions brought about with the participation of a large g roup of the 
socialist countries, e.g. U N C I T R A L draf t s agreements, and the Vienna Convention 
on the international sales of goods. 
7. The General Conditions of Delivery of the C M E A have been destined to 
regulate only a single type of civil-law relations between the enterprises of the member-
countries, i.e. sales, even if their rules should be applicable to other types of contracts 
to, mutatis mutandis, as this view was expressed by several authors .1 8 In fact, the civil-
law relations between the enterprises of the CMEA member-countries have a much 
broader basis. Accordingly, the elaboration and putting into force of uniform rules for 
several types of contracts of the system of the institutions of civil law may be 
experienced from the end of the fifties, and within the course of the implementation of 
the Complex Programme, in particular. 
As the general rules of obligation of the civil law come from the abstraction of 
the rules of sales, and the particular rules of the types of contracts are taken f r o m the 
differences f rom the same, respectively, so the uniform regulation of the economic 
17
 РОЗЕНБЕРГ, M. Г.: Общие условия поставок СЭВ-Финлапдия, Vnyeshnaya Torgovlya, 6/1980.; 
JUHASZ, J.: KGST-finn ÁFSZ (General Conditions o f the Delivery of G o o d s between the C M E A and 
Finland), Külgazdaság, 8/1979.; HEIKKI, J.: Comparative Aspects of the Application of the Finland/CM EA 
General Conditions of Delivery of Goods; Essays in Honour of Erik Castrén, Helsinki, Publication of the 
Finnish Branch of the International Law Association, 2/1979. 
18
 Cf. ЛУНЦ, Л. А.: Соотноще международного договора и внутригосударственного закона в 
гражданском и трудовом праве, Utsebniye Zapiski VNIISZ, 14/1968, p. 226.; SzAsz, I.: op. cit. p. 184.; 
BÀNRÈVY, G.: KGST 1968. évi Általános Szállítási Feltételei (General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods of 
the CMEA from 1968), Döntőbíráskodás, 5/1969. 
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relations under civil law are based on the regulation of the General Conditions of the 
Delivery of Goods within the legal system of the C M E A . 
In conformity with the above-mentioned, the respective member-countries 
elaborated first the General Conditions of Erection19 and the General Conditions of 
Technical Assistance (Service)20, taking into consideration the General Conditions of 
Delivery as laid down in 1958. Subsequently, taking as basis the dispositions of the 
General Conditions of Delivery f rom 1968, bringing into harmony with the previous 
systems of rules, and effecting the modernization of the regulations, the General 
Conditions of the technical service of machinery, equipment, and other goods and 
commodities delivered by organizations of the member countries of the CMEA, entitled 
to act in the field of foreign trade, were put into effect on January 1, 1974 (General 
Conditions of Technical Assistance (Services) of the CMEA from 1973)21, as well as 
the General Conditions of the fulfilment of erection and technical services related to the 
delivery of machinery and equipment for and by organizations of the member-countries of 
the CMEA, entitled to act in the field offoreign trade (General Condit ions of Erection of 
the CMEA from 1973)22. Furthermore, the General principles of the supply of spare 
parts of machinery and equipment, delivered within the mutual trade between the member 
countries of the CMEA and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia became also 
effective.23 
The requirement of regulation, created by the specific features of the long-term 
relations arisen in the field of the specialization of production and co-operation, was 
met by the General Conditions of the specialization of production and co-operation 
between the organizations of the member-countries of the CMEA (General Conditions 
of the Specialization of Production and Co-operation)2 4 , which came into effect with 
January 1, 1980. 
In connection with the broadening of the field of co-operation, the elaboration 
of uniform model contracts bearing upon licenses became necessary. The documents 
elaborated by the member-countries this frame comprised a general model contract of 
license, supplementary conditions concerning the transfer of technical-scientific 
achievements other than inventions and know-how, a model license contract on know-how 
transfer, a model license contract on the transfer of technical-scientific achievements free 
of charge, and a model license contract on trade-marks. 
8. The member-countries concluded an international convention in 1972,25  
containing the constitution of a uniform system for the settlement of disputes 
19
 A külkereskedelem hatályos jogszabályai (Legal rules in force in foreign trade), p. 343. 
20
 A külkereskedelem hatályos jogszabályai (Legal rules in force in foreign trade), p. 351. 
21
 Promulgated in Hungary by Law-decree No. 30. from 1973. 
22
 Promulgated in Hungary by Law-decree No. 31. from 1973. 
23
 Promulgated in Hungary by Decree No. 5/1973 (II. 9.) KKM of the Minister for Foreign Trade. 
24
 Promulgated in Hungary by Law-decree No. 24. from 1974. 
25
 Convention on the settlement by arbitration of civil-law disputes resulting from economic and 
scientific co-operation (Promulgated in Hungary by Law-decree No. 23. from 1973.). 
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concerning economic relations of enterprises, regulated or not by various uniform 
systems of norms. 
9. The legal character of the systems of norms, destined to give a uniform 
regulation of civil law relations, presents a great variety. Thus, these no rms may 
appear as 
—compulsory rules based on international conventions or agreements, e.g. the 
convention on arbitration; 
—uni form systems of rules, integrated into the legal systems of the member-
countries, on the basis of C M E A recommendations, and enforced without particular 
stipulation, such as the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods, the General 
Conditions of Erection, the General Condit ions of Technical Assistance (Services); 
—systems of norms integrated into the legal systems of the member-countries 
but enforcing only in case of particular stipulations; 
— n o r m s recommended for the parties but enforcing only in case of particular 
stipulations, i.e. as general conditions, etc. 
Although the norms referred to above differ from each other as far as their 
compulsory effect is concerned and, the more, some of them cannot be even considered 
as elements of a legal regulation, all of them have a very definite influence on the actual 
practice of contracting. (As Bauer hinted to it, the model conditions will be considered 
as usage by the boards of arbitration beyond doubt , and a dispute will be settled on the 
basis of same, unless otherwise stipulated, as it is laid down in paragraph 12 of the 
uniform statutes of the boards of arbitration attached to the chambers of commerce2 6). 
10. As it is clear f rom the precedings, uniform systems of norms and conditions, 
regulating the relations of economic co-operation within the framework of the C M E A , 
were set up on a broad scale with the development of the co-operation in question. As 
the question raised earlier concerned more how to develop a distinct system of norms, 
the actual problem concerns more and more the ways and means of the development of 
the complexity of distinct systems of norms regulating civil law relations, e.g. the 
relations of systems of norms to each other, the suitability of the present system of the 
unification of law (i.e. the separate unification of groups of norms coupled to a given 
economic relation, such as delivery, erection, services, etc.) for the promotion of the 
unification of civil law relations, and the regulation of a broader range of civil law 
relations within a uniform system. 
The view has been expressed more and more frequently both in juridical practice 
and the literature that the harmony between the various systems of norms and the 
juridical settlements put down in them is not ensured satisfactorily in the actual system 
of development, even if, as it is the rule, the system and the settlements of regulation of 
26
 BAUER.M.: A KGST Komplex Program jogi vonatkozásai és időszerű kérdései (Legal aspects and 
topical problems of the Complex Programme of the CMEA) . (A report). 9th National Working Conference 
of the Hungarian Lawyers' Association (Publication of the Hungarian Lawyers' Association). 1979, 
manuscript, p. 455. 
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the General Condit ions of the Delivery of Goods of the CMEA are considered as 
starting point in the unified systems of norms. 
Beside the efforts serving to ensure harmony, the differences between the 
individual systems of norms may be attributed to several fundamental causes, reading 
as follows: 
a) Some differences reflect the necessary differences resulting from the inner 
content of the given type of economic relations. 
b) Another group of the differences cannot be motivated by the existence of 
differences of the content of economic relations. Accordingly, these result from a lack 
of a common fundamental regulation of systems of norms, coming into existence 
separately from each other but duly attached to given economic relations, on the one 
hand, or the failure of consideration of the application of already established rules, on 
the other hand. 
c) Furthermore, differences arise also from the circumstance that the individual 
systems of norms, the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods, in particular, but 
other systems as well, used to be developed from time to time, and the achievements of 
these efforts failed to appear in other systems of norms, due to the lack of development 
work in same, either at the same time or subsequently. Thus, the General Conditions of 
Erection or the conditions of supply and shopping services reflected the system of the 
rules of the 1958 General Condit ions of the Delivery of Goods at the time of their 
establishment; later on, i.e. at the time of their improvement, effected at the beginning 
of the seventies, the regulation of the General Condit ions of the Delivery of Goods, as 
laid down in 1968 was taken into consideration. As regards, however, the stipulations 
put down in the General Condit ions of the Delivery of Goods in their 1968/1975 
wording and the reshaped text of the said document in 1979, these provisions were 
reflected no more, for the development work effected in the second half of the seventies 
did not include the improvement of the General Conditions of Erection and the 
General Conditions of Technical Assistance (Service). 
As it is clear from the above-mentioned, some differences proved to be justified 
but others, not few in number, are unjustified or unnecessary. 
The total lack of the regulation of some types of relations by a uniform system of 
norms, such as building contracts2 7 , having a highly important place within the system 
of co-operation, as well as projecting contracts, atypical contracts, etc. has caused 
troubles as well. 
As it was thus laid down, the problems to ensure the development of the. co-
ordinated harmony of the unified systems of norms, on the one hand, and to settle the full 
range of co-operation by means of uniform legal rules, on the other hand, present 
themselves as important purposes of the further development work. 
21
 The Standing Committee for Foreign Trade of the C M E A set up a working group in 1973, with a 
view to elaborate "General Conditions for Building". After an activity of two years, the working group came 
to the conclusion that the elaboration of the said general conditions required further experiences. 
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The targets mentioned above raise then the problem whether it would be justified 
to integrate the general rules of the systems of norms regulating civil law relations into 
a single system of norms, and to improve them within this system, in other words to 
elaborate, essentially, the uniform general part of the law of obligations within the 
framework of civil law. 
Several arguments may be mentioned to support the view to find a solution for 
the said task. 
a) As a result of subsequent phases of development work, a regulation is coming 
to light, bearing upon the conclusion, the content, the fulfilment, the breach of contract 
and the enforcement of claims, within the scope of the General Conditions of the 
Delivery of Goods of the C M E A , which will be applicable, in general, not only to the 
legal relations within the sphere of regulation of the said General Conditions of the 
Delivery of Goods but to the relations regulated by the other uniform systems of 
norms as well. 
b) A considerable part of the rules laid down in the General Conditions of the 
Delivery of Goods may be found in the provisions of the relevant national laws within 
the sphere of the rules of general character, i.e. not in respect of sales. Accordingly, 
these rules of the General Condit ions of the Delivery of Goods are applicable within 
the relations of obligations of the enterprises of the member-countries of the C M E A 
not only to sales but to a broader range of transactions. 
c) The overwhelming part of the rules already unified in the General Condit ions 
of the Delivery of Goods in the way mentioned above is regulated, in a more or less co-
ordinated way, within the sphere of the general rules of the law of obligations of the 
member-countries. In consequence of this, the work of the unification of the law 
presents a less considerable task than in the field of the universal unification of the law 
in which the rules to be unified show important differences of content. 
d) Together with the development of economic relations, the claims for atypical 
contracts is increasing. The general part of a unified law of obligations may well give a 
solid basis to the constitution of contracts of this type. 
e) As a result of the realization of the Complex Programme, settlements of this 
kind could be made already, i.e. in the field of the settlement of legal disputes.28 
28
 The settlement of legal disputes by a court of arbitration, attached to the Chamber of Commerce 
of the defendant's country, was provided originally by paragraphs 91. and 92. of the General Conditions of 
the Delivery of Goods, regulating sales. Taking into consideration, however, the experience of its general 
applicability beyond sales transactions, the settlement of disputes arisen between the member-states in the 
field of civil law by arbitration, is now provided by an international agreement containing a general 
regulation for all civil law relations resulting from economic co-operation. As it was mentioned above, the 
disposition of settlement covers a broader field than that of the uniform regulation, enforcing in all systems 
of norms, and given for the systems of norms already made uniform, as it was applicable also to civil-law 
relations, resulting from economic co-operation, for which no uniform system of norms has been elaborated 
as yet. A settlement of the said kind, elaborated not only to relations regulated by an already uniform system 
of norms but covering all relations within the law of obligations, has the additional advantage, beyond those 
referred to above, that the achievements of the unification work of this kind comprise then types of contracts 
without a uniform regulation as well (e.g. building contracts). 
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On the basis of what was referred to above, the claim for the elaboration of the 
general part of a unified law of obligations, as the next step of the establishment of a 
uniform legal system, is appearing in the legal literature of the member-countries of the 
CMEA in an increasingly broad sphere.29 
11. Apar t from the actual attractive nature of the said trend of development, 
some problems arise from its reception, and these should be mentioned, too. 
Several problems are settled in the general part of the law of civil obligations 
which have only a relatively marginal significance as far as mutual relations are 
concerned. Accordingly, it has no sense to make short-term efforts to find uniform 
solutions in respect of these problems, all the more as settlements with considerable 
differences may be found in the law of the member-countries.3 0 
The general part of the law of obligations is integrated into the complex system 
of the given civil law. In view of this, the achievements of a systematic work, 
concerning the unification of the general par t of the law of obligations may bring 
positive results more in the long run than with a medium-term character. Even so, these 
achievements may result in numerous cases more in harmonization than in unification. 
(For the time being, work is made with a view to give a survey of the general part of the 
law of obligations of the member-countries, and to reveal the possibilities of 
harmonization and unification, mainly in fields being of importance for the inter-
relations of the enterprises of the member-countries; this work plays an important role 
in the long-term development of the civil law of the member-countries. Taking into 
account the experiences obtained so far, however, the elaboration of the general part of 
a uniform law of obligations within the said work cannot be expected.) 
The elaboration of the general part of the law of obligations supposes to separate 
the constituent elements of the general part f rom the individual systems of norms and 
to include them into the general part of the law of obligations to be unified. This would 
mean, however, to give up one of the most considerable advantage of the General 
Conditions of the Delivery of Goods and other unified systems of norms, i.e. the 
circumstance that all unified rules relating to a given contract are integrated into a 
single system of norms, and in a structure conforming to that of the contracts, ensuring 
thus an easy survey for the contracting parties. In case of a disintegration of the said 
system, the contracting parties would be compelled to face the existence of several 
systems of norms with their mutual relations, instead of the present, and simple, 
structure. In addition to this, the necessity of the application of the applicable national 
laws would not be excluded even with the elaboration of the general part as outlined 
above. 
2 9
 B A U E R , M . : o p . c i t . p . 4 6 0 . 
30 £f "Comparative study of the norms of the applicable national law which are applicable to contracts 
subjected to the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods, accepted by the CMEA countries. Formation of 
contracts and the validity of contracts." (Comprehensive material for the respective working team of the 
Legal Conference of the CMEA, prepared by a Hungarian group of experts, and compiled on the basis of 
papers of the member-countries. 1980. A manuscript.) 
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12. Thus it seems that the unification of the general part of the law of civil 
obligations, pronounced as the next step of development, would involve important 
difficulties. Taking into consideration, furthermore, the actual processes realized in the 
co-operation of the member-countries since the acceptance of the Complex 
Programme, and the development of the character of economic relations, the 
unification in question would not correspond to the present phase of the economic 
development of integration. Of course, the problems as how to proceed with a 
medium-term scheme or what may be recommended under the present conditions 
appear now. In view of these problems, the joint application of several measures seems 
to be necessary, such as 
a) to make a survey of all normative regulations, with a view to ensure that they 
should reflect the achievements of the development of other normative systems; 
b) to let accepted as a binding rule that the achievements of the improvement of a 
given system of unified norms be reflected simultaneously in the other systems of 
unified norms; 
c) to elaborate the general conditions of building and projecting as this would 
complete the establishment of the unified normative regulation of the most important 
relations. 
The independent unified normative regulation of further fields or economic 
relations depends, in fact, on the way of approach to the trend of the formation of the 
types of contracts. The alternatives are: to increase the number of the types to be 
formed and regulated, as this is emphasized in the jurisprudence of the German 
Democratic Republic in particular, and is reflected, accordingly, in the Act on 
International Economic Contracts (Gesetz über internationale Wirtschaftsverträge), 
or to prefer the existence of fewer types, and to apply the combinations of same, with 
extending interpretation and application, etc. It should be mentioned as a 
characteristic fact that min. ten types of contracts are distinguished within the group of 
contracts aimed at the promotion of industrial development, i.e. contracts relating to 
research, development, consulting, engineering, the supply and installation of big 
industrial plants, including turn-key deliveries, deliveries including the production of 
goods or commodities, the transfer of technology, including license contracts, 
servicing and maintenance, technical assistance, leasing, joint ventures, and industrial 
co-operation. The relations in question are regulated, however, with the consideration 
of the existing types by the national legislation of the individual countries instead of 
being regarded as distinct types. It is only the German Democratic Republic in which 
typified regulations have been established, in the Act on International Economic 
Contracts (GIW), bearing upon economic-technical services (wirtschaftliche-
technische Leistung, paragraph 82. of the said act), the installation of plants 
(Errichtung von Anlagen, paragraphs 88-97.), license contracts (Lizenzvertrag, 
paragraphs 176-186.), and service contracts (Leistung, Kundendienstvertrag, para-
graphs 126-136.). The conclusion of contracts of the said types is promoted by various 
international organizations more by elaborating reference conditions, guiding 
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principles, etc. Accordingly, suggestions such as to elaborate a draft convention of 
contracts dealing with the installation of big industrial plants, with a view to the 
Vienna Convention on the international sale of goods, cannot reckon with a solid 
support. (It should be noted, however, that the problem of elaborating a special type of 
contracts bearing upon the delivery of big industrial plants and equipment within the 
C M E A area has been discussed by the jurisprudence of several member-countries.) 
The creation of an excessive number of types within normative regulation might 
result in an unnecessary disintegration of the regulation system; at the same time, the 
typification of economic relations including remarkable characteristic features, 
established on a broad scale, seems to be desirable. As regards the existing relations of 
the member-countries of the CMEA, it should be examined whether it is necessary to 
increase the number of the types of contracts, taking into account the lack of the 
constitution of general conditions, model conditions, directives, etc. comprising the 
elements of more than one type, on the one hand, and whether it would be practicable 
to concentrate the elaboration and application of same, to the unification of atypical 
relations, on the other hand. 
d) The legal institutions which, as it is established in international practice, used 
not be regulated by the parties, e.g. formation of contracts, prescription, etc., could be 
separated from the regulation of the types. Similarly to the 1972 convention on arbitra-
tion, these could be then regulated so as to cover the entire field of economic relations. 
e) In compliance with practical requirements, and the experiences obtained from 
a survey of the rules of the member-countries bearing upon the law of obligations, 
having in view their harmonization and unification, the various unified types of rules of 
obligations should be then completed and improved. Having surveyed the legal rules of 
the member-countries, applied in their national legal systems for economic co-
operation, it may be stated that some achievements of the long-term work concerning 
the examination of the possibilities of harmonization and unification may be well used 
for the continued joint development of the unified types of obligations. Beyond the Co-
ordination of the actual practice, the organized and continuous analysis of the 
contractual and arbitration cases has to get an important role in the improvement of 
the distinct systems of norms, as this requirement asserted itself already, to some 
extent, in the preparation of the 1979 wording of the General Conditions of the 
Delivery of Goods as put down in the 1968/1975 version. 
The many-sided approach outlined in the preceding, the continued development 
of the unified types, the constitution of new types, the assurance of harmony between 
the distinct types, and the elaboration of a uniform regulation, to be decisive for the 
whole system of economic relations within a specified scope, present an important step 
on the way of the development of the legal system. As concerns the medium-term 
reality and the practical effect of this development work and, the more, its long-term 
n 
validity, it seems that this approach corresponds better to the present development of 
economic co-operation and the requirement of extending the legal frames of this co-
operation than the elaboration of the general part of a unified law of obligations. 
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The problem of the effect of the universal unification of the law on the future 
course of development presents itself when the ways of the future development proper 
are determined. The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods was 
signed on April 10, 1980. Most of the countries applying the General Conditions of the 
Delivery of Goods participated in the preparation and elaboration of the convention. 
Hungary is a signatory to it, and its ratification by a considerable number of the 
C M E A member-countries is expected. The elaboration of other conventions, 
susceptible of obtaining a universal acceptance, is also provided, even if on the long 
run. Anyhow, the question arises whether the universal unification of the law makes it 
unnecessary to set up a uniform regional regulation in given fields or, in other words, 
the constitution of the rules in question is equivalent to a deviation f rom the course of 
the universal unification of the law. 
The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods offers a suitable 
model for the required replies. The solutions elaborated in the framework of the 
socialist unification of law are reflected in the convention in several points. At the same 
time, the priority of other international agreements, such as the General Conditions of 
the Delivery of Goods of the C M E A , are explicitly acknowledged (Article 90.). 
Anyhow, this acknowledgement raises again the problem of the legal nature of 
recommendation as established within the decision-making system of the CMEA, for 
the exception referred to above is applicable to international agreements31 . Beyond the 
said stipulation, the Vienna Convention provides that two or more contracting parties, 
applying a similar or identical legal regulation to matters regulated by the Convention, 
may declare the Vienna Convention not to be applicable provided that they have their 
site in their country of residence. Furthermore, a signatory party to the Convention 
may make the same declaration in respect of its relations with a non-signatory party 
(Article 94). 
In view of the afore-mentioned, the enforcement of the unification of the law 
within the CMEA, reflecting the specific features of economic co-operation realizing in 
the area, continues to have an important role. At the same time, it seems to be an 
important task to take into consideration the achievements of the universal unification 
of the law in the course of the improvement of regulation, and to look for solutions 
being in harmony with same and reflecting the specific features. 
As a matter of fact, the problem of the national law, to be applicable beside the 
uniform system of legal norms of the member-countries in case of an accession to the 
Vienna Convention, will present itself. Regarding the mutual relations of the member-
countries to each other, the Vienna Convention cannot be considered as secondary 
applicable law in case of a reference to the Article 94. mentioned above, as this would 
exclude the application of the Convention proper. Nevertheless, in case of a reference 
31
 Recommendations are to be regarded as international agreements of this kind. Cf. SZÁSZ, I.: A 
KGST Altalános Szállítási Feltételek. IX. Az ÁSZF mint nemzetközi szerződés (General Conditions of the 
Delivery of Goods of the CMEA. IX.—The General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods as an international 
agreement), p. 151. 
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only to Article 90., the application of the Convention as a secondary applicable law 
could be taken into consideration, as the disposition laid down in Article 90. does not 
exclude the application of the Convention as a whole; it stipulates only that the 
Convention is not applicable to a problem which is regulated by an international 
agreement. In fact, the application of the secondary applicable law is usual, with the 
existence of unified systems of norms, just in fields not regulated by an international 
agreement. 
According to a provision laid down in Article 95. of the Convention, a party is 
allowed to make a declaration, when adhering to the Convention, to apply the 
Convention only in respect of the signatory countries, and not to apply it in case that its 
national law should be applicable according to the rules of private international law. 
Accordingly, a country having made the declaration referred to above ought to apply 
its national law in respect of a CMEA member-country which was not signatory to the 
Convention; on the contrary, a country not having made the declaration concerned, 
ought to apply the Convention, unless its application was excluded with reference to its 
Article 94. In view of the afore-mentioned, it seems to be reasonable for the member-
countries of the CMEA to adhere to the Convention with reference to indents (1) and 
(2) of its Article 94, as this way ensures to maintain the present relationship between 
the uniform systems of normative rules and the national legal systems. 
(It should be noted that the application of the Vienna Convention as national 
law in the mutual relations of the CMEA countries to each other would not bring 
about an important effect on the unification of the law, as the stipulations of the 
Convention concern mostly problems also settled by the systems of norms of the 
CMEA; at the same time, the judicial practice would become more complicated for, in 
cases not regulated also by the Convention, this latter ought to be interposed and 
consulted, prior to make recourse eventually to the respective'national law.) 
14. There are several problems, of practical importance, which ought to be 
settled in the course of the continued development of the unified types. Three of them 
should be dealt with below, just to give examples. 
a) Explicite regulation concerning interpretation and the applicability of the 
applicable national law. In respect of the application of the uniform systems of norms, it 
has been an almost permanent problem the explicite rule of interpretation of the 
uniform systems of norms and, furthermore, the possibility of application of Article 
110. of the General Condit ions of the Delivery of Goods, and the extent to which 
normative regulation may, and must, be completed by means of interpretation. 
Evidently, the said application could be facilitated considerably with an explicite 
regulation within the course of the development of the systems of normative fuies. The 
existing, and varying, views of jurisprudence are not completed by relevant normative 
rules so far . 3 2 
32
 EÖRSI, GY.: Megjegyzések az ASZF ПО. §-пак alkalmazási köréről (Comments to the field of 
application of Art. 110. of the General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods) . Contract problems in the trade 
of goods between the CMEA countries. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó (to be published). 
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The problem in question presents itself not only in respect of the unification of 
law within the CMEA area. Thus, the Vienna Convention stipulates in this respect 
that, as far as interpretation is concerned, the international character of the 
convention, the requirement of uniform application, and the demand of benevolence 
in international trade should be taken into consideration (Article 9, paragraph (1)). 
From the point of view of a C M E A regulation, the two first elements mentioned above 
are highly remarkable, for the requirement of uniform application and the promotion 
of unification appear as important points for the apnlication of the systems of norms in 
question. 
As regards the problems excluded from the explicite regulation, the first step 
cannot be to make recourse to the applicable national law according to the stipulations 
of the Vienna Convention; instead, reference should be made first to the fundamental 
principles on which the Convention is based; the actual problem should be settled on 
the basis of the said principles, and the application of the applicable national law is 
only admitted in the absence of satisfactory rules (Article 7, paragraph (2)). As a 
matter of fact, the problem raises as to where may be found the fundamental principles 
in question and, in case of the Vienna Convention, it will not be an easy task to find 
them. As regards co-operation within the C M E A area, however, the fundamental 
principles of co-operation are laid down in several documents. On the other hand, it is 
again not an easy task to reveal and determine them from a juridical point of view, to 
form a uniform judgment and to set up a system from them. At the same time, indirect 
references to the fundamental principle of co-operation appear in the jurisprudence 
and judicial practice even now. (So, the Court of Arbitration at tached to the Chamber 
of Commerce of the German Democratic Republic, proceeding in the case No. 72/76, 
refused to adjudge a penalty of 20 pc, stipulated in the respective contract , arguing that 
" the requirement of the unification of the law meant the requirement of strengthening 
a tendency favouring to restrict the right of disposition of the part ies". In other words, 
the refusal of the enforcement of a penalty higher than 8 pc, explicitely admitted by the 
General Conditions of the Delivery of Goods and stipulated by the parties was based 
on a fundamental principle of co-operation to which reference was made by the court . ) 
Evidently, the normative statements of interpretation rules and the fundamental 
principles should have a major role in the elaboration of a uniform legal system than 
they have now, as their tasks and possibilities are on a much broader scale than in the 
Vienna Convention. 
b) The precise definition of a state measure as a fact relieving from liability 
continues to be an important problem, even if only the broad range of practice and 
theoretical approach are considered, as they present themselves.33 
c) In respect of the legal regulation, there is a frequently mentioned claim, 
resulting from the circumstance that, although the big majority of the contracts is 
33
 For more details, cf. SZÁSZ, I.: A KGST Általános Szállítási Feltételek felelősségi rendszerének 
továbbfejlesztése. (Improvement of the liability system of the General Conditions of the Delivery of G o o d s 
of the CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 3/1976. 
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fulfilled, the law failed so far to elaborate efficient methods for the case of non-
fulfilment within the system of co-operation. The more, it has to be taken into 
consideration here that, as far as cases of non-fulfilment appear , the interests of the 
contracting parties, or countries, respectively, are affected to a fundamental extent. 
The sanction of penalty proved to be an insufficient way, or incentive, for the 
protection of the economic interests of the par ty claiming for fulfilment. Within the 
system of civil law liability, purchase to cover and the complex effect of the menace of 
damages or the loss of further deals may lead to appropriate results in such cases; 
nevertheless, the institutions of the civil law failed to obtain substantially satisfactory 
effects in the inter-relations of the enterprises of the member-countries so far, on 
account of the limits of the enforcement presented by the existing economic conditions. 
The restriction of the enforcement of the cases of vis maior by positive legal rules, e.g. 
the regulation of the vis maior effect of the afore-mentioned state measures, in 
particular, the limitation of the possibility of rescission of the obligor in case of vis 
maior, and the protection of the interests of the claimant against the obligor, not being 
in a position affected by vis maior by means of a penalty higher than 8 pc, e.g. fixing a 
delayed date of fulfilment with a supplementary penalty by the relevant court of 
arbitration, may give directives, to be taken into consideration in the course of fu ture 
development, as long as the real effects of rescission purchase to cover and damages 
will enforce themselves. 
Summing up the preceding, it is clear that the member-countries of the C M E A 
succeeded in achieving very substantial results, under specific conditions, in respect of 
the uniform civil law regulation of their mutual relations arising out of economic 
problems. At the same time, the achievements in question represent starting points for 
the solution of subsequent tasks and the improvement of the system. 
Регулирование гражданско-правовых договорных связей 
и возможные направления развития в правовой системе СЭВ 
И. С А С 
Рассматривая развитие гражданско-правовых связей, между предприятиями достигнутое д о 
сих пор в правовой системе сотрудничества в рамках СЭВ, автор устанавливает, что за истекшие 25 
лет сложилась многоцветная система единого регулирования гражданско-правовых связей. Хотя 
некоторые правовые институты гражданско-правовых связей характеризуются специальностями, 
вытекающими из государственного сотрудничества стран-членов и развития товарно-денежных 
отношений, они хорошо организуют сотрудничество между предприятиями и можно их развивать 
дальше в зависимости от валютных отношений между странами-членами и развития товарно-
денежных отношений. 
Те формы правового решения, которые можно найти в конвенциях, рекомендациях, системах 
диспозитивных правовых норм и рекомендованных типовых положениях, заключенных разновре-
менно в ряде областей жизненных условий и экономических связей, проявляют различия, 
являющиеся отчасти обоснованными, отчасти необоснованными или же ненужными. Важными 
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задачами дальнейшего развития гражданско-правовой системы сотрудничества в р а м к а х СЭВ 
являются обеспечение гармонического согласия унифицированных с и с т е м норм, созвучного друг с 
другом их развития, а также регулирование едиными правовыми нормами все б о л е е широких 
областей сотрудничества. 
При определении направлений дальнейшего развития в интересах обеспечения единства 
системы н о р м возникает мысль о разработке о б щ е й части единого обязательственного права, 
которую многие представляют в юридической литературе. Автор анализирует проблемы э т о г о пути 
и приходит к выводу, что имея в виду о с о б е н н о с т и настоящего и ожидаемого развития 
сотрудничества развитие системы доступно не разработкой общей части гражданско-правовых 
обязательств, а совместным применением нижеследующих мероприятий: 
Н е о б х о д и м о было бы рассматривать все нормативные регулирования с такой точки зрения, 
чтобы они отражали результаты развития других нормативных систем. 
С л е д о в а л о бы принимать как правило, что результаты дальнейшего развития отдельных 
систем н о р м одновременно д о л ж н ы быть отражены в других системах норм. 
Н у ж н о было бы разработать общие условия строительства и проектирования, ведь этим 
возникает нормативное регулирование важнейших отношений. 
Те институты права (но только те), регулирование которых в международной практике 
осуществлено не сторонами, м о ж н о выделить из регулирования типов (заключение договора, 
давность, и т. п.) и регулировать их — п о д о б н о конвенции 1972 г о д а о б арбитражных судах — 
применительно к экономическим отношениям в целом. 
Отдельные унифицированные типы обязательств н е о б х о д и м о развивать д а л ь ш е в со-
ответствии с требованиями практики и на основе результатов рассмотрения обязательственно-
правовых н о р м стран-членов, осуществляемого в интересах их гармонизации и унификации. 
А в т о р изучает стремления С Э В к унификации права, соотношение их влияния на право 
международной торговли и на куплю-продажу с универсальной унификацией права, и констатирует 
возможность согласия. 
Наконец автор занимается некоторыми подчеркнутыми вопросами; требованиями регулиро-
вания, относящегося к применимости субсидиарного права; требованиями регулирования учета 
государственной меры как факта, о с в о б о ж д а ю щ е г о от ответственности, а также причинами 
недостаточности санкций за неисполнение. 
Die Regelung der Zivilrechtlichen 
vertraglichen Beziehungen und die möglichen Richtungen 
der Entwicklung im Rechtssystem des RGW 
I. SZÁSZ 
In der Überschau der b isher igen E n t w i c k l u n g der zivilrechtlichen Beziehungen z w i s c h e n den 
U n t e r n e h m e n im Rechtssystem der R G W - K o o p e r a t i o n stellt die A b h a n d l u n g fest, d a ß s i c h in den 
vergangenen 25 Jahren ein bunte s Sys tem der e inhe i t l i chen Regelung der zivilrechtlichen B e z i e h u n g e n 
herausgebi ldet hat. Zwar tragen einzelne Rechts inst i tut ionen der zivilrechtl ichen B e z i e h u n g e n 
Sonderhe i ten , die sich aus der staatlichen K o o p e r a t i o n der Mitg l ied länder , s o w i e a u s der 
Entwickel thei t der Waren- und Geldverhäl tn isse e r g e b e n d e , aber die Organis ierung der K o o p e r a t i o n 
zwischen den Unternehmen ist gut , und die Währungsbez iehungen z w i s c h e n den Mitg l i eds taaten , in 
A b h ä n g i g k e i t v o n der E n t w i c k l u n g der Waren- u n d Geldverhältnisse, k ö n n e n gut wei terentwickel t 
werden. 
D i e Lebensverhältnisse , d ie in den auf zah lre i chen Gebieten d e r Wir t schaf t sbez iehungen zu 
verschiedenen Zeiten ents tandenen K o n v e n t i o n e n , Empfehlungen, in d e n dispositiven recht l ichen 
Rege lungssys t emen empfoh lenen M u s t e r b e d i n g u n g e n anzutreffenden rechtl ichen L ö s u n g e n weisen 
teilweise begründete , teilweise a b e r eventuell u n b e g r ü n d e t e oder gar u n n ö t i g e A b w e i c h u n g e n auf . Die 
Sicherstel lung des harmonischen Z u s a m m e n k l a n g e s der vereinheit l ichten N o r m e n s y s t e m e , ihre 
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abgest immte Entwicklung, sowie die einheitliche rechtl iche Regelung weiterer Gebiete der 
Kooperat ion auf je breiterer Basis bi ldet eine wichtige Aufgabe der Weiterentwicklung des 
zivilrechtlichen Systems der RGW Kooperat ion . 
Bei der Fest legung des Trends Weiterentwicklung taucht der Gedanke der Ausarbeitung eines 
einheitlichen al lgemeinen Teils des Schuldrechts auf; dieser G e d a n k e ist in der Rechtsliteratur vielfach 
vertreten. Der Beitrag analysiert die Prob leme dieses Verfahrens und gelangt zur Konklusion, daß in 
Anbetracht der Eigenheiten der gegenwärtigen und zu erwartenden Entwicklung der Kooperation, 
die Entwicklung des Systems nicht durch Ausarbeitung des allgemeinen schuldrechtlichen Teils des 
Zivilrechts, sondern durch gemeinsame Anwendung der fo lgenden Verfügungen erreicht werden 
kann. 
Es sollten sämtl iche normative Regelungen aus dem gesichtspunkt durchgesehen werden, o b 
sie die Ergebnisse der Entwicklung anderer normativen S y s t e m e spiegeln. 
Es sollte als Regel gelten, d a ß die Ergebnisse der Weiterentwicklung der einzelnen 
Normensysteme in den anderen Normensys temen gespiegelt werden. 
Es sollten die allgemeinen Bedingungen des Baus und der Planung ausgearbeitet werden, da 
dadurch die normative Regelung der wesentlichsten Beziehungen zustande k o m m t . 
Jene Rechtsinstitutionen, die a u c h in der internationalen Praxis nicht durch die Partner 
geregelt werden, (aber nur diese), k ö n n t e n von der typischen Regelung ausgeschlossen werden 
(Vertragsschluß, Verjährung usw.). D i e s e könnten, ähnlich der Arbitragegerichtskonvention v o m 
Jahre 1972, für die Gesamtheit der Beziehungen geregelt werden. 
Die einzelnen vereinheitlichten Schuldrechtstypen sol l ten den praktischen Anforderungen 
entsprechend, — und aufgrund der z w e c k s Harmonisierung und Vereinheitlichung überprüften 
schuldrechtlichen N o r m e n der Mitgl iedstaaten — weiterentwickelt werden. 
Die Abhandlung untersucht das Verhältnis der Rechtsvereinheitlichungsbestrebungen des 
R G W im Vergleich zur universalen Rechtsvereinheit l ichung in bezug a u f das Recht des 
internationalen Hande l s und des Kaufs , und stellt fest, d a ß e ine Harmonisierung möglich sei. 
Schließlich befaßt sich die A b h a n d l u n g mit einigen hervorgehobenen Fragen, sowie die 
Anforderung einer ausdrücklichen Rege lung bezüglich der D e u t u n g und der Anwendungsmögl ich-
keit des Hinterlandrechts, die Regelung dessen, daß die staatl ichen Verfügungen, a ls Verantwortung 
aufhebende Akte berücksichtigt werden, und spricht über die Gründe des ungenügenden Wesens der 
Sanktionen im Falle einer Nichterfüllung. 
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Das internationale Institutionssystem 
der RGW-Integration 
L . FICZERE 
Hauptabteilungsleiter 
Sekretariat des Ministerrates 
Die Abhandlung untersucht einzelne Organisations- und Rechtsbeziehungen des 
internationalen Institutionssystems der RGW-Integration. Sie geht d a v o n aus, daß bei der 
Untersuchung des Institutionssystems der Integration in Betracht gezogen werden muß, d a ß 
sich die Integration sowohl auf Staats- als auch auf Unternehmenebene realisiert, und der Staat 
nicht bloß als Souverän, sondern auch als Eigentümer am Integrationsvorgang teilnimmt. 
Der erste Teil der Abhandlung befaßt sich mit den Entwicklungstendenzen und d e m 
BegrifTsbereich des internationalen Institutionssystems der RGW-Integration. Es wird 
unterstrichen, daß in der Entwicklung des Institutionssystems der Integration zwei Tendenzen 
herrschen, und zwar der Wachstum des Institutionssystems in quantitativem Sinn, der 
Vorgang ihrer inneren Differenzierung, beziehungsweise die Sicherstellung der wirksamen 
Funktionierung des bereits zustande gebrachten Systems, der inneren Integriertheit der 
differenzierten Organisationsstruktur. Bei der Untersuchung des Begriffsbereichs des 
Institutionssystems gelangt er zur Folgerung, daß von dem Begriff des Institutionssystems in 
einem engeren, bzw. weiteren Sinn gesprochen werden kann. In engerem Sinn umfaßt das 
internationale Institutionssystem bloß die zwischenstaatlichen (bilateralen und multilateralen) 
Organisationen, in weiterem Sinn aber umfaßt es auch die gemeinsamen Organisationen auf 
Unternehmenebene (institutionelle Organisationen). 
Der zweite Teil der Abhandlung überblickt die rechtlichen Mittel des inneren 
Beziehungssystems des internationalen Institutionsmechanismus, und innerhalb dessen die 
Beziehungen zwischen dem R G W , als zentrales Basisorgan des Institutionssystems der 
Integration und den auf einzelnen Gebieten der Kooperation funktionierenden zwischenstaatli-
chen Organisationen, ferner die Beziehungen des R G W und der internationalen Wirtschaftsor-
ganisationen (internationale Assoziationen, gemeinsame Unternehmen zueinander in ihrer 
Funktionierung, die Mittel und die Methode der Koordinierung ihrer Tätigkeit. Er kommt 
zum Ergebnis, daß die einheitliche Richtung des internationalen Institutionssystems letzten 
Endes durch das gemeinsam aufgestellte Zielsystem der Integration bestimmt wird, das im 
langfristigen Programm der Kooperat ion zum Ausdruck kommt. Gleichzeitig aber funktionie-
ren die einzelnen Kooperationsorganisationen innerhalb des Institutionssystems, im Bereich 
der in den Gründungsurkunden bestimmten Aufgaben, selbständig. D a s schließt die 
entsprechende Koordinierung der Funktionierung der gemeinsamen Organisationen durch-
aus nichts aus, gerade im Gegenteil , es ist sogar eine Voraussetzung, was auch durch 
organisationsrechtliche Mittel (Kooperationsprotokol le) gesichert sind. 
Der dritte Teil der Abhandlung untersucht die Funktionierung des Institutionssystems 
aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Entscheidungsberechtigung des RGW. Sie befaßt sich mit den 
rechtlichen Merkmalen und den unterscheidenden Eigenheiten des RGW-Beschlusses, der 
R G W - E m p f e h l u n g , des abgestimmten Vorschlags und der unmittelbaren Vereinbarung. Er 
schenkt der Untersuchung des Verhältnisses der RGW-Empfehlung und der internationalen 
Abkommen besondere Aufmerksamkeit und gelangt zur Folgerung, daß die R G W -
Empfehlung ein selbständiger, spezieller rechtlicher Akt ist, die im Vergleich zum 
internationalen Vertrag zahlreiche spezifische Züge aufweist. Schließlich überblickt er die 
inhaltlichen Elemente des materiellen Wirkungskreises der einzelnen RGW-Organe. 
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Eine Grundlegende Bedingung der Weiterentwicklung, der Steigerung der 
Wirksamkeit der RGW-Integration ist die Sicherstellung der die Ausbreitung und 
Vertiefung der Integrationsvorgänge unterstützenden rechtlichen und institutionellen 
Rahmen. Das hängt vor allem damit zusammen, daß der organisatorische und 
rechtliche Mechanismus der Integration, ihr Institutionssystem nicht bloß ein 
einfacher Vermittler des wirtschaftlichen Inhalts der Kooperation ist, sondern es 
vermag mit seinen eigenartigen Mitteln und Methoden darauf eine Rückwirkung 
auszuüben, es kann die Entfaltung und Entwicklung der Integrationsvorgänge 
zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten fördern, oder gegebenenfalls verlangsamen oder 
verhindern. Daraus ergibt sich, daß die Untersuchung des Begriffsbereiches, der 
Struktur und der Funktionierung des internationalen Institutionssystems der RGW-
Integration zur Klärung der Rolle, der Möglichkeiten und gleichzeitig auch der 
Schranken seiner Leistungen beizutragen vermag. 
Das internationale Institutionssystem der RGW-Integrat ion hat sowohl 
strukturell, als auch funktionell mehrere Aspekte, sie ist eine komplexe Erscheinung, 
deshalb kann es aus organisatorischem, volkswirtschaftlichem, soziologischem, 
rechtlichem usw. Gesichtspunkt untersucht werden. Innerhalb dieser Rahmen 
möchten wir die Aufmerksamkeit auf einige grundlegend rechtliche Fragen im 
Zusammenhang mit den Entwicklungstendenzen und des Begriffsbereiches, mit dem 
inneren Verbindungssystem, sowie mit der Entscheidungsordnung des internationalen 
Institutionssystems der RGW-Integration lenken. Es soll voran gehen, daß auch bei 
der Untersuchung der Struktur und der Funktionierung des Institutionssystems der 
RGW-Integration von den Prinzipien ausgegangen werden muß, aufgrund welcher 
sich die Kooperation zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten realisiert. Diese durch die 
Grundurkunde des R G W niedergelegten Prinzipien sind die folgenden: die 
Staatssouverenität, die Unabhängigkeit und Beachtung der nationalen Interessen, die 
Nichteinmischung in innere Angelegenheiten, die volle Gleichberechtigung, die 
wechselseitigen Vorteile und wechselseitige Hilfsleistung.1 Es soll hier jene Verfügung 
des Komplexprogramms separat hervorgehoben werden, daß die sozialistische 
Wirtschaftsintegration völlig freiwillig zustande kommt und nicht mit der Errichtung 
übernationaler Organisationen einhergeht, sie berührt in keiner Weise die Fragen der 
inneren Planung und Wirtschaftung der Organisationen.2 
Bei der Untersuchung des internationalen Institutionssystem der Integration 
muß ferner folgendes beachtet werden: 
— die Integration verwirklicht sich sowohl auf makro Ebene — Kooperation 
der Volkswirtschaften, der Staaten —, als auch auf mikro Ebene — Kooperat ion der 
Wirtschaftsorgane, der Unternehmen —, ein Umstand dem bei der Beschreibung, vor 
allem bei der Bestimmung der Kategorie des Institutionssystems, Rechnung getragen 
werden muß; 
1
 Siehe Grunddokument des RGW. Art. I, Punkt 2. 
1
 Siehe Komplexprogramm. Kap. 1, Punkt 2. 
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— im Vorgang der Integration sind die Staaten nicht bloß als Souverän, sondern 
auch als Eigentümer vorhanden, was hauptsächlich auf die Struktur und Funktionie-
rung des Institutionssystems Einfluß ausübt; 
— das internationale Institutionssystem verknüpft sich eng mit den nationalen 
Lenkungssystemen, (die in den internationalen Systemen getroffenen Entscheidungen 
realisieren sich, wenigstens bezüglich der zwischenstaatlichen Institutionen, überna-
tionale Lenkungssysteme), es kann sich von diesen in wesentlicher Form nicht 
unterscheiden, wenn auch aus juristischem Gesichtspunkt zweifellos von einer anderen 
Qualität die Rede ist. 
Die Betonung der erwähnten Prinzipien ist schon aus dem G r u n d wesentlich, 
weil sie einerseits für die Funktionierung der in das Institutionssystem gehörenden 
einzelnen gemeinsamen Organisationen, vor allem für ihre Entscheidungsordnung 
bestimmend sind, andererseits aber bringen sie die inneren immanenten Eigenheiten 
des internationalen Institutionssystems der RGW-Integration verglichen mit Institu-
tionsmechanismen anderer Integrationsgruppen zum Ausdruck.3 Dieses letztere gilt 
auch dann, wenn die erwähnten Prinzipien im Funktionsmechanismus der in die 
RGW-Integration gehörenden verschiedenen gemeinsamen, z. B. zwischenstaatlichen 
und zwischenbetrieblichen Organisationen die erwähnten Prinzipien aus der unter-
schiedlichen Natur dieser Organisationen selbstredend in abweichender Form und in 
abweichendem M a ß zur Geltung kommen. 
I 
Das heutige internationale Institutionssystem der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsin-
tegration entstand schrittweise parallel mit der Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen und 
wissenschaftlich-technischen Zusammenarbeit . Ohne die Entstehung und Entwick-
lung des Institutions- und Organisationssystem oder einige größere Stationen dieses 
Vorgangs charakterisieren zu wollen, wollen wir hier bloß auf die bisherige 
Entwicklung und die Aufgaben der Weiterentwicklung des Institutionssystems fühlbar 
machende Doppeltendenz hinweisen. 
Die eine Tendenz der Entwicklung kann im G r u n d e genommen als Vorgang des 
sozusagen quantitativen Wachstums, als Verlauf der inneren Differenzierung aufgefaßt 
werden. Das Wesen dieses Vorgangs ist, daß die Ausdehnung der Kooperation auf 
immer größere Gebiete der Wirtschaft, der Wissenschaft, der technischen Entwicklung 
usw. auch im Institutionssystem die Gründung von immer neueren Organisationsein-
heiten, gemeinsamen Institutionen zur Folge hatte. Diese Entwicklungstendenz war 
grundlegend und in erster Linie für die ersten zwei Jahrzehnte nach der Gründung des 
R G W charakteristisch, aber auch in dieser Zeit kam es natürlich nicht mit 
3
 Cf. VALKI, L.: A KGST döntéshozatali problémái (Probleme der Fällung von Entscheidungen des 
RGW), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 4/1973. 
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ausschließendem Charakter zur Geltung. Zur Illustrierung dieser Entwicklungsten-
denz können wir als Beispiel auf die Differenzierung der inneren Organisation des 
RGW in der zweiten Hälf te der 50er und ersten Hälfte der 60er Jahre (Aufstellung von 
zweiglichen, späterdann funktionellen ständigen Kommissionen), beziehungsweise — 
von den 60-er Jahren — auf die Gründung von selbständigen, an gewissen konkreten 
Gebieten der Kooperation tätigen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen außerhalb des 
RGW, (z. B. Intermetall, Interchim, OPW, usw.), ferner auf die Gründung bilateraler 
gemeinsamer Unternehmen (z. B. Haldex) hinweisen. Nach der Annahme des 
Komplexprogramms begann der Ausbau der gemeinsamen Unternehmen auch auf 
multilateraler Basis, bezüglich dieser sind aber die Möglichkeiten heute bei weitem 
noch nicht ausgenützt.4 Wir können also sagen, daß als Resultat dieser Entwicklungs-
tendenz ein verhältnismäßig kompliziertes und innerlich differenziertes Institutionssy-
stem der Kooperation zustandegekommen ist, in welchem von den interregierungsor-
ganisationen (RGW) bis zu den gemeinsamen Unternehmen (z. B. Interlichter) dem 
Charakter nach völlig verschiedene gemeinsame Institutionen anzutreffen sind. Es soll 
aber bemerkt werden, daß einer derartigen quantitativen (horizontalen) Zunahme des 
Institutionssystems aus wirtschaftlichem Gesichtspunkt gewisse begründete und 
sinngemäße Schranken gestellt sind, das heißt die Gründung neuer Einheiten kann 
keineswegs zum Selbstzweck werden. Daraus ergibt sich, daß im Rahmen des 
Institutionssystems die Gründung aller neuen gemeinsamen Organisationen gründlich 
erwogen werden soll. Allgemein könnte man sagen, daß die Gründung einer neuen 
gemeinsamen Organisation dann begründet ist, wenn die Arbeitsteilung auf dem 
gegebenen Feld bereits ein bestimmtes Entwicklungsniveau erreicht hat und die 
Gründung der neuen Institution tatsächlich remunerativ erscheint, beziehungsweise 
wenn die zu lösende Kooperat ionsaufgabe im Rahmen der bereits existenten 
gemeinsamen Institutionen nicht gelöst werden kann. 
Infolge der erwähnten Differenzierung und Kompliziertheit des internationalen 
Institutionsmechanismus der RGW-Integration gelangte, besonders in den letzten 
Jahren eine andere Entwicklungstendenz in den Vordergrund, dessen Wesen in der 
inhaltlichen Entwicklung der bereits bestehenden Institutionsrahmen, in der Vertiefung 
der Wirksamkeit ihrer Tätigkeit und ihrer Arbeitsmethoden, kurz also in der 
Verbesserung der Qualität der Arbeit besteht. Diese allgemeingefaßte Anforderung 
soll nicht nur gegenüber einzelnen dem Institutionssystem angehörenden Organisa-
tionseinheiten Geltung erlangen, sondern auch gegenüber der Gesamtheit des 
Institutionssystems. Dieser letztere Umstand macht die Überholung des bis zu einem 
gewissen Grad atomisierten, verhältnismäßig stark differenzierten Institutionssy-
stems, die Steigerung seiner inneren Integriertheit begründet;5 auf die organisatorisch-
rechtlichen Mittel kommen wir später zu sprechen. 
* Siehe mehr FICZERE, L.—SÁRKÖZY, T.: A KGST-országok nemzetközi gazdálkodó szervezeteinek 
alapvető jogi kérdései. (Die grundlegenden rechtlichen Fragen der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisatio-
nen der RGW-Länder), Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1978. 
^
 5
 ШИРЯЕВ, Ю.: Экономический механизм социалистической интеграции. Moskau, 1973. р. 120 et 
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Es taucht die Frage auf: wie kann die Kategorie des internationalen 
Institutionssystems der RGW-Integration umschrieben werden? 
In der Literatur sind mehrere Standpunkte bezüglich des allgemeinen Begriffs 
und der Bestandteile des Mechanismus der Integration bekannt.6 Unter Betonung der 
Unterschieden zwischen den Standpunkten können als gemeinsame Züge gelten, daß 
als Hauptbestandteile des Mechanismus der Integration im allgemeinen folgende 
gelten: a) die Formen der Planungskooperation, b) die volkswirtschaftlichen Mittel 
der Realisierung der Integration (Ware, Geldwesen), und c) organisatorische und 
rechtliche Formen und Institutionen.7 Im Zusammenhang damit vertreten einige 
Autoren auch den Standpunkt , daß der internationale Mechanismus der Kooperation 
auch einzelne mit den Außenhandelsbeziehungen des gegebenen Landes zusammen-
hängende innere Planungs- und Regelungselemente in sich faßt.8 
In dieser allgemeinen Auffassung ist das Institutionssystem ein Teil des 
Mechanismus der Integration, ein verhältnismäßig differenziertes mit anderen 
Elementen aber in engem Verhältnis stehendes, mit diesen sogar gewissermaßen eine 
Einheit bildendes Element desselben. In diesem Zusammenhang faßt ferner das 
Institutionssystem sowohl das rechtliche, innerhalb dessen besonders das internatio-
nale Vertragsrechtssystem, als auch das institutionelle System in engerem Sinne in sich, 
— wie es übrigens auch wir im Rahmen dieser Abhandlung anwenden.9 
Im Zusammenhang mit der Struktur des Institutionssystems der Integration in 
obigem Sinne kann festgehalten werden, daß diesem System verschiedene gemeinsame 
Organisationen und Institutionen angehören. Bezüglich der Gruppierung der in das 
Institutionssystem gehörenden gemeinsamen Organisationen entstanden in der 
Literatur mehrere Standpunkte.1 0 Ohne Anspruch der Vollständigkeit können wir 
darauf hinweisen, daß die gemeinsamen Institutionen gemäß folgenden zwei 
Merkmale klassifiziert werden: a) die Mitgliederschaft, b) der Charakter der Tätigkeit. 
Diese Merkmale müssen — obzwar sie die Institutionen von verschiedenen Seiten 
charakterisieren — in ihren wechselseitigen Zusammenhang und wechselseitiger 
Beziehung zueinander ins Auge gefaßt werden. 
Aufgrund der Mitgliederschaft gibt es die zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen, 
das heißt jene Organisationen, wo die Mitglieder — im Wege der zuständigen 
staatlichen Organe — die Staaten selbst sind, bzw. die Zwischenbetriebsorganisatio-
nen (Organisationen von Anstalten), wo die Mitglieder die Unternehmen (Anstalten) 
sind. Die Bedeutung der Differenzierung aufgrund der Mitgliederschaft erscheint von 
rechtlicher Seite darin, daß für die Tätigkeit der zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen 
6
 Siehe darüber: ТОКАРЕВА, П . : Международный организационноправовой механизм 
социалистической экономической интеграции. Moskau, 1980. р. 29. et seq. 
7
 Ш И Р Я Е В , Ю . : o p . c i t . р . 7 1 . 
8
 Теория и практика социалистической интеграции. Moskau, 1975, р. 86 et seq. 
' ТОКАРЕВА, П . : o p . c i t . р . 3 1 . 
10
 Siehe darüber Особенности международного социалистического общественного произ-
водства. Moskau, 1973, р. 93. 
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die Normen des Völkerrechts maßgebend sind, während die Funktionierung der 
Zwischenbetriebsorganisationen hauptsächlich durch die Normen des nationalen 
Rechts, beziehungsweise des internationalen Privatrechts geregelt werden. Dies gilt 
auch dann, wenn in der bisherigen Praxis die zwischen-betrieblichen Organisationen, 
(z. B. internationale Wirtschaftsorganisationen) nicht durch zivilrechtlichen Vertrag, 
sondern durch zwischenstaatliches Abkommen (internationalem Vertrag) gegründet 
worden sind, was den Organisationen selbstverständlicherweise eine Eigenart, einen 
„öffentlichrechtlichen" Charakter verleiht. 
Das zweite Merkmal der Differenzierung, der Charakter der Tätigkeit, gibt zur 
mehrfachen Klassifizierung Möglichkeit. Es gibt z. B. einen Standpunkt , der von 
koordinierende, wirtschaftende und verwertende (Außenhandels-) Tätigkeit aus-
übenden Organisationen spricht.11 Andere wieder behandeln, neben den koordi-
nierenden und wirtschaftenden gemeinsamen Organisationen, die Organisationsfor-
men für Informationserteilung und Erfahrungsaustausch separat, die übrigens die 
lockersten Organisationsformen sind.1 2 
Es ist klar, d a ß neben diesen beiden grundlegenden Klassifikationsmerkmalen 
gegebenenfalls selbstredend auch andere Kriterien Daseinsberechtigung haben. Es 
kann z. B. aufgrund der Entscheidungsordnung, beziehungsweise der Separiertheit 
von den Mitgliedern, also aufgrund des Ausmaßes der „effektiven Macht" der 
Organisation, von einem Typ der gemeinsamen Organisationen gesprochen werden, 
wie z. B. Organisationen die bloß Empfehlungen akzeptieren, wo das entscheidende 
Wor t den einzelnen Mitgliedern zufällt. In diese Gruppe gehören offenbar die 
gemeinsamen Institutionen zwischenstaatlichen Charakters. Eine Spezialität der 
anderen Gruppe der gemeinsamen Organisationen ist dagegen, daß der Grad der 
Getrenntheit des Lenkungsorgans der Organisation kräftiger ist, das heißt, es kann 
nicht nur Empfehlungen vorlegen, sondern in bestimmten Fällen auch für die 
Mitglieder bindende Entscheidungen fällen. In diese Gruppe gehören in erster Linie 
die gemeinsamen Unternehmungen, nämlich die internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisa-
tionen. 
Bei der Untersuchung der Struktur des Institutionssystems der Integration muß 
der RGW seihst separat behandelt werden. Es kann dabei, zum Beispiel, darauf 
hingewiesen werden, daß er, im Vergleich mit den anderen gemeinsamen Organisatio-
nen der Kooperat ion, nach seinen Tätigkeitsbereich die umfassendste zwischen-
staatliche Organisation ist.13 Andererseits ist das Niveau der Vertretung der 
Mitgliedstaaten im R G W das höchste; man könnte sogar sagen, daß der RGW eine 
11
 Кормнов, Ю.: Развитие международных экономических организаций в социалистической 
экономической интеграции. Prag, 1974, р. 44. 
12
 Siehe: Проблемы социалистической экономической интеграции. Moskau, 1974, р. 232 et seq. 
13
 Der Funktionsbereich des R G W umfaßt gegenwärtig sämtliche wesentliche Gebiete der 
wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlich-technischen multilateralen Kooperation. Auf diesen in dieser 
Beziehung bestehenden speziellen Zug des R G W wird in der Literatur meinerseits hingewiesen. (S.z.B.: 
Международные организации социалистических стран, Moskau, 1971, p. 80 et seq.) 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
Institutionssystem des RG W 4 3 
typische Interregierungsorganisation ist, während in den im Zuge der Kooperat ion 
entstandenen sonstigen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen die Mitgliedstaaten durch 
ihre Ministerien (Oberbehörden) vertreten werden. 
Schließlich muß auch daraufhingewiesen werden daß in das Institutionssystem 
der Integration sowohl die multilateralen, als auch die bilateralen gemeinsamen 
Institutionen hineingehören. Aus diesem Gesichtspunkt betrachtet ist die mitunter 
auftauchende Anschauung kaum haltbar, die die bilaterale, bzw. multilaterale 
Kooperation voneinander kraß trennt, ja diese sogar einander gelegentlich 
gegenüberstellt. Die bilateralen und multilateralen Formen können auch auf dem 
Niveau des Institutionssystems nur in ihrer gegenseitigen Verbindung, einander 
ergänzend, gemeinsam untersucht werden, auch dann, wenn sie in ihrer gemeinsamen 
Institutionsqualität, miteinander verglichen, natürlicherweise auch spezielle Eigenhei-
ten vorweisen mögen. Dieses Erkenntnis ist heute auch schon in der bezüglichen 
normativen Regelung ein praktisches Erfordernis. Im Zusammenhang damit können 
wir z. B. auf die in 1979 vorgenommenen Änderung des Grunddokuments des R G W 
hinweisen, wo es heißt, daß die Mitgliedstaaten in der zwei- bzw. mehrseitigen 
Kooperation in Rahmen des Rates durch den R G W unterstützt werden.14 
Unter Beachtung der soeben gesagten kann eine engere und eine breitere 
Kategorie des Institutionssystems der Integration unterschieden werden. In engerem 
Sinne gehören in den Begriff des internationalen Institutionssystems der Integration 
bloß die zwischenstaatlichen, durch das Völkerrecht geregelten gemeinsamen 
Organisationen (z. B. die auf dem Gebiet der wissenschaftlich-technischen Koopera-
tion entstandenen multilateralen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen, bilaterale 
Interregierungsausschüsse der Kooperation, usw.). 
In weiterem Sinn umfaßt die Kategorie des Institutionssystems der Integration, 
neben den bilateralen und multilateralen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen, auch 
jene gemeinsamen Organisationen internationalen Charakters, wie die gemeinsamen 
Institute, gemeinsame Laboratorien, internationale Wirtschaftsorganisationen (inter-
nationale Assoziationen, gemeinsame Unternehmen, internationale Gesellschaften) 
usw. Anhand dessen taucht selbstredend der Anspruch auf die Sicherung der 
Wechselwirkung zwischen diesen beiden Ebenen des Institutionssystems auf, d a s sich 
sowohl mittelbarerweise, durch Einschaltung von nationalen Lenkungssystemen, als 
auch unmittelbarerweise, nämlich durch Regelung auf einem entsprechenden Niveau 
realisiert, ohne natürlich, daß rigorose hierarchische über- und untergeordnete 
Verhältnisse in internationaler Beziehung entstünden. 
Bei der Untersuchung der Kategorie des Institutionssystems der Integration 
müssen, über die statische Betrachtung hinaus auch die Funktionierung, die Dynamik 
desselben in Betracht gezogen werden. Das bedeutet unter anderen, daß in der 
Kategorie des Institutionssystems auch die Elemente der Tätigkeit der gemeinsamen 
Institutionen inbegriffen sind, das heißt jene Mittel und Methoden, mit Hilfe deren der 
14
 Siehe: Grunddokumenl des RGW. Art. III, Punkt 1 „d". 
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Institutionsmechanismus auf die Integrationsvorgänge Einfluß, Einwirkung ausübt . 
Die Betonung dieser Beziehung des Problems ist auch schon deshalb wichtig, weil die 
Wirksamkeit der Gesamtheit des Institutionssystems, aber auch der einzelnen 
Kettenglieder desselben dadurch erwogen werden können, daß man feststellt, wie weit 
und mit welchem Wirkungsgrad die angewendeten Mittel und Methoden die 
praktische Verwirklichung der Zielsetzungen der Integration sichern. Anhand dessen 
m u ß die Wichtigkeit der Wirksamkeitsbereiche und der angewendeten Ordnung der 
Entscheidungsberechtigung zwischen den in d a s Institutionssystem gehörenden 
. gemeinsamen Organisationen, ferner zwischen den inneren Organen der einzelnen 
gemeinsamen Organisationen (z. B. Exekutivkomitee des R G W und ständige 
Kommissionen, usw.) separat hervorgehoben werden. 
II 
Der institutionelle Mechanismus der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsintegration 
bildet, auf das innere Verbindungssystem gebaut, ein einziges Ganzes. Diese Einheit des 
Institutionssystems wird durch d a s mehr oder minder umreißbare Zielsystem, durch 
die für einen längern Termin abgestimmte Wirtschaftspolitik der Kooperation 
bestimmt.15 Abhängig davon an welchem Gebiet, beziehungsweise an welcher Ebene 
der Kooperation der einzelnen Institutionen sie ihre Tätigkeit entwickeln, ist ihre 
Aufgabe und Rolle in dem Vorgang der praktischen Verwirklichung der abgestimmten 
wirtschaftspolitischen Ziele selbstredend unterschiedlich. Daraus ergibt sich teilweise, 
daß die durch die abgestimmten wirtschaftspolitischen Zielsetzungen umrissene 
Einheit des Institutionssystems auch durch organisatorisch-rechtlichen Mitteln 
unterstützt zu werden braucht. In diesem Zusammenhang besteht die Rolle der 
organisatorisch-rechtlichen Mittel besonders in der Sicherung der erwünschten 
Koordination und Verbindung zwischen den einzelnen Institutionen), bzw. Institu-
tionsgruppen, sowie in der Ausschaltung eventueller Parallelitäten, Überdeckungen, 
usw. 
Bei den in das Institutionssystems der RGW-Integration gehörenden gemeinsa-
men Organisationen finden wir verschiedenartige Beziehungen.16 Dementsprechend 
bestehen Beziehungen zwischen den zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen untereinan-
der, und innerhalb deren Beziehungen zwischen dem RGW und der an einzelnen 
bestimmten Stellen der Kooperat ion tätigen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen, 
ferner Beziehungen der zwischenstaatlichen kooperativen Organisationen — darunter 
des RGW — mit den interbetrieblichen gemeinsamen Organisationen, das heißt den 
l s
 Das Zielsystem der Wirtschaftspolitik der Kooperation wird neben dem Komplexprogramm 
hauptsächlich in den langfristigen Kooperations-Zielprogrammen abgefaßt. 
16
 Eine spezielle Untersuchung verdient das System der äußeren Beziehungen des RGW, das in den 
letzteren Jahren sowohl bei den nicht Mitgliedländern, als auch gegenüber den internationalen 
Organisationen eine immer breiter werdende Entwicklungstendenz aufweist. 
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internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen, und schließlich Verhältnisse dieser letzte-
ren miteinander. Aufgrund prinzipieller Überlegungen, aber auch wichtigkeits halber 
wollen wir uns im weiteren mit zwei Beziehungen dieses vielfältigen inneren 
Beziehungssystems befassen, namentlich: mit einigen aus rechtlichem Gesichtspunkt 
interessant erscheinenden Momenten der Beziehungen und des gegenseitigen 
Verhältnisses (a) des R G W und der an bestimmten Gebieten der Kooperation tätigen 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen und (b) des R G W und der internationalen 
Wirtschaftsorganisationen. 
(a) Die Beziehungen und Verhältnisse zwischen dem RGW und der an sonstigen 
Gebieten der Kooperation gegründeten zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen werden vor 
allem durch den Umstand bedingt, daß sowohl der R G W , als auch die genannten 
Organisationen ihrem Charakter nach zum selben Organisationstyp gehören, sie sind 
Subjekte des Völkerrechts. Demzufolge ist das Verhältnis unter ihnen ein beigeordne-
tes Verhältnis, das Verhältnis internationaler Organisationen gleichen Charakters 
zueinander. Bei der Untersuchung ihrer Beziehungen m u ß aber auch die zentrale 
Rolle des R G W innerhalb des Institutionssystems der Kooperation vor Augen 
gehalten werden. 
Die rechtlichen Grundlagen der Beziehungen und der Koordination zwischen 
dem R G W und den sonstigen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen der Kooperation 
werden durch das Komplexprogram, durch die Gründungsurkunden der einzelnen 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen, sowie durch die die Fragen des Verhältnisses 
zwischen dem RGW und diesen Organisationen regelnden Abkommen (Protokolle) 
bestimmt. 
Das Grunddokument des RGW stellt im Zusammenhang damit fest, daß die 
durch die Mitgliedstaaten zwecks Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiete der Wirtschaft, 
der Wissenschaft, der Technik gegründeten internationalen Organisationen mit dem 
RGW in vertraglicher Beziehung stehen und das der R G W seine Tätigkeit, aufgrund 
der geschlossenen Vereinbarungen, seine Tätigkeit mit der Tätigkeit dieser Organisa-
tionen abstimmt. (Art. XII). 
Die konkreten Regeln und Prinzipien der Beziehungen und der Kooperation 
zwischen dem RGW und den sonstigen auf einzelnen Gebieten der Kooperation 
zustandegebrachten Organisationen sind auch durch das Komplexprogramm gere-
gelt. 
Das Programm berührt die Beziehungen und die Zusammenarbeit des RGW 
und der sonstigen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen der Kooperation in mehreren 
Beziehungen. Aus dem Gesichtspunkt der unsererseits zu untersuchenden Frage 
verdienen die folgenden drei Momente Aufmerksamkeit: die den Mitgliedstaaten 
obliegenden Verbindlichkeiten, die Form und der Charakter der Kooperation und die 
Hervorhebung der Selbstständigkeit der zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen. 
Im Zusammenhang mit der ersten Fragen hält das Komplexprogramm fest, daß 
die Mitgliedstaaten Verfügungen treffen dahingehend, daß die Tätigkeit der durch die 
betreffenden Staaten aufgrund der RGW-Prinzipien gegründeten, auf dem Gebiete der 
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Wirtschaft, der Wissenschaft und der Technik mit weitreichender Verantwortung 
ausgestatteten zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen mit der Tätigkeit des RGW 
harmonisieren. Das Komplexprogramm schreibt ferner vor, daß die Mitgliedstaaten 
Verfügungen treffen, daß die im Zusammenhang mit den Fragen der Kooperation 
zusammenhängenden RGW-Empfehlungen bei der Tätigkeit der durch sie 
gegründeten zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisationen in Betracht gezogen 
werden. Und schließlich stellt das Programm fest, d a ß die Mitgliedstaaten, bei der 
Gründung der zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen, in den Gründungsdokument 
dieser Organisationen jene Bestimmungen festlegen, die zur Aufnahme der Beziehun-
gen mit dem RGW notwendig sind. 
Das Komplexprogramm weist im weiteren auf den Charakter und auf die Form 
der Kooperation hin. Die Zusammenarbeit richtet sich grundlegend auf die 
notwendige Realisierung der Koordination. Bezüglich der Form der Koordination 
stellt das Programm fest, daß sich diese Koordination aufgrund der zwischen dem 
R G W und dieser Organisationen zum Abschluß gelangenden Abkommen und 
Protokolle realisiert. 
Auch aus dem Gesichtspunkt des Inhalts der Kooperation zwischen dem R G W 
und der bezüglichen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen ist jene These des Pro-
gramms von Bedeutung, welche besagt, daß die mit dem RGW in Vertragsverhältnis 
gelangten zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen selbständige zwischenstaatliche Orga-
nisationen der Mitglieder bleiben und aufgrund ihrer Gründungsurkunden funktio-
nieren.17 
Die rechtliche Grundlage der Beziehung und der Koordination zwischen dem 
R G W und den zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen wurde auch in den Gründungs-
urkunden der bezüglichen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen niedergelegt. Bis zur 
Annahme des Komplexprogramms legten die Gründungsurkunden, meist in einem 
separaten Artikel, jenes Recht der Organisation fest, d aß sie mit anderen internationa-
len Organisationen Verbindungen herstellen kann. Die Gründungsurkunden der nach 
der Annahme des Komplexprogramms gegründeten zwischenstaatlichen Organisatio-
nen machen insofern einen Schritt vorwärts, daß sie auf die Kooperation mit der R G W 
unmittelbar hinweisen. 
Das Gründungsabkommen der im Jahre 1973 gegründeten zwischenstaatlichen 
Organisation „Interelektro" hält fest, daß sie ihre Tätigkeit im Einklang mit der 
vorliegenden Vereinbarung . . . sowie mit den ihren Tätigkeitsbereich berührenden 
Empfehlungen und Entscheidungen des RGW ausüben wird. Es weist ferner darauf 
hin, daß das Interelektro seine Tätigkeit mit der Arbeit der RGW-Organe abstimmt, 
besonders in Bezug auf die Realisierung der bezüglichen Verfügungen des Komplex-
programms. (Gründungsabkommen des Interelektro, Art. II, Seite 2.) 
Die kontrahierenden Partner in den Kooperationsvereinbarungen zwischen 
dem RGW und sonstigen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen sind einerseits der 
11
 Siehe: Komptexprogramm. K.ap 16. Punkt 6. 
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R G W als internationale Organisation (und nicht das betreffende RGW-Organ!) , 
andererseits die zuständige zwischenstaatliche Organisation. Es ist notwendig dies 
auch separat festzuhalten, da in den Kooperationsprotokollen im allgemeinen 
erwähnt wird, welche RGW-Organisat ion es ist, über welche die bezügliche 
internationale Organisation mit dem R G W konkret zusammenarbeitet. Andererseits 
ist es aber offenbar, daß über eine Rechtsfähigkeit zur Herstellung von Kooperation 
und Beziehungen mit anderen internationalen Organisationen nur der RGW als 
internationale Organisation, nicht aber seine einzelnen Organe verfügen. Das ist auch 
dann der Fall, wenn die Kooperation mit einer internationalen Organisation im 
Namen des RGW für den RGW durch eines seiner konkreten Organe realisiert wird. 
Praktisch hat der RGW mit sämtlichen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen der 
Kooperation Kooperationsvereinbarungen (Kooperationsprotokolle) geschlossen.18 
Die Analysierung dieser Protokolle zeigt, daß sie ihrem Inhalt nach zahlreiche 
gemeinsame Elemente aufweisen, wenn auch, abhängig von dem Charakter der 
Organisationen, gewisse Eigenheiten existieren (siehe z. B. die Kooperationsprotokol-
le mit der Internationalen Bank fü r wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und der 
Internationalen Investitionsbank). 
In den Kooperationsprotokollen wird hervorgehoben, daß sich die Kooperation 
nach dem Prinzip der Wechselseitigkeit vollzieht. Als Hauptmethoden der Koopera-
tion zwischen dem R G W und den zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen sind folgende 
vorgesehen: gegenseitige Abstimmung der Arbeitspläne, eine wechselseitige Informa-
tion, gemeinsame Ausarbeitung von Themen, systematischer Austausch der bezüg-
lichen Materialien und Dokumente (Protokolle), gegenseitige Teilnahme in den 
Veranstaltungen und Tagungen der Organe, Organisierung von gemeinsamen 
Arbeitsgruppen usw. Es sei bemerkt, daß sich in der Praxis auch eine weitere 
Kooperationsform verbreitet hat, und zwar die Besprechung von umfassenden 
Referaten über die Tätigkeit der einzelnen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen im 
Rahmen der Sitzungen von RGW-Organen, vor allem des Exekutivausschusses, zum 
Teil aber auch einzelner zweiglichen ständigen Kommissionen, was auch eine 
wirksame Form der wechselseitigen Koordination ist. Die neueste Entwicklung zieht 
die Formung engerer und wirksamer Beziehungen zwischen dem R G W und sonstigen 
zwischenstaatlichen Kooperationsorganisationen vor 1 9 ohne d a ß das in dem 
Charakter und in der Natur der Beziehung wesentliche Veränderung verursacht hätte. 
Die in der letzten Zeit abgeschlossenen Kooperationsprotokolle heben in dieser 
Beziehung hervor, daß diese Organisationen im Laufe ihrer Funktionierung die an sie 
gerichteten und sich auf die Gesamtheit der Kooperation beziehenden Entscheidungen 
der RG W-Sitzungsperiode und des Exekutivkomitees, und die sich auf die Ganzheit der 
18
 Es sei bemerkt, daß, mit Hinsicht auch auf die praktischen Erfahrungen, der R G W in 1980 mit den 
bezüglichen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen neue Kooperationsabkommen geschlossen hat. 
19
 Die praktische Realisierung der langfristigen Kooperations-Zielprogramme setzt unter anderen 
eine kräftigere Organisationsintegration voraus, als die frühere gewesen ist. 
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Kooperation beziehenden, im Rahmen des R G W ausgearbeiteten normativ methodi-
schen Urkunden für maßgebend erachten. 
Auch prinzipiell ist es eine interessante Frage, wie und in welcher Quali tät die 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen mit dem RGW verbunden sind. Über diese Frage 
entfaltete sich auch in der Literatur eine weitverbreitete Debat te . Die Debat te wurde 
dadurch entfacht, daß das Komplexprogramm, das Verhältnis des RGW und dieser 
Organisationen behandelnd, eine Erklärung enthält, gemäß deren diese Organisatio-
nen (das heißt die zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen), als spezialisierte Organisatio-
nen mit dem RGW verbunden sind. (Komplexprogramm, Kap. 16, Punkt 5.) 
Aufgrund dessen stellt sich die Frage, wie und in welchem Sinne von einer 
Qualifizierung der zwischenstaatlichen Organe als spezialisierte Organe die Rede sein 
kann. Mit anderen Wor ten : soll der Ausdruck „spezialisierte Organisation" so 
verstanden werden, wie es sich in der internationalen Praxis eingebürgert hat (z. B. als 
Analogie der spezialisierten Organisationen der NATO), oder hat dieser Ausdruck 
eine andere Bedeutung speziellen Inhalts. Wie das aus dem zitierten Wort laut des 
Komplexprogramms hervorgeht, gibt das Programm auf diese Frage keine eindeutige 
Antwort. 
In der Literatur haben sich diesbezüglich zwei, einander gewissermaßen 
widersprechende Standpunkte herausgeformt: 
Aufgrund der Analysierung der bezüglichen Thesen des Komplexprogramms, 
ferner aufgrund der Analyse der bereits erwähnten Kooperationsvereinbarungen, 
vertreten Viele den Standpunkt , daß die Mehrheit (aber nicht die Gesamtheit) der 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen als spezialisierte Organisationen des RGW zu 
betrachten sind.20 Das ist vor allem dami t begründet, daß die Tätigkeit dieser 
Organisationen eng mit der Funktion des R G W verbunden ist. 
Diese Autoren bezeichnen als grundlegende Merkmale der spezialisierten 
Organisationen des R G W , übereinstimmend mit dem Komplexprogramm, die 
folgenden: 
(a) sie funktionieren nach den Prinzipien des R G W , 
(b) sie sind auf dem Gebiet ihrer Tätigkeit mit einer weitgehenden Verantwor-
tung ausgestattet, 
(c) sie stehen mit dem RGW in vertraglicher Kooperationsbeziehung, 
(d) diesem letzteren zufolge stimmen sie ihre Tätigkeit eng mit der Tätigkeit des 
RGW ab. 
Auch diese Autoren betonen aber, daß es zur Vervollständigung und klarer 
Gestaltung des spezialisierten Status dieser Organisationen einer weiteren Ausbreitung 
und Vertiefung der Koordinat ion zwischen diesen Organisationen und des RGW 
bedarf.21 Im Interesse der Regulierung des Rechtsstatus der spezialisierten Organisa-
tionen des RGW schlagen sie die Ausarbeitung einer internationalen Vereinbarung 
20
 Совет Экономической Взаимопомощи. Основные правовые проблемы. Moskau, 1975, р. 
286 et seq. 
21
 Op cit. p. 308. 
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vor, die den Rechtsstatus der spezialisierten Organisationen umfassend regeln 
würde.22 
Schließlich muß auch bemerkt werden, daß auch die Autoren, die sich zur 
Qualifizierung der zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen als spezialisierte Organisatio-
nen des R G W bekennen, betonen, daß die Behandlung dieser Organisationen als 
spezialisierte Organisationen keineswegs irgendwie die Beschränkung ihrer 
Selbständigkeit bedeuten kann; es kann zwischen diesen spezialisierten Organisatio-
nen und dem R G W keinerlei Subordination, keine Unter- und Übergeordnetheit 
herrschen.23 
Dieser Auffassung gegenüber besteht in der Literatur auch eine andere Ansicht. 
Die Vertreter dieses letzteren leugnen es, daß die zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen 
spezialisierte Organisation des R G W wären. Sie begründen diese Auffassung damit , 
daß der im Komplexprogramm abgefasste Ausdruck „spezialisierte Organisation" vor 
allem nicht die rechtliche Qualifikation dieser Organisationen bedeutet, sondern im 
Wesentlichen jenen Umstand, daß sie ihre Tätigkeit, im Vergleich zum R G W , die 
seinem Tätigkeitsbereich nach in gewissem Sinne eine universale Organisation ist, auf 
einem engeren Kreis der Kooperation, auf einem spezifischen Feld ausüben. Die 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen sind also dem Charakter ihrer Tätigkeit nach 
spezifizierte Organisationen, und nicht wegen ihrer Beziehung zum RGW.2* 
Die Vertreter dieser Auffassung lenken die Aufmerksamkeit darauf, daß es 
äußerst schwierig wäre die zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen als spezifizierte Organe 
des RGW aufzufassen, schon deshalb, weil die zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen, 
gemäß der Zusammensetzung ihrer Mitgliedschaft, mehrerlei sind. So gibt es 
zwischenstaatliche Organisationen, deren Mitglieder nicht nur RGW-Länder , 
sondern auch andere sozialistische Länder sind (z. B. Eisenbahnkooperations-
Organisation), oder in denen nicht sämtliche RGW-Länder , sondern nur einige von 
ihnen Mitglieder sind (z. B. Intermetall). Daraus ergibt sich, d a ß es hier nur von 
spezialisierten Organisationen dieser Länder gesprochen werden kann, nicht aber von 
den spezialisierten Organisationen des RGW. Dementsprechend können wir von 
spezialisierten Organisationen der sozialistischen Länder, von spezialisierten Organisa-
tionen der interessierten RGW-Mitgliedstaaten, und schließlich von spezialisierten 
Organisationen der RGW-Mitgliedländer sprechen.25 
Die Vertreter dieses Standpunktes argumentieren auch damit, daß nicht in allen 
mit den zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen geschlossenen Kooperat ionsabkommen 
ausgedrückt wird daß sich die betreffende Organisation an den R G W als „spezifizierte 
Organisation" knüpft . Im Kooperat ionsabkommen des RGW mit der Bank fü r 
Internationalen Zusammenarbeit und der Internationalen Investitionsbank figuriert 
22
 Op. cit. p. 309. 
23
 Siehe: Т О К А Р Е В А , П . : op. cit. p. 2 4 . et seq. 
2 4
 Siehe darüber МОРОЗОВ, В.: Международные экономические организации социалистических 
стран. Moskau, 1968, р. 26. 
2 5
 C f . М О Р О З О В , В . : o p . c i t . р . 2 5 . 
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eine derartige Abfassung überhaupt nicht, woraus gleichfalls darauf gefolgert werden 
kann, daß es verfehlt wäre die zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen als spezifizierte 
Organisationen zu betrachten. Unserer Meinung nach wäre es heute noch schwer auf 
die Frage, ob die zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisationen der Kooperation 
spezifizierte Organisationen des R G W sind oder nicht, eindeutige Antwort zu geben. 
Bei der Prüfung dieser Angelegenheit muß der Umstand in Betracht gezogen werden, 
daß die zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen der Kooperation nach dem Prinzip ihrer 
Tätigkeit und der Zusammensetzung ihrer Mitgliedschaft verschieden sind. Anderer-
seits müssen die Formen und Methoden der Verbindung der verschiedenen 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen mit dem R G W , und der Inhalt ihrer Verbindung 
beachtet werden. Die Frage von dieser Seite betrachtet, kann die Verbindung der 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen und des R G W unseres Erachtens heute noch 
nicht als solche angesehen werden, das in jeder Beziehung sämtlichen Kriterien der 
„spezifizierten Organisationen des R G W " entsprechen würde. Es m u ß aber 
gleichzeitig betont werden, d a ß für eine bestimmte Gruppe der zwischenstaatlichen 
Wirtschaftsorganisationen jene Kriterien immer deutlicher werden, deren kräftigere 
Entfaltung, hauptsächlich aber die Vertiefung und weitere Ausbreitung des Inhalts 
dieser Verbindung diese Organisationen im Zuge der weiteren Entwicklung tatsächlich 
zur echten spezifizierten Organisationen des R G W machen könnte. Hier denken wir 
grundlegend und in erster Linie auf zwischenstaatliche Wirtschaftsorganisationen, die 
nach dem Prinzip des R G W arbeiten und deren Mitglieder RGW-Staaten sind. 
(b) Im Vergleich mit den zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen haben im 
Institutionssystem der Kooperat ion die internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen (im 
weiteren IWO) einen speziellen Stand. Die spezifische Lage der IWO ergibt sich vor 
allem aus ihrem Charakter, aus ihrer rechtlichen Qualität. 
Die IWO können nicht als Subjekte des Völkerrechts betrachtet werden, 
sondern sie verfügen über zivilrechtliche Rechtspersönlichkeit, genauer ausgedrückt: 
sie sind Rechtssubjekte des Rechts des Sitzlandes. Es versteht sich natürlich, daß sie 
aus ihrem internationalen Charakter herrührend spezielle Subjekte des nationalen 
Rechts sind, indem in den Gründungsurkunden die volle Anerkennung der 
Rechtspersönlichkeit der IWO auf dem Gebiete sämtlicher interessierten Länder 
gesichert erscheint.26 Aus dieser rechtlichen Qualität der IWO folgt es, daß ihre 
organisatorisch-juristische Beziehung mit dem RGW anderer Natur ist, als die 
Beziehung des RGW und anderer auf bestimmten Gebieten der Kooperation tätigen 
zwischenstaatlichen ökonomischen Organisationen. 
Bei der Untersuchung des Inhalts dieser Beziehung ist es notwendig zwei auch in 
der Literatur oft auftauchende Extremitäten zu vermeiden. 
Das Wesen der einen Extremität besteht darin, daß sie die Beziehung zwischen 
der R G W und der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisation im Grunde als eine 
2 6
 Es sei bemerkt, daß auf diesen Umstand die Gründungsdokumente der bisher gegründeten 
internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen ausdrücklich hinweisen. 
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hierarchische Über- und Untergeordnetheit ansieht, und auf dem Standpunkt steht, daß 
die zuständigen Organisationen des R G W die IWO gemeinsam lenken.2 7 Dieser 
Auffassung kann angesichts der im Grunddokument des R G W und im Komplexpro-
gramm abgefaßten Kooperationsprinzipien nicht zugebilligt werden. 
Das Grunddokument des R G W , wie auch das Komplexprogramm geht im 
ganzen System der Kooperation aus dem Prinzip der Gleichheit der Mitgliedstaaten 
aus. Das Programm hebt noch speziell hervor, daß die seitens der Mitgliedstaaten 
gegründeten internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen keinen übernationalen Cha-
rakter tragen dürfen. Darüber hinaus verrichten die IWO, aufgrund ihrer Grün-
dungsurkunden ihre Tätigkeit selbständig. Deshalb soll der in der Literatur 
ausgedrückten Anschauung recht gesprochen werden, daß im System der internatio-
nalen Organisationen der sozialistischen Staaten keine Über- oder Untergeordnetheit 
existiert.28 
Bei der Untersuchung der Beziehung des R G W und der IWO m u ß unserer 
Beurteilung nach auch eine andere, dem obigen entgegengesetzte Extremität 
vermieden werden. Ausgegangen von der oben beschriebenen Selbständigkeit der 
IWO, beziehungsweise mit Bezug darauf , existieren auch Auffassungen, die die 
Selbständigkeit der IWO quasi absolutisieren.29 Eine derartige Annäherung dieser 
Frage verbergt die Gefahr , daß die IWO aus dem Institutionssystem der Koordination 
herausgerissen wird. 
Bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage soll davon ausgegangen werden, daß die 
IWO Komponente des in weitem Sinne genommenen Institutionsmechanismus der 
Kooperation sind und demzufolge ist die Sicherung der entsprechenden Koordination 
zwischen den entsprechenden Organen des RGW und der IWO unvermeidlich. 
Die rechtliche Grundlage der Verwirklichung der Koordination wurde — außer 
dem Komplexprogramm — auch in den Gründungsurkunden der IWO, sowie in den die 
Schaffung von unmittelbaren Arbeitsbeziehungen zwischen dem RGW-Sekretariat und 
den Exekutivorganen (Direktorien) der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen zum 
Ziele habenden Protokollen abgefaßt. 
Aufgrund der Analysierung dieser Protokolle kann festgestellt werden, daß die 
Arbeitsbeziehungen auf die enge Harmonisierung der Tätigkeit der bezüglichen 
RGW-Organe und der IWO gerichtet sind. 
Die Formen und Methoden der Arbeitsbeziehungen sind die folgenden: 
a) wechselseitige Information über die Arbeitspläne, beziehungsweise deren 
entsprechende Abstimmung, 
27
 Die Darlegung dieser Auffassung s. z.B. CIZKOVSKY: Der Mechanismus der planmäßigen Lenkung 
der wirtschaftlichen Kooperation in der sozialistischen Integration der RGW-Mitgliedstaaten. Prag, 1975, p. 
16. 
28
 Siehe: Совет Экономической Взаимопомощи. Основные правовые проблемы. Moskau, 1975, р. 
398. 
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b) Schaffung einer ständigen und laufenden Arbeitsbeziehung, beziehungsweise 
deren Aufrechterhaltung im Zuge der Vorbereitung von Materialien im Zusammen-
hang mit den bedeutenderen Fragen der Kooperation; Austausch von in den 
Sitzungen zur Debatte stehenden Arbeitsdokumente, 
c) wechselseitige Information über die in den Sitzungen angenommenen 
Beschlüssen. 
Die Arbeitsbeziehung zwischen dem Sekretariat des RGW und dem Direkto-
rium der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisation realisiert sich über die seitens des 
Leiters der zwei Organe ermächtigten Vertretern. 
Eine besondere Form der Beziehung der durch den R G W und den Mitgliedstaa-
ten gegründeten gemeinsamen Organisationen ist es, wenn die Organe des RGW an 
diese Organisationen gerichtete Empfehlungen annehmen. Die Empfehlungen dieser 
Na tur sind, im Vergleich mit den Typischen RGW-Empfehlungen, auch ihrem 
Charakter nach speziell. 
Aufgrund der Hauptmerkmale der RGW-Empfehlungen — die wir später 
ausführlich darlegen werden — kann festgestellt werden, daß die durch die RGW-
Organe an die internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen adressierten Empfehlungen 
nicht für RGW-Empfehlungen gelten können, wie sie in der Grundurkunde des RGW 
niedergelegt sind. Das geht vor allem da raus hervor, d a ß die Grundurkunde des RGW 
ausschließlich von Empfehlungen, adressiert an die Mitgliedstaaten spricht und 
keinerlei Verfügungen über Empfehlungen an die seitens der Mitgliedstaaten 
gegründeten internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen beinhaltet. Es sei bemerkt, 
daß auch das Komplex program von keiner an die internationalen Organisationen 
adressierten Empfehlungen spricht, sondern festlegt, d a ß die RGW-Mitgliedstaaten 
Verfügungen treffen, daß im Zuge der Tätigkeit der internationalen Wirtschaftsorga-
nisation die RGW-Empfehlungen, die diese Organisationen betreffen in Betracht 
gezogen werden. 
Auch das ist offenbar, daß infolge der Verschiedenheit der Adressaten, natürlich 
auch die Rechtsfolgen der Empfehlungen abweichend sind. Aus der in der Grundurkun-
de festgelegten Empfehlung entsteht gegebenenfalls eine Verbindlichkeit materiellen 
Charakters. Die an die internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen adressierten 
Empfehlungen haben aber keine derartige Folgen, aus diesen entsteht für die 
Organisationen, anderen internationalen Rechtssubjekten gegenüber, keine unmittel-
bare Verbindlichkeit. 
Dasselbe sehen wir auch, wenn wir die Kooperat ionsprotokolle und die 
Gründungsurkunden durchblicken. Dor t wird nämlich von einer ,,Beachtung" 
derartiger Empfehlungen seitens der internationalen Organisation gesprochen. Wie 
die betreffende internationale Organisation die RGW-Empfehlung beachtet und in 
welcher Form sie dieselbe realisiert, das hängt völlig von der Einsicht dieser 
Organisation ab. Daraus geht hervor, daß die unmittelbar an die internationalen 
Wirtschaftsorganisationen adressierten RGW-Empfehlungen, ihrer rechtlichen Natur 
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nach, keineswegs als irgendwelche „verbindliche Weisungen" zu betrachten sind, 
sondern eher die Stellungnahmen und Empfehlungen des RGW in solchen Fragen 
ausdrücken, deren Lösung, infolge des Gründungsdokuments, in den Aufgabenkreis 
und Wirkungsbereich der einzelnen internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen 
gehört. 
III 
Eines der wichtigsten Elemente der Funktionierung des Institutionssystems ist 
die Art der Entscheidungsordnung. Eine Differenz in der Entscheidungsordnung 
besteht hauptsächlich zwischen den in das Institutionssystem gehörenden Institutions-
gruppen (zwischenstaatliche, beziehungsweise zwischenbetriebliche gemeinsame 
Institutionen), aber gewisse Eigenartigkeiten sind auch in der Entscheidungsordnung 
der in ein und dieselbe Institutionsgruppe gehörenden gemeinsamen Organisationen 
zu finden. Ohne darauf einzugehen, diese zweifelsohne beachtenswerte Unterschiede 
und Eigenartigkeiten darzulegen, möchten wir, wegen ihrer Wichtigkeit, im weiteren 
einige mit der Entscheidungsordnung des RGW, als wichtigste Organisation des 
Institutionssystems zusammenhängende Fragen berühren. 
Für die Entscheidungsordnung des RGW ist jener früher bereits erwähnte 
Umstand bestimmend, daß der R G W seinem Charakter nach eine zwischenstaatliche 
(Interregierungs-) Organisation ist, deshalb hat er keinen von den Mitgliedern 
derselben völlig gesonderten, von denen völlig unabhängigen ausschließlichen 
Wirkungskreis. Das bedeutet nicht, daß der RGW, als internationale Organisation, 
keinen autonomen Willen besitzt. Im Gegenteil! Es geht nur darum, daß dieser Wille 
unmittelbar rechtsverbindlich für ihre Mitglieder keine völkerrechtliche Verpflichtung 
entstehen läßt, sondern es entstehen für die Mitgliedstaaten von den durch den R G W 
getroffenen Entscheidungen internationalrechtliche Verpflichtungen nur dann, wenn 
und, nachdem die einzelnen Länder diese in ihrem nationalen Rahmen nachträglich 
akzeptiert haben. Es muß noch bemerkt werden, daß eine derartige Auffassung der 
Entscheidungskompetenz des RGW nicht ausschließt, das der R G W in bestimmten 
konkreten Fällen durch die Mitglieder ermächtigt wird konkrete Schritte zu 
unternehmen (z. B. auf dem Gebiet der äußeren Beziehungen des RGW). 
In die Entscheidungsbereich des R G W gehören objektiverseits all jene Fragen, 
die im Grunddokument als Aufgabe der Organisation bezeichnet sind. Andererseits 
aber werden die Grundlagen und rechtlichen Formen der Entscheidungsordnung 
durch die entsprechenden Bestimmungen des Grunddokuments (hauptsächlich 
Artikel IV des Grunddokuments) , und durch die die RGW-Organe betreffende 
Geschäftsordnung und Prozeßregel bestimmt. Diese Regelung bringt jene Prinzipien 
zum Ausdruck, die die Basis der Entscheidungsordnung des RGW bilden. Diese sind 
im Wesentlichen die folgenden: 
— die Mitgliedstaaten nehmen an jedem Abschnitt der Entscheidung mit 
gleichen Rechten teil, 
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— die Entscheidungsordnung des R G W kennt das Prinzip des Mehrheitsbe-
schlusses nicht, die Entscheidung geschieht aufgrund der Einstimmigkeit aller 
interessierten Staaten, 
— in den meritorischen Fragen der Kooperation können nur die nach dem 
Prinzip der gleichen Vertretung funktionierenden Organe Entscheidungen treffen, 
— aus den durch die RGW-Organe akzeptierten Entscheidungen entstehen für 
die Mitgliedstaaten unmittelbar keine materiellen Verbindlichkeiten, diese Entschei-
dungen werden für sie nach der nachträglichen Akzeptierung derselben verpflich-
tend. 
Von den erwähnten Prinzipien müssen wir uns — schon wegen seiner 
praktischen Bedeutung — mit dem Prinzip der Interessiertheit befassen. Im 
allgemeinen bedeutet das Prinzip der Interessiertheit, d a ß es jedem Mitgliedstaat 
zusteht, in der im R G W auf die Tagesordnung gesetzten Kooperationsfrage 
Interessiertheit oder Uninteressiertheit zu bekennen. Eine der Rechtsfolgen der 
Bekennung der Interessiertheit ist, daß der zuständige Organ des R G W in der 
aufgeworfenen Frage nur mit Einverständnis sämtlicher interessierten Staaten 
Entscheidung treffen kann. Es soll übrigens bemerkt werden, daß die Interessiertheit 
der Mitgliedstaaten als positiv angenommen wird, wenn sie sich nicht uninteressiert 
erklärt haben. Andererseits kann die Tatsache, daß ein Land in der vorliegenden Frage 
Uninteressiertheit erklärt, beziehungsweise an der Entscheidung nicht teilgenommen 
hat, die übrigen Staaten nicht daran hindern, daß sie in der die Kooperation 
berührenden Frage, im Rahmen des R G W , für sie selbst wirksame Entscheidungen 
annehmen. Beide Seiten des Prinzips der Interessiertheit sind von Wichtigkeit, denn 
nur unter gleichzeitiger Wirksamkeit dieser doppelten Forderung kann das Beteili-
gungsrecht an den Entscheidungen vollständig und praktisch tatsächlich reell wer-
den. 
Sollte ein Land an der Entscheidung nicht Interessiert sein, beziehungsweise an 
der Entscheidung nicht teilgenommen haben, entsteht aus der Entscheidung für dieses 
Land gar keine Verpflichtung. Gleichzeitig aber hat es das Recht sich später dieser 
Entscheidung anzuschließen. 
Was nun die rechtliche Form der seitens des RGW angenommenen Entscheidun-
gen betrifft, sollen die folgenden Entscheidungsformen herausgehoben werden: (a) 
Beschluß, (b) Empfehlung, (c) abgestimmter Vorschlag. Dem muß gleich hinzugefügt 
werden, daß im System der Kooperation in der letzten Zeit auch eine, in vieler 
Beziehung den internationalen Abkommen ähnliche Form, wie die unmittelbare 
Vereinbarung, die zwar keine streng genommene Entscheidungsform des R G W ist, 
aber wegen ihrer Neuartigkeit und rechtlicher Natur besondere Aufmerksamkeit 
verdient. 
(a) Die innere Funktionierung des RGW als internationale Organisation 
regelnde Entscheidungsform ist der Beschluß. Daraus ergibt sich, daß der Gegenstand 
des Beschlusses nicht die meritorische Zusammenarbeit , sondern die organisatori-
schen und Verfahrensprobleme ist. Beschlußfassungsrecht haben sämtliche RGW 
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Vertretungsorgane.30 Der Inhalt dieses Wirkungskreises der einzelnen RGW-Organe 
ist durch das Grunddokument des R G W und durch die die einzelnen R G W 
Vertretungsorgane betreffenden Geschäftsregel bestimmt. Es sei bemerkt, d a ß es 
Fragen gibt, in denen die Beschlußfassung dem höchsten Organ des R G W , der 
Ratssitzung zugeteilt ist. Solche sind z. В.: Aufnahme eines neuen Mitglieds in die 
Organisation, die Modifizierung des Grunddokuments , usw. D a die Beschlüsse fü r die 
einzelnen Länder keine materielle Konsequenzen haben, bedarf es keiner 
nachträglichen Bestätigung seitens der Mitgliedstaaten. Demzufolge treten die 
Beschlüsse im allgemeinen nach ihrer Annahme in Kraft , falls diesbezüglich der 
Beschluß selbst keine andere Vorschrift enthält , beziehungsweise aus dem Charak te r 
des Beschlusses bezüglich der Inkraftsetzung nichts anderes folgt. 
(b) Unter den Entscheidungsformen des R G W haben die RGW-Empfehlungen 
eine zentrale Rolle. Es ist kein Zufall, daß auch in der Literatur die Debatten meist 
über die Beurteilung der rechtlichen Natur der Empfehlungen, ihrer verpflichtenden 
Kraft , usw. entfaltet hat, ohne jedoch in sämtlichen Streitfragen einen einheitlichen 
Standpunkt erreicht haben zu können. 
Neben den praktischen Bezügen der Frage läßt es allein schon dieser Umstand 
begründet erscheinen, daß wir uns — wenn auch bloß skizzenhaft — mit der 
rechtlichen Natur der mit der RGW-Empfehlung zusammenhängenden Fragen näher 
befassen. 
Bei der Untersuchung der charakteristischen Züge der RGW-Empfehlung kann 
als Ausgangspunkt dienen, daß mit der Annahme der Empfehlung3 1 sogar zwei Arten 
von Rechtsverhältnissen entstehen: einerseits zwischen dem R G W und den an den 
Empfehlungen teilnehmenden Ländern; das ist dem Charak te r des Rechtsver-
hältnisses nach verfahrensmäßig (das Sekretariat des R G W ist verpflichtet die im 
Protokoll des zuständigen Organs niedergelegte Empfehlung den berührten Ländern 
zuzusenden, und die betreffenden Länder sind verpflichtet diese binnen 60 Tagen zu 
untersuchen das Sekretariat des RGW, und über ihn die interessierten Partner, über 
die Annahme oder Zurückweisung zu verständigen); andererseits aber entsteht nach 
der nachträglichen Annahme der Empfehlung seitens de r berührten Länder 
(Bekräftigung) Rechtsverhältnis auch zwischen den betreffenden Ländern. Dieses 
Rechtsverhältnis ist aber nunmehr nicht formell, sondern besitzt einen materiellrecht-
lichen Charakter und hat gegebenenfalls zur Folge, daß die berührten Länder einander 
gegenüber gegenseitig Verpflichtungen eingehen. Infolge der abweichenden Deu tung 
dieser Doppelheit erklären einzelne Autoren die RGW-Empfehlung, nach der 
Annahme derselben seitens der Länder, automatisch für internationales Abkommen, 
andere wieder für spezielles internationales Abkommen (pactum sui generis), wieder 
3 0
 Die Vertreterorgane des RGW sind die folgenden: Sitzungspenode des Rates, das Exekutivko-
mitee, die Kooperationsausschüsse, die ständigen Kommissionen, die ständigen Konferenzen. 
31
 Die „Annahme" der Empfehlung hat sogar zwei Momente: die Annahme der Empfehlung seitens 
des RGW-Organ und die Annahme der Empfehlung seitens des nationalen Organs der interessierten 
Länder. 
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andere erachten es für eine Entscheidungsform ohne verpflichtende Kra f t . 3 2 
Demzufolge gab es, besonders in den früheren Perioden der Kooperation, 
hauptsächlich in der Volkswirtschaftsliteratur, bezüglich der rechtlichen Natur der 
RGW-Empfehlungen Auffassungen, gemäß deren die RGW-Empfehlung ihrem 
Charakter nach kein rechtlicher, sondern ein moralischer Akt ist. Das bedeutet mit 
anderen Worten, daß die Realisierung der RGW-Empfehlungen nicht durch deren 
rechtlich zwingenden Charakter, sondern ihr moralisch-politisches Ansehen gesichert 
wird. 
Es taucht die Frage auf, wie eigentlich das Verhältnis zwischen der RGW-
Empfehlung und dem internationalen Abkommen beschaffen ist. 
Bei der Untersuchung des gegenseitigen Verhältnisses der RGW-Empfehlung 
und des internationalen Abkommens müssen gleichzeitig zwei Momente in Betracht 
gezogen werden: es müssen einerseits jene gemeinsamen Züge, Berührungspunkte 
untersucht werden, die zwischen der RGW-Empfehlung und dem internationalen 
Abkommen bestehen, andererseits müssen jene eigenartigen, spezifischen Unterschei-
dungsmerkmale in Betracht gezogen werden, die für diese beiden charakteristisch 
sind. 
Zwischen der RGW-Empfehlung und dem internationalen Abkommen beste-
hen zahlreiche gemeinsame Züge. Es ist z. B. sowohl das internationale Abkommen, 
als auch die RGW-Empfehlung internationaler Rechtsakt. Das bedeutet unter 
anderen, daß sie mit den allgemein anerkannten Prinzipien und Normen des 
internationalen Rechts in Einklang stehen müssen. Ein weiteres gemeinsames 
Merkmal ist, d a ß die RGW-Empfehlung, als internationales Abkommen, eine gewisse 
Willenseinheit der daran teilnehmenden Länder voraussetzt. Das stimmt auch dann , 
wenn bei der RGW-Empfehlung diese Willenseinheit im Rahmen einer internationa-
len Organisation entsteht, weshalb es sich hier nicht um die Willenseinheit von Staaten 
im allgemeinen, sondern von der Willenseinheit der in der gegebenen internationalen 
Organisation teilnehmenden Mitgliedstaaten handelt . Das bedeutet auch gleichzeitig, 
daß die RGW-Empfehlung nicht nur und nicht einfach die Verkörperung des 
einheitlichen Willens der interessierten Staaten ist, sondern daß sie auch die 
Willenserklärung der internationalen Organisation als solches repräsentiert. Insofern 
ist die RGW-Erklärung der einseitige Akt der internationalen Organisation, was sie 
aber vom internationalen Abkommen gleichzeitig auch unterscheidet. Bleiben wir aber 
einstweilen bei der Analysierung der Berührungspunkte der RGW-Empfehlung und 
des internationalen Abkommens. Ein weiterer gemeinsamer Zug derselben ist, d a ß 
sowohl die Annahme der RGW-Empfehlung, als auch der Abschluß des internationa-
len Abkommens durch Staaten und internationalen Organisationen angeregt werden 
kann. Ein gemeinsamer Zug ist ferner, daß gegebenenfalls sowohl aus der R G W -
Empfehlung als auch aus dem internationalen Abkommen für die teilnehmenden 
32
 Siehe ausführlicher: УСЕНКО, E.: Юридические акты СЭВ. — Совет Экономической 
Взаимопомощи. Основные правовые проблемы. Moskau. 1975, pp. 206—247. 
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Länder internationalrechtliche Verpflichtungen entstehen. Anhand dieser letzteren 
muß separat betont werden, daß sich die aus der RGW-Empfehlung und aus den 
internationalen Abkommen stammenden internationalrechtlichen Verpflichtungen, 
betreffend ihrer Rechtskraft, voneinander nicht unterscheiden. Als gemeinsamer Zug 
der beiden internationalen Rechtsakten gilt auch, daß die Realisierung der aus der 
RGW-Empfehlung, beziehungsweise aus dem internationalen Abkommen stammen-
den Verpflichtungen als internationalrechtliche Pflicht der teilnehmenden Länder 
gilt. 
Neben den Erwähnten Berührungspunkten beziehungsweise gemeinsamen 
Merkmalen gibt es zwischen der RGW-Empfehlung und dem internationalen 
Abkommen eine ganze Reihe von Abweichungen. Diese Unterschiede bringen im 
Wesentlichen die Spezifika der RGW-Empfehlungen, verglichen mit den internationa-
len Abkommen, zum Ausdruck. Einige Eigenheiten der RGW-Empfehlungen in dieser 
Beziehung sind die folgenden: 
(a) Gegenstand des internationalen Abkommens kann jedes beliebige Gebiet 
sein, das sich aus dem Verhältnis der Staaten untereinander ergibt. In diesem Sinn ist 
das internationale Abkommen die umfassendste Verbindung universellen Charakters 
zwischen den Staaten. Demgegenüber können Gegenstand der RGW-Empfehlung nur 
wirtschaftliche und technisch-wissenschaftliche Kooperationsfragen sein, die das 
Grunddokument zur Aufgabe des R G W gestellt hat. 
(b) Eine gewisse Abweichung besteht zwischen der RGW-Empfehlung und dem 
internationalen Abkommen auch bezüglich des Vorgangs ihrer Ausarbeitung. Das 
internationale Abkommen ist, wie bekannt , das Resultat mindestens zweier das 
Abkommen zustande bringenden Staaten, wo die Tätigkeit selbst gar nicht geregelt ist. 
Abweichend davon ist die RGW-Empfehlung in vorbestimmtem Sinn ein einseitiger 
Akt des R G W als internationale Organisation, infolge dessen zwischen dem R G W und 
den an der Empfehlung teilnehmenden Ländern die bereits erwähnten Rechtsver-
hältnisse formellen Charakters entstehen, ohne selbstredend, daß der R G W in 
materiellrechtlichem Sinne Beteiligter der Empfehlung wäre. Ferner wird die Ordnung 
der Ausarbeitung (Annahme) der Empfehlung durch das Grunddokument des RGW, 
sowie seine sonstigen normativen Dokumente Geschäftsordnung und Prozeßregel 
bestimmt. Dementsprechend geht die Ordnung der Ausarbeitung (Annahme) der 
RGW-Empfehlung im Rahmen einer rechtlich geregelten Prozedur vor sich. 
(c) Nach dem Inkrafttreten der internationalen Abkommen entstehen unmittel-
bar Rechte und Verpflichtungen zwischen den an diesem Abkommen teilnehmenden 
Mitgliedstaaten. Abweichend davon läßt die RGW-Empfehlung — als einseitiger Akt 
in vorbestimmtem Sinn — im Moment der Annahme seitens des R G W in direkter 
Form keine wechselseitigen Rechte und Verpflichtungen für die daran teilnehmenden 
Länder entstehen. Das ergibt sich unter anderen daraus, daß im Rahmen des 
gegebenen RGW-Organs die Vertreter der Staaten als Mitglieder der Organisation an 
der Annahme der Empfehlung teilnehmen und nicht als im vorhinein beauftragte 
Vertreter der betreffenden Staaten. 
4* Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
58 L. Ficzere 
(b) Zur Inkraftsetzung der internationalen Abkommen bedarf es nicht in jedem 
Fall der nachträglichen Bestätigung (Bekräftigung), sie können im Moment ihrer 
Unterzeichnung in Kra f t treten. Demgegenüber müssen die zuständigen nationalen 
Organe der teilnehmenden Staaten die RGW-Empfehlung in allen Fällen untersuchen 
und sich über die Annahme oder Zurückweisung äußern. 
(e) Über die Wirkungsdauer und Modifizierung der internationalen Abkommen 
verfügt das Abkommen selbst. Demgegenüber enthält die RGW-Empfehlung 
bezüglich ihrer Wirkungsdauer und Abänderung (Modifizierung) im allgemeinen 
keine Verfügungen. Die Modifizierung, Abänderung, beziehungsweise die 
Außerkraftsetzung der RGW-Empfehlung kann sowohl aufgrund der Initiative der 
daran teilnehmenden Länder, als auch auf Anregung des RGW vorgenommen 
werden. Die Modifizierung, beziehungsweise die Außerkraftsetzung der Empfehlung 
gehört in den Wirkungskreis des R G W als internationales Organ. 
Aus den dargelegten gemeinsamen Zügen der RGW-Empfehlung und des 
internationalen Abkommens, beziehungsweise aus den Eigenheiten, die sich in dieser 
Beziehung offenbaren, kann festgestellt werden, daß die Empfehlung ein seihständiger, 
eigenartiger internationalrechtlicher Akt ist. Ein auch der RGW-Empfehlung 
gegenüber geltend zu machendes Erfordernis ist, daß sie mit den allgemein 
akzeptierten Prinzipien und Normen des internationalen Rechts und mit den 
Vorschriften des Grunddokuments des RGW und ihren sonstigen normativen 
Dokumenten in Einklang stehen muß. Unserer Beurteilung nach wird sie auch nach 
der nachträglichen Annahme (Bekräftigung) seitens der Mitgliedstaaten nicht 
automatisch zum internationalen Abkommen, sondern sie behält in bestimmten Sinne 
ihren selbständigen Charakter, wenn sie auch mit dem internationalen Abkommen 
zahlreiche ähnliche Züge aufweist. Der erwähnte selbständige Charakter kommt unter 
anderen auch darin zum Ausdruck, daß die Änderung (Modifizierung) und 
Außerkraftsetzung der Empfehlung in allen Fällen dem RGW als internationale 
Organisation vorbehalten ist. Es kann also als Endergebnis festgehalten werden, daß 
aus der RGW-Empfehlung nach der nachträglichen Annahme seitens der Länder 
Rechte und Verpflichtungen mit internationalrechtlicher Kraft entstehen, ohne jedoch, 
daß sie selbst unmittelbar zu internationalem Abkommen werden würde. 
Aus der von den interessierten Ländern angenommenen Empfehlung entstehen 
Verpflichtungen sogar in zwei Verhältnissen, und zwar; (a) in der wechselseitigen 
Beziehung der an der Empfehlung teilnehmenden Länder; diese Verpflichtungen sind 
gewöhnlich internationalrechtliche Verbindlichkeiten materiellen Charakters, (b) 
Verpflichtungen der an der Empfehlung beteiligten Mitgliedländer in RGW-Relation; 
diese letztere Verpflichtung entsteht aus jener Verfügung des Grunddokuments , daß 
die Mitgliedstaaten übereingekommen sind die Verwirklichung der ihrerseits 
angenommenen Empfehlungen sicher zu stellen, beziehungsweise den Rat über deren 
Durchführung zu orientieren. (Art. II, Punkt 4 a) und d)). 
(c) Eine spezielle Form der RGW-Entscheidung ist der abgestimmte Vorschlag. 
Mit einem derartigen Entscheidungsrecht werden durch die bezüglichen normativen 
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Dokumenten unter den Vertretungsorganen des R G W die sogenannten ständigen 
Sitzungen33 ausgestattet, die übrigens über kein unmittelbares Empfehlungsrecht 
verfügen. 
Abweichend von der RGW-Empfehlung entstehen aus den abgestimmten 
Vorschlägen für die Mitgliedstaaten keine Verpflichtungen mit rechtlicher Geltung, 
deshalb müssen sie auch nicht nachträglich bestätigt werden. Die Verwirklichung der 
abgestimmten Vorschläge geschieht deshalb in den einzelnen Ländern nach ihrem 
Beliehen, im Einklang mit ihrer inneren Ordnung. 3 4 
Über die unmittelbare Vereinbarung muß separat gesprochen werden. Diese 
Form wurde früher besonders im Kooperationsausschuß für Planung angewendet. 
Diese Form wurde übrigens in der Geschäftsordnung dieses RGW-Organs zum 
erstenmal erfaßt, hauptsächlich in Angelegenheiten, die eine operative Entscheidung 
beanspruchten, bei denen aber die Annahme der RGW-Entscheidung nicht begründet, 
oder möglich war. Neuerlich wurde diese Form, nach der Modifizierung des 
Grunddokuments in 1979, auch in die Grundurkunde aufgenommen,3 5 wodurch ihre 
Anwendungssphäre bedeutend erweitert wurde. 
Wie kann diese Form aus rechtlichem Gesichtspunkt qualifiziert werden? 
Wie darauf bereits hingewiesen wurde, ist eine derartige Vereinbarung nicht die 
Entscheidungsform des RGW als internationale Organisation, sondern der Akt 
unmittelbar der Mitgliedstaaten. Daraus ergibt sich, daß in einer Kooperationsfrage 
die ermächtigten Vertreter der Mitgliedstaaten unmittelbar Vereinbarung schließen 
können. Eine derartige Vereinbarung tritt in der durch die Staaten bestimmten 
Ordnung in Kraft , beziehungsweise die nachträgliche Bestätigung ist — falls sich die 
Länder nicht anderweitig vereinbart haben — keine Vorbedingung der Inkrafttretung. 
In dieser Beziehung führt die unmittelbare Vereinbarung mit dem internationalen 
Abkommen gemeinsame Merkmale. Ihre Verbindung mit dem R G W meldet sich in 
erster Linie darin, daß solche Vereinbarungen im Rahmen der RGW-Organe zustande 
kommen und in den Protokollen derselben festgelegt sind. Die unmittelbare 
Vereinbarung kann also ihre rechtliche Natur betreffend als quasi internationales 
Abkommen, als atypisches internationales Abkommen genannt werden. 
Die normativen Dokumente des RGW machen zwischen den durch die 
verschiedenen RGW-Organe angenommenen rechtlichen Akten (Entscheidungsfor-
men) aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Rechtskraft keinen Unterschied. Das bedeutet, daß 
die durch die einzelnen RGW-Organe angenommenen Rechtsakte (Entscheidungsfor-
men), mindestens nach außen hin, nicht als Akte der einzelnen Organe, sondern als 
3 3
 Die im RGW gegenwärtig tätigen ständigen Konferenzen sind die folgenden: Juristische 
Konferenz, Konferenz der Leiter der Preisämter, Konferenz der Leiter des Wasserversorgungsämter, 
Konferenz der Leiter der Erfindungsämter, Konferenz der Minister für den Binnenhandel, Konferenz der 
Minister für Arbeitswesen. 
3 4
 Eine weitere Untersuchung beansprucht die Frage, bei welchen Typen der Kooperationsfragen 
diese rechtliche Form am besten angewendet werden kann. 
3 5
 Siehe: Grunddokument des RGW. Art. IV, Punkt 4. 
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Akte des R G W als internationale Organisation erscheinen. In diesem Sinne können 
wir also nicht von einer Hierarchie unter den rechtlichen Akten (Entscheidungsfor-
men) des R G W sprechen. Das bedeutet aber selbstredend nicht, daß es in dem 
Wirkungskreis der einzelnen RGW-Organe objektiverseits keine Unterschiede geben 
würde. Die Bestimmung der einzelnen RGW-Organe, der Bereich ihrer Aufgaben und 
Funktionen ist prinzipiell auch für ihre Rechtskreise und Wirkungsbereiche in 
objektivem Sinne bestimmend. Der Inhalt derselben ist im Grunddokument des RGW 
und in anderen normativen Dokumenten (Geschäftsordnung der einzelnen Organe) 
niedergelegt. 
Das höchste Organ des RGW ist die Sitzungsperiode des Rates. Aus diesem 
Status der Sitzungsperiode folgt es, daß sie berechtigt ist alle Fragen zu besprechen und 
entsprechende Entscheidungen zu treffen, die in den Wirkungsbereich des R G W , als 
internationale Organisation gehört. Mit Hinsicht darauf, d a ß der Wirkungskreis der 
Sitzungsperiode objektiverseits, unter den durch das Grunddokument bestimmten 
Rahmen, prinzipiell unbeschränkt ist, könnte man sagen, daß dieser Wirkungskreis 
allgemein ist. 
Zwar ist die Sitzungsperiode berechtigt in sämtlichen in ihren Wirkungskreis 
gehörenden Fragen Entscheidungen zu treffen, das bedeutet aber selbstverständlich 
nicht, daß in sämtlichen Kooperationsfragen die Sitzungsperiode entscheidet. 
Unter den RGW-Organen ist ihrer Bestimmung, Aufgaben und Funktionen 
nach eine bestimmte Arbeitsteilung geltend, die auch dem Inhalt ihres objektiven 
Wirkungskreise nach bestimmend ist. Gleichzeitig gibt es aber Fragen, bei denen nur 
die Sitzungsperiode zu entscheiden befugt ist, das heißt, die in den ausschließlichen 
Wirkungskreis der Sitzungsperiode gehören. Diese Fragen sind ihrem Charakter nach 
solche, die die wichtigsten, die bedeutendsten Bezüge der wirtschaftlichen und 
wissenschaftlich-technischen Kooperation zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, beziehungs-
weise die wichtigsten Fragen der Organisation und der Funkt ion des R G W berühren. 
Solche Fragen sind zum Beispiel: 
(a) Die Bestimmung der Funktionierungstendenz des RGW, die Annahme des 
langfristigen Programms der Kooperation (z. B. Komplexprogramm, beziehungswei-
se die Annahme der langfristigen Kooperations-Zielprogramme), 
(b) Aufnahme von neuen Mitgliedern in den R G W , 
(c) Die Annahme der Modifizierung des Grunddokuments des R G W , 
(d) Entscheidung über die Aufstellung der Kooperationsausschüsse und 
ständigen Kommissionen des RGW, 
(e) Ernennung des Sekretärs des R G W , usw. 
Das oberste Exekutivorgan des R G W ist der Exekutivkomitee des R G W . In den 
Wirkungskreis des Exekutivkomitees gehören die folgenden wichtigeren Fragen: 
(a) Die Lenkung der Realisierung der bevorstehenden Kooperationsaufgaben, 
die Verfolgung der Durchführung der Verpflichtungen, die aus der Annahme der 
Empfehlungen durch die Mitgliedstaaten herrühren, 
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(b) die Koordinierungsarbeit der Pläne, die Lenkung der Spezialisierung und der 
Kooperation, die Organisierung der Ausarbeitung der Grundtendenzen der Arbeits-
teilung, 
(c) Die Ausarbeitung des Warenaustauschverkehrs und der wechselseitigen 
Leistungen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, beziehungsweise die Ausarbeitung der 
Hauptrichtungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Kooperation, 
(d) die Lenkung der Arbeit der Kooperationsausschüsse, der ständigen 
Kommissionen und des Sekretariats des R G W , 
(e) die Bestätigung des Budgets des Rates, beziehungsweise des Budgetreferats, 
sowie des Personalstandes des Sekretariats, usw. 
Aufgrund des Bereiches und der Natur der der Kompetenz des Exekutivkomi-
tees zugewiesenen Fragen kann festgestellt werden, daß sein Wirkungskreis, seine 
Inhaltselemente in objektivem Sinn betrachtet gleicherart allgemein sind. 
Es m u ß ferner aufmerksam gemacht werden, daß es Fragen gibt, bei denen die 
Entscheidung durch das Grunddokument des RGW und sonstige, normative 
Dokumente ausdrücklich der Kompetenz des Exekutivkomitees zugewiesen sind. 
Solche Fragen sind zum Beispiel die Ernennung der stellvertretenden Sekretäre 
des RGW, die Bestätigung der Kooperat ionsordnung des R G W , sowie der 
Geschäftsordnung der ständigen Kommissionen, zur Kontrolle der finanziellen 
Tätigkeit des R G W Aufstellung entsprechender Organe, usw. 
Die Hauptaufgabe der Kooperationsausschüsse ist die komplexe Untersuchung 
der wichtigsten Fragen ihres Betätigungsfeldes, beziehungsweise, im Rahmen der 
gegebenen Funktion, der wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlich-technischen Koopera-
tion, und die vielseitige Lösung derselben. Der Wirkungskreis der Koope-
rationsausschüsse umfaßt in objektivem Sinn die Fragen der Kooperat ion auf dem 
Gebiet der Planung und der wissenschaftlich-technischen, bzw. materiell-technischen 
Versorgung. 
Die im Rahmen des R G W funktionierenden ständigen Kommissionen haben die 
Entwicklung der vielseitigen wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen im Rahmen der volkswirt-
schaftlichen Funktion, bzw. in einzelnen Zweigen der Volkswirtschaft, und die 
Organisierung der wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlich-technischen Kooperation zur 
Aufgabe. Demzufolge ist auch der Inhalt ihres objektiven Wirkungskreises durch die 
Rahmen des gegebenen Zweiges, bzw. der gegebenen Funktion begrenzt. In diesem 
Sinn hat auch der objektive Inhalt des Wirkungskreises dieser Organe einen speziellen 
Charakter. 
Die genannten Organe (Sitzungsperiode des Rates, das Exekutivkomitee, die 
Kooperationsausschüsse und die ständigen Kommissionen) sind die sogenannten 
grundlegenden Vertretungsorgane des RGW. Das bedeutet unter anderen, daß all jene 
Entscheidungsbefugnisse, mit denen das Grunddokument (Art. IV) den Rat ausgestat-
tet hat, in den Wirkungskreis dieser Organe in originalem und nicht objektivem Sinn 
des Wortes gehören. Diese Befugnisse sind das Recht der Fassung von Empfehlungen 
an die Mitgliedstaaten, sowie das recht der Beschlußfassung. 
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Neben den erwähnten grundlegenden Vertretungsorganen des R G W funktionieren 
auch andere Organe mit Vertretungscharakter. Solche Organe sind die ständigen 
Konferenzen des R G W (z. B. die juristische Konferenz, Konfe renz der Leiter der 
Preisämter, Konferenz der Minis tere des Binnenhandels, usw.). D a s Hauptunterschei-
dungsmerkmal des Wirkungskreises dieser Organe in Bezug auf die Entscheidungen ist, 
d a ß sie über kein Empfehlungsrecht verfügen. Wenn sie in einer Kooperat ionsfrage 
eine Entscheidung für nötig ha l ten , legen sie dem Exekutivkomitee des R G W oder 
einem anderen über Empfehlungsrecht verfügenden grundlegenden Vertretungsorgan 
einen entsprechenden Vorschlag vor. Gleichzeitig aber sind sie befugt — und das ist 
auch eine gewisse Eigenheit ihres Rechtsstatus und demzufolge auch ihres Wirkungs-
kreises — in den in ihren Aufgabenkreis gehörenden Kooperat ionsfragen vorange-
hend erwähnte abgestimmte Vorschläge anzunehmen. Das Beschlußfassungsrecht 
steht natürlich auch den s tändigen Kommissionen zu. 
Abschließend soll noch erwähnt werden, daß von d e m vorhin erwähnten 
Entscheidungsrecht, wie die unmittelbare Vereinbarung, in jedem beliebigen Organ des 
R G W Gebrauch gemacht werden kann, wenn die Mitgliedstaaten in der gegebenen 
Frage in dieser Form entscheiden wollen und dazu die Vertreter der Mitgliedstaaten im 
konkreten Fall entsprechende Ermächt igung haben. 
Международная институционная система интеграции СЭВ 
Л. ФИЦЕРЕ 
В статье изучены некоторые организационные и правовые отношения международной 
институционной системы интеграции СЭВ. Автор исходит из того, что рассматривая институ-
ционную систему интеграции необходимо иметь в виду, что интеграция осуществляется на уровне 
государств равно как и предприятий, и государство принимает участие в процессе интеграции не 
только в качестве суверена, но и собственника. 
Первая часть статьи посвящена тенденциям развития и понятийной категории международ-
ной институционной системы инзеграции СЭВ. А в т о р подчеркивает, что в развитии институцион-
ной системы интеграции намечается две тенденции: количественный рост институционной системы, 
процесс ее внутренней дифференциации с одной стороны, и обеспечение эффективного действия 
сложившейся системы, внутреннего интегрирования дифференцированной организационной 
структуры, с другой стороны. Рассматривая понятие институционной системы автор приходит к 
выводу, что о понятии институционной системы можно говорить в узком и широком смысле. В 
узком смысле международная институционная система охватывает только межгосударственные 
(двух- и многосторонние) организации, а в широком смысле слова Она включает в себя и совместные 
организации, действующие на уровне предприятий. 
Во второй части статьи рассматриваются правовые средства системы внутренних связей 
международного институционного механизма и в рамках этого — взаимоотношение С Э В как 
базового органа институционной системы интеграции с межгосударственными организациями, 
функционирующими в отдельных областях сотрудничества, а также с международными хозяйствен-
ными организациями (международными товариществами, совместными предприятиями) в ходе их 
деятельности, далее рассматриваются средства и методы координации их деятельности. Автор 
выводит заключение, что е д и н о е функционирование международной институционной системы в 
конечном счете определяется совместно разработанной системой целей интеграции, которая была 
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сформулирована в долгосрочной программе сотрудничества. В то ж е время в рамках институцион-
ной системы отдельные организации сотрудничества самостоятельно функционируют в кругу 
обязанностей, предусмотренных в их учредительских документах. Э т о не исключает, а наоборот , 
предполагает соответствующую координацию деятельности совместных организаций, к о т о р у ю и 
организационно-правовые средства (протоколы с сотрудничестве) призваны обеспечить. 
В третьей части статьи автор рассматривает функционирование институционной системы в 
свете порядка принятия решений СЭВ А в т о р изучает правовые признаки и отличительные 
специфики решения СЭВ. рекомендации СЭВ. согласованного предложения и непосредственного 
соглашения. В рамках этого автор подвергает детальному изучению взаимосвязи рекомендации 
СЭВ и международных д о г о в о р о в и приходит к заключению, что рекомендация СЭВ представляет 
собой самостоятельный, своеобразный международно-правовой акт, который — сопоставляя с 
международным договором — проявляет ряд специфических черт. Наконец автор рассматривает 
содержательные элементы компетенции отдельных органов СЭВ в вещественном смысле слова. 
The international institutional system of CMEA 
L. FICZERE 
T h e paper analyzes s o m e organizat ional a n d legal aspects o f the international ins t i tut ional 
system o f C M E A integration. It starts from the p o i n t that surveying the institutional s y s t e m of 
integration it s h o u l d be cons idered that the in tegrat ion goes on both at s ta te and enterprise level and 
the state part ic ipates in the p r o c e s s not only as s o v e r e i g n power, but a s proprietor, too. T h e first part 
o f the paper dea l s with the deve lopment trends a n d terminological sphere of the in ternat iona l 
institutional sys tem of C M E A integration. It e m p h a s i z e s that two t e n d e n c i e s could be surveyed in the 
deve lopment o f the inst i tut ional system o f the integration: the quanti tat ive increase o f the 
institutional sys tem, the process o f inner di f ferent iat ion, respectively the consol idat ion o f the inner 
integration o f the differentiated organisat ional s tructure . Analyzing the terminological s p h e r e o f the 
institutional sys tem it takes the c o n c l u s i o n that w e m a y talk about the t e r m o f institutional s y s t e m in a 
narrower a n d a wider meaning . In its narrower m e a n i n g the international institutional sys tem inc luded 
only the inter-state (bilateral a n d multilateral) organizat ions , in w i d e r meaning it i n c l u d e s the 
c o m m o n organ iza t ions at enterprise (institute) level , too . 
T h e s e c o n d part o f the p a p e r deals with the legal means o f the inner connection system o f the 
international institutional m e c h a n i s m , including the connec t ion be tween the C M E A as centra l basic 
organizat ion o f the inst i tutional system of in tegra t ion and the v a r i o u s inter-state organizations 
operating o n different spheres o f co-operat ion, a n d the C M E A a n d the international economic 
organizations ( international a s soc ia t ions , joint ventures ) , the means o f c o o r d i n a t i o n of their act iv i t ies 
and their m e t h o d s . It draws the conclus ion that the universal d i rec t ion o f the operat ion o f the 
international institutional s y s t e m is determined u l t imate ly by the c o m m o n l y established s y s t e m o f 
purposes in the integration. In the s a m e time, wi th in the institutional s y s t e m the various c o - o p e r a t i n g 
organs independently operate in the sphere de termined by their charters. T h i s fact does n o t exc lude , 
moreover, it requires the a p p r o p r i a t e coord inat ion o f the operation o f the c o m m o n o r g a n s . This 
coord inat ion is promoted by organizat ional - legal m e a n s t o o ( c o o r d i n a t i o n protocols). 
T h e third part o f the p a p e r surveys the o p e r a t i o n o f the inst i tut ional mechanism in t h e cross-
section o f the decision-making system of CMEA. It d e a l s with the legal features and di f ferent iat ing 
characteristics o f C M E A resolutions, C M E A recommendations, collated proposals a n d direct 
agreements. W i t h i n this subject it goes in deta i l s analyzing the re la t ion between the C M E A 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n and the internat ional agreements a n d draws the c o n c l u s i o n that the C M E A 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is an independent , special legal act , w h i c h shows s o m e spec i f ic features c o m p a r e d to 
the international agreement. F ina l ly , it surveys the c o n t e n t elements o f the sphere of authority o f each 
C M E A o r g a n s in their object ive meaning . 
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Civil law problems of the specialization 
of production and of the co-operation 
in production in the framework of CMEA 
I. VÖRÖS 
research officer 
Institute for Legal and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian 
Academy o f Sciences 
"The wide-ranging development o f inter-
national specialization of production is the 
most important problem o f socialist 
economic integration." "The socialist inter-
national co-operat ion results in m o r e pro-
found relations of integration than any 
other form o f economic co-operat ion". 
( K o r m n o v ) 
The paper investigates the place and role of the institution of "international 
specialization of production as well as o f the co-operation" in the economic a n d legal 
mechanism of C M E A and comes to the conclus ion that the present "specialization of 
production and co-operat ion" covers in the reality a pure specialization. The co-operat ion and 
its contractual form shall be strictly delimited therefrom; the co-operat ion contract has an 
essentially different role in the integration. A l though the deve lopment of the contract of 
international co-operation in production c o m e s up against significant difficulties, the a u t h o r of 
the paper believes that the economy—both the socialist e c o n o m i c integration a n d the 
beginning of a new era in the world economy—requires the deve lopment of legal relationships 
of co-operat ion type. The elaboration of the international co-operat ion contract of product ion 
would mean an important step on this way. 
1. The socialist economic integration scarcely has such an institution—except 
perhaps for the commodity and financial relations—which has been realized as much 
differently f rom those conceived and written about it than the specialization of 
production and the co-operation. The fact is that the not ion itself is somehow 
inadequate. This institution namely has been spoken and written about and decided 
upon just f rom the beginning in such a way: the two words connected with " a n d " , and 
this duality has remained up to now, it has become a matter of common economic and 
legal knowledge and there—in spite of the propagation of differentiated approaches 
laying stress on the precise definition and the delimitation of the two notions—keeps 
stubbornly its ground. 
Of course, both the uniform and the differentiated treatment have certainly their 
own reasons. The traditions of decades have displayed their effect which—especially in 
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the jurisprudence—are able to survive sometimes with surprising obstinacy; 
presumably this fact played also a role in that that the Legal Conference of CMEA was 
charged with the elaboration of the system of legal conditions of the specialization of 
production and of the co-operation, and especially, however, in that that also the 
finally elaborated and already enacted legal document : the General Conditions of the 
Specialization of Production and of the Co-operation (promulgated in Hungary by the 
Law-Decree N o . 24 of 1979) seems to regulate both institutions (or as one 
institution?). It is not contestable either that the matter is not only the process of 
theoretical purification behind the use of word " a n d " or the differentiation also severe 
divergences of opinions—relating to the nature and the maintenance of socialist 
economic integration, to the place taken and to the role played therein by the 
specialization and co-operation—may be concealed.1 
The non-unanimity of the situation caused by the terminologies used 
consciously or less intentionally is obviously embarrassing. As a consequence thereof 
namely at least three problems come up. The first is that it impedes the revelation of the 
duality of the pair of concepts, of the particular contents—giving the impression of a 
category " to be settled" uniformly. Secondly: The terminology of the "General 
Conditions of the Specialization of Production and of the Co-operat ion" gives the 
impression as if bo th or a uniform institution(s) would be successfully regulated and 
thereby it entertains the possible belief in the field of legal investigations that by means 
of this significant uniform norm the legal alternatives to be offered for promoting the 
specialization and co-operation processes would be adequately covered. Finally, a 
question being in our opinion highly—if not the most—significant remains obscure 
what a role may have one institution and what the other in the economic mechanism of 
socialist economic integration; that due to their particularities, what part to fill is 
suitable one and the other, finally, to the performance of which function the 
requirements of the given period of the integration lay social-economic-political and 
legal claims on the level of the community of socialist countries. 
2. All these questions shall be, however, faced when the possibilities in principle 
of the further development of this field of the socialist economic integration are seeked 
taking into consideration the possible demands. We are of the opinion that there is no 
reason to rest: the covered way should be examined just in the light of the above 
questions; its appreciation is possible also depending on the answering of these 
questions. 
1
 As for the conceptional differences, see in the legal literature e.g. the conception of the uniform 
process of the specialization and co-operation governed "centrally" by the states (we will come back to that 
later): Das System rechtlicher Regelung der sozialistischen ökonomischen Integration, Berlin, 1975. Chapter 
5.: Die rechtliche Regelung der Spezialisierung und Kooperation der Produktion, or H U T S C H E N R E U T E R , H.: 
Regierungsabkommen und Ministervereinbarungen im System vertraglicher Rechtsformen der internationaler 
Spezialisierung und Kooperation der Produktion im Bereich des RGW, Staat und Recht, 6/1979.; the same 
author: Entwicklungslinien auf dem Gebiet der Spezialisierungs- und Kooperationsverträge zwischen 
Wirtschaftsorganisationen der RGW-Länder, Staat und Recht, 1/1980. 
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I. 
The place of the specialization of production and of co-operation 
in the history of development of the socialist economic integration 
3. It is well-known that in the 10-15 years following the Second World War the 
striving after autarchy and universalism became predominant in the economic policy 
of socialist countries under the effect of outer and inner conditions. Also the 
mechanical acceptance of the earlier experiences of Soviet industrialization con-
tributed thereto. Consequently, parallel production capacities were established one 
after the other, which, however, developed quite isolatedly f rom each other with 
respect to the technology. 
The end of the period of autarchy may be estimated to be in 1956: in the decision 
of the 7th session of CMEA the recognition is already reflected that the co-ordination 
and division of production programs of the member-countries shall be set as target. The 
legal mechanism of the new phase based partly on the system of recommendations 
which laid down with binding force the objects and the time limits for their 
achievement, whereas the member-countries were entrusted with the measures to be 
taken. On the other hand, the intention of specialization-co-operation materialized in 
the recommendations was realized through the traditional foreign-trade channels. 
4. The claim to the switch over to the intensive developing phase came up at the 
beginning or in the middle of the sixties: at this time, the elimination of unjustified 
parallelisms came expressly into prominence, the fundamental instrument of which 
was held to be the specialization of production and the co-operation. The increase of 
importance of this institutions is signified by the documents accepted in the sixties. The 
13th session in 1960 proposed to the states only to conclude agreements for realizing 
the recommendations for specialization which expressed the requirement to go beyond 
the traditional foreign-trade means. The document entitled "Fundamenta l principles 
of socialist international labour division" elaborated in the 15th session and adopted in 
1962 offered already the concept of the international specialization of production and 
of the co-operation. Accordingly, the question is the concentration of the manufacture 
of products of the same sort in one or some socialist countries, the purpose of which is 
the satisfaction of needs of the interested countries, whereas its means are the elevation 
of the technical and organizational level of the production, as well as the development 
of continuous interstate economic relationships, of the co-operation in production.2 
(This definition of the concept had a great effect on the theory, too . ) 3 
2
 Legal Documents of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid, Budapest, 1978. pp. 42-43. 
3
 It is referred to and cited in several papers, e.g. ГРИНГОЛЬЦ, И. A. ( G R I N G O L Z ) : О договорных 
формах специализации и кооперирования производства между странами-членами СЭВ, Uchonye 
Zapiski. Vipusk 27, Moscow, 1972, p. 92.; KOPMHOB, Ю. Ф. (KORMNOV): Специализация и кооперация 
производство стран СЭВ, Moscow, 1972. Chapter I.; PÉCSI, К . : A KGST termelési integráció közgazdasági 
kérdései (Economic questions of the integration of production in CMEA), Budapest, 1977. p. 43. 
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Subsequently, the document under the title "Effective measures for the 
improvement of the work in the field of the specialization of production and of the co-
operation, especially in the preparation, development and realization of the 
specialization of production and of the co-operat ion" approved by the session of the 
Executive Committee on M a y 29,1967, stressed among others the significance of legal 
means, emphasizing the importance of laying down in agreement the rights and 
obligations of the participating states. 
5. The Complex. Program (1971) outlined an integration model in which the 
process of integration is essentially consciously-purposefully controlled by the state 
and in which, at the same time, the extension and consolidation of commodity and 
financial conditions, as well as those of the international markets of the member-
countries are of great importance.4 The basis of the integration model was the 
necessity of the switch over to the intensive development, its antecedents were 
constituted by the fact that in the early sixties even the pace of development of the 
economies and the trade of the member-countries with each other diminished.5 
Therefore, the claim was raised that the subject of co-operation should be not 
exclusively the integration of unvariedly separated production capacities th rough the 
macro-level organization of foreign-trade relations. 
In the centre of the Complex Program fell the production process as a whole, as 
the totality of creative phases. This circumstance laid new claim towards the economic 
mechanism of integration: it was to provide for the performance of the structural as 
well as the technical tasks of integration.6 
It was the harmonized structure-policy of the member-countries, directed 
towards the development of some mutually defined international economic structure 
which came into the limelight—if not to the very centre—of the new international 
economic-political conception formulated by the Complex Program.7 
The integration mechanism outlined by the Complex Program is generally 
described as the ensemble of three elements being in organic relation. They are: co-
operation in planning, commodity-money relations, as well as the organizational-
institutional-legal forms. It was obvious f r o m the very first tha t in the realization of the 
co-ordinated international structure policy the decisive role will be played by the 
fundamental planning co-operation. At the same time, it became also evident that the 
results of the co-ordination in planning of this structure policy will be t ransformed into 
the practice fundamentally by the specialization of production and by the co-operation 
belonging to the range of the third element of the mechanism. It is scarcely a mere 
4
 Cf. Legal Documents of CMEA, p. 61. 
5
 Kiss,T.: Ho! tart a KGST integráció? (Where is the integration of C M E A got to?), Budapest, 1972. 
p. 45. 
6
 Ш И Р Я Е В , Й . С . ( S H I R Y A Y E V ) : Экономический механизм социалистической интеграции, 
Moscow, 1973, Chapter И. 
7
 SHIRYAYEV: ibid. Chapter III.; the same author: Международное социалистическое разделение 
труда, Moscow, 1977. Chapter II. 
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chance that the Complex Program (Chapter 4, paras 20.2 and 26.5) mentioned on the 
second place among the subjects of the co-ordination of planning the specialization of 
production and the co-operation. Therefore, the state-controlled specialization and 
co-operation follow logically f rom the planning co-operation, the close— 
conceptional—connection, relation of the two institutions is obvious.8 
It is beyond doubt that the demand on the rationalization of the branches of 
industry9 follows f rom the internal logic of the objects and the economic mechanism 
of the Complex Program. The fact, however, that the specialization and the co-
operation were realized with a one-sidedness preferring the planning co-ordination, 
may be explained by the particularities of the development of integration, by the 
upshots of the period elapsed since the Complex Program, by the effective realization 
of the Program. 
At that time, Kormnov underlined among others the interaction between the 
specialization and co-operation on one side and the planning co-ordination on the 
other, emphasizing that at the same time the specialization and co-operation 
themselves furnish suitable basis for the planning co-ordination.1 0 It is a fact that 
the Complex Program not only started in those days from the combination of inter-
state agreements and contracts of economic organizations but also abstained to 
assume some hierarchic relation between them (Chapter 6, para 7). It outlined such a 
conception of specialization and co-operation (Chapter 10, paras 4, 5) in which the 
character of the institution was supplied through the connection with the planning co-
ordination by a significant inter-state attraction, and simultaneously by the reliance 
upon the intensive initiative of enterprises. 
6. It is widely known that the above economic-political conception and the 
corresponding mechanism was realized not quite according to the original ideas. Mádl 
expected in 1969 a historical change of era, the exceeding of the conception of extensive 
centralized development of economy. The enumeration of phenomena rendering 
necessary the change, however, shows—despite the considerable results—that they are 
still far from being completely solved. The economic literature has mentioned 
repeatedly even since the essential survival of the parallel production structure, the 
separation of production, the different interests in foreign trade, the naturalization of 
exchange and—due to the lack of convertible currency—the associated bilateralism, 
the endeavour for mutual balance, in general the overshadowing and deformation of 
economic categories, as well as the prices being unable to give orientation in respect of 
efficiency (since they show exclusively the exchange ratio) that, taking all those into 
8
 Cf. Complex Program, Chapter 6, para 7, as well as CSABA, L.: A KGST integráció gazdasági 
mechanizmusának időszerű problémái (Actual problems of the economic mechanism of integration in 
CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 11/1980. 
9
 KORMNOV, op. cit. Chapter V. The significance of the specialization of production and of the co-
operation is also proved by that that the report on the Session No. X X X I V of June 1980 mentions it as the 
most important trend in the intensification of efficiency of the co-operation. 
1 0
 KORMNOV: ibid. 
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consideration, no effective commodity motion exists, the lack of direct relations of 
enterprises, etc.11 
The overshadowing of the commodity and financial conditions, as a matter of 
course, increased the significance of the other mechanism-column: of the planning co-
operation. All these resulted logically in the predominance of the inter-state macro-
sphere12, and in the negliging of the micro-sphere and in connection therewith, that 
of the aspects of efficacity and economicalness. All these together determine the basic 
particularities of the mechanism, namely that it does not exceed even today the frames 
of an extensive integration referring to the sphere exclusively of the production (and not 
of the turnover), and essentially corresponds to the type of centralized economic 
mechanism of plan-reduction before the economic reforms.1 3 The conception 
relating to the economic mechanism of the Complex Program was preceded by the 
centralized management systems of plan-reduction of the fifties, and followed by the 
recentralizing processes of the seventies; thereby the present situation may be 
explained in many respects. The relation of the international mechanism to the internal 
management systems—moreover, its being determined by them—is namely well 
known. 1 4 The fundamental consistency15 with respect to the majori ty of the 
internal management systems means thus an inconsistency with respect to the 
Complex Program. 
7. The fate of this mechanism was shared by the international specialization of 
production and co-operation, too. The demand on the rationalization of the production 
programs according to industrial branches emerged f rom the above notion of the 
planning aspect, f rom the internal logic of the conception as a whole. The 
restructurizing international economic-political attitude, the planning co-operation 
aiming at the definition and delimitation of production profils of the sectors of national 
11
 MÁDL, F.: A gazdasági integráció jogi struktúrája felé (Towards the legal structure of the economic 
integration), Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1 9 6 9 , pp. 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 ; for a comprehensive analysis of the international 
mechanism cf. C S A B A , op. cit. as well as PÉCSI, op. cit. pp. 3 2 . et seq.; Kiss, op. cit. pp. 4 6 - 6 8 ; BOTOS, К . : 
Külgazdasági koncepció — nemzetközi kooperáció (Foreign economic conception — international co-
operation), Közgazdasági Szemle, 1 1 / 1 9 7 9 . 
12
 SHIRYAYEV—who warns against whatever decentralization of the management of co-operation in 
production (thus of the process of specialization and co-operation)—outlines himself that "only the 
possibilities presenting themselves on the national economic level of the international co-operation are 
utilized", (op. cit. n. 6. Chapter I I I . ) ; cf. also P É C S I , op. cit. p. 31. 
1 3
 PÉCSI: o p . c i t . ; C S A B A : o p . c i t . 
1 4
 K O R M N O V : A nemzetközi termelési szakosítás és kooperáció problémái a KGST-lagországokban 
(Problems of the international specialization and co-operation of production in the member-countries of 
CMEA). p. 118. in: A szocialista integráció fejlesztésének elméleti és gyakorlati kérdései (Theoretical and 
practical questions of the development of socialist integration), Budapest, 1978. p. 118.; SHIRYAYEV, Chapter 
I I I . 
15
 PÉCSI, op. cit. p. 57.; by the essential consistency reference is made to a fact and not to a 
requirement; the dissimilarities of internal mechanisms to each other and to the international mechanism 
have objective reasons: S H I R Y A Y E V : op. cit. (n. 7 . ) Chapter I I . ; as for the dissimilarities, cf. e.g. FÖLDES, К . : 
Nemzetgazdaságok a szocialista együttműködés rendszerében (National economies in the system of socialist 
co-operation), Közgazdasági Szemle, 1 1 / 1 9 7 9 . 
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economy produced at the same time an element in the organizational-legal mechanism. 
As organizational element we refer here to a conception accepted by the majority of the 
present mechanisms after the economic reforms—the large intermediate governing 
organizations, vertical manufacturing plants—which realize the state planning 
decisions and for the sake thereof, have both managing function and powers. 
Certainly, in the international mechanism, simple international intermediate 
governing organs cannot be established: the socialist economic integration is the 
economic co-operation of sovereign socialist states, the definition of special lines of 
industrial branches belongs to the rights of the individual states,16 where the 
organization and management of the economy flows lastly through national state 
management channels to the economic organizations. The appropriate means for the 
"flowing down" of the decisions on planning co-operation were ready found by the 
protectors of integration: the inter-state agreements on specialization and co-
operation. According to the present practice, these agreements t ransform the results of 
planning co-operation into "target-like" bilateral obligations, whereas the participat-
ing states ensure the enforcement of the inter-state agreements according to their 
internal management system. The end point of the enforcement is the contract of 
economic organizations on the specialization of production and on co-operation 
transforming the bilateral consent into a civil law obligation. The contents of this 
contract are, however, nearly completely defined by the inter-state agreement placed on 
the medium level. The contract has therefore an importance not in the establishment of 
the relation of specialization and co-operation but rather in the performance, 
execution, in the provision for the fulfilment thereof; it "puts" rather the "point" on to 
the letter " i " of the decision on state-level, it means the sanction, the enforceability 
thereof.—As for its legal nature, it is close mainly to the former plan-contracts. 
II. 
Nature and legal particularities of specialization 
and co-operation 
8. The nature of specialization and co-operation is determined as follows, taking 
into consideration the afore-mentioned. 
a) Instrument of the restructurizing of national-economic sectors on C M E A 
level; its function is the definition, the "division" of profiles as a result of international 
understanding. 
b) The object and the function attract unambiguously the inter-state character 
together with its economic and legal consequences. In the practice there is nearly 
always some planning co-operation act serving as the basis of the relation of 
specialization and co-operation ( C M E A recommendation, decisions of the bilateral 
1 6
 KORMNOV, o p . Cit. ( n . 3.) 
5* Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
7 2 /. Vörös 
scientific-technical co-operation committees, bilateral intergovernmental agreements 
on the specialization of production and co-operation).1 7 
c) In the centre of the specialization and co-operation it is to be found not a 
product but one of the branches of the national economy, mostly that of the industry, 
the specialized production of large volume performed herein, its object is some larger 
project (e.g. in Hungary the co-operation in highroad vehicle industry, co-operation in 
aluminium industry and the olefin co-operation). 
d) Since the intention is the reduction to the greatest possible extent of the 
parallel production structures, the co-operation aims not at the interconnection of 
productions of similar profile but just at the separation thereof through the 
development of "pure" profiles. The separation relates similarly to national 
economies, industrial branches as well as to enterprises. The direct consequence of 
separation is the uni-directional character of the relation of specialization: one party— 
specialized to the production—only produces and delivers, the other party—so-called 
"not-specialized" to the production—only takes over. The matter is here not a real co-
operation of production or realization, since the result of the separated production is 
forwarded through the traditional foreign-trade channels to the not-specialized party 
meeting its demands. 
e) The end-product oriented character of specialization and co-operation 
understandingly follows f rom the separating character. 
0 T o the above characteristics of specialization and co-operation corresponds 
legally the two-level nature as main rule: the international inter-state agreement is 
followed by the civil-law contract concluded by the economic organizations. The 
essence of the "labour division" between the two levels, realized in the practice— 
somewhat simplifying the question for the sake of a more clear exposition—consists in 
that that the decision on specialization relating to the labour division is passed on inter-
state level; the main feature of this agreement is the production organizing character, 
the preparation of the barter relations.18 On the other hand, the essence of the civil-law 
contracts is a pactum de contrahendo i.e. obligation undertaken for the conclusion of 
subsequent foreign-trade contracts. In this legal relationship—although the contracts 
17
 Though K O R M N O V writes about the productive activity of enterprises chosen especially for this 
purpose, the emphasis on choice, however, excludes by itself any doubt [op. cit. (n. 14.) p. 91.]. As for the co-
operation in planning, neither the Complex Program, nor the practice of the integration in CMEA know the 
institution of cooperation in planning on enterprise level, although in principle the possibility thereof cannot 
be excluded. 
1 8
 K O R M N O V , p. 9 1 ; though BOGUSLAVSKY divides the rights and the obligations of the parties into 
two groups: those relating to the preparation and organization of production, as well as to the exchange of 
goods [ Б О Г У С Л А В С К И Й , M. M. ( B O G U S L A V S K Y ) : Правовое регулирование международных экономических 
связей, Moscow, 1 9 7 0 . pp. 1 5 - 1 9 . ] but G R I N G O L Z ( O P . cit.) criticizes it, pointing out that the exchange of 
goods is performed on the strength of contracts formed especially for this purpose—in the contracts on 
specialization and co-operation the parties undertake only to conclude such contracts; H U T S C H E N R E U T E R , 
H.: Die Entwicklung des Vertragssystems auf dem Gebiet der internationalen Produktionsspezialisierung und 
-kooperation ( I S P K ) . Report on the conference (February, 1 9 8 0 ) organized in Moscow by the International 
Institute dealing with the economic problems of socialist world system of CMEA, (MS) p. 5. 
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do contain production obligations to the charge of the specializing party—the clause 
relating to specialization and production organization has no significance since if the 
party does not produce he will violate at any rate the pactum de contrahendo. This latter 
obligation—one of the main ones—thus practically absorbs from a legal point of view 
the obligation of production which is considered to be the other main obligation of the 
specializing party. As for the long-range foreign-trade general contract of delivery, 
included in many contracts, however, this is not the essence of the contract on 
specialization and co-operation but the consequence of the pactum de contrahendo, so 
to say the definition of the subject of the pactum. 
The pactum de contrahendo, therefore, prepares not the production but the 
exchange of goods: it is of barter-organizing character. This character corresponds to 
the claims set up by the place and role of the specialization and co-operation in the 
economic mechanism, i.e. it is conform to the characteristic features—being relevant in 
civil-law respect—having been outlined above (uni-directional relation, separating 
character). The relation of the pact to the exchange of goods, the fact that if does not 
exceed the limits of barter taken in broad sense, reflects the role which the integration 
mechanism foresees for the economic organizations: the contracting parties of the 
civil-law contract. The relation of the parties does not go beyond the exchange of goods 
organized for a long range—considering the essence of the matter; that , however, does 
not alter the fact that the parties—as for their positions—are located on the opposite 
poles of the commodity relations. T o the clash of interests characterizing thereby their 
relation the pact gives the required—and adequate—legal answer. 
III. 
Results, problems 
9. The results and (at the same time) advantages of the inter-state projects of 
specialization and co-operation (reduction of parallel production, optimum pro-
duction volume, market having an absorbing capacity for a long time) are well-known 
as much as their enumeration is superfluous. We refer only to the fact that without 
these programs, several sectors (primarily industrial branches) and several product 
groups of the Hungarian national economy could not have been developed at all since 
without the enormous market provided for by the C M E A we would not have even the 
possibility thereof. The question is not , therefore, whether the participation in such a 
specialization activity should be considered useful but it is, how it could be made 
better—also for the benefit of the entire integration community. 
10. For this purpose, however, primarily the problems of the functioning and the 
practice of specialization and co-operation shall be revealed. In the following some 
phenomena giving food for thought will be briefly referred to: 
a) the inter-state decisions relating to the rationalization were not always 
justified by a successful specialization; 
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b) the continuance of parallelisms still causes troubles in spite of decisions on 
specialization; 
c) the decisions on specialization tend primarily to the satisfaction of demands of 
the particular countries, and from the exclusive state interest resulting therefrom 
directly follows the subordinate role of economic considerations; the decision on 
specialization frequently contains not the most efficient variant; 
d) due to the lack of financial interest on enterprise level and because of the 
specialization is having an attitude directed to the end product a monopolistic position 
is frequently ensured for the specializing par ty , and thus the negliging of the technical 
development and the deterioration of quality are common phenomena. (The reason is 
obvious: for want of stimulation and interest, the market demands do not influence at 
all or influence only to an insignificant extent the activity of the enterprises; the single 
motive is—somewhat simplified—to fulfil the "task set by the plan" contained in the 
inter-state agreement, which is " t ranslated" by the contract of specialization and co-
operation into the language of the civil law); 
e) the gravest problem caused by the almost exclusive rule of the end-product 
attitude, is the practically complete lack of specialization according to components— 
unit parts, as well as to the phases of technological process.1 9 Shiryayev and Pécsi 
consider the conception prevailing in the last decades, relating to the precise division of 
programs of the manufacture of end products—and thereby the entire conception 
serving as basis for the specialization practice—one-sided;20 in our opinion, well-
founded. 
11. The pact mentioned above is thus the adequate legal expression of the 
economic conception serving for its basis, and even more so of the effectively realized 
specialization practice; the working group dealing with the elaboration of the General 
Conditions of the Specialization of Product ion and of the Co-operation performed 
successfully its task within the framework of its assignment. At the same time, it is a 
fact that this pact is suitable essentially for seizing the position resulting from the 
opposite market and commodity relations; it is not only unsuitable for expressing the 
elements of joint interests but this is not a t all its function. Moreover: the construction 
practically suppresses the elements of the possible community of economic interests 
and forces the parties to the opposite poles of the commodity relations—if they were 
not already standing completely there (which can be proved by several practical 
1 9
 K O R M N O V raised objections against it early in the seventies op. cit. (n. 3.) Chapter I . but he finds the 
same at the end of the seventies as well as PÉCSI. K O R M N O V , op. cit. (n. 14.) p. 93.; PÉCSI, op. cit. pp. 83-85. 
This fact is referred to also by the very high share of the turnover of machines and equipment in the trade 
within the C M E A (BOTOS, op. cit.) which not only did not become the fundament of an export counterattack 
on the world market but—on the contrary!—has lead to a considerable advance in the capitalist import of 
components (this fact, however, contributed to the intensification of balance problems of foreign trade in 
several member-countries—ibid. 
2 0
 PÉCSI, op . cit. p. 112. ; SHIRYAYEV, o p . cit . (N. 6.) Chapter II.; the same author , o p . cit. (N. 7.) 
Chapter I. 
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examples).21 This pact "reduces" and accomplishes the " t a rge t " undertaken by the 
state correctly and efficiently. The mechanism confirmed by the pact and by the severe 
sanction system contained in the General Conditions on the Specialization of 
Production and of the Co-operation leads to a system logically closed. At the same 
time, this system leads to problems in economic efficiency and quality, on the one hand, 
and to sometimes strained legal relationship of the partners, o n the other, contrary to 
the legal intention. 
It should be noted, however, that some elements of the former conception 
favouring exclusively the interstate legal level still appear in the General Condit ions on 
the Specialization of Production and of the Co-operation. At the same time, the 
General Conditions shall be applied only for contracts formed after the coming into 
effect of the General Conditions; therefore, the contracts concluded earlier and 
prolongated in 1980 were not redrafted. The General Conditions—as proved by Bauer 
and Sábicz—do not make feel their effect in the contractual practice;2 2 the contents of 
the contracts are featuring in several respect a character of international and 
constitutional law, in spite of having been signed by the enterprises. It is a practical 
problem that due to the new price principle the price situation became completely 
unstable, and so—for the lack of a real sliding price clause—the pact contained in the 
specialization contract does not function even as a long-range contract of delivery. 
While it is obvious, on the one hand, that the legal institution of the pact is a correct 
legal alternative of the economic-political object of restructurization of inter-state and 
end-product attitude, it is indisputable, too, on the other hand , that by a possible 
elimination of the above-mentioned economic and legal problems the promotion of 
the specialization process by special legal means has still significant reserves. 
21
 Two enterprises concluded a contract on specialization and co-operation on the strength of the 
appropriate inter-state decision, in which they agreed upon the division o f production: one o f them 
manufactures one part of the end product, the other, however, the other part thereof and the latter will 
assemble the end product. The former one delayed with the delivery, the other party, however, disregarded 
the enforcement of penalty with respect to the long-range relation. He did so in spite of the fact that in this 
way he himself was delayed with the delivery of the end product towards the foreign-trade company of the 
same country. This foreign-trade company, however, did not hesitate about the enforcement of penalty. It 
should be noted that traditional foreign-trade contracts are formed often even there where the connection of 
the parties—with respect to the effective specialization relation—could be rendered much closer as 
compared to the usual foreign trade contracts of delivery by means of specialization contract ( S H I R Y A Y E V , 
op. cit. (n. 6.) Chapter II). 
2 2
 B A U E R , M . - S A B I C Z , I.: Még egyszer a KGST-n belüli szakosítási szerződésekről (Once more about 
the contracts on specialization within the CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 11/1981. 
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IV. 
Prospects of specialization relations 
12. In this respect, first of all the financial interests of the economic organizations 
should be developed considering the specialization process. This "rehabilitation" of 
the enterprise level certainly contradicts the exaggerated conception based on the 
today really predominant specialization practice which acknowledges only its 
exclusive state interests and administrative managing character. This conception may 
be briefly outlined as follows. 
13. Its roo t is the economic consideration rendering the inter-state level 
absolutistic according to which the measures for specialization and co-operation are to 
be based exclusively on the international co-operation programs relating to the 
selected industrial branches. On the other hand, f rom the point of view of law, this 
conception applies the notion of socialist international economic law which combines 
the international law and civil law relations and in the centre of which stands the 
common state management and planning of the specialization and co-operation 
processes. According to this conception2 3 the specialization and co-operation of 
production is considered to be the common state management and planning of the 
specialization process, the concrete results of which is an agreement of international 
law character. T h e agreement is the common management act of the states, the effect of 
which—according to the representatives of the discussed conception—is a direct 
establishing of an (obviously civil law) legal relationship between the economic 
organizations.2 4 The inter-state agreement has therefore coordinating and organizing 
functions—let us add: like the intermediate governing syndicate in the majority of 
C M EA countries—and this c o m m o n managing act regulates the relations of economic 
organizations. The inter-state agreement is distinguished from the civil law contracts 
by its managing character; the latters are confined to the regulation of economic 
activity.25 
From this conception logically follows the hierarchic relation between the 
agreements concluded by governments, and ministries, respectively, on the one hand, 
and the civil law contracts of the economic organizations, on the other. This means the 
pyramid of legal obligations arising in this way, the functional relation and co-action of 
the contracts a n d agreements.26 
23
 For the detailed exposition thereof cf. SEIFFERT, W.: Der Systemcharakter der rechtlichen 
Regelung der sozialistischen ökonomischen Integration, Staat und Recht, 11/1970. 
24
 Die rechtliche Regelung der Spezialisierung und Kooperation der Produktion, (note 1.) pp. 205-210. 
This somewhat audacious declaration is damped—and rendered contradictory and obscure—by the 
contiguous remark according to which the constituted obligations are legally not directly binding: ibid. On 
the contrary: SZÁSZ, I.: A KGST Altalános Szállítási Feltételek (The General Conditions of Delivery of 
CMEA), Budapest, 1974, pp. 190-193. 
25
 Op. cit. pp. 211, 214. 
2 6
 H U T S C H E N R E U T E R : Regierungsabkommen und Ministervereinbarungen im System vertraglicher 
Rechtsformen, p. 513.; the same author: Die Entwicklung des Vertragssystems, p. 3. 
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The conception27 supposes obviously a much closer p lanning co-operation than 
with the plan co-ordination. However,—as pointed out by Kormnov and Shiryayev— 
in the present phase of integration and also in the reasonable fu ture , the idea of super-
plans "above the states" is fully unfounded.2 8 The unfoundedness follows primarily 
from the fact that the socialist economic integration is the voluntary co-operation of 
sovereign socialist countries. But it is also the consequence of that that more 
concretely, an inter-state agreement as some kind of "international managing ac t " 
cannot establish, either directly or indirectly, any obligatory legal relationship between 
the economic organizations by evading the states, the national economic management, 
because thereby the national state socialist property right above the production means 
would be infringed, too. 
The concept of the specialization and co-operation process as a management 
pyramid infringes the exclusive national state economic management rights materializ-
ing in the state socialist property rights also f rom the organizational aspect. In the civil 
law contractual practice namely, the institution of "Council of Representatives" is 
often met, which is the forum of solving the problems arising in the course of the 
performance of contracts, its function is thereby the systematic co-ordination of the 
activities of the parties. In the conception of the management pyramid, however, the 
Council would grow over the parties: through it a connection is established between 
the parties of civil-law specialization contract and the various CMEA organs. 
14. The lacking legal foundations of the conception of the management 
pyramid—in addition to those said above—could be pointed out by the fact that the 
General Conditions on the Specialization of Production and Co-operation—which 
express the present communis opinio of the member-countries of C M EA—do not know 
either the institution of the Council of Representatives or require tha t the 
specialization and co-operation contracts concluded by the economic organizations 
would have some "basis" materializing in any inter-state agreement. In the conception 
of the management pyramid the demand for some previous inter-state agreement is 
immanently concealed, its omission from the General Conditions, however, refers to 
the fact, on the one hand, that the member-countries take the level according to the 
Complex Program of the common state management of specialization process 
automatically for granted, but they do not want to hamstring the activity of the 
economic organizations in statu nascendi, on the other. Finally, the development of 
specialization processes being subject to the absolute condition of the planning method 
supposed by this conception would mean the dominance of the administrative-
organizational aspect, to the prejudice of the economic aspect .2 9 
21
 Which intends to project definite elements of economic mechanism and particular solutions into 
the international mechanism of socialist integration by obvious informality. 
2 8
 K O R M N O V , op. cit. (n. 3 . ) ; S H I R Y A Y E V calls the attention to the fact that the internationalization of 
productive forces did not yet rendered questionable the state-national organizational form of production 
(op. cit. n. 6.) 
2 9
 K O R M N O V , o p . c i t . ( n . 3 . ) 
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As for the institutional aspect , it contradicts the basic civil law nature of the legal 
relationship, the principle of the co-ordinate position of the parties, but also the 
subordination of economic organizations exclusively to their nat ional state economic 
management to establish an o rgan by means of the specialization contract, to which 
the members would submit themselves and which would fulfil a managing function. 
Moreover, this is also conceptually excluded: the subordinated economic or-
ganizations cannot waive in whatever civil law contract—even if based on inter-state 
agreement—the rights of the s tate economic management. Similarly contestable is the 
effect of constituting a legal relationship assigned to the inter-state agreement, which— 
reaching beyond its hierarchic atti tude—underestimates the importance of the level of 
enterprise relations, although it deems in principle necessary the combination of the 
two levels.30 Consequently, the conception of the management pyramid is supported 
neither by the general line of socialist economic integration ei ther contained in the 
Complex Program, or effectively realized, no r by the conception of the General 
Conditions on the Specialization of Production and Co-operation. Moreover, the 
General Conditions—just disregarding the above-mentioned criteria—outlined 
essentially a civil-law relationship and let consciously open the possibility of the 
autonomous activity on the level of the economic organizations. T h e possibility of the 
development of this activity on the strength of the main trend of specialization processes 
being directed through inter-state consent and within the framework thereof follows 
certainly f rom the whole conception of the socialist economic integration, f rom its 
institutional system, without, however, the necessity of mixing for this purpose the 
inter-state level and the level of the economic organizations in the pyramid of 
international law and civil law obligations. 
15. The specialization and co-operation contracts of the economic organizations 
may be in principle suitable, on the strength of the General Conditions on the 
Specialization of Production and Co-operation, for the realization of the other 
possibility offered by the pactum de contrahendo—mostly going beyond the character 
of executing the inter-state agreement and of organizing the exchange of goods— 
namely for the realization of the autonomous production organizing character—taken 
in the above sense. Thereby, no t only the exploitation of advantages on the enterprise 
level of the integration would be possible but also the making profitable of possibilities 
to which the inter-state level is not directed bu t is not suitable either. 
The contracts of specialization relating to e.g. the product division, to the 
specialization according to p roduc t nomenclature can liberate significant stimulating 
powers. The product division namely creates certainly some faint connection of 
interests between the parties ( the parties cannot complete their s tock of products by the 
defective products so that their assortment of products will not be complete). Some 
elementary degree of mutuality appears thus in the sphere of turnover. The General 
30
 Die rechtliche Regelung . . . p. 208. 
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Conditions offer appropriate orientation that the minium connection of interests, 
being possibly concealed by the specialization—which, however, does not go beyond 
the essential separating character involving an opposite position in the commodity 
relations—would be realized by a concrete contract . For the actual establishment of 
such a contract, however, in addition to the system of the legal conditions, the 
implication of enterprise interests and a suitable system of national-economic 
conditions are necessary. Only in this way may it be achieved that no formal contracts 
of specialization would be concluded (which e.g. put down the existing situation bu t do 
not take aim at any essential improvement of structure and efficiency), moreover, 
specialization contract would not at all be concluded and the above-mentioned 
harmony of interests would not get lost among the stipulations of a long-range foreign-
trade general contract of delivery. 
The anxiety recurring in the literature is well-known that the intensification of 
relations of the economic organizations would lead to spontaneity, to a fnarket 
anarchy. On the one hand, we should mention that whatever direct a relation may be, it 
is, however, established within the framework of the socialist integration based on 
planning co-operation, where the scope of these relations is determined f rom the 
beginning by the planning co-operation acts. On the other hand , it is not correct to 
contrast the micro-economic sphere and the planned order in such a manner that in the 
realization of the plan this sphere would mean a "by-pass" alien to the socialism.31 
It is just on the contrary: today when the planning co-operation is a fundamental 
integration instrument of the interconnection of economic activities of the socialist 
countries, not only one " u p p e r " administrative aspect shall be taken into con-
sideration but also the other one manifesting itself in the relations between the 
economic organizations.32 The essence of specialization contracts is: the pactum de 
contrahendo is suitable for stabilizing the relations of the parties due to its long-range 
barter character but in case also due to its production organizing character, and thus it is 
able to promote foresight. The long-range relations of the enterprises—if their 
economical character is proved in the practice—furnish appropriate bases for the 
planning co-operation activity. Accordingly, the specialization contracts of the 
economic organizations fit well into the mechanism of the socialist integration as legal 
institutions promoting the planned order. It is needless to say that such a role cannot be 
expected from a contract, hierarchically subordinate in every respect and in each case, 
being of an executive character, while practically being mainly formal. 
16. All these may lay further claims with regard to the contracts. Only one 
example is to be mentioned. The main condition of "keeping watchful" the interests of 
3 1
 S H I R Y A Y E V , o p . c i t . ( N . 6 . ) 
3 2
 E Ö R S I , G Y . takes the element of the purposefulness present in the relation of the parties for one 
feature defining the character of the contract on specialization: A gazdaságirányítás új rendszerére áttérés 
jogáról (On the law of the switch over to the new system of economic management), Budapest, 1968. p. 228.; 
see further FÖLDES, o p . cit . p. 1290. 
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an enterprise consists in that tha t in case of a more severe quality problem the parties 
must not be too much connected on the basis of mere hierarchic-administrative 
considerations. The penalty system of the General Conditions does not relate to the 
continuous deterioration of quality (in this respect the sanctions relating to the 
occasional violation of the foreign-trade contract are decisive, similarly negliging 
technical development renders possible only damages). In a more mobile system of 
economic conditions of integration, appearing in the form of limited and controlled 
economic competition of the economic organizations a sanction of warning character 
may play a more important role. We mean here a clause having had a part of one time 
in the contractual practice but which has been lost since then. This clause rendered 
possible that the party could enter into a contract with another specializing party 
participating in the specialization contract to its preference if this one has offered the 
product with a better quality, if the previous par tner did not undertake the supply with 
better parameters within a reasonable time limit. 
This warning sanction does not aggravate immediately the relationship between 
the parties (like e.g. penalty or damages) and does not push the parties in the direction 
of getting rid of the legal relationship; it ra ther induces them to reorganize their 
relationship. The losses namely inherent in the reasonable economic competition are 
much more lower than the economic deadlocks of reproduction of poor quality or 
obsolete technics in the monopolistic position, which is, in addition, excused by the 
legal stamp of a valid contract . 
The development of the autonomous function of production organization and 
specialization of the enterprise may give a considerable push to the specialization 
according to the phases of component and unit part as well as technological process.33 
The real significance thereof may be estimated if the fact is taken into consideration 
that this type of specialization is the "antechamber" of the real co-operation in 
production. Since, how may the relation hitherto described be qualified? The answer to 
the question raised in the introduction cannot be any more avoided. In what respect 
may specialization and co-operation be here spoken about, where are the co-operation 
elements of the legal relationship; altogether, what should be meant by specialization 
and co-operation? 
33
 Recently, the report on the Session No. X X X I V of June 1980 established that "the extent of 
international specialization of uniform unit parts and components shall be amplified with a view to the 
intensification of the manufacture of end products." 
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V. 
Concept and delimitation of specialization 
and co-operation in production 
17. As already mentioned, the legal literature does not pay too much attention to 
this question, therefore the common use of the two concepts and their application for 
the above-analyzed system of relations—beside the occasional observance of the 
differences which is still more problematic!—are generally accepted.34 
18. As for Marx, he saw in the co-operation the direct co-operation of many 
workers—which was not intermediated by the exchange, i.e. which took place within 
the phase of production,—for achieving the same result, for the production of the same 
product, of the same use-value.35 His notion—although it relates to the co-operation 
inside the workshop—makes the linking and not at all the separating feature 
characterizing the specialization to be the fundamental particularity of co-operation. 
19. The essence of the co-operation is approached by the various au thors in a 
similar way:3 6 they understand thereby the common, collective productive activity based 
on the production division of the components of the end product—that is the 
"individual labour division". Kormnov underlines, within it, the specialization relating 
to a component, or to the individual phases of the technological process. We also 
accept this notion. The specialization on international scale and the connection of the 
specialized production processes reach such a level that compared to it any foreign-
trade relation—may it be, however, very close—seems to be occasional, accidental. 
The restoration of the unity of the divided working activities raises new claims: the 
claim to a co-operation comprising also the reproduction phases preceding and 
following the exchange of goods. The international co-operation in product ion is 
therefore that kind of labour division where the labour division means the separated 
performance of some phases of the production process, of certain economic functions, 
and then their re-comhination for the sake of the finishing of the manufacture of an end 
product. The co-operating partners so to say mutually complete their capacity with 
that of the partner through the interconnection of activities.37 Accordingly, in the co-
3 4
 In addition to the Hungarian legal literature: Soôs, L.: A KGST gyártásszakosítási és kooperációs 
polgári jogi szerződések fogalmáról (On the notion of civil-law contracts on the specialization of production 
and co-operation in CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 8 / 1 9 7 6 . Cf. e.g. the cited papers of G R I N G O L Z , 
H U T S C H E N R E U T E R , BOGUSLAVSKY, as well as the report compiled in 1 9 7 3 (MS) by the working group 
elaborating the General Conditions on Specialization in Production and Cooperation (Report on legal 
questions in connection with the formation and the performance of contracts on specialization of 
production and co-operation) as well as the cited volume Dos System rechtlicher Regelung der sozialistischen 
ökonomischen Integration. 
3 5
 MEGA, Volume 3, Berlin, 1976. pp. 229-230. 
3 6
 PÉCSI , o p . c i t . p . 4 8 . ; K O R M N O V , o p . c i t . ( n . 1 4 . ) p . 9 1 ; SHIRYAYEV, o p . c i t . ( n . 6 . ) C h a p t e r I . ; t h e 
same author, op. cit. (п. 7.) Chapter I. ( " . . . the partners . . . change over from the independent manufacture 
of end products to the common production thereof'), and Chapter I I . ; BOGUSLAVSKY, op. cit. p. 147. 
3 7
 SHIRYAYEV speaks about the effective combination of certain elements of the productive apparatus 
of several countries (op. cit. п. 7.) Chapter II. 
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operation in product ion the productive units get in close connection and, at the same 
time, in interdependence with each other . The dependence means that none of them can 
return forthwith to the production without this labour division, therefore the 
maintenance of the co-operation becomes a common interest. All these mean that the 
productive units should participate in the co-operation with effective productive work; 
their productive activity and the result thereof, the end product, will be practically 
materially common. 
20. This seems to be the decisive critérium of the co-operation in production 
pointing out at the same time, also the difference f rom the specialization. Since, 
although the specialization and the co-operation—as it is obvious f rom those said 
above—are connected in several points , moreover, they overlap each other the co-
operation displays real identity with the characteristic features of the specialization 
described above (para 8) so to say in not a single point. 
a) The co-operation is not the means of the sectoral labour division but that of 
the individual l abour division: its purpose and funct ion are not the elimination of 
parallelisms between the branches, but they are " m o r e modest" than that; to bring into 
harmony the activities of the productive units through the partial connection of their 
capacities. 
b) This a t t racts unambiguously the co-operation level of the enterprises: the 
international co-operation in production is essentially a category of the enterprise 
level.38 
c) The subject of co-operation is not the realization of some large-volume 
specialized production program bu t it is normally a smaller one; it aims at the 
manufacture of one single product within labour division (this may be, of course, also a 
huge complicated equipment, a plant , etc.). The co-operation is therefore not sector-
centric but product-centric. 
d) Finally, the co-operation is—this is already obvious—not of a separating but 
of a joining character, from which the mutuality: the two-directionalness of the relation 
follows (reciprocal delivery of components, of spare parts, common developing 
activity). 
e) This relation involves, as a matter of course, not the independent manufacture 
of the end product but the orientation to the components, unit parts, although the 
parties finally fasten their eyes on the less expensive manufacture of the end product. 
Beside the enumeration of the differences, where is the overlapping to be found? 
This manifests itself in the estimation of the relation of the specialization and the co-
operation to each other: more precisely, in the extent one is present in the other. It is 
obvious from the concept of co-operation elaborated by the economists (note 36) that 
the co-operation in production consists of two phases: first, from the agreement on 
specialization relating to the division of production of components, etc., and from the 
subsequent phase in which the result of the separate activities of the component 
3 8
 PÉCSI, o p . c i t . p . 5 1 . ; B A U E R - S A B I C Z , o p . c i t . 
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production are recombined through mutual deliveries. This latter phase t ransforms the 
production process in its totality into a materially common one. The agreement on the 
specialization is followed by a co-operation in trade relating to the inside (production 
phase of the same) of the reproduction process. On the other hand, in case of the 
specialization, the agreement on specialization relating to the manufacture of the end 
product is followed by the agreement on a co-operation in trade relating to the next 
phase of the reproduction process, to the realization; the production phase is ended, 
therefore the trade co-operation may relate only to the outside of the production, to 
the realization. Consequently, with the specialization, no co-operation is taking place 
within the same reproductive phase, whereas with the co-operation both of them are 
present. 
21. Therefore, the specialization—reducing the problem to its essence—is just a 
qualified exchange of goods (long-range undertaking of obligations relating to the 
order and to the delivery of the product) which does not go qualitatively beyond the 
construction of the long-range inter-state barter agreements, and may be taken as a 
quantitatively intensified specific variety thereof. On the other hand, the co-operation 
in production—since it takes place within the same (productive) phase of the 
reproduction process—creates a close community of interests between the parties. 
Therefore, the specialization results in the separation of the parties through the 
labour division, without, however, that the labour division would dismember the 
production phase, and in addition, it results in a certain dependence. For the 
surmounting of the contradiction of separation and dependence, the usual foreign-
trade channels and legal institutions offer—due to the production phase already 
finished—a suitable solution. On the contrary, the labour division within the co-
operation in production splits up the production phase itself into parts, therefore a 
special legal institution is necessary to re-establish the dismembered unity of this 
phase, moreover, at a higher level. That is why it is necessary to exceed qualitatively the 
traditional foreign-trade barter relations. 
22. Hence, the question posed early in the paper shall be answered in such a way 
that the specialization and the co-operation are two, or essentially different phenomena, 
which are to be treated in this way also by the law. There is no uniform category of 
"specialization and co-operation" as no such contract exists. The legal relations called 
today "contract on the specialization of production and co-operation" a re actually 
pure specialization contracts and have nothing to do with the real co-operation in 
production. The trouble is caused by the fact that no distinction is made between the 
trade co-operation within and outside the same production phase; thereby, the two 
phenomena are actually confused. 
5* Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
8 4 / . Vörös 
VI. 
Future of the co-operation in production. 
Contract of international co-operation in production 
23. It is a commonplace in the literature that the co-operation in production is in 
practice very rare, the advantages of co-operations of smaller proportion based on the 
relations of the enterprises are not exploited, the co-operation is still in its early stage.39 
The objective programs aiming at the development of industrial branches manufactur-
ing stressedly important products through multi-lateral common planning are today 
(through the channel of the planning co-operation) essentially specialization-oriented. 
In our opinion—after the main fields of the future cooperation are settled in the 
objective program on the inter-state level—a thorough differentiation should be made 
with the choice of the type of the co-operation. Not a definite type should be imposed 
upon the objective program but on the contrary: on the basis of the contents and the 
objects of the program the most suitable type for the realization of the co-operation and 
the labour division should be chosen. Since, however, the specialization is the instrument 
of the large-scale co-operation on a sectoral level, it is hardly contestable that it fits e.g. 
to the demands of the objective program, in energetics the labour division of 
specialization type, whereas for the objective program on consumer's utility goods, 
that of a co-operation type would be more suitable. 
24. The co-operation, however, may mean a way out (as a matter of course, 
beside several other solutions) for solving such problems which are faced by the 
socialist countries due to the world economic change of era continuous since the middle 
of the seventies. As it is well known, due to the problems, the pace of the increase has 
diminished, whereas in the exportation to the non-socialist countries a shortage of 
goods, a lack of balance occurred.40 It follows logically that the member-countries of 
the C M E A should try to find a solution for their equilibrium problems not separately 
but cooperating on third markets, through the co-operation in production.4 1 
Moreover: Kormnov considers desirable a European-scale specialization of unit parts 
and a co-operation between the two systems ( though not mentioning the world-
economic problems but obviously in connection therewith).42 
25. Claims for co-operation in production are abundantly found in the socialist 
integration; the problem is caused by the fact that the development of the co-operation 
is not rendered possible by the present mechanism of the integration. From our 
exposition—we believe that not without any reason—the conclusion may be drawn 
3 9
 PÉCSI, o p . c i t . P . 4 8 ; BOTOS, o p . c i t . SHIRYAYEV, o p . c i t . ( N . 6 . ) 
4 0
 The pace of increase of the common national income of the CMEA countries has been 7.4 per cent 
in 1966-1970,6.2 per cent in 1971-1975 whereas between 1976 and 1980 it will be presumably 5.3 per cent. 
F Ö L D E S , o p . c i t . 
4 1
 BOTOS (op. cit.) sees also the way out in the co-operation; C S A B A (op. cit.) transposes the problem 
more generally to the level of international mechanism. 
4 2
 KORMNOV, o p . c i t . (n. 14.) pp. 1 0 6 - 1 0 8 . 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
Specialization and co-operation 8 5 
that the law of the integration ought to begin the preparations already today for 
developing an economic mechanism establishing more favourable conditions—for the 
co-operation and especially for the labour division of the co-operation in production— 
and for meeting the legal demands following therefrom.4 3 
The task is not less than to find such legal means which are efficiently able to 
express the essential community of interests of the contractual parties placed around 
the same pole of the exchange of goods, without establishing a common economic 
organization and combining financial means for this purpose. The connection of 
interests being faint at the specialization, however, is replaced here by the common 
interests involved in the manufacture of the common product in good quality, i.e. by 
the elements of a joint venture. This community of interests signifies a new feature as 
compared to the simple foreign-trade contract of delivery, or to the specialization 
contract comprising the promise of the formation of a contract. This community of 
interests renders possible the co-ordination not only o / the productive activity but of the 
research and development activity preceding the production and of the activity in the 
realization phase following the production (e.g. service). 
The community of interests and the co-ordination of activities keynote the 
contract of co-operation in production. At the same time, it is a fact that the parties 
exchange the components produced by them in the framework of contracts of delivery 
which—since the parties are placed on the opposite poles of the commodity relations— 
reduces the community of interests. It is to be seen that—like with the contracts of 
specialization—two legal relationships exist between the parties also here. In the basic 
legal relationship they establish the contract relating to the common production, 
whereas the exchange of the unit parts and components is agreed upon in several 
contracts of delivery. In the basic legal relationship the parties are placed on the same 
pole of the commodity relations, but the clash of interests appearing in the contracts of 
delivery removes them from here. In these contracts the parties face each other as 
sellers and buyers. The defect in quality of the delivered components or the delay of the 
delivery may temporarily put into the shade the community of the interests of the 
parties, though it does not bring it to an end. If i t would put an end thereto, the matter 
would be then a problem touching upon the basic relationship. A special contradiction 
is faced here that namely in this imagined contract of co-operation some legal relations 
concerning the delivery realizing just the basic legal relationship loosen the community 
of interests of the parties. Since, however, the community of interests signified in the 
basic legal relationship holds together the parties, this community of interests of higher 
level is able to release from time to time the clash of interests appearing in the legal 
relations concerning the delivery. If, however, the advantages expected f rom the co-
operation do not appear for a longer time, the relationship between the parties— 
4 3
 S H I R Y A Y E V notes that the co-operation brings several new moments both into the relations 
between the parties and into the forms of exchange of the results of productive activity; for this purpose, 
however, particular agreements are necessary (op. cit. n. 7.) 
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as a hopelessly deteriorated marriage—definitively slackens and mostly will be 
broken off. 
26. As for the basic legal relationship, three particularities follow f r o m those said 
above: first: the long-range and frame character of the legal relationship; secondly: the 
necessity of an intensive co-ordination of the activities; thirdly: a limited possibility of 
application of the system of sanctions ensuring the performance of obligations (the 
role of penalty diminishes, whereas the importance of rescission increases). 
The afore-said simultaneously points out the close connection existing between 
the basic legal relationship and the legal relations concerning the contracts of delivery 
realizing the basic one. The contracts of delivery namely form in their totality a certain 
system the performance of which means to a considerable extent the performance of 
the contract of co-operation itself. T h e contracts of delivery cannot be examined 
separately either f rom each other, or f r o m the basic legal relationship. The connection 
between the two legal relationships is much closer, than with the contracts of 
specialization, and it is also different f rom the latter considering its character. 
27. The schematical survey of some features of the contract of international co-
operation in production did not strive after being perfect. The purpose was only to 
point out the dissimilarity of the legal institutions of the contract of specialization and 
the contract of co-operation, as well as the fact that the development of the latter 
should be perspectively reckoned with, and—in our opinion and also in the opinion of 
others—this latter could already today considerably improve the prospects of the 
successful progress of the integration. Nevertheless, the law should offer by its specific 
means several alternatives for solving the problems of the economic life; for the very 
reason that among them the most suitable solution could be chosen. 
Гражданско-правовые проблемы специализации и 
кооперирования 
производства в рамках СЭВ 
И . ВЕРЕШ 
Автор в статье изучает место и роль института «международная специализация и 
кооперирование производства» в экономическом и правовом механизме СЭВ и приходит к выводу, 
что в настоящее время «специализация и кооперирование производства» покрывает чистую 
специализацию. От этого надо отграничить кооперирование и его договорную форму; роль 
договора по кооперированию в интеграции существенно отличается от этого. Несмотря на то, что 
перед развитием договора по международному кооперированию производства стоят существенные 
барьеры, автор на такой позиции, что экономика — социалистическая экономическая интеграция 
равно как и наступление нового периода в мировой экономике — претендуют на развитие 
правоотношений типа сотрудничества. Важный шаг по этому пути представляло бы собой 
оформление договора по международному кооперированию производства. 
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Die zivilrechtlichen Probleme der Produktions-
spezialisierung und Produktionskooperation im RGW 
I . V Ö R Ö S 
Der Beitrag sucht den Platz und die Rolle der „internationalen Produktionsspezialisierung 
und Produktionskooperat ion" im wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Mechanismus des RGW und 
gelangt zu der Konklusion, daß die gegenwärtige „Produktions- und Kooperationsspezialisierung in 
der Wirklichkeit eine echte Spezialisation ist. Sie muß von der Kooperation und deren vertraglichen 
Form streng unterschieden werden; der Kooperationsvertrag hat in der Integration eine wesentlich 
unterschiedliche Rolle. Der Entwicklung des internationalen Kooperationsvertrags auf dem Gebiet 
der Produktion stehen zwar wesentliche Hindernisse in d e m Weg, der Beitrag äußert jedoch die 
Meinung, daß die Wirtschaft — sowohl die sozialistische Wirtschaftsintegration, als auch der 
Epochenwechsel der Weltwirtschaft — die Entwicklung von kooperationsartigen Rechtsverhältnissen 
beansprucht. Die Herausformung des internationalen Produktions-Kooperationsvertrags wäre auf diesem 
Weg ein wichtiger Schritt. 
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The problem of treaty-making 
between the CMEA and the Common Market 
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The C o m m o n Market is inclined to establish very restricted legal contacts between the 
two organizations, while the C M E A proposes rather wide-ranging regulation, i.e. to include 
the most-favoured-nation clause and the principle o f non-discrimination in the treaty. In the 
Community's opinion, the C M E A is incompetent in these matters. The author points out that 
the socialist integration is entitled to agree to any treaty, supposed that the subject of the treaty 
is under the competence of the organization. The Charter does not delimit exactly the extent o f 
this competence and the activities o f the organization did not cover so far c o m m o n commercial 
policy. Nevertheless, the articles o f the treaty proposed by the C M E A d o not presuppose an 
active commercial policy. The above-mentioned proposi t ions may be met by the C o m m o n 
Market without c o m m o n C M E A commercial policy towards third parties. 
It is a general experience that while in the political sphere a fairly extensive co-
operation can be brought about without the establishment of an institutionalized 
framework between the states, the economic co-operat ion demands the creation of 
substantive and organizational-procedural norms of increasing precision. It is by no 
means accidental that besides the United Nat ions the legal f ramework of the 
international economic organizations has reached high standards and exactly these 
organizations have contributed remarkably to the development of general inter-
national law. It is an important landmark in this field that the members have 
authorized some of these organizations to acquire rights and enter in to obligations in 
their own name. In this way, these organizations may serve the ends for which they 
have been called to life more effectively. 
Some years ago, the institutionalization of relations between the C M E A and the 
C o m m o n Market has been taken up.1 Both of the part ies formulated their conceptions 
as regards the establishment of the relations, moreover , each of them elaborated a 
draft- treaty, upon several essential stipulations of which, however, the parties could 
not yet agree. This paper analyzes the legal questions relating to the treaty-making, in 
the first place that one, with which powers the C M E A and with which the Common 
Market is vested in this field. 
1
 On the previous development of the relation between the two integrational organizations cf. V A L K I , 
L.: A Közös Piac szervezeti és döntéshozatali rendszere (Decision-making in the Common Market), 
Budapest, 1977. pp. 385-393. 
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Until recently the CMEA was not vested with international treaty-making power. 
The expansion of the international division of labour, the progress of the C M E A 
integration, the growing interest of third countries in the economic co-operation with 
the socialist states, and last but not least, the mutual rapprochement of the C M E A 
and the European-Communities have prompted the C M E A to amend its Charter 
according to the changed conditions. 
The lack of treaty-making power did not mean, however, that the organization 
could not maintain relations with third states or other international organizations. The 
1959 Char ter of Sofia contained the following provisions in this respect: 
Article 10—Participation of other states in the work of the Council: "The Council 
of Mutual Economic Assistance may invite to participate in the work of its organs also 
those states which are not members of the Council. The Council defines the conditions 
under which the representatives of these states may take par t in the work of organs of 
the Council on the basis of agreement with the respective states." 
Article 11 —Relations with international organizations: "The Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance may establish and maintain relations with the economic 
organizations of the Uni ted Nations and other international organizations. The 
Council defines the nature and form of these relations on the grounds of agreement 
with the respective international organizations." 
F r o m Article 10 it is evident that , at the time of the formulation of these 
provisions, the members of the CMEA had not in mind that the CMEA should ever 
appear as an economic unit in the international relations. They did not suppose that the 
CMEA could have at all relations of such character to third states which should be 
regulated. This is the reason of the formulat ion that non-member-states "could take 
part" in the work of the Council. Hence, in conformity with Article 10 it is not two 
units (a state and an organized group of states) which enters into relations but merely 
the participation of one unit (a state) in a jo int economic venture of another unit (an 
organized group of states). As for its na ture , this venture in all cases remained an 
internal affair of the C M E A and could not be substantially modified even by the 
participation of a " fore ign" party. 
At the same time, it seems as if Article 11 had set out f rom different 
understanding. It spoke of the CMEA as a formation relatively independent of its 
member-states which established and maintained relations independently with the 
economic organizations of the UN and other international organizations. From 
various documents of the CMEA and the practice so far followed it is, however, 
evident that the founders of the organization did not even in this respect have in mind 
the economic relations of two larger units of a group of states but they merely 
envisaged a certain co-operation of the administrative organs. This will hold also as far 
as the economic organizations of U N are concerned since the member-states of the 
CMEA are mostly also members therein. Still for practical purposes, the situation was 
very much the same in respect of n o n - U N organizations. 
The reason of this circumstance may be as follows. 
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First of all, the CMEA as organization has never endeavoured to bring about an 
economic unit wholly separated from world economy as a whole. There is not a single 
mechanism within the CMEA which would have similar function as e.g. the different 
mechanisms of the Common Market . There is not customs union, nor is there a free 
flow of capital between the ten states, no common systems of external economic 
protection have been established, neither d o the member-states pursue a jo in t 
commercial policy, etc. Generally, it was not intended by the C M E A to create in the 
given multinational region economic conditions as if it were the case of a single, 
uniform region. Therefore, in this sense the C M E A did never strive for the integration 
of the national economies or for the coalescence of segregated formations. The 
mechanisms of co-operation of the CMEA rather had as their funct ion the extension of 
the mutual division of labour of the separately existing economic units. Merely for 
historical reasons, a situation has developed where the division of labour have not 
developed in multilateral dimensions; the exchange of goods and settling the accounts 
still take place in bilateral form. Consequently, the mechanisms of the CMEA have 
been brought about with a view to developing bilateral trade, the co-ordination of the 
national economic plans, the specialization ofproduction and the promotion of industrial 
co-operation. 
Thus, this character of the mechanism of international co-operation of the 
socialist countries precluded for the time being the need for, and even the possibility of 
the acting of the CMEA as a unit in international economic relations with either third 
states or other international organizations. 
The other reason of the formulation of the cited provisions is to be found in the 
political-legal conceplation valid in that time. The international law and the political 
contemplation of socialist countries did not yet accept at the end of the fifties the 
conception that international organizations could be subjects of law. The starting point 
was that only the states can become subjects of international law. "The essential 
feature of subjects of international law is namely—stated a paper—the disposition of 
supreme power in international field which renders them able to take par t in 
legislation, to undertake obligations."2 Consequently, the treaties in the conclusion of 
which also international organization participates, oblige not directly the organization 
but the states behind the organization. The organization can enter in a treaty only 
under delegated powers but never by its own right. Those sharing this opinion resumed 
that the recognition of the subject of law of international organizations would mean 
simultaneously the recognition of their being "supranat ional" and , in this way, it 
would affect the sovereignty of the member-states. Especially unfavourable opinions 
were voiced in this respect against the Common Market the founders of which have 
invested their organization with the treaty-making power. According to them, the 
relatively wide-ranging powers were the undeniable prove of the supranational 
character of the West-European integration. 
2
 Cf. МОДЖОРЯН, Л. А.: Субъекты международного права. Moscow, 1958. P. 7. 
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Later, however, the socialist literature on international law abandoned this 
attitude. Several authors pointed out that legal personality did not mean more than 
some units had rights and obligations in a given legal system.3 It depends exclusively on 
the legislators whom they want to invest with legal personality. In the international life 
where the states obviously have the possibility of original legislation, nothing excludes 
that they invest also their organizations with treaty-making powers ta. with the 
acquisition of rights and undertaking of obligations. The enforcement of the opposite 
attitude would mean just the curtailment of the sovereignty. The sovereign state has 
namely unrestricted legal capacity, consequently its treaty-making capacity is 
similarly unrestricted. The state may undertake any obligation, may acquire any right 
and may enter into agreement on any subject with other states. W h y just the possibility 
would be forbidden for it to invest an organization whose member it is, with treaty-
making power within the scope of authority defined by it? 
The international legal literature has not presumed any more an equality 
between supranationalism and treaty-making capacity and has not excluded the 
possibility that the CMEA became a subject of international law. This change of 
attitude contributed undoubtedly to the amendment of the Charter of the 
organization, more precisely, it cleared away the obstacles thereof. 
The necessity of the amendment, however, had an other—rather technical— 
reason, too. By virtue of the above-cited provision of Article 11, seemingly, any 
contract could be signed with any international organization, but the original Russian 
wording precluded it. The Russian text spoke of "dogovorennost" which was not the 
same. This expression in Russian legal terminology includes agreement on etymolog-
ical grounds only, but not on grounds of legal terminology. If, therefore, a certain text 
spoke of "dogovorennost", an agreement could though be reached with the other party, 
still this did not imply the signature of an agreement—and more less an international 
treaty. The authority conferred by the original Russian wording is, therefore, narrower 
than its translation and since the authentic wording of the Char te r was the Russian, it 
had to be amended in any case. 
Since after 1959 several organizational-institutional changes have taken place 
within the C M EA and the Complex Program of Bucharest has brought about changes 
of content in the activities of the organization, the member-states of the C M E A have 
decided to incorporate all changes uniformly and in conjunction in a new wording. 
After a thorough preparat ion, this new wording has been elaborated in 1974 and 
the amendment has been accepted by the leading organs of the C M E A . Subsequently, 
the member-states have ratified, in conformity with their constitutional provisions, 
this amending treaty which has entered into force in 1976.4 
J
 Cf. H A R A S Z T I , G Y . : A nemzetközi jogalanyiság kérdéséhe: (To the question of international legal 
personality). Acta ELTE, Tom. I I . Fase. I , I960.; Т У Н К И Н , Г . И . : Вопросы теория международного права. 
Moscow. 1962. pp. 17—19.; Т А Л А Л А Е В , Д . Н . : Юридическая природа международного договори, 
Moscow, 1963. р. 63., etc. 
4
 Cf. V A L K I , L . — R A N S B U R G , G . : A KGST Alapokmányának módosításáról (Amendment of the 
Charter of the CMEA), Külgazdaság, 2/1976. 
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Already the very first provisions of the amended wording refer to the right of 
international treaty-making. A new sub-section (b) has been taken up in section 2 of 
Article 3, according to which CMEA "may—in conformity with the present Char te r— 
sign treaties with the member-states of the Council, with o ther countries and with 
international organizations". Simultaneously, the title of the previous Article 10 (at 
present Article 11) has been changed from "Participation of Other States" to "The 
Relations of the Council with Other States". The provision of this Article, tha t the 
organization may invite to his work also states which are not its members, has though 
been preserved, still completed with the following words: " . . . or can establish co-
operation with them in another form". 
The following Article 12 (the former Article 11) renders possible further on the 
establishment and maintenance of relations with various international organizations. 
The only amendment is the change of their designation: instead of "the economic 
organizations of U N " "organs and specialized agencies of the U N " are mentioned, a 
modification which improves the terminology used in the Charter . 
Both Articles have been modified in their substance by the addition of words 
referring to the form of regulation of the relations with third parties. In the meaning of 
this modification the C M E A brings under regulation any kind of co-operation with 
third states or international organizations "by virtue of agreement, especially (usually) 
by signing agreements". This term—together with the previous one—refers unam-
biguously to the fact that henceforth, the C M EA also as an independent unit may sign 
treaties with third state, namely in such fields which belong to the competence of the 
organization. In this way, the CMEA virtually acquired the general power of treaty-
making and, in this respect, it is not limited but by the provisions of integration, i.e. 
Article 3 of the Charter on the activity and sphere of authority of the C M E A . 
It is again another question that this Article deals with the integrational activity 
of the organization further in highly generalized terms. The Char te r does not contain a 
precise list of powers, it merely enumerates the fields (industry, agriculture, t ransport , 
harmonization of plans, specialization, co-operation, exchange of goods, exchange of 
scientific-technical results, respectively) in which the C M E A organizes the co-
operation of member-states. This means that in a concrete treaty-making question it is 
impossible to proceed exclusively from the Charter , since this does not contain any 
restriction but does not pronounce positively either upon what the CMEA can agree 
with third parties. Therefore, it may occur in principle e.g. tha t the leading organs 
prepare an agreement on such questions which would actually belong though to the 
integration and co-operation mentioned in Article 3 but in respect of which within the 
CMEA no common activity has started yet. 
If the statute says nothing about the powers of an international organization, 
usually the resolutions of the leading organs are decisive. The member-states namely 
do not define precisely the scope of powers in advance because it is not yet possible in 
the moment of the establishment of the organization. If they would strive af ter a 
comprehensive regulation, later the leading organs would be thereby bound and the 
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troublefree development of the organization would be impeded. It is more 
advantageous if the leading organs themselves shape the powers of the organization by 
continuously made decisions. In case of doubt, it should be revised only whether the 
given case had already "internal" antecedents. If so, the agreement can be concluded. 
If not, the agreement cannot be signed until no respective decisions are made, and the 
common activity within the organization is not started. This is the case also with the 
C M E A . Since in the CMEA only unanimous decisions can be made, the risk is not 
involved that the leading organs "become de tached" from the member states and 
extend the powers of the organization against the interests of the member-states or 
enter into agreements with third states or international organizations. 
The Char ter does not provide, even after the amendment, for the process of 
treaty-making. As in other questions of decision-making, the founders have left the 
practice to formula te the appropriate rules. However, since the above-mentioned two 
Articles name the Council as subject of treaties, obviously the central organ of general 
competence of the CMEA—i.e. the General Assembly—is authorized to make the 
required decisions. There are n o obstacles to the attendance of the government 
representatives of the member-states at the negotiations so as to have first-hand 
information of the progress made. The latter, namely the government representatives 
may figure even among the signatories and so give birth to agreements of "mixed 
character" i.e. agreements where the organization and the member-states are equally 
subjects. Whether or not such agreements have to be ratified will, in all likelihood, be 
determined by their subject mat ter . It may hardly be necessary to ratify an agreement 
on—let us say—the exchange of statistical information. Cases may, however, occur 
when with the progress of the C M E A integration agreements may come to be made in 
domains, too, where ratification is indispensable. 
The agreements so far signed (e.g. with Finland) date back to a time before the 
amendment becoming effective and do not affect material economic relations. The 
purpose of these agreements was, in the first place, the laying of the frameworks of co-
operation so tha t there was no need for their ratification. The representatives of the 
governments of member-states, however, also attended together with the represen-
tatives of the Secretary, the negotations. 
Which are the treaty-making powers of the Common Market? 
With full knowledge of supranational not ions in connection with the C o m m o n 
Market it is a surprising fact tha t the organization has not been invested with general 
treaty-making power. There is no t a single provision in the Rome Treaty which would 
have granted unrestricted powers to the Communi ty to conclude treaties. Only three 
concrete cases are when powers are granted: 
1. In conformity with Article 113 the common commercial policy has after the 
expiry of a transitional period to be continued " o n uniformly established principles" 
particularly in regard to the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements. Later, this 
article has given rise to disputes in both the practice followed by the Community and in 
professional literature. Many have namely called into doubt the interpretation as if by 
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virtue of this provision only the Community could sign tariff and t rade agreements 
with third states and international organizations. The term namely that the 
commercial policy shall be continued on "uniformly established principles"—it was 
said—refers to the maintenance of national treaty-making power. The member-states 
shall not but establish in advance the principles by virtue of which they will enter into 
negotiations, and sign the treaties, respectively.5 
The dispute has been settled by the Council in 1962. In the form of a resolution 
an authentic interpretation has been given to Article 113 and it was held that even 
during the transitional period action had to be taken by the member-states for the 
unification of commercial policies. After the expiry of the transitional period the 
above-mentioned agreements could be signed exclusively by the leading organs of the 
Community.6 Neither the Rome Treaty, nor the position taken by the Council 
contained direction in that respect what whould be done if third state would not 
recognize the Common Market as subject of international law and did not want to 
establish therewith a relation by agreement. 
2. Articles 229-231 specify indirect powers of treaty-making. According to their 
wording, the Common Market maintains "appropriate relations" and "close co-
operation "with the United Nations, their specialized agencies, the G A T T , the Council 
of Europe, the OEEC, and if expedient, "with all other international organizations". 
Although these Articles do not expressly mention the right of treaty-making, still both 
in professional literature and in practice a wholly uniform affirmative position has 
been taken in this respect. However, nothing is said in these Articles of what the 
content may be of inter-organizational agreements. In our opinion, since the case is 
one of the maintenance of "relat ions" and "co-operat ion", the founders of the 
Common Market, too, had not rules of substantive law in mind at the wording, but 
provisions of an administrative nature regulating such co-operation. The agreements 
containing such provisions cannot touch essentially upon the position of the member-
states, moreover, it is not at all sure that they would give rise to direct rights and 
obligations in their respect. 
3. The third power to treaty-making is to be found in Article 238. Accordingly, 
"the Community may conclude with third country, with a union of states or with an 
international organization, agreements creating an association involving reciprocal 
rights and obligations, joint action and special procedures". With respect to the right 
of treaty-making the wording is unambiguous. The situation is, however, an altogether 
different one as regards the content of the agreement so made. The reference to 
"reciprocal rights and obligations" and to "joint act ion"does not clearly state the 
content, nor does the term "special procedures" specify by what such an agreement 
differs from other international agreements. The content of hitherto concluded 
5
 Cf. E V E R L I N G , U . : Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy in the European Economic 
Community, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 4. No. 2. 1966. p. 150. 
6
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, September 25, 1969, p. 62. 
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agreements of association, however, points out that the leading organs have 
interpreted this Article as general powers of treaty-making, since close economic 
relations have been established with the associated states. At any rate, the member-
states have agreed with this interpretation. 
As regards the procedure of treaty-making, in conformity with the general rule, 
the Council has powers to conclude treaties, whereas the negotiations come within the 
province of the Commission. In the event of tariff and commercial agreements the 
provision shall be completed with the rule that the Commission brings forward 
suggestions to the Council as to the formulation of the content of agreements. The 
ministers then on the ground of the suggestions authorize the Commission to take up 
negotations, and then in the form of guidelines define the tactics to be followed in the 
negotiations. In these negotiations the Commission relies on the support of a special 
committee formed of government representatives appointed by the Council. It is 
worthwhile to note that on the above decisions—correspondingly on the treaty-
making—decision is reached by a qualified majority of the ministers. At the same time, 
the representatives of the member-states may veto the conclusions of agreements for 
association. As regards the treaty-making all that the Rome Treaty decrees is that 
before the signature the European Parliament must be consulted. If an agreement has 
to be signed with an international organization the same rules will hold, i.e. the 
negotiations are carried on by the Commission, the agreements are, however, signed by 
the Council. 
In conformity with the Treaty of Rome, the Council and the Commission act 
autonomously, i.e. as regards the content of agreements or their coming into force the 
member-states have no further say in the matter. In this way, the agreements have a 
direct binding force on the member-states from the moment the Council declares the 
agreement to have been concluded. There is neither ratification nor any subsequent 
procedure of approval required. 
Virtually, the actual procedure of treaty-making departs in many respects from 
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Above all, the 1965/1966 crisis of the 
Community, which for a long time to come excluded the passing of majority decisions, 
had an effect on the relevant provisions of the Treaty. Therefore, all agreements of the 
Community are passed by the completely unanimous decision of the member-states 
irrespective of the rules of decision-making the Treaty of Rome provided. 
The second difference is of similar character. Although the Rome Treaty decrees 
the involvement of a special committee of government representatives only at the 
signing of tariffand commercial agreements, in practice on each occasion the member-
states appointed their representatives who attended the conferences to their end, 
moreover, took an active part in the talks. Formally, though the representative of the 
Commission acted for and on behalf of the Community, the other party might easily 
have the impression as if he were negotiating not with one but earlier with seven, now 
with ten parties. The government representatives showed extreme vigilance when it 
came to safeguard the national interests of their countries. By this procedure, the 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
CMEA — Common Market treaty 9 7 
member-states might closely follow each phase of the negotiations and control their 
process so that the Commission had a very modest chance only for enforcing its own 
policy. 
The predominant role of national interest has been noticeable also in the practice 
of the Community's treaty-making policy. Often the member-states have gone as far as 
to lay claims to the signing and even the ratification of the agreements so that the 
subsequent decision of the Council on undertaking of obligations has become merely a 
formal legal act. The agreements signed by the Community—in particular those for 
associations—can therefore be hardly distinguished f rom other multilateral con-
ventions, since they are signed by all participating countries and, according to their final 
clauses, they come into force after the instruments of ratification have been deposited by 
all countries. It is in this way that the so-called "mixed agreements" have come into 
being, where the member-states, the associated states, the Council and the 
Commission were equally parties. 
From what has been set forth it is evident that the founders have invested the two 
organizations with appropriate powers. The question is only how these organizations 
will make use of these powers in their practice. This matter obviously will not be 
decided by legal considerations. Whether the two integrations of Europe will conclude 
agreements with each other and if so, with which content, is an important political 
question — obviously for both parties. The upshots up to now do not give rise for the 
moment to too much optimism. A long time passed since Gromiko came forward in an 
initiative manner in this respect on the preparatory meeting of the European 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in 1973 in his negotiations with the 
President of the Council, the Danish minister of Foreign Affairs, Anderson. In the 
course of these eight years it has become obvious that the Common Market which has 
always found wanting the diplomatic recognition from the side of socialist countries, is 
far f rom being ready to develop relations on the merits with the CMEA. The reason 
thereof was semi-officially defined in that he does not want to "upgrade" the role of the 
Soviet Union within the CMEA on the expense of the smaller socialist countries, he 
does not want to strengthen the socialist integration. Several Western politicians and 
experts have elucidate in vain that the Western interests would be better served by the 
institutionalization of the relations developed with the C M E A . They referred in vain to 
the general experience that the operation of international organizations would offer 
much more possibilities to the enforcement of interests of smaller countries than 
allowed generally by the traditional diplomatic relations (i.e. just the position of small 
socialist countries would be strengthened by the institutionalization of the relations), 
nothing has altered the readiness to agreement of those in Brussels.7 Many people draw 
7
 Cf. — inter alia — B O L Z , К . : Zwischen Anerkennung und Ablehnung — Das Verhältnis zwischen EG 
und RGW, in: Die EG-Außenbeziehungen (ed. H A S E N P F L U G , H.), Hamburg, 1 9 7 9 . ; S C H U L Z , E.: 
Überlegungen zur Gestaltung der Ostbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: Die Ostbeziehungen der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft (ed. SCHULZ, E.), München/Wien, 1977. 
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therefrom the conclusion that not so much the anxiety of the Common Market about 
the situation of smaller countries impeded up to now the agreement but rather the 
survival of political tenets remained here from older times. 
These questions were, of course, not discussed at the negotiations of the parties. 
All the more was spoken about the legal problems. One of the debated questions was in 
the first period to what extent the introduction of the common commercial policy of 
EC concerns the socialist countries. Is it really necessary to enter into agreement with 
the West-European organization or may they reserve the right to choose indepen-
dently their contracting parties. As it is known, the Community did not offer any more 
after 1st of January 1975 the possibility to its members to conclude bilateral 
agreements with third countries, therefore since that time an unregulated state prevails 
in the trade between the Common Market and the socialist countries. As is well-
known, according to the official att i tude of Brussels, commercial agreements shall be 
concluded in such a way that one party shall be the organization, whereas the other one 
a third state. In this connection they referred to the agreements the Common Market 
signed previously with several countries—e.g. with Yugoslavia and Rumania. On the 
other hand, it is also known that the socialist countries refused this solution partly 
because they found the situation unequal that the member-states of the CMEA enter 
into negotiations separately with the Community as with an economic great power 
(only the Soviet Union could have appeared as a party equal in rank) and partly 
because they found that the Community intended to use this means for the political 
division of the socialist countries. 
This problem cannot be solved solely on the basis of international law 
considerations. It may be stated at any rate that the decision of a group of states cannot 
legally effect third states. Consequently, the Community cannot independently 
determine with whom the socialist countries should enter into legal relationship. The 
argument much cited in the literature of the Common Market that their 
organization—like the UN—is an "objective" subject of law and if once established, it 
must take the place of member-states in legal relations with third countries, does not 
stand fast. The position of the organization—and the U N is just the single exception— 
is not identical with that of the state. The states—due to the mere fact of their 
formation—become subjects of the international law, whereas in case of the 
organization, the decision expressed in the Charter of the founders is required thereto. 
This decision is, however, relevant only in the relation to each other of the founders, 
but not in connection with third parties. These parties can freely decide upon whether 
they recognize the organization as subject of international law or not and after a 
possible recognition, whether they are ready to enter into treaty obligations with it or 
not. The recognition has in this case an other legal effect than in case of the states. The 
recognition of the latters may be only a declarative act, whereas that of the former of 
constitutive character. 
If it is, therefore, necessary to regulate the relations of a group of states with a 
third state, it cannot be expected f rom the latter to sign an agreement at any rate with 
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an international organization having treaty-making power in the field in question. If 
the third state does not want to recognize the organization for one reason or another, 
or after the recognition she does not want to enter into legal relation with it, its 
members shall be in principle ready to conclude bilateral agreements. This is 
supported, however, by the principle of treaty-making freedom. 
As a matter of fact, this principle holds good also in the opposite relation: 
neither the members of the group of states in question can be obliged to conclude 
bilateral agreements if they do not want to do so. The law does not give and cannot give 
any solution. The circumstance, however, must not be left out of consideration that in 
Europe the commercial relations were regulated up to the above-mentioned time by 
bilateral inter-state agreements, and the members of the Community were who wanted to 
change the status quo. The responsibility for the present state of affairs must not shifted 
upon those who do not absolutely agree in this unilaterally decided change. 
Especially not if considered that an essential part of commercial and association 
agreements the Community signed hitherto with third states—as it was to be seen— 
can hardly be distinguished from conventional multilateral agreements. When the 
government representatives of the member-states attend the negotiations and then 
take part in signing the agreement, moreover, when the agreements are put up for 
ratification, then the Community becomes only one of the signatory parties. To force 
the exclusive representation if the difficulties could be surmounted quite simply by the 
application of an already existing form of treaty-making, can be hardly regarded as a 
well-intentioned political attitude. 
None of the socialist countries opposes that the Common Market harmonize the 
commercial policy of its member-states. This could be done, however, even if its 
member-states would have kept to the practice of bilateral agreements. A good 
example thereof is the obligatory consultation process introduced in 1974 with the 
conclusion of industrial co-operation agreements and applied hitherto.8 According to 
the decision of the Council if the member-states want to negotiate with third states on 
the conclusion or on the prolongation of validity of such an agreement, they must 
inform immediately each other and the Commission. If one of the member-states or the 
Commission claims within eight days, consultations must be held in the framework of 
a special committee of government representatives. The purpose of consultations is to 
ensure that the co-operation agreements correspond to the objects of the common 
commercial policy. The decision of the Council does not mention what should happen 
if the consultations would not resolve the arising misgivings; the concerned parties 
may appeal certainly to the Court of Justice of the Common Market in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Rome Treaty. Although no such Court procedure 
occurred hitherto in the framework of the organization, the obligatory consultation 
process seems, however, by itself to be an appropriate instrument for the co-ordination 
of the treaty-making practice. 
8
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, L No. 208., July 30, 1974. 
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The other problem raised from the very first time on the side of the Common 
Market has been the question of the competence of the CMEA. According to them, 
neither the modification of the Charter of the C M E A would authorize the 
organization to conclude agreements of considerable economic effect—such as 
commercial agreements. They refer thereto that the CMEA—as against the 
Community—has no common commercial policy, has no common customs border, 
does not apply common import quota, etc. Consequently, the agreement between the 
two integrations cannot contain stipulations of commercial policy content because the 
member-states of the C M E A have further on reserved their sovereign rights. At the 
same time, the Common Market has the suitable competence because its member-
states have delegated several powers to the organization in the course of the past more 
than two decades and—they add—the matter is here not only the delegation of treaty-
making power but also the development of cooperation realized in every spheres of 
commercial policy. Referring thereto, the Community has opposed—and opposes also 
today—the taking up of the most-favoured-nation-clause as well as the prohibition of 
discrimination into the inter-organizational agreement, asserting that only the 
member-states of the C M E A can agree on questions of such nature with the Common 
Market. Moreover, according to their proposal, the inter-organizational agreement 
could definitely refer to that on the important quota, on the application of the most-
favoured-nation-clause, on the various protective mechanisms, as well as on the 
removal of impediments to the commercial turnover the Community and the member-
states of the CMEA should later on entered into agreement. 
This position is, however, legally untenable. As has already been made clear, 
with the modification of the Charter, the member-states have vested full treaty-making 
powers in the CMEA, which means that the CMEA may sign any agreement to the 
subject matter of which the competence of the organization extends. It is, however, 
true that the Charter says nothing about the precise extent of these powers and it is also 
true that the leading organs neither have hitherto decided upon the development of a 
common commercial policy. The fact is, however, that the content of agreement 
suggested by the socialist countries does not suppose any active commercial policy on the 
side of the CMEA. The provision for the most-favoured-nation-clause and the 
suspension of discrimination mean such a unilateral act which could be effected by the 
Common Market even if the socialist integration does not apply any kind of 
commercial policy against third parties. As for the C M E A , it would make decisions 
which would oblige its own member-states to take the appropriate internal legal 
measures. 
Incidentally, the competence of C M E A developed by the leading organs is by no 
means narrower than that of the Common Market. It should be namely taken into 
consideration that the two integrations accomplish co-operation of qualitatively other 
character. The participants of the West-European integration endeavour to the 
elimination of the factors impeding the division of labour resultig from the 
development in separated economic institutional systems of their states and they are 
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going to establish a multinational institutionalized system in their region. Their aim is 
to produce in this region conditions similar to the domestic ones for the division of 
labour, and for the micro—i.e. inter-company—integration, respectively. For this 
sake, they created the free flow of the factors of production, and then they took 
measures—for the moment, essentially unsuccessful—to harmonize their national 
economic policies. The participants of the socialist integration, however, do not strive 
after the establishment of a uniform, institutionalized system, after the removal of 
economic barriers existing between their states. Their activity tends towards the 
harmonization of national economic policies, more precisely towards the bilateral and 
multilateral harmonization of national economic plans, towards the organization of 
international specialization of production and of the co-operation. While, therefore, 
the Community intends to realize the extension of micro-integration by means of 
macro-integrational mechanisms, in indirect way, the C M E A tries to promote the 
micro-economical co-operation directly, mostly without the application of macro-
mechanisms. This means that while the West-European integration displays activities 
in the field of trade only, the East-European integration deals in the first place directly 
with the problems of production. The essence of the mat ter is to be found in that both 
organizations have considerable decision-making powers in the own sphere of activity. 
The Common Market has wide-ranging powers e.g. in the development of the 
commercial policy but cannot decide upon the specialization among the member-
states of the production of an article. Whereas the C M E A can make decisions on 
specialization and even if it did not produce decision-making powers for itself in the 
field of commercial policy, its plan-harmonization activity goes far beyond that what 
has been ever produced by the Community in the field of co-ordination of economic 
policies. 
All these show that the contestation of the competence of the other party is a 
hardly justifiable measure; in all likelihood, it has the only purpose of concealing the 
lack of political will. 
In other questions the differences of opinions have been earlier eliminated or 
such ones did not at all occurred. In the period of establishment of relations between 
the two organizations a still much debated question was e.g. who should negotiate in 
their name. At first, the Commission did not want to take seat at the conference table 
together with the representatives of the Secretariat of the CMEA and instead, it 
preferred to meet the representatives of the governments. They mentioned that the 
Secretariat had no independent decision-making powers within the C M E A , let alone 
in the international relations. In reply thereto, the C M E A declared also that it wanted 
to negotiate with the representatives of the member-states of the Community and not 
with "eurocrats" of Brussels. 
As for the competence of the two bodies, it is an indisputable fact that that of the 
Commission is much wider. Whereas namely the Secretariat of the C M E A discharges 
only functions of an administrative character and has among its duties the preparatory 
work for decision-making, the Commission may make decisions of an autonomous 
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character in the field defined by the Treaty of Rome, decisions, namely, which are 
directly binding on the member-states, entreprises and even on private persons. It also 
remains a fact that whereas the Treaty of Rome expressly authorizes the Commission 
to negotiate agreements with third parties, there is no provision of the like taken up in 
the Sofia Charter. This is, however, wholly irrelevant f rom the point of view who 
should be the negotiating party. The C M E A namely, may within the limitations of 
international courtesy appoint any person or organ for continuing the negotiations. 
The only condition is that the representative so appointed should be authorized to 
make valid declarations on behalf of the organization. If there are no provisions in the 
Char ter on this point, obviously the organ authorized to decision-making in the given 
case has powers to make the required decision. The Common Market can in no case 
raise objections to this procedure, since the appointment of the person or organ to take 
part in the negotiations is a proper "domest ic affair" of the CMEA. The situation is, of 
course, the same vice versa; the C o m m o n Market decides also within its own 
competence on its representation. 
Subsequently, this question was successfully agreed upon so that the agreement 
on the level of delegations was not any more impeded (in this question the mutual 
understanding is necessary quite apa r t from the above-mentioned disputes, in 
accordance with the diplomatic practice). Contacts between the two organizations 
have been established on the level both of the representatives of the organizations and 
of the representatives of governments. 
It has early become evident that the parties have been ready to co-operate in other 
fields hitherto not mentioned—since not discussed — such as the exchange of trade 
and economic statistics and economic prognoses, as well as the protection of 
environment and the standardization. As long as, however, no agreement is entered 
into in the main questions, as a mat ter of course, the starting with the effective co-
operation cannot be expected either in these fields. 
With respect to the conclusion of the definitive agreement and to its moment no 
forecast is possible. It is, however, sure that the conclusion of the treaty would be 
advantageous for the people participating in the integration. To all appearances, the 
C o m m o n Market must change its political attitude for this purpose and then the legal 
approach will change, too. 
Вопрос заключения договора между СЭВ и Общим Рынком 
Л . В А Л К И 
Общий Рынок желает осуществить урегулирование отношений между двумя организациями 
лишь в очень узкой области, а СЭВ предлагает включить в соглашение также применение принципа 
наибольшего благоприятствоьания и освобождения от всякой дискриминации. Общий Рынок 
ссылается на то, что СЭВ не имеет в этой области соответствующей компетенции. Автор излагает, 
что социалистическая интеграционная организация вправе подписать любой договор, предмет 
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которого входит в ее компетенцию. Хотя в Уставе не определен точно объем этой компетенции, и 
деятельность организации д о сих пор не распространялась на общие вопросы торговой политики, 
однако договорные пункты, предложенные со стороны СЭВ, не предусматривают какую-либо 
активную торговую политику СЭВ. Обеспечение наибольшего благоприятствования и прекращение 
дискриминации составляют такой односторонний акт, который может быть исполнен Общим 
Рынком и тогда, если СЭВ не применяет никакой торговой политики в отношении государств-
членов. 
L'accord entre la Communauté Européenne et le CAEM 
L. VALKI 
La communauté désire que l'accord entre les deux organisations ne s'étende que sur une partie 
assez restreinte des rapports. Le C A E M de son part, souhaite que l 'accord contienne la c lause de la 
nation la plus favorisée et celle de l'indiscrimination. Selon l 'argumentation de la C o m m u n a u t é 
Européenne, le C A E M ne possède pas la compétence nécessaire pour un accord de ce genre. L'auteur 
souligne que le C A E M peut signer tout accord dont l'objet relève à sa compétence. La Charte du 
C A E M ne comprend pas une régulation absolument précise de la compétence de l 'organisation et les 
activités actuelles de l'organisation ne s'étendent pas encore sur la pol i t ique commerciale commune . 
Mais les proposit ions du C A E M ne demandent pas l'existence de la polit ique commerciale commune 
de la part du C A E M . L'application de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée et l'indiscrimination est 
un acte unilaterale et peut être appliquée sans l'existence de la pol i t ique commerciale c o m m u n e du 
C A E M . 
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Arbitration in the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance 
J. JUHÁSZ 
head o f department 
Ministry for Foreign Trade 
The paper offers a review of the policies defined in article 15. of the Complex Program of 
the states united in the C M E A in respect o f the methods of arbitration observed in their foreign 
trade transactions; it also discusses the antecedents, the results so far achieved and the 
problems still to be solved. The author deals in detail with the settlement of civil law disputes 
arising from the economic and scientific-technical co-operation by way of arbitration, in her 
discussion the author also extends to the uniform regulation o f the tribunals o f arbitration 
organized in the national chambers of commerce of the member-states of C M E A . According 
to the author arbitration as developed in the C M EA is a most firmly established system and the 
most elaborate system o f arbitration in operation in world economy. 
Article 15. of the Complex Program purposing the intensification and perfection 
of the co-operation and the advancement of the socialist economic integration of the 
countries of the C M E A approved by the XXVth Session of the CMEA in July 1971. 
declares in respect of the tribunals of arbitration operat ing in the foreign trade 
transacted between the states of the C M E A : 
"9. The CMEA member-countries shall carry out co-ordinated measures for the 
further improvement of the functions of existing foreign trade arbitration boards in the 
C M E A member-countries and the procedure of examining controversial issues 
between the economic organisations of these countries which may arise from 
agreements and contracts on problems of economic, scientific and technological co-
operation, dealing, in particular, with: 
— the extension of the competency of national foreign trade arbitration boards 
placing under their jurisdiction litigation in civil law between economic organisations 
stemming from relations in all fields of economic, scientific and technological co-
operation between the C M E A member-countries; 
— expansion of the exchange of information (including exchange of arbitration 
rulings) between arbitrat ion boards of the C M E A member-countries with a view to 
enhancing the uniform application by the arbitration boards in CMEA countries of the 
provisions laid down in the General Terms of Deliveries of Goods Between 
Organisations of the C M E A Countries ( C M E A G T D 1968) and other documents 
regulating individual aspects of their economic, scientific and technological co-
operation: 
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— approximation and unification of proceedings governing the consideration of 
suits in national arbitration boards in the Chambers of Commerce of the C M E A 
member-countries." 
In the present study we should like to offer a review of the antecedents of these 
policies, the measures introduced for the achievement of the ends of these policies and 
the tasks still to be tackled in this scope. 
The general conditions of the delivery of goods established in the CMEA since 
19581 are obligatorily applicable to the delivery of goods between the particular 
member-states of C M E A and consti tute the first multilaterally accepted system of 
norms. The instrument here referred to—although fundamentally it incorporated civil 
law norms2—defined the most impor tan t provisions associated with the settlement of 
legal disputes. Article XVI of this instrument includes provisions governing 
arbitration and, a m o n g others, s ta ted the principle that all disputes arising from a 
contract or in connection with it had to be settled by way of arbitration by excluding 
procedure as instituted by the ordinary courts of law. 
On the approval of the "Genera l Conditions of the Delivery of G o o d s of 1958" 
the tribunals of arbitrat ion organized in the national chambers of commerce of certain 
member-states of C M E A could look back to a past of some length. So, e.g., the Central 
Committee and the Council of People 's Commissars by a resolution passed on June 17 
1932 called to life as a social organization the Foreign Trade Tribunal of Arbitration 
organized by the side of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce of the USSR. The 
procedural rules of the tribunal of arbitration referred to above has been confirmed by 
the Presidium of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce in January 21, 1949.3 
The procedural rules of the Tribunal of Arbitrat ion organized by the side of the 
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce had been originally confirmed by the decree 1/1953 
(VIII 28) of the Ministry of Home Trade, the statutes of the Bulgarian Tribunal of 
Foreign Trade Arbitrat ion were defined by the decree no. 109 of February 4, 1952 of 
the Council of Ministers. Tribunals of arbitration of a similar nature were in operation 
in other states of C M E A . 4 The provisions of the General Conditions of Delivery of 
G o o d s of CMEA of 1958 relating to arbitration also influenced the provisions of other 
general conditions introduced in C M EA so e.g. section 47 of the General Conditions of 
Installation of C M E A of 1962 incorporates provisions similar to those defined in 
article XVI of the instrument referred to above. In conformity with section 28 of the 
1
 The CMEA General Conditions of the Delivery of G o o d s of 1958. were introduced in Hungary by 
the decree 5/1958 (Kk. É. 4.) KkM sz. 
2
 Cf. SZÁSZ, l.: A KGST Általános Szállítási Feltételek (The General Conditions of the Delivery of 
G o o d s of CMEA.) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1974. p. 83. 
3
 Cf. ХЛЕСТОВЛ, И. О.: 40 лет Внешнеторговой арбитражной комиссии, Sovietskoe Gosudarstvo 
i Pravo, 10/1972. 
4
 Cf. SZÁSZY, I.: Nemzetközi polgári eljárásjog (International Law of Civil Procedure), Budapest, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1963. pp. 628-629. 
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General Conditions of Technical Service of C M E A of 1962 the disputes arising f r o m a 
contract or procedure associated with the settlement of legal disputes are ruled by 
section 65 of the General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of C M E A of 1958. 
The General Conditions of Delivery of G o o d s of CMEA undergo a continual 
process of development so since 1958 the instrument was amended or supplemented on 
three occasions. Chapter XVI of the General Condit ions of Delivery of Goods of 1958 
dealing with arbitration has undergone in 1968 an amendment as regards both fo rm 
and contents. Formally, the section originally figuring as the XVIth has become the 
XV, substantially, the amendment provides for the definition of the term of inclusion 
as laid down in the General Condit ions of Delivery of Goods of C M EA of 1968 and so 
also for the language to be used in the procedure of arbitration. The provisions relating 
to arbitration as included in the General Condit ions of Delivery of Goods of C M E A of 
1968 are by virtue of section 59 of the General Condit ions of Installation of the C M E A 
of 1973 to disputes arising from contracts coming within the purview of these 
conditions and so also by virtue of section 33 to disputes arising from contracts 
concluded under the General Conditions of Technical Assistance (Services) of C M E A 
of 1973. 
In view of the activities and results of arbi trat ion in foreign t rade transactions in 
the process of drawing up the Complex Program it has become evident that arbitrat ion 
within the scope of the National Chambers of Commerce have to be made subject t o a 
revision, for the purpose of further development. In this manner within the scope of the 
C M E A at the end of 1969 a special organized team took up the study of the questions 
associated with the extention, approximation and unification of the rules of procedure 
of arbitration, this work was continued by the Legal Conference of CMEA. 5 
A) Agreement on the settlement of civil law 
disputes arising from economic and scientific-technical 
co-operation by way of arbitration 
A number of methods could have been applied for the extension of the 
jurisdiction of the tribunals of arbitration operating within the chambers of commerce 
of CMEA. So the one solution suggested would have implied the vesting of exclusive 
jurisdiction in the national chambers of commerce operating in the member-states of 
4 
C M E A by way of municipal provisions of law for the settlement of disputes arising 
from economic and scientific-technical co-operation or the settlement of these disputes 
by way of judicial or arbitral procedure had been entrusted to the discretion of the 
parties concerned. An other method suggested implied the drawing up and approval of 
an international convention on the jurisdiction of the tr ibunals of arbitration 
5
 Cf. K E M P E R - S T R O H B A C H - W A G N E R : Die Allgemeinen Lieferbedingungen des RGW 1968 in der 
Spruchpraxis sozialistischer Außenhandelsschiedsgerichte. (Kommentar) Berlin, 1975. p. 395. 
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organized within the chambers of commerce.6 The member-states of CMEA decided in 
favour of this second method and applied it a n d on the 26 of M a y of 1972 signed the 
agreement on the "Settlement of Civil Law Disputes Arising from Economic and 
Scientific-Technical Co-operation by way of Arbitration"; this agreement was 
promulgated in Hungary as law-decree no. 23 of 1973.7 
This instrument is of ten referred to as an Agreement on Jurisdiction8 because its 
principle purpose is to br ing under regulation the jurisdiction of tribunals of 
arbitration organized by the side of national chambers of commerce of the member-
states of C M E A ; it defined the subjective and objective scope of disputes for the 
settlement of which exclusive jurisdiction has been vested in the tribunals of arbi trat ion 
referred to before. The exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals of arbitration, at the same 
time, implies that the parties concerned are no t authorized to stipulate the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts of law for the settlement of civil law disputes arising f rom the 
Agreement referred to before. An agreement to this end would be null and void. Thus, 
the agreements have an effect not only in international relations but also in domestic 
ones in so far as they bring under regulation the division of jurisdiction between the 
ordinary courts of law and tha t of the tribunals of arbitration organized within the 
respective chambers of commerce.9 
The statement suggests itself therefore that arbitration as regulated by the 
Agreement must be regarded as one substantially depar t ing from otherwise 
internationally usual agreements of this kind. Namely, while in general it is 
characteristic of the institution of arbitration tha t the parties have recours to it instead 
of the ordinary courts of law by their own free will and it is also left to the parties to 
elect the tribunal of arbitrat ion to which their case should be referred, the present 
Agreement has adopted the system of institutions as laid down in the General 
Conditions of Delivery of G o o d s of C M E A , accordingly, within a certain scope 
instead of on the will of the part ies the jurisdiction of the tr ibunals of arbitration relies 
on provisions of law and, a t the same time, the scope of tr ibunals of arbitration to 
which the case may be referred has also been defined.10 A t the same time, the 
fundamental criteria by which the members of the tribunals of arbitration or the single 
6
 Cf. SzAsz, I.: Új szakasz a KGST-országok jogi együttműködésében (New phase in the legal 
cooperation of the CMEA countries), Magyar Jog, 9/1970. 
1
 A Kölcsönös Gazdasági Segítség Tanácsának Jogi Dokumentumai (The Legal Instruments o f the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), ed. BAN, T. Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1978. 
pp. 634-640. 
8
 Cf. NÈVAI, L.: A választottbírósági szabályzatok és a polgári perrendtartások viszonya a KGST-
tagországokban — különös tekintettel Magyarországra (The relationship between the rules of arbitration 
and the Codes of civil procedures in the CMEA countries—with special regard to Hungary), Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1 - 2 / 1 9 7 4 ; id.: A szocialista külkereskedelmi választottbíráskodás fejlődésének újabb vonásai (New 
traits in the development of socialist foreign trade arbitration) Külgazdaság, 3 / 1 9 7 6 . ; S T R O H B A C H , H.: 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Justiz. N e u e Justiz, 1 3 / 1 9 7 3 . 
9
 S T R O H B A C H , o p . c i t . 
10
 Cf. SzAsz, I., op. cit. (note no. 3.) pp. 308-309. 
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arbitrator may be appointed by the parties or whether there lies appeal against the 
award are uniform with those established in international arbitrat ion. 
The Agreement defines the scope of disputes to be referred to arbitration in two 
approximation. So the Agreement provides first that all legal disputes arising f rom 
contracts made within the scope of economic and scientific-technical co-operation of 
the signatories or f rom other civil law relations are settled by way of arbitration (§ 1. 
article I.); by way of examples the Agreement enumerates the most typical contractual 
relationships (§ 2. Article I.). Secondly, the Agreement states that the disputes arising 
from contractual and other economic relations have to be such as coming abou t 
between the economic organizations of the countries concerned (§ 1. article I.). The 
Agreement in like manner by way of examples enumerates some of the organizations 
coming within the purview of arbitration (§ 3. article I.).11 
In connection with the provisions included in § 1. of Article I. questions of 
interpretation are likely to arise. Accordingly, there are opinions which call into doub t 
whether the provision of this article could be interpreted so as disputes arising f rom 
relations not covered by the Agreement—e.g. f rom the collision of ships—could be 
referred in all cases to arbitration i.e. to the scope of operation of the Agreement. 
Namely, in accordance with these opinions if the provision compared to other 
provisions of the Agreement or to other general conditions of C M E A the conclusion 
may be drawn that the opinion referred to above amounts to an extensive 
interpretation of the Agreement. The Agreement primarily applies to disputes arising 
from contracts under economic and scientific-technical co-operation and so the scope 
of the Agreement does not extend to disputes expressly relaying on delictual claims.12 
The present author for her part is of the opinion, that if it is borne in mind that § 1. 
Article I., makes mention of "all legal disputes arising from any other civil law 
relationship" and secondly, that according to § 2. of article I., that in addition to 
contractual relations attention has to be given to any other civil law relation arising 
from economic and scientific-technical co-operation that if the legal disputes of a non-
contractual nature arising from the economic and scientific-technical relationships of 
the signatories of the present Agreement come in all cases within the jurisdiction of the 
present Agreement. In Hungarian judicial practice a similar s tandpoint has become 
established. According to the position 1/1977 adopted by the Presidial Conference of 
Civil Law College of the Supreme Court of Hungary dealing with the application of the 
11
 Cf. RÊVAI, T.: Egyezmény kizárólagos választottbírósági hatáskörről a KGST-tagállamok 
szervezetei közötti polgári jogi vitákban (Agreement on the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals o f 
arbitration in civil law disputes between the organizations of the CMEA countries). Külgazdaság, 8/1972.; 
NÉV AI, L.—RÊVAI, T.: A KGST-tagállamok kamarai választottbíróságainak hatásköréről (On the 
jurisdiction of the tribunals of arbitration of the chambers of commerce of the C M E A countries), Magyar 
Jog, 12/1972. 
12
 Cf. STROHBACH, H.: Konvention über die schiedsgerichtliche Entscheidung von Zivilrechtsstreitig-
keiten, die sich aus Beziehungen der wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlich-technischen Zusammenarbeit 
ergeben, Sozialistische Außenwirtschaft, 7/1972. 
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Agreement13 legal disputes arising from damage caused in non-contractual relations 
have to be considered legal disputes arising f rom civil law relations to be referred to 
arbitration provided that all other conditions of the application of the Agreement are 
present. 
At the same time, in certain cases difficulties may have to be confronted at 
determining whether the activities in question may be considered such as coming 
within the province of economic and scientific-technical co-operation. So e.g. if vessels 
flying the flag of countries signatories to the Agreement collide on the Danube in the 
course of delivery of goods of the signatories then legal disputes so arising must 
presumably considered such as coming within the scope of operation of the 
Agreement. On the other hand , if the accident occurs in the course of passenger 
transport the claims to damages arising f r o m the collision would come within the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts of law. Provided this interpretation of the provisions of 
the Agreement may be considered the correct one, the question may arise whether the 
division of jurisdiction in this manner may be accepted as justified. 
The Agreement exempts the settlement of definite problems from the jurisdiction 
of arbitration. Thus, in conformity with § 1. of article III. obligation of the making of 
contracts or the acceptation of certain terms of a contract does not come within the 
jurisdiction of the tribunals of arbitration. The reason of this provision is that in the 
practice of the countries of C M E A already before the coming into operation of the 
Agreement it was a generally established principle that contract-making between the 
economic organizations of the particular countries could not be enforced by way of 
arbitration. The primary reason explaining this policy is that long-term or annual 
inter-state (or intergovernmental) agreements including schedule of goods come 
within the scope of public international law and so f rom such agreements no 
obligations of civil law contract making do immediate arise as a consequence. There 
are opinions according to which one of the consequences of the want of a bilaterally 
obligatory adherence to the economic plan contract-making cannot be enforced by 
way of arbitration.1 4 
This provision of § 1. of Article III., however, does not affect the scope of 
jurisdiction of tribunal of arbitration to proceed in claims to damages or penalty 
arising f rom the violation of the obligation of contract-making as laid down in the 
pactum de contrahendo. Thus , e.g. in the case of contracts for the specialization of 
production and co-operation coming within the scope of operation of the General 
Conditions of Specialization of Production and Co-operation as Existing between the 
member-states of CMEA 1 5 either party desists from contracting on the delivery of 
13
 The standpoint referred to above has been published in number 6/1977. pp. 439 -440. of the 
Hungarian Court Decisions. 
14
 РОЗЕНБЕРГ, M. Г.: Регулирование поставок между организациями стран-членов СЭВ. 
Sovietskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, 7/1975. 
15
 The General Conditions for the Specialization of Production and Co-operation between the 
organizations of the countries represented in CMEA have been promulgated in Hungary by the law-decree 
no. 24. of 1979. 
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goods, the other party cannot apply to the tribunal of arbitrat ion to bring about a 
contract or the obligation of the other party to negotiate a contract 1 6 still the party in 
question may in conformity with § 4. of section 26. of the Agreement referred to above 
apply to the tribunal of arbitration to decree the payment of penalty. 
Opinions have come to the fore17 which in view of the fact that al though the 
Agreement referred to before has come into operation after the signature of the C M E A 
Convention provides in its section 53. that all diputes arising from the contract of 
specialization or in association with it have to be determined by the tr ibunal of 
arbitration organized by the side of the chamber of commerce of the dependent 
country or of a third country call into doubt whether the provision included in § 1. of 
article III. of the Convention could be followed in respect of contracts of 
specialization. In the opinion of the present author from the fact that in accordance 
with section 53. of the Agreement referred to before the disputes in question have to be 
determined in conformity with the C M E A Convention, the conclusion may be drawn 
that in the event of disputes arising from contracts of specialization or in association 
with them the fundamental Convention as a whole must be regarded as mandatory and 
so also the provision included in § 1. of article III. of the Agreement. In this connection 
opinions have become manifest that in view of the Agreement coming to operat ion in 
1972. whether there was any need to take up provisions for the settlement of disputes in 
the C M E A Agreement for Specialization and Co-operation negotiated in 1979.18  
Although the present author considers this opinion theoretically properly founded for 
practical purposes the solution adopted by the CMEA Agreement for Specialization 
appears to be holding its own, this is the case because the Agreement referred to before 
calls forth the attention of those dealing with it to the Agreement governing also the 
C M E A Agreement of Specialization. 
In addition to § 1. of Article III. of the Agreement also Article VI. deals with the 
kinds of legal disputes to which the Agreement cannot be applied. So § 1. of Article VI. 
of the Agreement exempts under the operation of the Agreement legal disputes 
referred to by bilateral or multilateral agreements signed by the signatories earlier to 
the jurisdiction of definite organs. Provisions of this kind have been taken up in the 
Warsaw Agreement on Air Transport of Goods and in Agreement on International 
Transport of Goods by Railway and Agreement on International Transpor t of 
Passengers by Railway19. 
In conformity with § 2. of Article VI. the Agreement cannot be applied to civil 
law disputes which at the time of the signature of the Agreement municipal legislation 
16
 Cf. JUHÁSZ J.: A KG ST-tagországok szervezetei közötti termelés-szakosítás és kooperáció 
Általános Feltételei (The General Conditions for the Specialization of Production and Co-operation 
between the organizations of the member-states of CMEA), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 10/1979. 
11
 Cf. B A U E R , M . : joint Report to B Á N , T . ' S ; Lecture on the legal aspects and actual problems of the 
Complex Program of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance given in the 9th Conference of the 
Hungarian Lawyers' Association (M. S.) p. 460. 
1 8
 B A U E R , o p . c i t . 
1 9
 C f . STROHBACH, o p . c i t . 
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has referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of a municipal court of law or any other 
municipal authority. The joint communications no. 306/1973. (IK. 11.) I M - K k M and 
no. 302/1975. ( IK. 4.) I M - K k M inform of the civil law disputes whose determination 
come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the organs referred to above. Although the 
sphere of disputes is not congruous still on hand of reports as defined by the 
communications mentioned the statement suggests itself that in general cases 
associated with patents, trade marks , real estates by virtue of the provisions of § 2. 
Article VI. of the Agreement do no t come within the scope of arbitration. 
In conformity with Article IV. the awards of arbitration and settlements and 
accords approved by the tribunal of arbitration must be regarded as definitive and 
obligatory. These have to be considered as recognized without any further procedure 
and can be enforced in any signatory countries in the same way as the enforceable 
decisions of the municipal judiciary of the country where they have been passed. In this 
connection it should be borne in mind that in the majority of cases action is instituted 
in the tribunal of arbitration organized by the side of the chamber of commerce of the 
defendant 's country, the awards pronounced against the defendant are in general 
pronounced by the tribunals of arbitration of the country of performance. From this 
principle cases are exempted e.g. when in respect of counter-claims arising from the 
same relationship in respect of which action has been instituted and claims to inclusion 
the tribunal of arbitration determining the action proceeds or when by agreement of 
the parties the case is referred to arbitration in a third country. 
The provision taken up in Article IV. which for the purpose of enforcement 
guarantees the same force to awards of arbitration as to the enforceable decisions of 
the ordinary coutry of law departs f rom the provisions of the New York Convention 
on "The Recognition and Enforcement of the Awards of Foreign Tribunals of 
Arbitrat ion" of June 10. 1958.20 According to this convention for the recognition and 
enforcement of the awards coming within the scope of the New York Convention no 
fees, costs and conditions substantially higher or more rigorous than those usual in 
municipal arbitrat ion can be decreed. Hence, the New York Convention for the 
purpose of the enforcement of the awards of foreign tribunals of arbitration accepts 
the conditions of the enforcement of the awards of arbitration of the country of 
performance as mandatory and no t those specified for the enforcement of the decisions 
of the ordinary courts of law of the respective country. 
As is known for want of a mandatory convention or treaty the legislative and 
judicial practice of the particular countries in operation for the enforcement of the 
awards of foreign arbitration present substantial differences in respect of the 
enforceability of the awards referred to above in a sense that these awards should be 
enforceable in conformity with the decisions of the municipal arbitration or foreign 
20
 In Hungary the Agreement was promulgated by the law-decree no. 25. of 1962. 
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courts or should be made dependent on the results of an action for performance or 
following upon the supervision of the case in its substance.21 
Article V. of the Agreement brings under regulation the causes for which the 
enforcement of an award can be denied. Among these the article quotes the cases when 
the awards have been pronounced in contradiction to the rules governing jurisdiction, 
or the injured party produces evidence to the effect that owing to the infringement of 
the rules of procedure in arbitration or circumstances beyond his control he was unable 
to defend his rights, or when the award has been rescinded or its enforceability 
suspended on the grounds of municipal legislation of the country where the award has 
been brought. The statement can therefore be made, that Article V. of the Agreement 
brings under regulation the causes of the denial of the enforcement of an award in a 
manner very much similar to that laid down in the provisions of Article V. of the 
mentioned New York Convention or in Article IX. of the Geneva Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration of April 21. 1961.22 
In view of the circumstance that the provisions of municipal legislation of the 
signatories substantially depart in respect of the grounds on which an award may be 
rescinded or its enforcement suspended, within the Legal Conference the conditions of 
the introduction of a uniform regulation of the method has been made subject to a 
study so far, however, no settlement has been reached. 
B) The Uniform Statutes of the tribunals 
of arbitration to be organized by the side of the chambers 
of commerce of the CMEA states 
In the same way the Legal Conference of the C M E A discussed the method of tne 
"Un i fo rm Statutes of the tribunals of arbitration to be organized by the side of the 
chambers of commerce of the signatories"2 3 and as an appendix the schedule "of the 
Costs and fees of arbitration and the costs to be borne by the parties". 
In the 66. Session the Executive Committee of C M E A (26—28. February 1974.) 
brought forward a recommendation according to which the provisions of the uniform 
procedural rules of arbitration applicable to disputes between the economic 
organizations of the C M E A countries should be supplementable by further provisions. 
In respect of the legal disputes between subjects-at-law of the CMEA countries, 
however, the supplements cannot conflict with the uniform statutes. 
The instrument referred to above incorporates detailed regulations regarding 
the organization and operation of arbitration and arbitral procedure. On this ground 
the procedural rules of the tribunals of arbitration organized by the side of the 
chambers of commerce of the signatory states have then been drawn up. The statutes of 
21
 For details cf. SZASZY, op. cit. pp. 670-671. 
2 2
 In Hungary promulgated by the law-decree no. 8. of 1964. 
2 3
 Cf. op. cit. (note no. 7.) pp. 641-659. 
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the tribunals of arbitrat ion have been drawn up with due regard to the uniform statutes 
yet not as a verbatim translation of these. According to certain opinions, the 
departures are of minor importance only,2 4 still views have come forward that some of 
these are quite substantial.25 
C) Extension of the exchange of information 
The carrying out of the exchange of information between the organs of 
arbitration existing in the CMEA countries as laid down in the Complex Program is of 
outstanding importance for both those applying the law and those engaged in the 
fur ther development of the instruments current in the practice of the C M E A countries. 
Namely, the acquaintance with the practice followed by arbitration in the 
particular countries may be apt to advance the establishment of a uniform practice in 
the administration of law and may also have an effect on the policy practiced by the 
organs of the C M E A countries concerned in contract-making and the performance of 
the contracts further on the att i tude of the parties concerned within the scope of 
arbitral procedure in making good their rights and performance of their obligation.26 
For the purpose of the development of normative instruments used in the 
practice of the C M E A countries is of importance because the acquaintance with the 
methods of interpretation established in arbitral procedure may help in formulating 
suggestions for an amendment of the instruments in question. 
The differences in arbitral practice may be traced back to a number of reasons. 
T o the reasons which in certain cases elicit a difference in interpretation of the 
municipal provisions of law further ones may crop up in the event of internationally 
approved mandatory normative instruments. Reasons of this type may be come 
manifest e.g. in cases when in certain cases the provisions of "The General Conditions 
of Delivery of G o o d s of C M E A " incorporates legal concepts which in the legal 
assistance of the particular CMEA countries differ by their contents (e.g. discounts). It 
is for a long time already a moot question in both literature and legal practice whether 
if "The General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of C M E A " fail to make mention of 
certain institutions of law—as was the case in respect of unilateral withdrawal from the 
contract in the event of faulty performance until 1975.—the interpretation is 
admissible that the buyer party cannot even bring forward a claim or whether on the 
ground of section 72. of "The General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of CMEA of 
2 4
 VARRÓ, J.: Bevezető, Külkereskedelmi jogi dokumentációk (Introductory, Foreign trade legal 
documentation), 10/1978. pp. 3-4. (Edited by International Legal Bureau of the Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce). 
25
 Cf. R É V A I , T . : Egységes Kamarai Választottbírósági Eljárási Szabályzat a KGST-tagállamaiban 
(Unified Statutes of the Procedure of Arbitration in the Chambers of Commerce in the member-states of 
CMEA), Külgazdaság, 6/1980. 
26
 Cf. БРАТУСЬ, С. H.: Арбитраж и международное экономическое сотрудничество, Soviet-
skaya Yusticiya, 1/1973. 
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1958." or section 110. of "The General Conditions of 1968." the law of the seller 
should.be applied.27 
This problem is closely associated with the policy to be observed in cases of a gap 
in the law. The opinions are divided, whether—setting out from the international 
character of the general conditions of goods of CMEA-in such cases recours should be 
had to analogy in the first place for the settlement of such problems, or whether the 
background substantive law should be applied.28 As the matter of course the 
uniformity of the application of law may be best advanced by the unequivocal and 
detailed formulation of the applicable instrument. To this end at the formulation of 
"The General Condit ions of Delivery of Goods of C M E A " of 1968. and their 
amendment and supplementation in 1975. and 1979. the legislators have attended to 
the problems apt to emerge in the course of the application of law. In view of this in 
"The General Conditions of 1968." section 72. of the General Conditions of 1958. was 
amended; this section provided for the application of the substantive law of the seller, 
then in 1975 the instrument was supplemented by section 2/A on withdrawal f rom the 
contract . For the purpose of the further development of the instrument the Legal 
Conference of C M E A studies the practice followed at the application of the General 
Condit ions of Delivery of Goods of C M E A . 
Also the biannual conference of umpires of the tribunals of arbitration 
organized by the side of the chambers of commerce of the C M E A countries has as its 
duty to advance the uniformity of the administration of justice. These conferences 
cannot bring forward obligatory recommendations, their purpose is consultation and 
the exchange of opinions.2 9 At the same time, the opinions given expression in these 
conferences in general convey an idea of the practice followed in arbitration by the 
particular states, the positions adopted in the course of the exchange of opinions are in 
general observed in the procedure of arbitration established in the particular 
countries.3 0 
In view of what has been set forth it is absolutely essential for those in charge of 
the application of law to become acquainted with the results of the analysis of the 
practice of arbitration in the particular countries by these conferences. To this end in 
Hungary in the Appendix to the periodical "Külgazdaság" analyses are published of 
concrete awards of the discussions of these conferences.31 
* 
2 7
 RUZICKA, J.: Cástecnánovelíizace Vseobecnych podminek dodávek RVHP(Partial modification of 
the General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of CMEA), Právni zpravodaj 1-3/1976. 
2 8
 For details cf. K E M P E R - S T R O H B A C H - W A G N E R , op. cit. pp. 6 2 . et seq.; K E M P E R , M . : Grundsätze der 
Auslegung und Anwendung der ALB/RGW 1968. Sozialistische Außenwirtschaft, 4 / 1 9 7 2 . ; РОЗЕНБЕРГ, op. cit. 
2 9
 C f . RÉVAI, o p . c i t . ( n o t e no . 25 . ) 
3 0
 C f . K E M P E R - S T R O H B A C H - W A G N E R , o p . c i t . p . 3 9 0 . 
31
 RÊVAI, T.: A KGST-tagállamokban szervezett kamarai választottbíróságok VI. konferenciájának 
állásfoglalása a választottbírósági gyakorlat egyes időszerű kérdéseiben (The standpoint of the VIth 
Conference of the Tribunals of Arbitration organized by the Chambers of Commerce of the CMEA 
countries in certain timely problems of arbitration), Külgazdaság, 1/1972; NÉVAI, L.: A szocialista 
külkereskedelmi választottbíráskodás fejlődésének újabb vonásai (Recent traits in the development of 
arbitration in socialist foreign trade). Külgazdaság, 3/1976. 
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Remarkable progress has been made in the achievement of the ends defined by 
the Complex Program for further development of the institutions of arbitration. 
Comprehensive and effective regulation is characteristic of the method of settlement of 
disputes arising in co-operation on an enterprisal level.32 In this way a system of 
arbitrat ion has become established in the CMEA countries which may for its high 
degree of perfection be considered the most advanced in world-wide arbitration. 
Naturally, the thesis is valid also for arbitration whether on the international 
p lane the particular institutions of law are open for fur ther development dependent on 
to what extent the parties concerned are interested in the uniform settlement of certain 
problems or to wha t extent fur ther development is substantiated by experience 
accumulated in the course of application of the particular instruments. Opinions have 
come to the fore which emphasize the need for the further development of provisions 
relating to arbitrat ion in order tha t problems associated with arbitration so, in 
particular, the setting aside of awards 3 3 , the institution of intervention, the conditions 
of litispendence, etc. might be settled in a uniform manner.3 4 
In view of all what has been set forth in the course of the following years within 
the scope of the Legal Conference of CMEA the question of the introduction of 
uniform statutes of arbitration in C M E A and of the tribunals of arbitration organized 
by the side of the chambers of commerce of the particular countries will come to be put 
on the agenda, for the purpose of the further development of the application of the 
instruments in question in the practice observed in the particular countries. 
Внешнеторговый арбитраж в СЭВ 
Й . Ю Х А С 
В статье рассматриваются цели, поставленные в 15 разделе Комплексной Программы в связи 
с внешнеторговыми арбитражными судами стран-членов СЭВ, изучается их предистория. далее 
достигнутые результаты и решимые задачи. 
Автор занимается «Конвенцией о разрешении арбитражным путем гражданско-правовых 
споров, вытекающих из отношений экономического и научно-технического сотрудничества», а 
также единообразным регламентом арбитражных судов при торговых палатах стран-членов СЭВ. 
П о мнению автора институционная система арбитражных судов стран-членов СЭВ уже сложилась и 
является самой разработанной системой международных арбитражей мира. 
32
 Cf. SzAsz, I.: A KGST integráció jogi mechanizmusa (The legal mechanism of the CMEA 
integration), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 4/1979. 
3 3
 C f . K E M P E R - S T R O H B A C H - W A G N E R , o p . c i t . p p . 3 9 6 . a n d 4 2 3 . 
3 4
 Cf . RÉVAI, o p . c it . (note no . 2 5 . ) 
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L'arbitrage commercial dans le CAEM 
J. JUHÁSZ 
L'auteur, au début, donne un aperçu des disposi t ions du Programme Complexe relatives à 
l'activité des arbitrages commerciaux, leur antécédents et les problèmes qui demandent solution. Elle 
analyse la Convent ion adopté en 1972 sur le règlement des litiges du droit civil résultant des activités de 
coopération é c o n o m i q u e scientifico-technique ainsi que le statut et la procédure uniformes des 
arbitrages organisés auprès des chambres de commerce des pays-membres du C A E M . L'auteur 
souligne que le sys tème d'arbitrage des pays socialistes est déjà complet et qu'il est le système de 
l'arbitrage le plus évo lué dans le monde . 
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Le rôle du système de droit 
des Etats-membres dans le mécanisme 
juridique du CAEM 
T . BÁN 
directeur général 
Ministère de la Justice 
Parmi les problèmes juridiques du fonctionnement du Consei l d'Assistance Économi-
que Mutuelle, l 'auteur traite dans son article du rôle du système des normes juridiques dans 
l'intégration économique . De son avis, il faut décider dès le départ de chaque processus 
d'intégration économique : lequel parmi les mécanismes o u techniques juridiques possibles 
sera développé. Selon l'auteur, le C A E M a opté pour une double voie de la formation de droit : 
le système qui jouera le rôle de l'appareil juridique de la coopérat ion économique, scientifique 
et technique sera construit graduellement en résultat des processus de création du droit partant 
d'une part du côté de la communauté, venant d'autre part de ceux déroulant au niveau du 
système juridique national des Etats-membres. 
L'auteur s 'occupe d'abord des processus qui se déroulent du côté de communauté . Il 
démontre qu'au sein du C A E M , dans la plupart des cas, ce ne sont que les phases quoique très 
importantes, mais seulement préparatoires du processus codificateur qui se déroulent dans 
l'organisation d'intégration elle-même. En effet lorsqu' une recommandation est adoptée dans 
les organes respectifs du C A E M en résultat du travail collectif des représentants des Etats-
membres délégués dans ces organes là alors — dans un certain degré malgré l'apparence, — le 
processus de décision, de codification n'est pas encore terminé. Il ressort des principes de 
fonctionnement du C A E M que la recommandation ne devient entièrement valable que si les 
organes compétents des Etats-membres en prennent acte et la notifient dans les 60 jours ce qui 
est un acte semblable, à plusieurs égards, à la ratification des traités internationaux. 
Conformément à cela une partie importante du système des normes élaborées collectivement 
ne peut pas être considérée comme étant des normes C A E M , car ces règles juridiques, en 
dernière analyse apparaissent dans le droit national des Etats-membres. Cette activité de 
création du droit qui commence au niveau de la communauté se termine à celui des Etats-
membres, a c o m m e spécialité qu'en résultat de ce travail dans tous les Etats-membres — tout 
au moins dans ceux qui y intéressés participent à la prise de décision — une règle identique 
apparaît dans le système juridique national, pour régler une quest ion donnée. A u fond cela est 
une unification, pour l'essentiel identique à la technique employée de plus en plus souvent dans 
les diverses régions du monde ou universellement, at qui a c o m m e résultat que des lois 
uniformes sont é laborées pour réglementer certaines questions. 
Par la suite, l 'auteur s'occupe de l'autre aspect de la création du droit du C A E M . C'est 
l'élimination des différences existantes dans les systèmes juridiques nationaux par la voie du 
rapprochement graduel des droits. Actuellement ceci consiste à examiner les questions données 
d'une manière comparative , pour préciser les différences. Étant donné qu'avant la fin de la 
seconde guerre mondiale , les Etats-membres du C A E M s'étaient développés très 
différemment, et que leur tradition juridique, comme leur mentalité diffèrent encore assez 
aujourd'hui même, d'autre part, parce que malgré le développement socialiste unitaire, leur 
droit se développe différemment, — à côté de la parenté évidente — l'Auteur pense qu' est plus 
simple de mettre Г accent, dans le C A E M , sur la méthode d'unification, car dans la période 
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actuelle n o u s pouvons en attendre des résultats plus rapides, que si nous aspirions à ce que les 
législations nationales des Etats-membres, partant, pour ainsi dire, de leurs propres initiatives, 
œuvrent à élaborer des règles juridiques identiques o u très semblables. 
1. Les expériences accumulées au cours des décennies écoulées dans les divers 
domaines de l ' intégration économique socialiste permettent de formuler des 
conclusions générales à propos du rôle du droit dans le CAEM. Ce qui relève 
l'importance de cette idée, c'est qu'il y a 10 ans, le Conseil d'Assistance Economique 
Mutuelle a créé la Conférence Juridique, organe spécialisé du CAEM pour 
promouvoir l'activité juridique. 
Si importants que soient les facteurs qui mettent à présent en vedette le travail 
juridique accompli dans le CAEM nous ne pourrions pas nous charger de nous étendre 
sur tous les aspects importants de cette activité. Même si les difficultés existantes, à côté 
des résultats remarquables, ont ralenti et ralentissent encore, la marche du travail 
juridique, il est indéniable — qu'il s'agisse du travail juridique dans le CAEM en géné-
ral, ou de l'activité juridique déployée dans les cadres de la Conférence Juridique en 
particulier, — que le mécanisme juridique du fonctionnement du C A E M est devenu de 
nos jours trop complexe, trop étendu et divergent dans le sens qualitatif et quantitatif 
qu 'on puisse en faire un tour d 'horizon d'un seul élan. 
C'est pourquoi je tâcherai dans la suite de traiter d'un groupe de questions 
déterminé. Alors que Г actualité de ce sujet — le rôle du système juridique national des 
Etats-membres dans le CAEM — grandit au sein du CAEM, celui-ci a en même temps 
un caractère assez général pour retenir l 'attention même de ceux qui ne s'intéressent 
pas qu'au travail juridique du C A E M . 
Bien que quelques monographies et articles aient été consacrés au phénomène 
qu 'on peut déterminer le mieux comme problèmes du rapport entre les prescriptions 
juridiques créées dans le cadres de l 'organisation d'intégration économique donnée des 
Etats y groupés d 'une port et les règles de droit intérieures des mêmes Etats d 'autre 
part , je suis sûr que l'examen de ces rapports fu t fait en premier lieu d 'une manière 
généralisée et abstraite, sans avoir encore été approfondi comme il faut , à propos des 
corrélations concrètes de l'intégration économique qui se déroule dans le CAEM. A 
mon avis cet examen a de l'actualité, parce que dans la mesure où l'intégration 
économique socialiste se réalise plus complètement, surgiront, dans les plus divers 
domaines du travail administratif, de chaque pays, des problèmes difficiles à résoudre 
sans l'analyse du rapport mentionné — donc celui des normes élaborées au sein du 
C A E M et du droi t intérieur des Etats-membres. 
2. C'est une expérience générale remontent aux temps anciens que le droit n'est 
point la juxtaposition de règles particulières, l 'entassement de prescriptions prises sans 
égard l'une pour l 'autre, mais un système dont l'efficacité est d 'autant plus intense que 
les parties de ce système, les diverses règles juridiques s'enchaînent. La science 
juridique s'efforçait toujours d 'élaborer la système le plus efficace des règles juridiques. 
Au cours des XIXe et XXe siècles, dans les divers Etats se sont effectivement 
développés les systèmes généralement acceptés de la mise ou point des droits. Ces 
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systèmes peuvent bien différer l'un de l 'autre dans les pays de divers régimes 
économiques et sociaux, en fonction des diverses cultures, traditions, mentalités 
juridiques, mais en dépit de cela, ils peuvent fonctionner et être efficaces. 
Cependant, l 'humanité entre de nos jours dans une période où elle rencontre de 
dimensions nouvelles par rappor t aux coulisses de la scène son histoire précédente. 
C'est ainsi sous beaucoup de rapports des sciences, de la vie sociale et notamment dans 
le domaine des Etats et du droit . 
Dans le cas des pays européens — y compris les pays socialistes d 'Europe 
orientale — cette nouvelle dimension commença de se former visiblement dans la 
période suivant la seconde guerre mondiale. On peut résumer le mieux ce phénomène 
en mentionnant qu 'à côté des Etats, même les groupements politiques, militaires, 
économiques ou autres, formés par les Etats, commencèrent de jouer un rôle 
grandissant, et comme sous certains aspects ces groupements commençaient à se 
comporter à la manière ou d 'une manière analogue des Etats, un rôle de plus en plus 
important a échu et échoit aux prescriptions faires par ces formations, prescriptions 
qu'il faut considérer, à titre de simplification, de même comme du droit. Nous nous 
trouvons donc face à une situation qui est plus complexe, en la comparant à la formule 
précédente plus simple où les systèmes logiques des droits exerçaient leurs effets à 
l'intérieur des frontières de chacun des Etats. Ne tenant compte que du degré de 
complexité le plus bas de cette nouvelle situation, il est déjà évident qu 'à présent quant 
à la solution de certains problèmes, à côté des prescriptions juridiques en vigueur à 
l'intérieur de l 'Etat, il peut entrer en ligne de compte l'application des règles adoptées 
concernant des problèmes analogues par le groupe d 'Eta ts ou l 'organisation 
internationale dont l 'Etat en question fait partie. Mais la vie produit toujours des 
situations d 'un degré de complexité plus élevé, puisqu'elle soulève non seulement le 
rapport des prescriptions juridiques du groupe d 'Etats avec le droit intérieur de chacun 
des Etats-membres, mais elle pose aussi la question des rapports entre les systèmes 
juridiques des Etats-membres eu égard à tel ou tel caractéristique du système juridique 
en vigueur dans le cadre du groupement d 'Etats ou de l 'organisation internationale. De 
toute évidence se pose également la question du rapport du système juridique du 
groupe d 'Etats ou de l 'organisation internationale avec les Etats ne faisant pas partie 
du groupement et même si ceux-ci forment un groupe eux-mêmes, ayant un mécanisme 
juridique particulier, aussi avec ce groupe d 'Etats ou organisation. 
Si nous y ajoutons que le "droi t" intégré des groupes d 'Eta ts en général ne 
s'étend pas à tous les problèmes soulevés par le fonctionnement du groupe, par la 
nature des choses, il peut y avoir des questions dans les cas desquelles, il y a du 
parallélisme entre le droit intérieur du groupe d 'Etats et celui des Etats-membres, mais 
il peut y avoir de telles où il n 'y a de prescription qu 'au niveau de l 'Etat-membre ou 
seulement à celui de la communauté , alors il devient encore plus clair qu'à présent le 
développement et le fonctionnement du système ne peut plus être résolu à l'intérieur de 
l 'Etat. Comme l'avance de l 'intégration économique socialiste qui se fait dans le 
CAEM, a exigé de tout le mécanisme de la coopération que les divers éléments de celle-
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ci — d'économie politique, monétaires et financiers, de planification, facteurs 
institutionnels — se composent en un système logique, bien formulé ayant égard l'un à 
l'autre, de même le mécanisme juridique qui fait partie de ce système doit disposer des 
conditions qui permettent de créer un ensemble prêt à fonctionner. Il faut en tenir 
compte dans l'activité juridique au sein du C A E M . 
Cependant , comment peut-on assurer l 'harmonie nécessaire entre les prescrip-
tions juridiques intervenues à de divers échelons — par exemple à ceux d 'Etat-membre 
et de communauté? 
Jusqu'ici j 'ai posé les questions en général, de façon qu'elles pouvaient concerner 
des groupements universels ou régionaux, des organisations, en outre des formations 
militaires, politiques, culturelles ou autres. Or, je voudrais aborder maintenant le sujet 
examiné sous une forme concrète. Je voudrais voir quelle est la réponse qu 'on peut 
donner dans le cas du CAEM à la question de savoir sont quels sont les rapports entre 
les prescriptions de type juridique (on leur donne des noms divers, comme : actes 
normatifs, recommandations, résolutions etc. mais je pense qu 'à titre de simplification 
nous pouvons les appeler règles juridiques du CAEM) créées à l'échelon de 
l 'organisation de l 'intégration économique socialiste, du Conseil d'Assistance 
Économique Mutuelle, et le système juridique intérieur des Etats-membres. 
De telles enquêtes sont en général introduites par des raisonnements comparatifs 
l'on met en parallèle de la façon la plus marquante les deux organisations d'intégration 
économique les plus importantes de l 'Europe: le CAEM et la CEE (le Marché 
Commun). Ce serait une solution tentante, mais j'estime que le lecteur connaît ou lui 
sont accessibles bon nombre d'analyses concernant le mécanisme juridique du Marché 
Commun. C'est pourquoi, bien qu'en général l'image soit moins frappante si nous 
analysons quelque chose en soi-même, je voudrais quand-même consacrer toute mon 
attention au mécanisme juridique qui caractérise le Conseil d'Assistance Économique 
Mutuelle. 
3. Les documents, statuts, déclarations qui déterminent — ou desquels on peut 
déduire — le rapport entre les règles juridiques formulées par les organes du CAEM et 
les dispositions qui constituent le système juridique intérieur des Etats-membres, sont 
assez laconiques. 
Je voudrais distinguer deux types de ces orientations : le premier type consiste 
aux déclarations politiques qui déterminent le caractère, la nature du CAEM, comme 
par exemple la déclaration du fait que la Conseil d'Assistance Économique Mutuelle 
est une organisation d 'Etats qui conservent entièrement leur souveraineté même après 
être devenus membres de l 'organisation. L'indépendance de ces Etats et le respect des 
intérêts nationaux reposent sur les principes de la non-ingérence dans les affaires 
intérieures des pays, de l'égalité en droits et de l'assistance mutuelle fraternelle. Il en 
ressort que d'après les règles en vigueur dans le CAEM, l 'Etat-membre ne peut pas se 
trouver en état de dépendance de l 'organisation créée, autrement dit l 'organisation n'a 
de priorité à aucun égard vis-à-vis des Etats-membres et deux ou plusieurs Etats ne 
peuvent pas non plus parvenir, à l'aide de l'organisation, à saisir le pouvoir sur les 
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autres Etats-membres. Au deuxième type de groupes de règles appartiennent les 
dispositions formulées sous une forme plus concrète, qui réglementent l 'ordre de prises 
de décisions du C A E M et lesquelles assurent — comme suite directe des thèses de 
caractère politique mentionnées plus haut — que le pays, adhéré comme membre, 
puisse sauvegarder la totalité de sa souveraineté aussi en tant que membre, c'est-à-dire 
que l 'organisation — ou un groupe des Etats-membres — ne peut pas prendre une 
résolution malgré la volonté d 'un Etat donné qui oblige aussi ce dernier Etat. 
Il faudrait remarquer, plutôt entre parenthèses, que ce qui précède représente les 
faits de la réalité d 'aujourd 'hui , sous forme d'images fixes. Néanmoins, cette 
constatation ne signifie point que dans la phase actuelle de l'évolution la situation 
dépeinte soit entièrement satisfaisante et qu 'on ne cherche pas les possibilités à 
l'intéreur du C A E M qui puissent assurer une plus grande mobilité à l 'intégration qui se 
fait dans le cadre de l'organisation. Mais, en at tachant notre attention pour un instant 
à un autre rapport , elle ne signifie non plus qu 'on puisse tirer des conclusions 
concernant la capacité juridique du CAEM qu 'on a tiré à l'Occident, sur la base des 
rapports entre les Etats-membres et l 'organisation, ou bien de ceux des Etats-membres 
entre eux. Il est évident que le rapport des Etats-membres avec l 'organisation et la 
capacité juridique de celle-ci sont des questions qu 'on peut séparer l 'une de l 'autre. 
Pour en revenir à la ligne principale de notre raisonnement, nous pouvons d 'ores 
et déjà constater que le CAEM ne peut pas être considéré comme un groupe d 'Eta ts 
qui, dans ses rapports d'association, met à priori les règles juridiques établies en 
commun au-dessus des dispositions intérieures des Etats-membres. Or, si les normes 
juridiques établies au niveau du C A E M et les lois intérieures des Etats-membres ne 
sont pas caractérisées par une hiérarchie et subordination, quel est le rapport entre ces 
deux sortes de droi t? 
La réponse n'est pas facile et il est même impossible de donner une réponse qui 
soit valable sous tous les rapports. Essayons donc d'examiner quelques groupes de cas 
en vue de donner un fondement à une réponse acceptable. 
Voyons tout d 'abord la recommandation, comme la forme la plus fréquente 
donc la plus importante des décisions sur le fond appliquées dans le CAEM. 
Bien qu 'on ait l 'habitude de dire que la recommandation n'est pas encore une 
décision, donc elle n 'a pas de caractère juridique et ne signifie qu 'un engagement de la 
part des Etats-membres d'examiner les résolutions prises en commun par leurs 
délégués au C A E M et de notifier dans un délai déterminé, dans les 60 jours, s'ils 
acceptent la recommandation ou non, j 'estime quand-même que la recommandation 
ne diffère pas tellement d'un traité international de ce point de vue qu'en résultat des 
engagements réciproques, apparaissent dans la vie intérieure des Etats des prescrip-
tions juridiques dont le contenu n'a pas été déterminé primairement par les organes 
législatifs à l 'intérieur de l'Etat, mais qui sont nées dans un milieu international, issues 
de l'activité codificatrice commune des pays-membres du CAEM intéressés. 
L'effet de la recommandation est aussi assez près de celui d 'un traité 
international multilateral : par la notification de l 'adoption de la recommandation 
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l'engagement s'intègre dans le système juridique intérieur de l 'Etat ayant adopté la 
recommandation et ceci, à mon avis indépendamment du fait que la convention ou la 
recommandation fut promulguée ou non par un acte de législation intérieure. Ce qui 
fait que la question du rappor t entre «la règle juridique » adoptée au C A E M et la 
norme nationale ne se pose même pas, puisque les prescriptions élaborées et adoptées 
au CAEM apparaissent dans les pays-membres comme droit national intérieur, en 
même temps les organes du CAEM ne créent même pas de droit en résultat final de 
l'activité de prise de décision dans le C A E M , la prise de décision n'arrive pas à la 
codification, seulement jusqu 'au seuil de celle-ci. 
Ces constatations là restent également valable si l 'on considère le groupe de cas 
qui n'est pas rare non plus dans le cadre de la réglementation des rapports juridiques 
contractuels des organes de gestion dans le CAEM notamment que la disposition 
élaborée par l 'organe compétent du CAEM, adoptée et ainsi apparaissant également 
dans le système juridique intérieur des Etats-membres, présente des lacunes dans le 
sens qu'elle ne règle pas un groupe donné des questions à réglementer, mais elle fournit 
une norme de type de droit international privé qui met au point lequel des droits 
nationaux respectifs pourrai t être appliqué à la question non réglementée. Bien que 
cela puisse être sujet de discussion, mais à mon avis il peut aussi arriver que c'est faute 
d'une telle norme de collision fixée en communiqué, le droit national d 'un des Etats-
membres soit appliqué, même si ce cas n'est pas un exemple brillant du processus 
d'intégration, étant donné que le problème aura été résolu à l'aide de la méthode 
générale qui s'était établie traditionnellement pour toutes sortes d'affaires de caractère 
international et qui est encore le produit de la phase d'évolution précédant la période 
des intégrations économiques. En tous cas, on peut dire aussi de cette variation qu'elle 
ne soulève pas la question des rapports entre la norme créée au niveau du C A E M et le 
droit national. 
L'analyse du processus de la création du droit au niveau du CAEM sous forme 
de recommandations nous a amenés donc à la conclusion qu 'au fond le droit ne nait 
pas à deux niveaux, mais seulement à un seul: à celui des Etats-membres. Selon les 
apparences le produit final de l'activité de décision dans le C A E M apparaît, sous forme 
de droit, en réalité aussi bien dans le C A E M que dans les Etats-membres. Or, cela ne 
découle pas du fait qu'effectivement la réglementation juridique, élaborée par les 
Etats-membres intéressés d 'un organe du C A E M dans une question donnée, se fait 
aussi bien dans le C A E M que le Etats-membres, mais du fait que le processus de 
naissance du droit dans le C A E M a plusieurs phases au point de vue méthodique. La 
première partie du processus de codification se déroule dans les organes compétents du 
CAEM, ceci arrive à des phases très importantes, vu que l'organe compétent du 
CAEM adopte, sous forme de recommandation, la proposition pouvant être 
considérée comme projet de règle juridique. 11 n'y a point de doute cependant que ce ne 
soit pas encore une règle juridique, elle la devient lorsque les Etats-membres, 
conformément à leur ordre constitutionnel intérieur, l 'adoptent et notifient 
l 'adaptation de la recommandation. 
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J 'a joute que ce que je viens de dire du caractère juridique des recommandations, 
est aussi valable pour le cas où les Etats faisant partie du C A E M créent des droits et 
obligations par des traités internationaux conclus entre eux, car dans ces cas non, plus 
ce n'est pas le CAEM qui codifie, en tant qu'organisation internationale, mais les 
Etats, ou gouvernements qui y participent. 
Cependant par tout ce que je viens de dire à propos de l'activité de codification au 
sein du C A E M , j'étais loin de vouloir affirmer que le C A E M , an tant qu'organisation 
internationale, n'eut pas la capacité de création du droit. Je reviendrai encore au 
réglement et règles de procédure des divers organes du C A E M qu'il faut considérer 
comme des normes de caractère juridique. J'attirerais maintenant plutôt l 'attention sur 
la capacité du CAEM à conclure des traités internationaux, puisque des traités 
internationaux comme par exemple celui du CAEM avec le gouvernement de l 'Union 
Soviétique sur la réglementation des questions relatives à l 'emplacement du bureau de 
CAEM sur le territoire de l 'Union Soviétique, le traité entre le CAEM et le 
Gouvernement yougoslave sur la participation de la Yougoslavie aux travaux du 
CAEM, l'accord de coopérat ion entre le CAEM et la République Finlandaise, ont été 
conclus non pas par les pays membres du CAEM, mais le C A E M lui-même avec des 
Etats tiers (ou bien dans un des cas cités, avec le gouvernement de l 'Union Soviétique). 
Dans les domaines donc où les normes à élaborer réglementent l'activité des 
organismes d'Etat ou de gestion ou les droits et les obligations des Etats mêmes, 
n'apparaissent des règles juridiques dans le sens dogmatique c'est-à-dire, des normes 
qu'on peut appeler droit qu 'à un seul niveau notemment à celui de la législation 
intérieure des Etats intéressés, participant au CAEM. Les lieux où se préparent ces 
règles ne sont pas ces Etats, mais l'organe du CAEM qui dispose de compétence dans la 
question donnée — c'est la spécialité de cette sorte de création du droit — la 
préparation est faite par les délégués mêmes des Etats et les phases essentielles de 
conciliation des intérêts et de prise de décisions du processus de codification se 
déroulent dans le C A E M , mais le matériel ne devient droit qu'en passant par les 
organes législatifs des Etats intéressés. 
Il n 'y a donc pas lieu de supposer que dans le cas des Etats groupés dans le 
CAEM, organisation de l'intégration socialiste économique, apparaissent les mêmes 
dispositions juridiques, c'est-à-dire celles qui réglementent les mêmes questions, au 
niveau de la communauté et à celui des Etats. Le CAEM est donc une organisation 
d'intégration économique où la question des rapports entre les normes juridiques en 
vigueur dans les Etats-membres et celles créées dans l 'organisation d'intégration, ne 
demande pas à être réglementée. 
Il y a un autre groupe de règles, en partant duquel nous pouvons faire la contre-
épreuve de ces constatation-là; je pense aux documents normatifs qui fixent les 
réglements, respectivement les règles de procédure des organes du CAEM. Ceux-ci ont 
également le caractère de règles juridiques, puisqu'ils sont obligatoires pour les Etats 
qui ont participé à leur élaboration et adoption. Ces règles normatives connues 
d'ailleurs dans toutes les organisations internationales, se présentent de même à un seul 
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niveau et non pas deux, avec la différence que dans ce domaine nous ne sommes pas 
victimes d 'un mirage optique comme tout à l 'heure (à propos des documents fixant les 
droits et obligations des Etats, des organismes administratifs et gestionnaires) étant 
donné qu'il est évident, dès le premier abord, que la réglementation juridique 
n'apparait qu ' au niveau de la communauté et non pas à celui des Etats. 
4. Sur la base des conclusions tirées de cette analyse-là on peut énoncer que 
l'existence du C A E M ne débouble point les prescriptions juridiques, évite le mode de 
réglementation qui crée une règle juridique relative à la même question au niveau de la 
communauté et une autre à celui de l 'Etat, de ce fait il est inutile d 'élaborer des règles 
hiérarchiques, prioritaires entre les deux sortes de réglementation. 
Mais alors, quelle est la réponse donnée par le CAEM à la demande de 
réglementation juridique de l ' intégration économique? Cette question est motivée par 
le fait que comme il ressort des ce qui précède — les éléments de l 'appareil juridique de 
l'intégration économique qui se fait dans le C A E M , apparaissent au niveau du système 
juridique des Etats-membres, faisant donc partie des systèmes juridiques lesquels par 
ailleurs, pour diverses raisons, diffèrent l'un de l 'autre dans une mesure considérable. 
5. Pour voir le problème dans son ensemble, nous devons jeter un coup d'oeil sur 
l'objectif du C A E M à savoir de rapprocher graduellement, c'est-à-dire d'unifier les 
règles juridiques intérieures (nationales) des pays-membres qui concernent des 
domaines apparentés aux processus d'intégration économique. (Voici ce qu'on peut 
lire au premier alinéa du 15e chapitre du Programme Complexe: . . . Le perfectionne-
ment des fondements juridiques de la coopération se fera notemment . . . par la voie du 
rapprochement des normes juridiques nationales respectives, ainsi que par 
l'unification de celles-ci de la part des pays intéressés.) 
C'est un objectif de grande portée. De ma part, je le considère comme une 
tentative unique, car en comparaison avec les essais d'intégration apparaissant dans les 
diverses régions du monde depuis le début de notre siècle, elle a recours à une méthode 
sans exemple jusqu'ici. Simplement dit : une tout autre sorte de mécanisme juridique 
était au service des objectifs d'intégration économique, juridique, ou politique qui 
s'étaient présentés avec des aspirations soit universelles, soit régionales au cours des 
quelques décennies écoulées : ou bien l 'élaboration et l 'adoption d 'un droit unifié, ou 
bien la subordination des droi ts particuliers au droit intégré, ou encore l'unification 
des normes de collision des systèmes juridiques. 
L'harmonisation — le rapprochement, l'unification — des droits intérieurs est 
un nouvel important , surtout la variété de cette méthode qui s'est établie dans le 
CAEM. J'essaie d'exposer brièvement cette méthode. Cela ne parait pas difficile, car la 
marche de l 'harmonisation n'est pas encore élaborée dans son ensemble, les documents 
y relatifs du C A E M , en premier lieu le chapitre du Programme Complexe consacré à la 
question des droits formule seulement en grandes lignes la marche de l'unification des 
droits par la voie de l 'harmonisation. 
L'essence de la chose est consiste à mon avis à ce que le Programme Complexe 
lui-même a désigné certains domaines sous une forme concrète — qui se trouvent 
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d'ailleurs les plus proches du noyau central des processus d'intégration économique — 
où les Etats-membres doivent étudier, en premier lieu par l 'intermédiaire de méthodes 
comparatives, la possibilité de rapprochement, de l'unification de leurs règles 
juridiques nationales y relatives. Conformément aux méthodes de travail établies et 
adoptées dans le C A E M , ce dernier cède la définition des sujets concrets, de la marche 
et des méthodes de l'étude à ses organes compétents, de toute évidence avec l'idée qu'il 
fau t prévoir toute la marche, le commencement et l'achèvement de ce travail, la 
programmation, les responsables, etc. de ses diverses phases, dans les plans de travail 
annuels des organes compétents d u CAEM. 
Etant donné qu'il y a encore peu d'expériences pratiques dans ce domaine, 
puisque depuis l 'adoption du Programme Complexe aucun processus commencé à ce 
sujet n'est encore arrivé à son point final, je tiens à remarquer seulement ici que le 
rapprochement et l'unification d u droit national des Etats-membres est souhaitable 
en premier lieu dans les domaines qui constituent le droit subsidiaire des questions 
élaborées et adoptées dans le C A E M , non réglées par des normes unies, c'est-à-dire où 
le droit uni lui-même prescrit l 'application des règles juridiques des Etats-membres 
dans certaines questions, ou là où, à défaut de telles prescriptions expresses, les droits 
nat ionaux peuvent être appliqués. Il va de soi, je pense, que le rapprochement des 
droi ts subsidiaires est mis au premier plan, puisque c'est une expérience quotidienne 
que par exemple sur la base des dispositions unifiées des Conditions Générales de 
Libraison on peut arriver à des résultats diamétralement opposés si là où l'on applique 
le droi t subsidiaire, dans un des cas on applique le droit de l'un, dans l 'autre cas le droit 
de l 'autre Etat-membre) car, met tons, c'est l 'application du droit du vendeur qui est 
stipulé). L'autre domaine où l 'harmonisation des droits nationaux est au premier plan 
de l'intérêt est la sphère des relations contractuelles où jusqu'ici on n 'a pas pu élaborer 
des normes unifiées. Il faut dire cependant que beaucoup hésitent encore s'il est utile de 
rapprocher les droits nationaux dans le CAEM à propos de questions de telle 
importance, au lieu d'élaborer de normes unifiées. 
C'est d 'autant vrai, car le Programme Complexe et à la suite de ceci les organes 
compétents du C A E M ne se sont occupés que d'une partie du processus 
d 'harmonisat ion, à savoir de déclarer qu'au cours de l'établissement du mécanisme 
jur idique du C A E M , c'est le rapprochement et l'unification des normes juridiques 
nationales qui est une des méthodes possibles, que ces travaux doivent être commencés 
et introduits par des études de droit comparé élaborées concernent certains problèmes, 
études qui permettent de mettre au point la question de savoir dans quelles questions et 
dans quel sens les droits nationaux diffèrent l'un de l'autre. 
Or, on a peu dit jusqu'ici d ' une question extrêmement importante notamment 
comment se formerait la seconde phase, finale, de ce processus d'unification de droits. 
Pour tan t ce qui est le plus important c'est de savoir comment des Etats souverains 
faisant parties d 'une organisation d'intégration économique peuvent résoudre le 
problème qui consiste à ceci : en résultat d 'une enquête comparative les droits 
nat ionaux doivent progresser dans le sens du rapprochement dans les domaines où les 
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législations nationales, pour des raisons économiques, politiques, sociales, donc dans 
l'ensemble historiques, ont évolué de manières différentes avant que ces pays se soient 
engagés dans le chemin de l'édification du socialisme et s 'évoent dans un certain sens 
même actuellement, et probablement s'évolueraient encore pendant longtemps en 
partie de manières diverses. 
Les méthodes de ce rapprochement ne sont pas élaborées, pourtant il y a toute 
une série de questions qui surgissent sur lesquelles il faut réfléchir à deux niveaux: à 
celui du C A E M et à celui des Etats-membres. 
La situation parait plus simple au niveau du C A E M dans la mesure où, en 
résultat d 'une étude comparative, il n'y a que deux alternatives qui puissent s 'offrir: ou 
bien il sera recommandé aux Etats de tenir compte d 'une manière adéquate des 
constatation faites au cours de l'enquête comparative en cas d'une codification 
ultérieure future dans le pays du domaine du droit donné — mais même dans ce cas, il 
faut prendre position grosso modo au sujet du modèle d 'après lequel les droits 
nationaux, parfois très différents à propos de certaines questions, doivent s'intégrer — 
ou bien il faut tirer la conclusion que les différences entre les droits nationaux ne 
peuvent être conciliées qu 'en mettant à l 'ordre du jour la réglementation de la question 
donnée d 'une manière unifiée. Dans ce dernier cas, interviennent les mécanismes de 
procédure prévoir la tache dans le plan de travail de l 'organe compétant du CAEM, 
constituer des groupes de travail d'experts en vue de résoudre la tâche, etc — qui sont 
nécessaires sous n ' importe quel aspect de l'intégration économique pour résoudre des 
questions données. 
Je souligne les points d' interrogation à propos de l 'harmonisation, du 
rapprochement des droits à l 'autre niveau : celui des Etats-membres. 
Il-faut partir du fait qu'en résultat des travaux accomplis au sein du C A E M en 
vue de rapprocher, unifier les droits nationaux, certaines constatations générales sont 
faites pour savoir quelle serait la solution optimale des règles juridiques nationales des 
Etats-membres à propos une question donnée. 
Comment pourraient les Etats-membres réagir à ces constatations? Existe-il des 
mécanismes à l'intérieur des Etats-membres, à travers lesquels ces constatations faites 
en commun pourraient se faire valoir? On peut tout de suite poser la question, du côté 
du CAEM, comme du côté des Etats-membres s'il y a quelqu'obligation juridique pour 
mettre en œuvre ces constatations collectives? 
J'estime que les Etats n 'ont aucune obligation de caractère juridique de mettre en 
œuvre dans leur législation les constatations des organes compétents du C A E M faites 
dans l'intérêt du rapprochement et de l'unification des règles juridiques nationales; en 
outre, à l'intérieur des divers pays il n'y en a probablement pas de mécanisme adéquat 
actuellement. Cependant, ce n'est pas là où je vois le problème. 
Quant à l'utilisation des constatations tendant à la réglementation chez soi d'une 
manière identique ou semblable des sujets étudiés en commun dans le C A E M , le 
problème est le suivant : prenons à titre d'exemple le droit civil, plus précisément le 
droit des obligations qui est le plus pratique. 
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Le droit d'obligation est en partie une norme unifiée dans le C A E M , mais il 
recèle des lacunes, des « brèches » qu'il fau t combler par le droit national. O n considère 
comme droit national p.e. le droit subsidiaire des Conditions Générales des Livraison 
du C A E M , mais les dispositions concernant ce domaine dans les droits nat ionaux les 
unes des autres. Peut-on espérer de pouvoir modifier ces dispositions concrètes — par 
exemple la norme réglant l'exemption des conséquences de la non-exécution 
intervenue à cause d'un force majeur ou de n'importe quelle autre norme — isolées, en 
les détachant de toute la législation civile nationale? C'est peu probable. En effet, la 
juridiction civile nationale des pays-membres du CAEM joue au moins un double rôle 
à ce point de vue. L'un est l'organisation des relations juridiques nationales, l 'autre la 
promotion du processus d'intégration dans le CAEM par les moyens particuliers du 
droit, en cas de références ou du manque du droit des obligations unifié d u CAEM. 
Les codes civils nationaux sont créés de toute évidence pour remplir la première 
fonction, la seconde est seulement d'un caractère secondaire. Il est évident qu ' en créant 
ces codes dans les divers pays — codes qui sont précisément des systèmes parce que 
leurs éléments sont établis en égard les uns aux autres — c'est la fonction principale de 
la juridiction civile: l 'organisation de l 'économie nationale qui est devant les yeux. Or, 
l'exigence de l'économie nationale des divers pays socialistes vis-à-vis de la juridiction 
civile au moins en partie est variée et elle le restera aussi dans l'avenir. (Les différences 
existantes dans les droits civils ne sont pas des faits du hasard, en ou t re il faut, 
naturellement, attacher une importance particulière, parmi les motifs des différences, 
aux diverses marches d'évolution de la période d'avant la libération.) 
Vu ces doubles rôle et face du droit civil des divers pays-membres du C A E M , et 
eu égard à ce que l'application quotidienne de ces règles du droit civil se fait entre 
partenaires contractuels dans le pays et non pas sur le plan international, de m a part je 
ne vois pas beaucoup de possibilités réelles à ce que les divers pays-membres puissent 
rapprocher ou unifier certaines parties de leurs droits civils, en résultat des enquêtes 
comparatives effectuées au sein du C A E M . Je pense qu 'à la lumière de ce qui vient 
d'être dit, il va de soi qu 'un tel rapprochement ou unification n'est pas question de 
décision ou de bonne volonté. 
En principe et d 'une manière abstraite on peut supposer que dans les divers pays-
membres du CAEM soient constituées des règles du droit civil particulières du pays, 
lesquels, à côté du droit civil traditionnel, visent spécialement les relations dans le 
CAEM, mais je pense qu'il est inutile de citer des arguments pour affirmer q u ' a u cas où 
l'on pourrait instituer dans tous les Etats-membres intéressés de telles règles parallèles, 
il serait plus pratique de créer des normes unifiées mêmes. 
6. Au chapitre précédent j'ai fait un dé tour vers le programme de rapprochement 
et de l'unification des droits au sein du C A E M avec la promesse que pa r la suite 
j'essayerais de revenir sur la question de savoir comment est le mécanisme jur idique du 
CAEM. 
Je pense qu'il ressort de ce qui précède que premièrement l'établissement du 
mécanisme juridique du C A E M se fait graduellement. C'est que le C A E M , à la 
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différence d'autres organisations d'intégration internationales ne constitue pas tout 
son mécanisme juridique, ou tout au moins les éléments essentiels de celui-ci, au 
moment de sa fondat ion. Deuxièmement : le développement graduelle de l'appareil 
juridique se fait en par tant de deux sens : du côté de la communauté, comme côté des 
Etats-membres. Sur le plan de la communauté cela se fait d'une manière planifiée, 
comme les organes dirigeants du C A E M le décident, on élabore au fur et à mesure les 
prescriptions juridiques dont l 'ensemble constituera le système de conditions 
juridiques de la coopération au sein de CAEM. 
Je répété que je crains qu'un des composants de l'établissement d 'un système 
juridique, le rapprochement et l 'unification des systèmes juridiques nationaux des 
Etats-membres par la voie d'études comparatives ou d'autres méthodes ne puisse 
donner les résultats qu 'on en attend. Comme ceci a des raisons objectives et non pas 
subjectives, je pense qu 'à l'occasion il faudrait y réfléchir et si besoin est, modifier les 
conceptions y relatives. Il est possible que si les énergies considérables qui sont retenues 
par cette methode de la codification au sein du C A E M , se libérant pouvaient être 
intégrées dans l 'autre méthode possible, le processus de la formation du droit unifié, 
cela pourrait accélérer la constitution d'un système de conditions juridiques. 
7. Aujourd 'hui dans l'activité juridique du C A E M et je pense dans tous les 
domains d'activité, on a l'habitude d'examiner l 'état de l'accomplissement des tâches 
déterminées par le Programme Complexe, si l'on cherche la réponse à la question : où 
en est le processus d'intégration dans le domaine donné . 
Pour quelle durée le Programme Complexe, c'est-à-dire le XVe chapitre de celui-
ci, règlement la coopération juridique a été prévu? Je pense qu'il serait impossible de 
trouver une réponse directe à cette question. Cependant , dans un sens général on peut 
risquer l'affirmation que tant que le programme n'est pas entièrement réalisé, il restera 
de toute façon à l 'ordre du jour. Mais peut-être n'est-il pas irréel non plus de dire que 
tout programme ne fait progresser les choses que jusque-là et dans la mesure où les 
conditions et les circonstances dans lesquelles il a été conçu et auxquelles il est 
conforme n'ont pas changé d 'une manière à remettre en question la réalité de 
l'exécution du programme. 
Je ne pense pas qu'il soit oppor tun d'examiner dans le cadres de cet article la 
question de savoir si, au cours des quelques années écoulées, les circonstances avaient 
changé et en quelle profondeur, et si ce changement ne rendrait pas motivée la 
modification du Programme Complexe, ou bien celle des tâches y désignées sur le plan 
de l'édification du système des conditions juridiques? 
Ces temps-ci il n'est pas rare qu 'on analyse les effets des processus défavorables 
amorcés dans l 'économie mondiale au début ou bien vers le milieu des années 70, même 
à propos de questions sur lesquelles il n'est pas certain qu'ils aient exercé une influence 
profonde. Je crois cependant que le lecteur sera d 'accord avec moi si j'exprime ma 
conviction que l 'évolution des conditions de l 'économie mondiale a influencée d 'une 
manière défavorable l'activité des pays socialistes, comme celle de leur organisation 
économique d'intégration, le C A E M . Souligner les interactions de l'économie et du 
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droit passe déjà aujourd ' hui pour un lieu commun, je me contente donc de poser tout 
simplement la question suivante : d 'une part à cause de la longueur relative du temps 
écoulé depuis l 'élaboration du Programme Complexe lui-même, d 'autre part, eu égard 
aux changements intervenus dans l'économie mondiale, ne serait-il pas d'actualité de 
repenser et de ranger de nouveau en ordre d' importance les tâches qui se dressent 
devant nous au cours de l'édification du système de condit ions juridiques de 
l'intégration économique socialiste? 
Роль правовых систем стран-членов в правовом 
механизме СЭВ 
Т . БАН 
Среди правовых вопросов деятельности СЭВ автор в настоящей статье рассматривает роль 
системы правовых норм в экономической интеграции. По мнению автора при исходном пункте 
процесса любой экономической интеграции нужно решать: какой вид возможных правовых 
механизмов, юридических техник будет создан. Автор на такой позиции, что СЭВ определил 
двойной путь развития права: такая система, которая будет выполнять роль правового аппарата 
экономического и научно-технического сотрудничества, постепенно сформируется в результате 
такого процесса образования права, который, с одной стороны, исходит от общности стран-членов, 
с другой же стороны происходит на уровне национальных правовых систем стран-членов. 
Автор сперва занимается процессами, происходящими на стороне общности стран-членов. 
Он доказывает, что в СЭВ в значительной части случаев очень важные, но только подготовительные 
фазы процесса образования права происходят в самой организации интеграции. Ведь когда в 
данных органах СЭВ зарождается рекомендация в результате совместной работы представителей 
стран-членов, делегированных в эти органы, тогда процесс правотворчества, принятия решений — 
вопреки видимости — еще не заканчивается. Ибо из основных принципов деятельности СЭВ 
вытекает то, что рекомендация становится полноценной в том случае, если компетентные 
государственные органы стран-членов в течение 60 дней извещают о результатах рассмотрения ими 
рекомендаций, и это во многих отношениях является подобным процессу ратификации междуна-
родных договоров. Соответственно этому значительная часть совместно разработанной системы 
норм тоже нельзя считать таковой, которую можно было бы рассматривать как нормы СЭВ, 
поскольку эти правовые предписания в конечном счете тоже проявляются в национальном праве 
стран-членов. Специальностью правотворческой деятельности, начатой на уровне общности стран-
членов и завершающейся на уровне отдельных стран-членов, является то, что в результате данной 
работы в национальной правовой системе каждой страны-члена — по крайней мере тех, которые из-
за своей заинтересованности участвуют в принятии решения — опубликована идентичная норма по 
регулированию данного вопроса. Это, по сути дела, унификация и тождественно такой технике, 
которая все чаще употребляется универсально или в различных регионах мира и в результате 
которой разрабатываются единые законы для рефулирования различных вопросов. 
Вслед затем автор занимается другой стороны установления права СЭВ. Это — устранение 
различий между национальными правовыми системами путем их постепенного сближения. 
Способом этого в настоящее время является сравнительное изучение данных вопросов в интересах 
точного определения различий. Автор на такой позиции, что вследствие того, что в период до 
окончания второй мировой войны страны-члены СЭВ прошли различные пути развития и их 
юридические традиции и образ мышления и поныне довольно различаются, далее что вопреки 
единого социалистического развития их правовое развитие — наряду со сходствами — ив настоящее 
время проявляет различия, проще сделать упор на способе унификации, потому что в настоящий 
период от этого можно ожидать быстрее достигаемые результаты, будто бы страны-члены в своем 
национальном законодательстве — по своей инициативе — трудились над формированием 
тождественных или подобных друг другу правовых норм. 
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The role of legal system of the 
member-states in the legal mechanism of CMEA 
T . BÁN 
The author surveys the role o f legal system in the economic integration among the legal 
questions of the operation of C M E A . According to his op in ion at the starting point of every kind o f 
economic integration process it should be decided: which kind of the possible legal mechanisms and 
legal techniques should be created. Accord ing to the author the C M E A decided a dual way to build up 
its legal system: on one hand from the community itself, o n the other hand o n the level of the national 
legal systems o f the member-states will yield gradually such a system, which plays the role o f the legal 
apparatus of the economic and scientific-technological co-operation. 
The author deals with the processes taking place o n the community sphere first o f all. He 
proves that in the C M E A in sizable part o f the cases very important, a l though on ly preparative phases 
o f law creation take place in the integration organization itself. As in the g iven organs of C M E A a 
recommendation is created as a result o f the c o m m o n work of the delegations o f the member-states, 
then—till a certain grade despite the appearance—the decis ion process, the w a y of legislation is not 
concluded. It c o m e s from the basic operative principles o f C M E A that the recommendation is 
becoming fully appropriate if the competent organs o f the member-states acknowledge it within a 
period of 60 days, which is in m a n y aspects similar process as the ratification of international 
agreements. Fol lowingly , a large part o f the commonly created norm system c a n n o t be considered as 
C M E A norms, because ultimately these normative regulations appear in the national law of the 
member-states. The specialty of this legislative activity, which starts at the community and ends at 
national level—at least in those countries , which—being interested—participate in taking the 
decision—the same regulation appears in the national legal systems for ruling a given quest ion. 
Actually, this is unification, basically the same technique, which is used m o r e and more frequently in 
different regional spheres of the world or universally, and as a result universal laws are worked out for 
regulating certain problems. 
Afterwards the author deals with the other side o f the C M E A law creation, namely with the 
elimination of the differences of the nat ional legal regulations in the way of approaching to each other. 
The recent method o f this approach is the comparative analysis of given quest ions for the sake of 
proper location o f the differences. T h e author expresses his opinion that partly because the prewar 
development of C M E A member-countries was different and their legal tradit ion and theory is rather 
different even today, partly because despite the universal socialist deve lopment beside the relations 
and similarity their legal development shows differences, it is simpler to put the emphasis on the 
unification methods today in the C M E A . Therefrom w e can expect faster results, than in case the 
member-states w o u l d take efforts to work out similar or identical legal regulat ions starting from their 
o w n initiatives. 
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Über die grundlegenden rechtlichen Fragen 
der zwischenstaatlichen ökonomischen 
Organisationen der RGW-Staaten 
M . BALÁSHÁZY 
Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin 
Karl-Marx-Universität, Budapest 
Die Abhandlung befaßt sich mit der Integration des Organisationssystems der RGW 
mit besonderer Hinsicht auf die zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisationen. Sie analysiert 
die diesbezüglichen Mangeln des internationalen Rechtes und deren theoretischen Zusam-
menhänge in der Entwicklung der Organisationen. 
Die funktionale Analyse dehnt sich auf das Entscheidungsverfahren sowie auch auf 
deren praktischen Widersprüchen aus. Der letzte Teil der Abhandlung befaßt sich mit der 
Mitgliederschaft der ungarischen Wirtschaftsorganisationen in den zwischenstaatlichen 
Organisationen. 
1. Die Wirtschaftsorganisationen der Integration 
Der gegenwärtige Abschnitt der RGW-Integration ist die Periode, in welcher der 
organisationsmäßige Ausbau der Kooperat ion vor sich geht. Für die frühere Periode 
waren die Warenlieferungen des Außenhandels charakteristisch. Die rechtliche 
Projektion dieses wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsniveaus war der vorerst noch 
sämtliche Ansprüche befriedigende Außenhandelsvertrag. Die wirtschaftliche Ent-
wicklung der RGW-Staaten führte dann zur nächsten Stufe der Entwicklung der 
Integration, genauer gefaßt: zur Integration der Produktion. In der vorangegangenen 
Periode war nämlich der wechselseitig vorteilhafte, harmonisierte Außenhandel 
charakteristisch, was doch den begrifflichen Merkmalen der Integration nicht 
geradezu entspricht. Die in der Wirtschaft vor sich gegangenen Änderungen 
verlangten also auch die Modifizierung des rechtlichen Arsenals. Neben der 
Bedeutung der traditionellen Beziehungen gewinnen die internationalen Wirtschafts-
organisationen, als adäquaten rechtlichen Formen der Entfaltung der Integration, 
eine immer größere Rolle. 
Was bedeutet aber eigentlich die Integration der Produktion, welche sind jene 
Merkmale, die den Rahmen der traditionellen rechtlichen Lösungen übertreten? 
U m diese Frage beantworten zu können, liegt es an der Hand vorerst die 
Ergebnisse der Volkswirtschaftslehre ins Auge zu fassen, da ja die rechtliche Regelung 
letzten Endes eine Frage der aktuellen Wirtschaft ist. 
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Pécsi zufolge ist die Integration eine Einheit der Integration der Produktion und 
des Umsatzes. In der Integration der Produktion fassen die beteiligten Länder zwecks 
Schaffung der wirksamen Struktur der Volkswirtschaft, durch Spezialisierung und 
Kooperation die Produktionsvorgänge in eine Einheit zusammen. Die Spezialisierung 
und die Kooperation stellt die gemeinsame Planung zwangsweise in den Vordergrund, 
und setzt diese auch voraus. N u r aufgrund der einheitlichen Planung kann die 
internationale Arbeitsteilung verwirklicht und das Problem der Optimalisation gelöst 
werden. Die Integration des Umsatzes des Marktes bedeutet die Zusammenschmel-
zung der Märkte, indem die Warenumsatzschranken zwischen den Volkswirtschaften 
aufgehoben werden. In diesem Vorgang spielen der finanzielle Überbau und die damit 
zusammenhängenden Kategorien eine hervorragende, aktive Rolle. Die Existenz der 
Waren- und Geldelemente, als Produktionsfaktoren, setzen die unmittelbaren 
Beziehungen zwischen den Produzenten, nämlich den Unternehmen voraus. Eine 
derartige Zerlegung des Integrationsvorganges ist aber deshalb nötig, damit die 
Unterschiedlichkeit zwischen den Entwicklungsvorgängen erkenntlich wird, mit der 
Betonung jedoch dessen, daß sie sich zugleich gegenseitig auch voraussetzen. Eine 
Produktionsintegration kann ohne Umsatzintegration nicht zustande kommen, in der 
Entwicklung dieser beiden kann aber eine zeitliche Abweichung bestehen.1 
Über diese Entwicklung kann, von der Seite der Organisationen betrachtet, 
festgestellt werden, daß es sich zwei Hauptformen der internationalen Wirtschaftsor-
ganisationen herausgebildet haben, und zwar die zwischenstaatliche ökonomische 
Organisation (im weiteren: ZÖO), und die internationale Wirtschaftsorganisation (im 
weiteren: IWO). Fü r die Mitgliedstaaten steht die Wahl zwischen diesen beiden 
Organisationsformen frei. Diese zwei Organisationen sollen zwei verschiedene 
wirtschaftspolitische Ziele verwirklichen. 
Der Komplexprogramm ist bestrebt den Unterschied zwischen diesen beiden 
Organisationen prinzipiell abzugrenzen. 
Die grundlegende Funktion der zwischenstaatlichen ökonomischen Organisa-
tionen ist die Koordinat ion der Tätigkeit der beteiligten Länder auf bestimmten 
Gebieten der Wissenschaft und der Technik. 
Die internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen sollen zwecks Verwirklichung 
der Zusammenarbeit und der konkreten Koordinat ion auf dem Gebiet der 
wissenschaftlichen Forschungs-, beziehungsweise der technischen Planungs- und 
Entwicklungsarbeiten, ferner zwecks gemeinsamer Wirtschaftung gegründet werden.2 
Die zwischenstaatliche ökonomische Organisation ist die entsprechende Organisation 
zur gemeinsamen Planung, sie ist die rechtliche Organisationsform der Verwirklichung 
der Produktionsintegration, eine durch den Anspruch der Produktionsintegration ins 
Leben gerufene Kooperat ionsform. In dieser Organisation spielen grundsätzlich 
Produktionsprobleme auf Makroebene eine Rolle. 
1
 PÉCSI, 1С.: A KGST termelési integráció közgazdasági kérdései (Volkswirtschaftliche Fragen der 
RGW-Produktionsintegration). Budapest, 1977. pp. 31 et seq. 
2
 Kapitel VIII des Komplexprogramms. 
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Diese Organisationen werden durch Staaten ins Leben gerufen, und die 
Mitglieder sind Vertreter der Staaten. Durch Gründung der ZÖO handelt es sich also 
um die Umformung des Wirtschaftsmechanismus der Integration „von oben her". 
Die Tätigkeit der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisation wird zur aktiven 
Verwendung der Waren- und Geldverhältnisse gegründet sie versieht also eine 
wirtschaftende Funkt ion; sie stellt Beziehungen zwischen Unternehmen her, sie pflegt 
also die im Rahmen der Integration gedeihenden Wirtschaftsbeziehungen „von unten 
her" , auf Mikroebene. Die internationale Wirtschaftsorganisation ist der adäquate 
rechtliche Ausdruck der Umsatzintegration. Die Trennung der Integrationsvorgänge 
ist selbstredend auch hier nicht steif. Bei der Umsatzintegration entstehen die 
Beziehungen nicht ausschließlich auf Mikroebene, sie werden auch durch Makroele-
mente durchwoben, auch schon deshalb, da ja die Umsatzintegration die Existenz der 
Produktionsintegrat ion voraussetzt. In der Umsatzintegration ist, neben den 
sonstigen Elementen, der Mikrocharakter dominierend; in der Produktionsintegra-
tion herrscht, gleichfalls neben den sonstigen Elementen, der Makrocharakter vor. 
Sowohl in der rechtlichen, als auch in der volkswirtschaftlichen Literatur wird 
darüber lebhaft diskutiert, welche Organisationsform soll oder mußbevorzugt 
werden.3 Die Diskussion kann kraß auf die Grundfrage zurückgeführt werden, ob der 
Wirtschaftsmechanismus der Integration entsprechend dem auf der gemeinsamen 
Planung basierenden zentralisierten Modell ausgebaut werden soll, oder entsprechend 
den auf dem Waren- und Geldkategorien gründenden Marktmodell. 
Aufgrund des Komplexprogramms kann die Diskussion nicht eindeutig 
entschieden werden, weil das Programm sowohl die Entwicklung der gemeinsamen 
Planung als auch die der Waren- und Geldbeziehungen vorsieht. Das ist auch 
verständlich, wenn wir in Betracht ziehen, daß die Zielsetzungen des Programms 
binnen anderthalb Jahrzehnte verwirklicht werden sollen, und so war es zweckdienlich 
für die Methode der Durchführung den Mitgliedstaaten eine Alternative zu gewähren. 
Da das Komplexprogramm keine Richtlinien gibt, das kann es auch nicht tun, setzt 
sich die Diskussion fort und verschiebt sich insbesondere in jene Richtung, ob 
„Schwerpunkte" gebildet und primäre Methoden, die die Hauptrichtung der 
Entwicklung der Kooperat ion bestimmen, gewählt werden sollen, oder soll das Ziel 
mittels verschiedenen Methoden gemeinsam und stufenweise realisiert werden. 
Besonders in der ökonomischen Literatur der übrigen sozialistischen Länder 
herrscht allgemein die Meinung, — aber auch bei uns ist es keine Seltenheit —, daß eine 
Hauptaufgabe herausgehoben werden soll, zu deren Verwirklichung die Kräf te 
zusammengefaßt werden müssen.4 Unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen sollen die 
Bedingungen sicher gestellt werden, daß sich die Koordination, die gemeinsame 
3
 Siehe: KNYZJAK, Z.: A nemzetközi tervezés elemei (Die Elemente der internationalen Planung), 
Közgazdasági Szemle 9/1975. 
4
 Ш И Р Я Е В , Й . С . (SCHIRJAJEW): Экономический механизм социалистической интеграции, 
Moskau, 1973. р. 185. Kiss, Т.: Nemzetközi tervezési együttműködés a KGST-ben (Internationale 
Planungskooperation im RGW), Közgazdasági Szemle, 6/1975. 
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Planung, die Spezialisierung und die Kooperation entfalten kann. Die Forschungen 
sollen sich auf dieses Gebiet erstrecken, da, angesichts der Integration und des 
Mechanismus der einzelnen Mitgliedländer, der Ausbau der Marktbeziehungen, unter 
Verwendung der Marktkategorien, nur zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt aktuell werden 
kann. Schirjajew steht auf diesem Standpunkt . Er stellt fest, daß der Anspruch auf 
Koordinierung der gemeinsamen Tätigkeit früher entsteht, als die Notwendigkeit der 
gemeinsamen Unternehmung und die Koordinat ion sei der Ausgangspunkt und die 
Vorbedingung der Kooperation auf Unternehmenbasis.5 
Aus der obzitierten Feststellung gelangt dann Schirjajew auf eine solche 
bestreitbare Folgerung,6 welche die Daseinsberechtigung der sich in der letzten Zeit 
entfaltenden Forschungsrichtung, die die Probleme der selbständigen Unternehmun-
gen zu ermitteln trachtet, in Zweifel zieht. Unserer Meinung nach müssen aber beide 
Forschungsrichtungen, unter Beachtung der gegebenen Umstände, in entsprechender 
Form entwickelt werden, da ja die Wirtschaftsintegration die Einheit der Produktions-
und der Umsatzintegration ist. Die Erfahrungen die bisher in Funktion getretenen 
Wirtschaftsorganisationen in Betracht ziehend gelangen wir zur Folgerung, daß man 
die Gründung der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen nicht in Vordergrund 
stellen soll, bloß deswegen, weil sie auch unter den Aufgaben des Komplexprogramms 
figuriert. 
Anfang der 70-er Jahre war die forcierte Gründung der IWO zu beobachten. Die 
zu dieser Zeit gegründeten internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen konnten bis 
zum heutigen Tage eine ihrer Aufgaben nicht verwirklichen, nämlich die wirtschaften-
de Funktion, folglich auch nicht die wirtschaftliche Rechnungsführung. Das kann 
unter anderen darauf zurückgeführt werden, daß die Gründung dieser Organisationen 
nicht aufgrund entsprechender volkswirtschaftlicher Analysierungen — als subjektive 
Bedingung der Gründung — vor sich gegangen ist, beziehungsweise nicht an jenen 
Gebieten erfolgte, wo es wirtschaftlich begründet war.7 Die Ermangelung der 
volkswirtschaftlichen Bedingungen bedeutet in der Integration besonders bei den 
multilateralen Organisationen ein Problem, da das unter anderen auch eine 
multilaterale Verrechnung voraussetzt, und — w i e Kálmán Pécsi darauf hin weist—ist 
eigentlich auch bei dem transferablen Rubel die bilaterale Verrechnung die effektive 
Verrechnungsform. Das kollektive transferable Rubel ist bloß formell multilateral, 
dem Inhalt nach ist es bilateral.8 Ähnliche Erscheinungen finden wir letzten Endes bei 
sämtlichen multilateralen Beziehungen. 
Auf eine Sache muß jedoch aufmerksam gemacht werden. Eine wie immer 
geartete Stellungnahme bezüglich dessen, ob diese Organisationen erfolgreich 
arbeiten, oder nicht, kann unseres Erachtens nicht reell sein. Die Tätigkeit der 
5
 SCHIRJAJEW: o p . c i t . p . 1 8 5 . 
6
 SCHIRJAJEW: o p . c i t . p p . 1 8 4 e t s e q . 
7
 F A R K A S , G Y : A szocialista nemzetközi gazdálkodó szervezetek perspektívái (Perspektiven der 
sozialistischen internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen), Külgazdaság, 10/1979. 
8
 PÉCSI: o p . c i t . p . 2 5 0 . 
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internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen umfaßt die wirtschaftende, das heißt also 
die Mikrosphäre. Anhand dieser Tätigkeit müssen die selbständige Unternehmeninte-
ressiertheit und die wirtschaftlichen Entscheidungen der Unternehmen zur Geltung 
kommen. 9 Demgegenüber steht, mangels einheitlicher rechtlicher Regelung, die 
Gründung von internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen unmittelbar mittels zivil-
rechtlicher Verträge den Mitgliedunternehmen nicht zu. 
Es ist also von zweifelhaftem Wert über die Tätigkeit der gegenwärtig 
funktionierenden I W O allgemein geltende Feststellungen zu machen zu einer Zeit, wo 
die in diesen Organisationen potentiell anwesenden Vor- oder Nachteile noch gar nicht 
ermessen werden können. Die Umstände sind noch derart unausgereift, daß von 
grundlegenden Problemen gar nicht gesprochen werden kann. 
Es ist nämlich offensichtlich, das gegenwärtig, wo die Frage der Gründung auf 
der Ebene der nationalen Wirtschaftslenkungsorgane entschieden wird und die 
Finanzierung aus Haushaltsbeiträgen vor sich geht, die ökonomische Entschei-
dungsselbständigkeit der Organisationen beschränkt ist. Diese Beschränktheit 
deformiert aber die ganze Organisation. 
Das ungarische Wirtschaftslenkungssystem machte zwischen dem Funktionsbe-
reich der Wirtschaft und der Wirtschaftslenkung einen krassen Unterschied, in diesen 
Organisationen konnte das aber nicht mit derselben Konsequenz durchgeführt 
werden. Die Einschaltung der Wirtschaftslenkungsorgane in die wirtschaftenden IWO 
ist nicht vorteilhaft, weil sich die ökonomischen und die Lenkungselemente 
vermengen. Eine derartige Verflechtung der Makro- und Mikroebene bringt mehr 
Probleme als Vorteile. 
Eines ist jedenfalls sicher. Auch dann ist eine massenhafte Verbreitung der IWO 
nicht zu erwarten, wenn die Hindernisse der Gründung beseitigt werden, weil die 
mögliche zeitliche Verschiebung zwischen der Produktions- bzw. Umsatzintegration 
gegenwärtig nicht bloß eine Möglichkeit, sondern eine Tatsache ist. 
Nichtsdestoweniger erfüllen die IWO in der Wirtschaft der Integration eine 
wichtige Rolle. Ihre Bedeutung besteht nämlich nicht in ihrer Anzahl, sondern darin, 
daß es für die wirtschaftenden Organisationen möglich wird, den Unternehmeninter-
essen entsprechend, eine diese Interessen zum Ausdruck bringende Wirtschaftstä-
tigkeit auszuüben. 
Der bisherige Entwicklungsverlauf der Integration war für die ZÖO günstig, da 
doch im Wirtschaftsmechanismus der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsintegration die 
Elemente des zentralisierten Wirtschaftsmodells eher anwesend sind, als die des 
Marktmodells. 
Es wäre aber verfehlt zu glauben, das bei den Z Ö O sämtliche Probleme beseitigt 
sind. Trotz der auf diesem Gebiet bestehenden objektiven Gegebenheiten gibt es nicht 
9
 RAcz, M.: A KGST-országok közös gazdasági szervezeteinek feladatköre, tevékenysége (Aufgaben-
bereich und Tätigkeit der gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsorganisationen der RGW-Länder). Gazdaság és 
Jogtudomány 1-2/1977. 
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geringe Schwierigkeiten, wenn auch diese Probleme völlig anderer Na tu r sind und 
leichter gelöst werden können. 
Auch die praktische Tätigkeit der ZÖO läßt manches zu wünschen übrig, 
obwohl das auch nicht den Organisationen auf die Schulter geschoben werden kann. 
Die Theorie ist völlig unausgearbeitet, herrschte doch immer die Ansicht, — 
zumindest auf dem Gebiet des Rechts —, daß die Zwischenstaatliche Organisation ein 
öffentlichrechtliches Rechtssubjekt ist, demzufolge die gründenden Staaten angesichts 
ihrer Souverenität die Fragen der Tätigkeit derselben nach ihrem Belieben regeln. Bei 
einer grundlegend politischen Organisation ist dieser Standpunkt akzeptabel, die ZÖO 
ist aber in erster Linie eine Organisation wirtschaftlichen Charakters, deshalb ist es 
nicht zweckmäßig die Souverenität in einer übertriebenen Weise auszulegen. Der 
Rückstand der Forschungen führte aber dahin, daß mangels genügender Kenntnis der 
Institution für die wirtschaftspolitischen Entscheidungen keine entsprechende 
Alternative existiert. 
Bei den Z Ö O handelt es sich um eine noch nicht genügend herauskristallisierte 
Institution. Auch über diese Organisation existieren nur rahmenhafte Vorstellungen, 
die Ordnung ihrer Funktionierung hat sich noch nicht herausgeformt. Es kann 
unübertrieben behauptet werden, d a ß heutzutage durch die praktische Tätigkeit der 
Organisationen „herausexperimentiert" wird, was schon längst hätte bekannt sein 
sollen. Das ist aber keine gewünschte Methode der Entwicklung der Organisationen, 
da dadurch dem Einfluß solcher Faktoren freier Weg geboten wird, die Resultate der 
Eventualitäten der momentanen Wirtschaftslage sind, die aber, da hier die Formung 
einer Organisation vor sich geht, sich in die Tätigkeit der Organisation fest verankern. 
Die nicht genügend geklärten und umrissenen Wirkungskreise, das selbständige 
Interesse der Organisation, die Abwesenheit einer volkswirtschaftlichen Anschau-
ungsweise können die Entwicklung der ZÖO in eine Richtung verschieben, daß sie jene 
Charaktermerkmale verliert, deren Wahrung unter allen Umständen geboten wäre. 
2. Die Regelungsprobleme der ZÖO 
Die äußeren Beziehungen der ZÖO sind nicht geregelt, worüber wir die 
Annäherungsweise von der Integrationsseite verstehen. Zu diesen äußeren Beziehun-
gen gehören die Gründung der zwischenstaatlichen Organisation, ihr Aufbau und ihre 
Funktionierung. 
Ebenso sind auch die inneren Beziehungen der ZÖO ungeregelt, wobei wir hier 
von der Seite der nationalen Wirtschaft vor Auge haben; zumeist sind hier die 
Beziehung der in der Organisation als Mitglied beteiligten nationalen Organe und der 
Z Ö O als Ganzes, zu den nationalen Wirtschaftslenkungsorganen und ökonomischen 
Organisationen. 
Es Fällt äußerst schwer die Tätigkeit der zwischenstaatlichen ökonomischen 
Organisationen in den Rahmen der nationalen Wirtschaft einzufügen, wenn eine 
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einheitliche internationale Regelung fehlt. In dieser Beziehung wurden zunächst nicht 
einmal Versuche unternommen, wie es bei den IWO der Fall war. Wir möchten 
betonen, daß es durchaus nicht unser Absicht ist, die ZÖO irgend welchen strengen 
Rechtsnormen unterordnen. Davon ist gar keine Rede, und zwar aus zwei Gründen. 
Einerseits halten wir es nicht fü r vernünftig eine noch im Entstehen begriffene 
Institution unter strenge rechtliche Regelung zu ziehen, weil ja dadurch die 
Möglichkeit der dynamischen Entwicklung gehindert würde. Andererseits aber auch 
deshalb nicht, weil die ZÖO eine zwischenstaatliche Organisation und als solches 
Subjekt des Völkerrechts ist. Wir wollen die gründenden Staaten überhaupt nicht 
einschränken. Es m u ß natürlich die Möglichkeit geboten werden, daß die Regierungen 
der betreffenden Staaten eine solche Organisation gründen, welche sie wollen, das 
heißt, daß sie von der einheitlichen Regelung Abstand nehmen, falls es angesichts der 
Tätigkeit der Organisation, oder aus sonstigen Gründen, laut Beurteilung der Gründer 
für begründet erscheint. 
Die praktischen Erfahrungen scheinen zu beweisen, daß in der Mehrheit der 
Fälle die Einführung einheitlicher Funktionierungs- und Organisationsprinzipien 
denkbar ist, obwohl momentan bei den Organisationen gewisse gemeinsame Züge 
gegeben sind, der Aufbau und die Funktionierungsordnung jeder einzelnen muß 
aber separat „studiert" werden, und zwar wegen des Risikos einer etwaigen Ab-
weichung. 
Die Ungeregeltheit der äußeren Beziehungen der ZÖO wirkt sich natürlich auch 
auf die inneren Beziehungen aus. Die Vielfalt der Organisationen verhindert es, daß 
sich die ZÖO an die Arbeit der inneren Wirtschaftslenkungsorgane harmonisch 
schmiegen können. 
Es müßten einheitliche Funktionierungsprinzipien und Regeln ausgearbeitet 
werden. Die Wissenschaft des Völkerrechts befaßt sich bereits mit dem Problem der 
internationalen Rechtssubjektivität der internationalen Organisationen, obzwar es 
bisher noch nicht gelungen ist die Bedingungen der Rechtssubjektivität festzulegen.10 
Wir können uns bloß auf die Feststellungen des positiven Rechts stützen, wenn wir die 
Rechtssubjektivität einer gegebenen Organisation und deren Inhalt feststellen wollen. 
Deshalb ist es äußerst wichtig diese Fragen positivrechtlich zu regeln. Es kam in 1966 
in Warschau über die ZÖO ein Abkommen zustande. (Abkommen über den 
Rechtsstatus und die Vorrechte der internationalen Zweigorganisation für wirtschaft-
liche Zusammenarbeit .) Dieses Abkommen gewährt den zwischenstaatlichen ökono-
mischen Organisationen die traditionellen Vorrechte und Immunität , ähnlich der 
Immunität und der Vorrechte der diplomatischen Körperschaften. Demzufolge sind 
die Vermögensgegenstände der Organisationen von der Konfiskation, bzw. Beschlag-
nahme durch die Verwaltungsbehörden befreit; die Akten und Dokumente der 
Organisation, sowie die zu deren Aufbewahrung dienenden Räumlichkeiten sind 
1 0
 H A R A S Z T I - H E R C E G - N A G Y : Nemzetközi jog (Internationales Recht). Budapest, 1 9 7 9 , p. 1 5 . 
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unverletzbar. Auch den Vertretern der Organisation stehen spezielle, durch das 
Völkerrecht gesicherte Befugnisse zu. Ihre amtliche Korrespondenz ist unantastbar; 
die Organisationen sind von der Entrichtung der direkten Steuern befreit, sie sind 
befreit von der Anmeldungs und Evidenzhaltungspflicht, usw. 
All diese Berechtigungen bringen die Organisationen und deren Vertreter mit 
den diplomatischen Körperschaften bzw. mit den Diplomaten in ähnliche Lage. 
Diese Art der Regelung des Rechtstatus muß aber als eine Zwangslösung 
angesehen werden, die nicht ohne Widersprüche ist. Die Immunität der diplomati-
schen Körperschaften dient gerade dem Ziel, ihnen gegenüber den sonstigen 
Organisationen des Empfangsstaates eine Sonderstellung zu sichern. Dadurch sollen 
die Sonderstellung, die Angehörigkeit zu einem anderen Land, die Wahrung der 
Sonderinteressen des anderen Landes ausgedrückt und betont werden. Demgegenüber 
muß aber die ZÖO eine völlig andere Funkt ion erfüllen. Es ist zweifelsohne begründet, 
daß ihnen ein internationaler Status eingeräumt wird, dieser internationale Status hat 
aber einen völlig anderen Inhalt, als der bisherige traditionelle internationale 
Rechtsstatus. 
Die ZÖO sind gemäß des völkerrechtlichen Kategorisieren partikuläre 
Organisationen mit speziellem Wirkungskreis, die zur Verrichtung ihrer Aufgaben 
vielmehr bedürfen als bloß der Gewährung der „Unverletzbarkeit". Die Organisatio-
nen sollten nicht bloß von der negativen Seite her angegangen werden. Es sollte ihnen 
die Befugnis in positiver Form eingeräumt werden, d a ß sie im Rahmen der 
Verrichtung ihrer Aufgaben Informationen einholen und jenen staatlichen Organen 
überleiten können, die organisationsmäßig zwar außerhalb der ZÖO stehen, deren 
Tätigkeit aber an einem gewissen Punkt die Tätigkeit der Z Ö O berührt. Die in den 
ZÖO steckenden Vorteile können nur auf diese Weise fü r die Nationalökonomie 
nutzbar gemacht werden. Hier würde sich also um den Ausbau eines Beziehungssy-
stems neuen Typs handeln, das — wie wir sahen — nicht in den Rahmen der 
traditionellen völkerrechtlichen Regelung eingezwängt werden kann. Wenn wir das 
versuchten, würden aus rechtlichem Gesichtspunkt „uner faß te" Gebiete bleiben. In all 
diesen fällen würden die Beteiligten gezwungen diese Lücken selbst auszufüllen, was 
aber zur Folge hätte, daß je nach Organisationen und Ländern abweichende Lösungen 
entstehen und die gesetzlichen Rahmen oft außer Acht gelassen würden. 
Die einheitliche rechtliche Regelung müßte die Gründer , den Zweck der 
Gründung, ihre Aufgaben, den Aufbau der Organisation, den Wirkungskreis der 
einzelnen Organisationen, beziehungsweise ihre Beziehungen untereinander, die 
Finanzierung, beziehungsweise — entsprechend den obenerwähnten — die Beziehun-
gen der Organisation als über einen internationalen Status verfügenden Organ, die sie 
mit den staatlichen Organen der Mitgliedländer begründet, erfassen. 
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3. Die Tätigkeit der ZÖO 
Untersuchen wir aufgrund der Praxis das Ziel und die Tätigkeit der 
zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen etwas näher, da dies auf Regelungsfragen jeder 
Art eine unmittelbare Auswirkung hat. Im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung kann auch 
ausführlich nachgewiesen werden, daß die Z Ö O eine Organisation der Integration ist. 
Die Z Ö O werden zur Ausübung einer Koordinationstätigkeit durch die Staaten 
gegründet, und als völkerrechtliches Rechtssubjekt, verwirklicht sie eine zwischen-
staatliche Koordination. Zufolge der bereits zitierten Feststellung des Komplexpro-
gramms ist sie zur Abstimmung der Tätigkeit von Volkswirtschaftszweigen und 
Unterzweigen befugt, und zwar in einer Weise, daß die Koordination die Ansprüche 
anderer Zweige der Volkswirtschaft und die Anforderungen der Mitglieder aus 
anderen an der Integrationsorganisation teilnehmenden Ländern vor Augen hält und 
harmonisiert. 
Die Z Ö O koordiniert also auf allgemeiner Ebene, und um das tun zu können, 
muß sie gewissen Organisationsanforderungen entsprechen. Die Staaten müssen in 
diesen Organisationen durch solche Organe vertreten werden, die das gleiche Niveau 
der Verpflichtungen und der Verantwortung versichern. Deshalb sieht das Komplex-
programm vor, daß an den Organisationen als Mitglieder Ministerien, staatliche 
Kommissionen und sonstige Oberbehörden teilnehmen. 
Die Organisationssysteme der Wirtschaftslenkung der verschiedenen sozialisti-
schen Länder, die Verteilung der Entscheidungswirkungskreise sind aber voneinander 
abweichend. Deshalb ist es eines der grundlegenden Erfordernisse, daß an der Arbeit 
der ZÖO Vertreter der Mitgliedstaaten mit identischem Befugnissen teilnehmen. Diese 
Frage muß unbedingt von inhaltlicher Seite erfaßt werden, denn die identischen 
Befugnissen bedeuten nicht unbedingt das identische Niveau der Vertretung. In den 
RGW-Ländern gestaltete sich nach den Wirtschaftslenkungsreformen das Verhältnis 
der zentralisierten bzw. der dezentralisierten Entscheidungen auf verschiedene Weise. 
In den Fragen der Wirtschaft wird bei uns im allgemeinen die Entscheidung auf 
Unternehmen-Niveau getroffen. Daraus könnte die Konsequenz gezogen werden, daß 
die Unternehmen in die Z Ö O einbezogen werden sollten und es besteht diesbezüglich 
auch in der Praxis eine kräftige Bestrebung, aber dieser Forderung kann aus 
verschiedenen später darzulegenden Umständen nicht zu gebilligt werden. 
Die ungarischen Wirtschaftslenkungsorgane müssen einen anderen Weg 
suchen, d a ß sie die Interessen der Unternehmen und auch die Gleichrangigkeit 
gewährleisten können. Unserer Meinung nach ist es zur Überbrückung dieser 
Probleme die ungünstigste Lösung die Unternehmen mit der Vertretung des Staates 
auszustatten. 
Wenn in den einzelnen Ländern das Organisationssystem der Wirtschaftslen-
kung differenzierter ist, und die Entscheidung, die in einem anderen Land durch eine 
Organisation getroffen wird, hier in die Kompetenz mehrerer Organisationen gehört, 
ist ein Problem rein technischen Charakters. Deshalb darf die Anzahl der die einzelnen 
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Länder vertretenden Delegationen nicht zahlenmäßig fixiert werden. Der abweichen-
den Mitgliederanzahl der Delegationen soll keine besondere Bedeutung beigemessen 
werden, da ja innerhalb der Organisation die Entscheidungen durch Abstimmung 
gefaßt werden, und jedes Land verfügt über eine Stimme. 
In allgemeinster Fassung ist das wirtschaftliche Ziel der Z Ö O die Harmonisie-
rung der Produktionsvorgänge, die Schaffung einer erfolgreich funktionierenden 
internationalen Arbeitsteilung durch Harmonisierung der Produktionsbeziehungen, 
ferner, daß die Vorbedingungen geschaffen werden, daß sich diese Beziehungen 
entfalten können. 
Deshalb bezieht sich die sich im Rahmen der Z Ö O vollziehende Koordination 
auf mehrere Tätigkeiten. Beinahe in sämtlichen Organisationen wurden die Standard-
vereinheitlichungsarbeiten zur Aufgabe gestellt, da das eine wesentliche Bedingung der 
im Rahmen der internationalen Arbeitsteilung vor sich gehenden Produktion ist. Ein 
ernstes Hindernis der Vertiefung and Erweiterung der Kooperationsbeziehungen ist, 
daß die Mitgliedstaaten in der Produktion voneinander abweichende Standardé 
benützen. In der Beseitigung dieser Schwierigkeiten wurden bereits wertvolle 
praktische Erfolge erreicht, es wurden mehrere abgestimmte gemeinsame Standardé 
angenommen und eingeführt. 
Eines der wichtigsten Mittel der echten Integration ist die Spezialisierung. Es ist 
kein Zufall, d a ß im Interesse der Entwicklung der internationalen Arbeitsteilung und 
der dem Weltniveau entsprechenden wirtschaftlichen Produktion die Lösung dieser 
Frage den Vorrang hat. Auch im Rahmen der Z Ö O kam es bereits zur Abschließung 
einer Reihe von Spezialisierungsabkommen, wenn auch die ZÖO auf diesem Gebiet 
keine so eindeutig erfolgreiche Tätigkeit ausübt . Das echte Erfordernis diesen 
Verträgen gegenüber ist die Vielseitigkeit. Ansta t t dessen kommen aber meist 
bilaterale Abkommen zustande, eben so, wie auf sonstigen Gebieten der wirtschaftli-
chen Zusammenarbeit . Und das ergibt sich wieder aus den Grundproblemen der 
RGW-Integration, nämlich aus der Eigenheit, d a ß die sozialistischen Länder über 
keine entsprechende Kapitalkraf t verfügen, in sämtlichen Ländern wird eine 
Mangelwirtschaft getrieben und zwischen den Ländern herrscht naturale Verrech-
nung. Andererseits wieder, da bei sämtlichen Mitgliedländern der langfristige Plan 
problematisch ist,11 nehmen sie die Produktion nur schwer auf sich, und — d a sie die 
Sicherheit anstreben — kommen sie dem Produktionsverbot noch schwerer nach, oder 
sie halten sich nicht daran. 
Das Problem der Spezialisierungsabkommen ist äußerst vielfältig und kompli-
ziert, deshalb können wir uns hier nur per tangentem damit befassen, möchten aber 
noch auf ein wichtiges Moment hinweisen. Darauf nämlich, daß das Zustandekom-
men der multilateralen Spezialisierungsabkommen oft eben durch die inneren 
Wirtschaftsregler gehindert wird. Das kommt am häufigsten dann vor, wenn das 
1 1
 H O C H , R . : A hosszútávú tervezésről (Uber die langfristige Planung), Közgazdasági Szemle, 
10/1979. 
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aufgrund der Spezialisierung für die Erzeugung erhaltene Tauschprodukt nicht in 
jenem Zweig (oder nicht bei dem Unternehmen) zur Verwendung gelangt, welcher 
(oder welches) die spezialisierte Erzeugung vorgenommen hatte. Es wäre von 
volkswirtschaftlichem Gesichtspunkt betrachtet die Beteiligung an der Spezialisierung 
vielleicht von Nutzen, (z. B. Einsparung an kapitalistischer Währung,) das zweigliche 
(Unternehmen-) Interesse verhindert aber deren Realisierung. 
Ein sich auch zu den Spezialisierungsabkommen eng knüpfendes Thema ist die 
Abstimmung der Entwicklungs- und Investitionspläne, das einen überwiegenden Teil 
der Tätigkeit der ZÖO bildet. Auch im Zuge der Entwicklung muß dem allgemeinen 
Kapitalmangel Rechnung getragen werden. Es tauchte des öfteren der Gedanke der 
gemeinsamen Investitionen auf, daß, falls sie erfolgreich verwirklicht werden könnte, 
für die Mitgliedländer von großem Nutzen wäre. Oft ist aber der Mangel an Kapital 
stärker als der Wunsch der gemeinsamen Investition, deshalb müssen die minder 
kostspieligen Methoden der Investitionskooperation bevorzugt werden, und zwar 
derweise, daß die einzelnen Mitgliedländer, aufgrund abgestimmter Entwicklungspro-
gramme,eine vorausbestimmte Entwicklung durchführen — innerhalb der nationalen 
Investition. Diese Lösung kann aber — angesichts des Volumens der Kraftquellen — 
nur bei Entwicklungen kleineren Umfangs angewendet werden.1 2 
Je breiter das Feld der Tätigkeit der ZÖO ist, desto mehr nützliche 
Informationen kumulieren sich bei den Organisationen. Sie kann das gegebene 
wirtschaftliche Feld der Mitgliedländer vergleichend durchblicken, ihre Entwicklung 
und die Möglichkeiten der Entwicklung ermessen, die angewendete Technologie 
beurteilen, usw. Sie ist fähig jene Vorschläge fertiggestellt zu unterbreiten, aufgrund 
deren die Kooperation entwickelt werden kann, und nicht zuletzt kann sie durch 
Vergleichung die in den einzelnen Volkswirtschaftszweigen verborgenen, jedoch 
wegen Mangel an Organisation oder Anwendung eines schlechten Systems 
unausgenützt gelassenen Möglichkeiten ermitteln. 
Die nationalen Planungsorgane müßten bei der Realisierung der gemeinsamen 
Planung eben von diesem Wissen Gebrauch machen. Sie müßten von den Z Ö O mehr 
Vorschläge und Begutachtungen einholen; perspektivisch wäre das auch die 
Hauptaufgabe der zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen. 
Es soll noch von solchen neuen Erscheinungen gesprochen werden, die sich in 
der Tätigkeit der Z Ö O soeben entfalten. Dieser neue Zug ist, daß die 
Koordinationstätigkeit der ZÖO einen komplexen Charakter annimmt. Einzelne 
Organisationen erfassen das Vertikum der Tätigkeiten. Sie ziehen die Abstimmung der 
Forschung, der Erzeugung und der Verwendung in den Bereich ihrer Tätigkeit. Durch 
diesen ausgebreiteten Wirkungskreis werden die zweiglichen Rahmen bedeutend 
durchbrochen, womit die optimale Ausnützung des geistigen Kapitals möglich wird. 
Aufgrund der koordinierten Forschungen wird es möglich hinsichtlich der spezialisier-
1 2
 B A L Â S H À Z Y - R À C Z - T E M E S I : AZ AGROMAS döntéshozatali mechanizmusa (Entscheidungsmecha-
nismus des AGROMAS). Handschrift, Budapest, 1977. 
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ten Erzeugung wesentlich besser begründete Vorschläge auszuarbeiten. So kann ein 
höherer Grad der Planmäßigkeit erreicht werden, da ja nicht nur die Produktion der 
Mitgliedländer, sondern auch die Koordination der Forschung und der Produktion 
zustandekommt. 
Eine solche vielseitige Tätigkeit läßt auch den organisatorischen Aufbau dieser 
eine so vielfaltige Koordination verwirklichenden Organisationen nicht unberührt. 
Der Zusammenhang der Änderung der Aufgaben und den Anspruch auf 
organisationsmäßige Änderungen wollen wir später behandeln. 
4. Der organisatorische Aufbau der ZÖO 
Gegenwärtig wird der organisatorische Aufbau der ZÖO durch das jeweilige 
Gründungsabkommen geregelt. Die durch individuelle Akten gegründeten Organisa-
tionen verfügen aber über gemeinsame Züge. Das höchste lenkende und Entscheidung 
treffende Organ ist der Rat. An der Arbeit des Rates nehmen die Delegationen 
sämtlicher Mitgliedländer teil. Die Anzahl und die Zusammensetzung der Delegatio-
nen soll — wie bereits erwähnt — nicht begrenzt werden, obwohl in der Praxis aucl) das 
vorkommt. Die Delegationen setzen sich grundsätzlich aus den Vertretern der 
nationalen Wirtschaftslenkungsorgane zusammen, sie sind es, die die einheitliche 
Stellungnahme der Mitgliedländer erarbeiten und vertreten müssen. 
In die Kompetenz des Rates gehört die Lenkung der meritorischen Arbeit 
innerhalb der Organisation. Sie entwickelt ihre Tätigkeit aufgrund eines Planes. Der 
Rat bestimmt die Themen, die unter Koordination fallen, sei es Standardisierung, 
Spezialisierung oder was immer. 
Und das ist wieder ein Gebiet, wo die Arbeit der Z Ö O besser ausgenützt werden 
könnte. Nicht nur die ständigen Kommissionen des R G W sollten Spezialisierungs-
vorschläge unterbreiten, sondern auch die Organe der Mitgliedstaaten, die keiner 
Organisation angehören, sollten von dieser Möglichkeit Gebrauch machen. 
Der Rat faßt in den in seine Kompetenz gehörenden Fragen Beschlüsse, und 
zwar aufgrund des Prinzips der Einstimmigkeit. Ausgegangen davon, daß der ZÖO 
eine koordinierende Tätigkeit ausübt , muß der Einstimmigkeit immer Geltung 
verschafft werden, damit die Koordinat ion nicht in eine Lenkungstätigkeit übergreift. 
Die angenommenen Beschlüsse bedeuten aber noch durchaus nicht die 
automatische Verwirklichung der beschlußmäßig akzeptierten Fragen. Die 
Durchführung der Beschlüsse geht im Wege einer Tätigkeitskette der nationalen 
Organe vor sich. 
Wenn die Ratssitzung ein Thema behandelt, über deren Entscheidung der Rat 
nicht befugt ist, wird eine Empfehlung abgefaßt. Hier aber macht es sich schon stark 
bemerkbar, daß die Form der Aufrechterhaltung der Beziehungen der ZÖO mit 
anderen Organen nicht in genügendem Maß vorausbestimmt und deshalb mangelhaft 
ist. Ihrem Charakter nach ist diese Empfehlung nicht von rechtlicher Na tur . Das muß 
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deshalb betont werden, weil sie, wegen der gleichen Benennung, leicht mit der R G W -
Empfehlung verwechselt werden kann. Die Empfehlung der Z Ö O ist nichts anderes, 
als eine Stellungnahme, ein Vorschlag, das aber keine Verpflichtung für die einzelnen 
Organisationen bedeutet. Diese Empfehlungen werden durch die einzelnen Organisa-
tionen so „popularisiert", wie die Möglichkeiten es gestatten, obwohl diese 
Empfehlungen ziemlich wertvolle Informationen und Ideen enthalten. Die Weiterlei-
tung, und noch mehr die Verwendung dieser Informationen ist eine Eventualität, 
obwohl es sich lohnen würde die Weiterleitung systematisch und laufend 
durchzuführen. Es sollte den ZÖO vorgeschrieben werden Informationen zu erteilen, 
während auf der anderen Seite, bei den nationalen Organen das Recht der Einholung 
von Informationen bewußt gemacht werden sollte; dieses neuartige Verbindungssy-
stem sollte in die Tätigkeit der ZÖO eingebaut werden. 
Der Rat entscheidet in den die Tätigkeit der Organisation betreffenden 
grundlegenden Fragen. Sie wählt zum Beispiel den Leiter des Exekutivorgans, die 
Kontrollkommission und entscheidet in sonstigen Geschäftsführungsangelegen-
heiten. 
Dem Rat ist das Exekutivorgan der ZÖO unterstellt. Es ist selten eine 
Körperschaft, sondern eher individuelles Organ. Zum Exekutivorgan gehört der 
Sachverständigenapparat der ZÖO. Die Mitglieder werden seitens der Mitgliedländer 
in die Organisation delegiert. 
Das Exekutivorgan verfertigt Vorschläge für die Ratsitzungen, bereitet die 
Ratbeschlüsse vor, beziehungsweise führt die ihn betreffenden Beschlüsse des Rates 
durch. 
In diesem Apparat häuft sich die Informationsfülle, das „Kenntnismonopol" , 
worüber die Organisation verfügt. Bei diesem Organ ist die Möglichkeit vorhanden — 
teils wegen der laufenden Funktionierung, teils wegen der Fachkenntnisse —, d a ß es 
das „internationale Opt imum" der Lösung der Aufgaben erreicht. Das internationale 
Optimum kann aber nie die Beschlüsse der nationalen Organe ersetzen, weil es j a bloß 
aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Aufgabe und des Ziels der ZÖO optimal ist! Zwischen den 
Schranken der Möglichkeiten ist es zweckmäßig das Opt imum so und insofern in 
Betracht zu ziehen, als es mit den Interessen der nationalen Wirtschaften in Einklang 
steht. Seine automatische Akzeptierung würde schon eine internationale Lenkung 
bedeuten. Das Exekutivorgan kann nie die Entscheidungen des Rates ersetzen. 
Deshalb ist die genaue Bestimmung des Verhältnisses der beiden Organe zwischen-
einander und die Sicherung des Primats des Rates durch eine rechtliche Garant ie von 
äußerster Wichtigkeit. Unter konsequenter Kontrolle des Rates besteht unserer 
Meinung nach kein Hindernis, daß dieses Organ, im Interesse einer besseren und 
begründeteren Entwicklung seiner Tätigkeit, mit den nationalen Wirtschaftslenkungs-
und Wirtschaftsorganen operative Beziehungen ausbaut. Die Berichterstattungs-
pflicht dem Rat gegenüber muß aber streng vorgeschrieben und konsequent 
angefordert werden. Das Exekutivorgan ist zur Bedienung des Rates berufen, wie auch 
die Z Ö O zur Bedienung der nationalen Wirtschaften verpflichtet ist. 
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Das dritte Organ der ZÖO ist die Kontrollkommission, deren Hauptaufgabe die 
Kontrolle der finanziellen Tätigkeit der Organisation ist. 
Die Kontrollkommission steht auch unter der Lenkung des Rates und ist ihm 
verpflichtet, über ihre Arbeit Bericht zu erstatten. 
5. Die Regelung und Entwicklungsrichtungen der ZÖO 
Es erschienen in der letzten Zeit in der sich mit der Integration, und innerhalb 
deren mit den Organisationen der Integration befassenden ökonomischen Literatur 
und Rechtsliteratur voneinander äußerst abweichende Vorstellungen. Es m u ß 
zugegeben werden, daß auch das Thema neu ist, und — wie bereits angedeutet — sind 
auch die gemeinsamen Institutionen im Entstehen. Deshalb sind sie, infolge ihrer 
Formbarkeit, gleichzeitig auch der Stoßpunkt der verschiedenen Integrationstheorien. 
Denn die Frage, wie sich ihre Entwicklung gestaltet und welche Richtung sie nimmt, 
berührt bereits auch die allgemeine Richtungstendenz der Entwicklung der Wirt-
schaftsintegration. Das ist auch natürlich, da im Institutionssystem der Integration 
nur jene Organisationen funktionieren können, die die allgemeinen Merkmale der 
Integration t ragen. Andererseits wirkt das Organisationssystem, als wichtiges 
Mechanismuselement, auf die Entwicklung der Wirtschaft selbst zurück. 
Der G r u n d der Meinungsverschiedenheiten liegt in der Verschiedenheit der 
Annäherung der Integrationsvorgänge. Die eine Gruppe der Vorstellungen stellt die 
internationale Ebene in den Vordergrund und hebt , da es sich um Integrationsorgani-
sation handelt, die internationale Seite hervor und setzt sich die Kräft igung dieser Seite 
zum Ziel. Die andere Gruppe der Vorstellungen packt die Tätigkeit der ZÖO von der 
Seite der nationalen Wirtschaft an, und erblickt die Arbeit auf diesem Gebiet für 
zweckmäßig. 
Die ersterwähnte Ansicht faßt die ZÖO als Lenkungsorgan auf und will, im 
Interesse der Sicherung der erfolgreichen Tätigkeit, diesen Organisationen Lenkungs-
befugnisse einräumen. Die Koordinat ion der ökonomischen Tätigkeit ist eine Art der 
Lenkung1 3 —schre ib t Schirjajew, und die Logik dieses Gedanken weiterführend stellt 
er fest: die Z Ö O führ t unter den Mitgliedstaaten Koordination durch, deshalb lenkt sie 
auch. Den Z Ö O Lenkungsbefugnisse einzuräumen würde eine oberflächliche Lösung 
bedeuten, obzwar übergangsweise ein anfangs sehenswerter Erfolg nicht ausgeschlos-
sen wäre. Dauernd würde es aber die Probleme überhaupt nicht lösen. Es steht fest, 
daß die Integration Vorteile und Nachteile hat, die Erwägung der Vor- und Nachteile 
bedeutet aber eine Annäherung aus dem vorerst noch entscheidenden volkswirtschaft-
lichen Gesichtspunkt. Die äußere Lenkung ist aber für die nationale Wirtschaft 
ungünstig. Es m u ß einfach zugegeben werden, d a ß ein Zweig oder Unterzweig aus der 
volkswirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Umgebung nicht herausgerissen werden kann. 
1 3
 SCHIRJAJEW: o p . c i t . p . 1 8 4 . 
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Es handelt sich also hier nicht einfach darum, daß—letz ten Endes—ein wirtschaftlich 
ungünstiges Resultat entsteht, sondern um vieles mehr. Die Lenkung der nationalen 
Wirtschaften von außen ist aus politischen Gründen nicht richtig, weil das ja die 
Einschränkung der Souverenität der beteiligten Länder bedeuten würde.1 4 Die 
Beteiligung an der Integration ist an sich eine politische Entscheidung, da ja die 
nationalen Wirtschaften zueinander zugänglich werden, das kann aber nicht gebilligt 
werden, daß die durch diese Entscheidung zustandegebrachten Integrationsformen die 
Entscheidungsberechtigten überragen. Eine solche Lösung ist durch keinerlei 
wirtschaftliches Interesse begründet. Die abgestimmte Wirtschaftslenkung auf ZÖO-
Ebene ist das Problem der fernen Zukunf t . 
Die äußere Lenkungstheorie wird auch von Rüster vertreten, wenn er auch von 
einer anderen Seite zu diesem Resultat gelangt. Seiner Auffassung nach kann bei der 
Beurteilung der gemeinsamen Organisationen der RGW-Integrat ion nicht die 
traditionellen Kategorien: nationales Recht Völkerrecht angewendet werden, es muß 
vielmehr in den neuartigen Erscheinungen auch die neue Qualität erkannt werden. Bei 
diesen Organisationen treffen sich die nationalen und internationalen Elemente. Diese 
beiden Normelemente verschiedenen Typs funktionieren nicht nebeneinander, 
sondern sie stehen in organischer Verbindung miteinander. In diesen Organisationen 
sind die Gegensätze und der Kampf der verschiedenen Elemente zugegen, und durch 
den Kampf dieser dialektischen Gegensätze entsteht die neue Qualität .1 5 
Rüster wünscht durch diese Theorie diese Organisationen in doppelter 
Unterstellung funktionieren zu lassen. Das bedeutet einerseits eine internationale 
äußere Lenkung, andererseits aber die Lenkung der nationalen Wirtschaftsleitungsor-
gane. Wenn aber eine Organisation in doppelter Unterstellung arbeitet, dann müssen 
die Aufgaben oder Tätigkeiten bestimmt werden, in denen die eine oder eben die 
andere Unterstellungslinie geltend wird. Eine aus zwei Richtungen kommende 
Lenkung gleicher Intensität in Hinsicht einer gleichen Aufgabe ist unvorstellbar. Von 
der Teilung der Aufgaben, das heißt von der Teilung der Lenkung einer Tätigkeit kann 
keine Rede sein. Es ist nämlich klar, d a ß die Wirtschaft der Integration die Resultate 
dieser Wirtschaftsorganisation in demselben M a ß benötigt, wie die nationale 
Wirtschaft . Demzufolge wäre die unter internationale und gleichzeitig nationalen 
Lenkung stehende Organisation ein Stoßpunkt. Wenn aber ein solches Zusammentref-
fen zu erwarten ist, dann müßte auch die Methode der Auflösung dieser Gegensätze 
festgelegt werden. Die Realisierung des Willens muß daher entweder auf der einen oder 
auf der anderen Seite erfolgen. Damit verliert aber die doppelte Unterordnung seinen 
Sinn, denn entweder kommt die Entscheidung von Seiten der nationalen Wirtschaft in 
Betracht, oder wird die äußere Lenkung geltend. 
14
 SÓLYOM, L.: KGST jogi formák és a kelet-nyugati együttműködés (Rechtsformen des RGW und die 
West-Ost Kooperation). Gazdaság és Jogtudomány, 3-4/1974. 
1 5
 R Ü S T E R : Funktion und Rechtsstellung internationaler Industriezweigvereinigungen im Prozess der 
sozialistischen Wirtschaftsintegration Potsdam-Babelsberg. 1973, pp. 79 et seq. 
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Die nationalen, bzw. die internationalen Interessen in solcher Weise 
zusammenstoßen lassen ist aber überflüssig. Zwar haben wir hier vom Zusammenstoß 
nationaler, bzw. internationaler Interessen gesprochen, wagen wir festzustellen daß es 
sich hier eigentlich nur um den Zusammenstoß nationaler Interessen handelt . Auch 
das ist nationales Interesse, daß an der gemeinsamen Organisation der Integration und 
an deren Tätigkeit auch die nationale Organisation beteiligt sei. Daß ist eine eigenartig 
politische und wirtschaftliche Erscheinung der Interessen. Der Vor- bzw. Nachteil der 
Beteiligung an der Integration wurde bereits erwogen. Und wenn sich die Wirtschafts-
lenkungsorgane neben der Anteilnahme entschieden haben, ist das deshalb geschehen, 
weil die Beteiligung an der Organisation für die Volkswirtschaft als vorteilhaft 
beurteilt wurde. Andererseits ist auch nationales Interesse, daß über den gegebenen 
Volkswirtschaftszweig nationale Lenkung geltend wird. 
Es ist ja möglich, daß solche mannigfaltige Interessenverhältnisse inkorporie-
rende Integrationsorganisation eine Organisation neuer Qualität zur Folge hat, nur 
realisiert sich eben die Entstehung dieser neuen Qualität über andere Prozesse. 
Wenn unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen den ZÖO Lenkungsbefugnisse 
zugesprochen werden, dann würde es zu den obenerwähnten Interessenzu-
sammenstößen führen. Dieser Konflikt könnte nur dann vermieden werden, wenn die 
zu den Z Ö O gehörenden Mitgliedstaaten aufgrund ähnlicher Mechanismen funktio-
nieren und über langfristige Volkswirtschaftspläne verfügen würden. Es ist also eine 
unrichtige Folgerung, daß die mit Lenkungsbefugnis ausgestatteten Z Ö O geeignet 
wären die Wirtschaftsmechanismen einander zu nähern, und daß die gemeinsame 
internationale Planung die begründete Vorbereitung der langfristigen 
Volkswirtschaftspläne fördern würde. Die Ausarbeiter der Lenkungskonzeption1 6 
erachten also als Ziel, was bloß eine Vorbedingung ist. 
Der langfristige Plan als Vorbedingung ist deshalb nötig, weil die Mitgliedstaa-
ten aufgrund dessen entscheiden müssen, ob sie an der Organisation teilzunehmen 
wünschen, ob sie daran interessiert sind, oder nicht. In der Frage der Beteiligung kann 
aber nur dann Stellung genommen werden, wenn die Perspektive der Volkswirtschaft 
bereits geklärt ist, und damit auch die Ansprüche und Möglichkeiten der Volkswirt-
schaft annähernd bekannt sind. Nur auf einer sicheren Basis kann die Anteilnahme an 
der Integration entschieden werden, vorausgesetzt, daß die Beteiligung ertragreich 
betrachtet wird. 
Ein solches Wirtschaftslenkungsystem ist aber sinngemäß Vorbedingung, denn 
nur auf diese Weise kann die Ha rmon ie zwischen der nationalen und der 
internationalen Lenkung in der Methode und in den Mitteln gesichert werden. 
Anderenfalls ist ein Verhalten identischen Charakters zwischen den zu verschiedenen 
Staaten gehörenden Institutionen und Unternehmen einzelner Verfügungen 
gegenüber unvorstellbar. 
16
 Darlegung und Kritik der Lenkungskonzeption siehe: F I C Z E R E , L-SÁRJCÖZY, T . : A KGST országok 
nemzetközi gazdálkodó szervezeteinek alapvető jogi kérdései (Grundlegende rechtliche Fragen der 
internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen der RGW-Länder). Budapest 1978, pp. 126 et seq. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
Zwischenstaatliche ökonomische Organisationen 1 4 9 
6. Die praktischen Erfolge der Lenkungskonzeption 
Die Diskussion zwischen den Theorien und Vorstellungen dauert mit 
wechselnder Intensität bis zum heutigen Tag an. Einmal verschafft sich die eine, das 
andere mal die andere Vorstellung stärkere Position. Diese Fluktuation wird auch 
durch die Vielzahl der praktischen Verfügungen bemerkbar. 
Die praktische Verbreitung der Lenkungskonzeption bedeutete jene in der 
Mitte der 70-er Jahre entstandene Bestrebung, gemäß deren die ZÖO auf das 
System der wirtschaftlichen Rechnungsführen umschalten sollen. Der selbständige 
Rechnungsführungszwang würde jene Vorteile vernichten, die sonst aus der Tätigkeit 
der ZÖO hervorgehen könnten. Im Falle einer Selbstfinanzierung würde anstelle der 
Interessen der Mitgliedstaaten das Interesse der Selbsterhaltung der Organisation 
treten. Der Träger dieses Interesses ist das Exekutivorgan der Organisation, der 
Apparat mit internationaler Zusammensetzung. 
Die Bestrebungen der Lenkungskonzeption wurden auch dadurch gefördert , 
daß in einzelnen sozialistischen Ländern das System eigenartiger, eine Zweirichtungs-
funktion ausübende Wirtschafts- bzw. Wirtschaftslenkungsorgane entstartden ist. 
(Z. B. D D R , Bulgarien.)17 Dessen Wesen besteht darin, daß die unter der Leitung 
dieser Organisationen stehenden Unternehmen einen bestimmten Teil ihres Gewinns 
an die Lenkungsorgane abführen, die davon ihre Selbsterhaltung decken. Die 
Interessiertheit der Lenkungsorgane an der Wirtschaft der Gelenkten setzt aber die 
Ausbreitung der Lenkungsbefugnisse, als alleiniges Beeinflussungsmittel voraus. 
Die Möglichkeit der Umschaltung auf die wirtschaftliche Rechnungsführung 
begannen sämtliche Organisationen zu prüfen. Diese Untersuchungen führten in allen 
Fällen zu der Feststellung, daß die Verwirklichung derselben unter den gegebenen 
Umständen nicht möglich sei. Die erste und wichtigste Begründung war, daß die Z Ö O 
keine derartige Tätigkeit ausübt , für welche Gegenwert berechnet werden könnte . 
Diese Organisationen üben ihre Tätigkeit auf einem Gebiet der Wirtschaft aus, der 
nicht in die Sphäre der Wirtschaftung fallt. Die vorhin genannten Aufgaben der Z Ö O 
betrachtet ist das durchaus einleuchtend. 
Im Zuge der Untersuchungen stellte es sich heraus, daß fü r den Produktenaus-
tausch vielleicht ein Gegenwert berechnet werden könnte, dies würde aber die Z Ö O zu 
einer Quasi-Handelsvertretung umformen, das aber dem Charakter der Organisation 
widerspricht. Es ist völlig überflüssig für eine derartige Aufgabe eine völkerrechtliche 
Rechtsperson zustande zu bringen, andererseits kann aber der Produktenaustausch als 
Tätigkeit gar nicht geplant werden. 
Auch die wissenschaftliche Forschung kann nicht als Basis der wirtschaftlichen 
Rechnungsführung gelten, denn das bedürfte einer äußerst großen Kapitalkraft, und 
auch diese Tätigkeit kann nicht als das Wesen der ZÖO betrachtet werden. 
17
 Ausführliche Darlegung siehe: Vállalatirányítás és vállalatok jogi helyzete (Unternehmenlenkung 
und die rechtliche Lage der Unternehmen). Band II, Budapest, 1976, pp. 24 et seq.; pp. 220 et seq. 
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Sollten aber unmittelbar Unternehmen in die Mitgliederschaft der Z Ö O 
einbezogen werden, dann deformiert sich wieder die ZÖO, ist doch die Aufgabe 
derselben die Koordination bestimmter Gebiete der Volkswirtschaft auf allgemeiner 
Ebene und nicht die konkrete Abstimmung der Unternehmentätigkeit. Diese letztere 
Tätigkeit bildet die Aufgabe der internationalen Wirtschaftsvereinigungen. Der 
organisatorische Formenreichtum der Integration darf nicht formell werden. 
Eine interessante Erscheinung war aber zu beobachten, als die Frage der 
wirtschaftlichen Rechnungsführung auf die Tagesordnung gesetzt wurde. Von der 
ausdrücklichen Einräumung der Lenkungsbefugnisse für die Organisation selbst war 
nie die Rede, obwohl bei einer Koordinierungstätigkeit auf dieser Ebene nur der 
Begriffspaar Wirtschaftung-Wirtschaftslenkung denkbar ist. Im Vorschlag zur 
Umschaltung auf die wirtschaftliche Rechnungsführung wurde aber von diesem Paar 
nur die eine Seite erfaßt. Deshalb führ te die Untersuchung bei sämtlichen 
Organisationen zum Ergebnis, daß eine Wirtschaftung nur unter grundlegender 
Veränderung der Tätigkeit denkbar sei. 
7. Die inneren Beziehungen der ZÖO 
Die Funkt ion und das Ziel der ZÖO können nicht von außen her verwirklicht 
werden. Die obigen Widersprüche können vermieden werden, wenn bei der Regelung 
nicht ausschließlich der internationale Charak te r der Organisation in Betracht 
gezogen wird. Bei der Gestal tung und Betätigung der Institution muß darauf 
Rücksicht genommen werden, was die Reali tät ist, nämlich, daß eine nationale 
Absonderung tatsächlich existiert, woraus folgt, daß an der Organisation Mitglieder 
mit abweichenden Interessen beteiligt sind. 
Das Wesen der die effektive Lage berücksichtigenden Lösung besteht darin, daß 
die ZÖO in den nationalen Entscheidungsmechanismus eingeschaltet werden müssen. 
In erster Linie und grundlegend ist das nat ionale Interesse entscheidend. 
Die Alleinherrschaft des nationalen Interesses birgt freilich die Möglichkeit in 
sich, daß sie den Rahmen der durch die Organisation zustandegebrachten Koopera-
tion zersprengt, und zwar wegen der völlig verschiedenen Interessen der Mitgliedstaa-
ten. 
Die Interessengegensätze werden aber die Kooperation dort bestimmt nicht 
hindern, wo das auf die Kooperat ion gerichtete gemeinsame Interesse stärker ist, als 
das nationale Interesse, oder diesem wenigstens gleich ist. Das heißt, die Kooperat ion 
entsteht nur an jenen Gebieten — dort handelt es sich aber um eine Kooperation im 
wahren Sinne des Wortes, — wo der wirtschaftliche Anspruch real ist. Das Schema der 
Entscheidungen ist folgendes: 1. Entscheidung der nationalen Organe: die Ausarbei-
tung von Entscheidungsalternativen vonseiten der Wirtschaftslenkungsorgane, 
entsprechend den Volkswirtschaftsinteressen; 2. in den Z Ö O abgestimmte und 
harmonisierte gemeinsame Entscheidung im Rahmen der seitens der Mitgliedstaaten 
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vorgelegten Alternativen; 3. Durchführungsphase aufgrund der Entscheidungen der 
nationalen Organe. 
Im Fragenkomplex des Entscheidungsmechanismus liegt das wichtigste 
Problem bei dem ersten Glied der Entscheidungsphase. Bei der Beteiligung an der 
Z Ö O fehlt nämlich die volkswirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise. Die Beteiligung an den 
ZÖO wird auf die auch im übrigen veralteten Zweige angelegt.18 Es ist eine 
bedauernswerte Tatsache, daß nicht die inhaltliche Änderung dazu führte, d a ß die 
Benennung dieser Organisationen von zweiglichen Kooperationsorganisationen auf 
zwischenstaatliche ökonomische Organisationen umgetauscht wurde. Die inhaltliche 
Änderung ist derzeit bloß ein frommer Wunsch, eine zu lösende Aufgabe. 
Der Hinweis auf die Zweige ist aus mehrerer Hinsicht eine widerspruchsvolle 
Lösung. Es ergibt sich aus der Ebene der Koordination, daß in den Fragen 
volkswirtschaftlichen Niveaus Entscheidungen gefällt werden müssen, selbstredend 
aufgrund des nationalen Interesses. Anstelle dieses Interesses tritt aber das 
Zweigsinteresse, das ist es was zum Ausdruck kommt , es erscheint aber gleichzeitig, als 
es in Wolkswirtschaftsinteresse wäre. Formell scheint es Volkswirtschaftsinteresse zu 
sein, was inhaltlich Zweigsinteresse ist. 
Noch kräftiger meldet sich dieser Widerspruch wenn die Z Ö O das Vertikum der 
Tätigkeiten umfaßt , und die einzelnen, in die Koordination einbezogenen Tätigkeiten 
ihrem Charakter nach zu verschiedenen Volkswirtschaftszweigen gehören. Ein gutes 
Beispiel ist da für die A G R O M A S , das sämtliche Stufen der Herstellung der 
landwirtschaftlichen Maschinenindustrie koordiniert (Forschung, Spezialisierung, 
Produktion, Verwendung). Dementsprechend müssen in den nationalen Sektionen der 
Organisation Vertreter von mehreren Volkswirtschaftszweigen zugegen sein (Ministe-
rium für Landesernährung, Ministerium für den Außenhandel, Ministerium für 
Industrie). Bei einer derweise aufgebauten und mehrseitig beteiligten Organisation ist 
die Lenkung der ungarischen Sektion einem einzigen Zweig zugewiesen. Aufgrund der 
gegenwärtigen Konstrukt ion wird die Stellungnahme des Landes seitens der 
nationalen Sektion einheitlich geformt. Die Abstimmung der Meinungsverschieden-
heiten der Zweige wird prinzipiell anhand der Konsultationen der Delegationen vor 
der Ratssitzung vorgenommen. Diese Meinungsverschiedenheiten sind aber die 
unvermeidlichen Äußerungen der abweichenden Zweigsinteressen. Die Existenz der 
abweichenden Zweigsinteressen braucht nicht bewiesen zu werden, aber auch das 
nicht, daß in den Rahmen der nationalen Wirtschaft die Kompromißbereitschaft der 
Zweige untereinander nicht besonders stark ist. In der Tätigkeit der nationalen Sektion 
sind die Kompromisse fördernde Mechanismen nicht ausgearbeitet. In der Sektion 
kommt die Lenkung des einen Zweiges zur Gel tung und mit einer milden Übertreibung 
können wir so behaupten, daß dieser Umstand die Möglichkeit der ausschließlichen 
18
 Über die Probleme der zweiglichen Lenkung siehe: B A U E R , T . - S Z A M U E L Y , L.: AZ ipar-ágazati 
irányítás szerkezete az európai szocialista országokban; néhány tanulság (Konstruktion der zweiglichen 
Lenkung der Industrie in den europäischen sozialistischen Ländern; einige Konsequenzen). Közgazdasági 
Szemle, 1971, 1, pp. 28 et seq. 
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Entscheidung in sich trägt. (Anhand der Durchführung der Aufgaben bedeutet dann 
ein Problem, wenn der leitende Zweig in die Tätigkeit des anderen Zweiges „sich 
hineinmischt".) Eine Betrachtungsweise auf Volkswirtschaftsniveau, die die Überein-
stimmung unter den Zweigen — wenn auch zwangsweise — ermöglichen würde, ist 
aber nicht vorhanden. Anstatt dessen kommt — wie wir gesehen haben — das Primat 
jenes Zweiges zur Geltung, zu welchem die Z Ö O nach ihrer Haupttätigkeit gehört . 
Deshalb ist das erste Glied des Entscheidungsmechanismus verfehlt. Es kommt 
eine Entscheidung zustande die unlösbare Widersprüche in sich trägt, und diese 
Entscheidung wird dann auf internationaler Ebene „abgestimmt", — im Rahmen der 
ZÖO. 
In der dritten Rückkuplungsphase tritt dann wieder die Durchführungsent-
scheidung der nationalen Organe in den G a n g der Dinge ein, damit sich die 
gemeinsamen Vorstellungen verwirklichen können. Die Phase der Durchführung 
stockt aber. (Die Lenkungskonzeption will diese Phase im Interesse der erfolgreichen 
Funktionierung ausschalten.) Dementsprechend ist es schwer, wenn nicht unmöglich, 
die wahren Wurzeln der Probleme zu ermitteln. Die nicht zur rechten Zeit ermittelten 
Interessengegensätze bringen bereits eine Reihe von akzessorischen Problemen mit 
sich. Die Fehler häufen sich, und die Ermit t lung der Gründe der unerwünschten 
Erscheinungen, geschweige denn die Abschaffung dieser Gründe, wird unmöglich. Die 
selbstgesetzliche Funktionierung des Zweigsystems kann nicht beeinflußt werden. Es 
wirkt unbedingt deformierend, wenn die Entscheidungen mit genügender Umsicht, 
nicht an jener Ebene Zustandekommen, die berufen wäre diese Entscheidungen zu 
vertreten. 
Komplexe Aufgaben können nur dann gelöst werden, wenn die Lenkung sich 
eine komplexe Betrachtungsweise zu eigen macht . Die Leitung der Zweige ist zur 
Lösung dieser Aufgaben objektiv ungeeignet. Die Nichtauflösung der Widersprüche 
entspringt aber nicht der vernachlässigsten Handhabung der Integrationsprobleme. 
Der Grundfehler steckt darin, daß in unserem Wirtschaftslenkung-Organisationssy-
stem ein Organ mit entsprechenden Eigenschaften, das dazu notwendig wäre, 
überhaupt nicht existiert. D e r Träger der volkswirtschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise 
und der Koordina tor der verschiedenen Interessen ist die Regierung, aber ihre 
Aufgaben haben — unter den gegenwärtigen Umständen — nicht einen derartig 
operativen Charakters, daß sie die inhaltlichen Aufgaben einer Beteiligung an einer 
internationalen Organisation versehen könnte. Aber die Beteiligung an der Integra-
tion beansprucht eine komplexe politisch-wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise zwischen 
(oder sogar über) den volkswirtschaftlichen Zweigen. Die Lösung dieser neuartigen 
Aufgaben ist im alten Rahmen , zumindest nach einer gewissen Stufe, nicht mehr 
möglich. Es müßte die Einheit des Inhalts und der Form verwirklicht werden, da daß ja 
schon durch unsere Teilnahme an der Integration erforderlich ist. Andererseits könnte 
dadurch gesichert werden, d a ß wir tatsächlich nur an jenen Gebieten in eine 
internationale Kooperation hineingehen, wo d a s für die Volkswirtschaft unbedingt 
notwendig und wirtschaftlich begründet ist. 
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8. Die Einbeziehung der Unternehmen in die ZÖO 
Eben im Interesse der Überbrückung der auf der Ebene der Lenkung 
auftauchenden Probleme war in der nahen Vergangenheit die unmittelbare Einbezie-
hung der Unternehmen in den Tätigungsbereich der ZÖO zu beobachten. 
Die Kräft igung dieses Prozesses wurde von verschiedenen Faktoren gefördert. 
Einerseits nahm infolge der in den sozialistischen Ländern vor sich gehenden 
Wirtschaftslenkungsreformen die Selbständigkeit der Unternehmen mehr oder minder 
zu und die Einbeziehung der Unternehmen in die ZÖO ging formell als die Steigerung 
der Selbständigkeit der Unternehmen vor sich. 
Andererseits aber gewann diese Erscheinung vonseiten der Vertreter der 
Lenkungskonzeption eine theoretische Unterstützung, die bestrebt waren auch die 
Durchführungsphase in den internationalen Wirkungskreis einzubeziehen, um 
dadurch gleichzeitig den Unterschied zu verringern, der zwischen der Vereinigung zur 
Koordinierungstätigkeit der Z Ö O und IWO besteht. 
Die unmittelbare Einbeziehung der Unternehmen in die Tätigkeit der ZÖO 
kann aus mehreren Gründen nicht als erfolgreich betrachtet werden. Vor allem kann 
diese Lösung aus Lenkungsgründen beanstandet werden, da sich dadurch in den ZÖO 
der früher bereits kritisierte Zweigscharakter noch weiter verstärkt, und zwar wegen 
der zweiglichen Gebundenheit der Unternehmen. 
Von einem Unternehmen kann wohl kaum eine komplexe politisch-wirtschaftli-
che und volkswirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise erwartet werden. Das ist auch nicht 
seine Aufgabe. Die Makroentscheidungen der Lenkungsorgane können nicht mit den 
Entscheidungen von Organisationen, die ihre Tätigkeit auf Mikroebene ausüben, 
ersetzt werden. 
Das charakteristische Beispiel zur Vergegenwärtigung dieses Problems ist die 
Organisation zur Kooperation der Achsenlagerindustrie. In dieser ZÖO erhielten die 
Ungarischen Rollagerwerke Entscheidungsberechtigung. Durch das Erscheinen des 
Unternehmens und durch seine Vorherrschaft in der Organisation erschienen auch die 
typischen Unternehmenprobleme, z. B. die Bestrebung zur Erlangung des 
selbständigen Außenhandelsrechts, ferner die Bemängelung dessen, daß zur gemeinsa-
men Investitionen keine Möglichkeiten bestehen. Diese Bestrebungen sind bei einem 
profitinteressierten Unternehmen völlig verständlich. Es taucht aber die Frage auf, ob 
es nicht begründet wäre auf die IWO-Form überzugehen, besonders, wenn wir 
betrachten, daß die Ungarischen Rollagerwerke in Ungarn eine Monopollage 
genießen, und daß die Achsenlagerindustrie auch in den anderen sozialistischen 
Ländern ebenso zentralisiert ist. Es sei noch erwähnt, daß eben durch die Monopollage 
der Widerspruch, daß ein Unternehmen einen Zweig, ja die volle Volkswirtschaft 
vertritt, nicht in die Extreme getrieben wird. Denn die typischen ZÖO-Funkt ionen 
sind bei der Organisation zur Kooperation der Achsenlagerindustrie auch vorhanden, 
z. B. als Ergebnis der Spezialisierungen die Aufrechterhaltung des Export— 
Importgleichgewichts usw., aber parallel damit melden sich auch schon die durch das 
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Unternehmeninteresse bedingte, ausschließlich für die Mikroebene charakteristische 
Bestrebungen. 
Über die ZÖO-Mitgliederschaft der Unternehmen kann auch aus anderen 
Gesichtspunkten nichts anderes behauptet werden. Es ist zu beanstanden, daß der 
Staat durch ein Unternehmen vertreten wird. Zur Vertretung des Staates, zur 
Eingehung von Verpflichtungen im Namen des Staates sind nur staatliche Organe 
befugt. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, daß aufgrund einer „Ermächtigung" ein 
Unternehmen den Staat vertritt, das kann aber nicht zur allgemeinen Praxis führen. Es 
müßte die Tendenz der Mechanismusreform von 1968 respektiert werden, daß die 
Sphäre der Wirtschaftung und der Wirtschaftsleitung getrennt werden soll. Es scheint, 
daß dieses Prinzip auf dem Gebiet der ZÖO nicht konsequent durchgesetzt werden 
konnte. Trotz dessen, daß besonders in internationalen Beziehungen, oder im Interesse 
derselben der Abstand von diesem Prinzip, oder die Einschränkung derselben 
durchaus nicht undenkbar sind, diese „Abweichungen" können aber nur dann 
gebilligt werden, wenn die Aufrechterhal tung der Beziehungen anders nicht 
verwirklicht werden kann. Es scheint zweckmäßig vorerst nach anderen Lösungen 
zu fahnden. 
Es ist nämlich zur Zeit nicht selten, daß der Leiter eines im internationalen 
Beziehungen Rolle spielenden Unternehmens als Vertreter des Staates Abkommen 
schließt. Und als Leiter eines Unternehmens eine unternehmenzentrische Betrach-
tungsweise besitzt. Daraus folgt, d aß der entsprechende Ausdruck des Volkswirt-
schaftsinteresses auch auf diese Weise nicht gesichert werden kann. 
Auf jenen Gebieten, wo an der Tätigkeit der ZÖO mehrere Unternehmen 
beteiligt sind, bedeutet die Vertretung auf Unternehmensebene noch größere Sorgen. 
In derartigen Fällen streiten sich nicht nur abweichende zweigliche, sondern auch 
abweichende Unternehmeninteressen innerhalb einer zwischenstaatlichen Organisa-
tion. 
Damit wollen wir nicht behaupten, daß die Interessen der Unternehmen 
außer Acht gelassen werden sollen, sondern daß ihre Beziehungen zu den ZÖO in 
entsprechender Form, durch wohlgeformte innere Regelung gesichert werden sollen. 
Es steht außer Zweifel, daß die Verkoppelung der Entscheidungen der Makro- und 
Mikrosphäre eine der wichtigsten Vorbedingungen der erfolgreichen Zusammenarbeit 
ist,19 das ist aber eine Frage der inneren Wirtschaftslenkung, und kein Problem der 
RGW-Integration. 
Die Verkoppelung kann dann verwirklicht werden, wenn die Entscheidung auf 
Makroebene auf einer hohen Stufe der Hierarchie vor sich geht und die volkswirt-
schaftliche Betrachtungsweise zur Geltung kommt. Andererseits muß aber auch auf 
der Ebene der Durchführung die Einheit gesichert werden. Aus dieser Feststellung 
mag vielleicht der Anspruch auf eine Konzentration der Unternehmen herausklingen 
19
 RAcz: op. cit. p. 141. 
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und dieses Gefühl ist auch nicht falsch. Wenn dieser Umstand dem Volkswirtschaftin-
teresse entspricht, muß diesem Anspruch Geltung verschafft werden. 
Es ist Tatsache, daß die an der Spezialisierung teilnehmenden Produktionsun'er-
nehmen an der Integration nicht erfolgreich beteiligt sein können, wenn sie ihr 
Verhalten in der Integration nicht mit Hinsicht aufeinander gestalten. Ein Ergebnis der 
unbeeinflußbaren Unternehmenverhalten ist, daß z. B. die Spezialisierungsabkommen 
deshalb nicht zustande kommen können, weil sich die Unternehmen weigern solche 
Abkommen zu schließen. Ihre Weiterungen sind durch rationale wirtschaftliche 
Überlegungen erklärbar. Den in Gewinninteressiertheit arbeitenden Unternehmen 
bietet die Teilnahme an der Spezialisierung keinen Gewinn, ja es bedeutet vielleicht 
einen Verlust, trotz dessen, daß sie für die Volkswirtschaft unbedingt von Vorteil wäre. 
Das sind nur herausgegriffene Beispiele, eine ausführliche Untersuchung der 
Tatsachen würde auf Widersprüche an vielen anderen Gebieten ein Licht werfen. Das 
ist jedenfalls auffallend, daß die Integration zur Kollision zwischen den Volkswirt-
schafts- und Unternehmeninteressen reiche Beispiele aufweist, und das kann nicht als 
Zufall aufgefaßt werden. 
Im Zuge dieser Kollisionen gelangt das Volkswirtschaftsinteresse dem Unter-
nehmeninteresse gegenüber in nachteilhafte Lage. Anhand einer ganzen Reihe solcher 
Beispiele sind wir dort angelangt, daß wir die Vereinheitlichung der Sphäre der 
Durchführung, die Konzentration der Unternehmen vorschlagen. 
Dieser Vorschlag widerspricht ohne Zweifel den ansonsten unterstützungs-
würdigen Vorstellungen der Wirtschaftslenkungsreform. An gewissen Stellen wünscht 
aber die Teilnahme an der internationalen Kooperation, daß auch mechanismusfrem-
de Lösungen akzeptiert werden. 
Wenn die Entscheidung über die Teilnahme an der Integration an hoher Stufe 
getroffen wird, das ist dann auch eine Garantie dafür, daß die Kooperation tatsächlich 
dem Volkswirtschaftsinteresse entspricht. 
Die sozialistische Integration ist, die Elemente und Methoden ihres Wirtschafts-
mechanismus betrachtet, zentralbedingt, wie auch die Wirtschaftslenkungssysteme 
der meisten sozialistischen Länder so beschaffen sind. Die ungarische Wirtschaftsre-
form ist in ihren Prinzipien und Methoden von den anderen abweichend, es ist also eine 
grundsätzliche Frage, wie weit die Staatsverwaltungsmittel im Interesse der Teilnahme 
an der Integration angewendet werden können bzw. müssen. Wenn an gewissen 
Gebieten Unternehmen konzentriert werden müssen, soll das getan werden, wenn es 
übrigens für die Volkswirtschaft vorteilhaft ist. Die Integration hat Vor- und 
Nachteile, deshalb soll unter gründlicher Analysierung klargelegt werden, ob aus der 
internationalen Zusammenarbeit ein solcher Vorteil entsteht, daß es sich lohnt 
„systemenfremde" Lösungen anzuwenden. 
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Основные правовые вопросы межгосударственных 
хозяйственных организаций 
М . БАЛАЖХЛЗИ 
Статья занимается организационной системой интеграции СЭВ, точнее межгосударственны-
ми хозяйственными организациями. Анализирует недостатки международно-правового урегулиро-
вания и их последствия, а также теории, связанные с направлениями развития межгосударственных 
хозяйственных организаций. В ходе исследования функционирования межгосударственных хозяйст-
венных организаций она анализирует механизм вынесения решения межгосударственными 
хозяйственными организациями, и в связи с этим недостатки, имеющие место на практике. Наконец, 
занимается членством венгерских хозяйственных организаций и органов по руководству хозяйст-
вом в межгосударственных хозяйственных организациях. 
On fundamental legal questions of interstate 
economic organisations 
M . BALÁSHÁZY 
The paper deals with the organizational system of the C M E A integration and particularly with 
interstate economic organizations. The shortcomings of the international legal regulation are 
analysed and also the theories concerning the developmental trends of these organizations. The 
functional analysis of the author emphasizes the decis ion-making procedures and their practical 
inconveniences. The last part o f the article deals with the membership in interstate economic 
organizations of Hungarian economic and management organizations. 
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The field of application 
and the rules of interpretation of ULIS 
and UNCITRAL conventions 
Prof . L. RÉCZEI 
The diplomatic conference held in Vienna from the 10th of March till the 11th of April 1980 
has elaborated the T E X T of an international convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods. The TEXT was preceded by the Hague Convention on the same matter, known as ULIS. 
The TEXT of the Vienna Convention contains the following provision in para 3 of Article 99: 
"A State which ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this Convention and is a party to either 
or both the Convent ion relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation o f Contracts for the 
International Sale o f Goods d o n e at The Hague o n 1 July 1964 (1964 Hague Formation 
Convention) and the Convention relating to a U n i f o r m Law on the International Sale o f 
Goods done at The Hague on 1 July 1964 (1964 Hague Sales Convention) shall at the same time 
denounce, as the case may be, either or both the 1964 Hague Sales Convention and the 1964 
Hague Format ion Convention by Not i fy ing the Government of the Netherlands to that 
effect." 
By this provision the Vienna Convention—very correctly—intends to avoid conflicts between 
the two Conventions. N o state can be a party to both of them. By separating the Contracting States of 
the two Conventions d o e s not mean, however, that the application of the two Convent ions , i.e. their 
territorial effect is equal ly separated. Both will remain in force and both are applicable not only to 
contracts of businessmen from States parties to one or other Convention, but to contracts concluded 
by parties having their places of business in States not ratifying any of these Convent ions . 
Hence as long as the 1964 Hague Convent ions will be in force they may be applied on 
international sales contracts regardless whether the countries o f the parties to such a contract have 
their places of business in countries parties to the Hague Convent ions , or in countries acceding to the 
U N C I T R A L Convent ion or in countries which acceded to n o n e of them. This is why it seems to the 
author of this study that a comparison between the two Conventions might be useful for people 
interested in the international trade. 
The Hague Conventions were not yet in force when the UNCITRAL accepted in its working 
program the e laborat ion of a new draft on a uniform law on sales. Although U N C I T R A L adopted the 
text o f ULIS as a basis o f its own draft, the two texts differ in some points significantly. This paper 
analyses the similarities and differences on ly from the aspects o f the field of application and the rules o f 
interpretation of the t w o Conventions. 
Both texts intended to satisfy the need of universality: the application o f the law should be 
extended to the possible largest sphere, therefore they exclude or at least severely limit the role o f 
national laws, as well a s the rules on confl icts o f laws, recognize the autonomy o f the parties and the 
opt ional character o f the uniform rules. 
The U N C I T R A L text is simpler, its sanctions are more moderate; there is a difference as to the 
types of transactions taken out of the Convent ion . 
As to the field o f application the paper concludes by stating that the U N C I T R A L text is narrow-
ing the scope of the rules as compared to ULIS, but widens the sphere of contracts subject to it. 
A s to the regulation of interpretation the main difference is that when interpreting U L I S the 
judge shall turn only to the basic principles o f the Convent ion, thus there is no legal source outside the 
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text to fill a gap, while the U N C I T R A L TEXT allows the judge to turn to the law to be applied 
according to the conflicts rule. Otherwise both texts give great liberty to the judge in interpreting the 
texts and this fact may give rise to the danger that the uniform text might applied in different sense due 
to differing interpretations. 
I. The antecedents of the UNCITRAL text.* 
It was debated on in the third session of U N C I T R A L in 1970, how the Working 
Group appointed in the year before should proceed to the elaboration of the 
convention on the international sales of goods. The discussions centered round the 
wording of the Convention approved at the Hague on the subject matter in 1964. The 
delegations of a number of countries took part in formulating the Hague text 
(hereinafter ULIS) which now as members of the Working Group undertook the 
formulation of a new convention. There were several delegations which thought that 
the text of ULIS was unacceptable even as the underlying instrument of the discussions 
and brought forward suggestion for the elaboration of a wholly new, unambiguous, 
concise wording. Other delegations voiced that the Working Group should set out 
from the text of ULIS, and that until the new wording was completed U N C I T R A L 
should bring forward recommendations to the member-states of the United Nat ions to 
ratify ULIS in its present form.1 
Eventually U N C I T R A L agreed that the wording of ULIS was appropriate for 
serving as the underlying document for the elaboration of a uniform convention on 
sales which would be acceptable for a considerable majority of states. Consequently 
the elaboration of the wording began as the revision of ULIS and the session advised 
the Working Group that 'Instead of selected items the Working Group should 
consider ULIS systematically, chapter by chapter, giving priority to Articles 1-17.2 
(2) The doubts as to the wording of ULIS were not wholly unfounded. At that 
time ULIS was not yet in operation, for until 1970 only three states have ratified it.3 
It was only after the fifth ratification that ULIS came into operation on the 18th 
August, 1972, and the assumption cannot wholly be dismissed that ratification and 
operation were to some extent accelerated by the work U N C I T R A L had taken up. 
On the other hand it is possible that exactly the work U N C I T R A L began 
detained other governments from the ratification of ULIS thus forestalling the birth of 
a highly complicated legal situation which might be brought about should a definite 
country become the signatory to two 'uniform' and 'universal' conventions, to 
conventions namely which would bring under regulation one and the same question in 
a divergent form.4 
* UNCITRAL draft, (or draft) means the text elaborated by U N C I T R A L and submitted to the 
Diplomatic Conference held in Vienna in 1980. TEXT means the draft convention adopted by this 
conference. ULIS is already known as meaning the convention adopted in the Hague in 1964. 
1
 Yearbook, vol. I, p. 132 
2
 Yearbook, vol. II, p. 51 
3
 The United Kingdom, San Marino, Belgium 
4
 So far ULIS has been ratified by nine states 
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It cannot be doubted, however, that opinions differ as to the applicability and 
utility of ULIS.5 Still, by the fact that through the accession of nine states ULIS has 
come into operation, this instrument in a high measure excels among the conventions 
signed in the latter quarter of a century, conventions namely which has as their goal the 
settlement of yet other questions associated with international sales and which had not 
come into operation to the present day. 6 
(3) It is not the objective of the present paper by weighing the pros and cons of 
ULIS to come to any definite conclusions. Although as participant of the Hague 
Conference the present author has been impressed differently, he would nevertheless 
agree with Professor André Tunc that U L I S is the product of creative activities rather 
than of a compromise.7 
Still practice tends to demonstrate that Professor Tunc has exaggerated the 
significance of the positive opinions formed of ULIS.8 The rigor commercialis which 
ULIS has luckily brought closer to the law merchant of the most developed capitalist 
countries has had a deterrent effect on the developing countries which have become 
connected with world trade only of late.9 Ratification of ULIS would stumble upon 
difficulties even in the socialist countries. The approach which would have the 
termination of the contract as the first sanction of a breach of contract cannot be 
reconciled to planned economy whose targets can be achieved by the performance of 
the contract and not by its termination. 
II. Principles and their invalidation 
(4) The principles which prevailed in the conference drawing up ULIS have 
served as guidance also for those formulating the U N C I T R A L draft . Such principles 
are e.g. the yet wider application of the convention, and what follows from it: the 
restricted recourse to the municipal laws, the exclusion of the conflicts of laws, the full, 
or nearly full, autonomy of the parties, in the hierarchical order the contract, custom, 
etc. precedes the uniform law, etc. 
All these principles have, however, forfeited some of their force by the 
circumstance that the wording of ULIS has opened the gates to reservations of which 
5
 See E Ö R S I , G Y . : The Hague Conventions of 1964 and the International Sale of Goods, Acta Juridica, 
1 9 6 9 
6
 A few of the conventions of the Hague Conference: 1958: transfer de la propriété; compétence du 
for contractuel; 1955: conflits entre la loi nationale et domicile; 1956: reconnaissance de la personnalité 
juridique; 1965: l'election du for, etc. 
7
 T U N C , A . : Commentary, p. 8 . Similarly R I E S E , О. in 1 9 6 4 supplement of Int. and Comp. Law 
Quarterly and SZAKATS, A. ibid., year 1964, p. 751. 
8
 The uniform law has appeared not only acceptable, but positively good to experts belonging to very 
different legal and political systems. Commentary, p. 16. 
' N o r is there any attempt to make rules to aid the weak and ignorant or inattentive, like the rules of 
the Sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code H O N N O L D , J . : The Hague Convention of 1954. (Issue 
of Law and Contemporary Problems . . . 1965, Durham N. C., p. 335.) 
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the signatories can at their option select such as would relegate the applicability of the 
convention to exceptional cases. International conventions as a rule set up barriers to 
the operation of the municipal law. A legal relationship coming within the sphere of an 
international convention cannot be governed by the municipal law. This is the case 
even more with conventions which have as their goal the unification of law. If the 
convention gives way to reservations which disagree with this goal, this might lead to 
the frustration of the convention, still in any case they will retard the process of 
unification. 
(5) Of the reservations of the Convention in particular the one incorporated in 
Article V deserves special mention. This reservation does not only prevent the 
application of the uniform law within as wide as possible a domain, but even calls into 
doubt the efficacy of the law as law by the circumstance that the application of the 
uniform law of sales has been made dependent only on the express contractual 
stipulation of the parties.10 
A law will become a law by its automatic application. Permissive law is 
permissive only for the parties, fo r the judge such a distinction is unthinkable. He will 
be bound by all laws with equal force. Still permissive law will bind him only if the 
parties have not agreed to the contrary in their contract. Still in matters not provided 
for by the contract the law will automatically settle the situation of the parties. If the 
judge cannot apply the law unless the contract of the parties permits him to do so, the 
judge will observe the law due to the will of the parties and not that of the State, i.e. in 
the same way as any other contractual stipulation of the parties. By this ULIS has 
become a certain type of contract, not even 'foreign law', for foreign law may be chosen 
by implication, yet according to this reservation ULIS requires express choice.11 
(6) The prevention of the automatic application of the uniform law even haunted 
during the elaboration of U N C I T R A L text. An amendment came to be brought 
forward according to which the law 'would apply to a transaction only if i t was made so 
applicable by the part ies . . , '1 2 One of the member-states pointed out in its comments 
that 'states could be reluctant to accede to the Convention, if its application is 
automatic . . , ' 1 3 and suggested to supplement the wording by the words 'by express 
statements.' 
The Working Group did not though admit the recommendations, still this 
indicates that the universal acceptance of the U N C I T R A L draf t will not be plain 
10
 There was an almost unanimous opposition to Article V of the Convention . . . It was stated, 
among others, that this reservation was inconsistent with the purpose of the Convention . . . that it was 
inadmissible to subordinate the Uniform Law to the will of the parties . . . KATONA, P.: The second session of 
UNCITRAL. Journal of World Trade Law, 1969, p. 564 
11
 paragr. (3) of Article I of the Uniform Law on International Sales Act 1967: While an Order of 
Her Majesty in Council is in force declaring that a declaration by the United Kingdom under Article V of the 
First Convention (application by choice of parties) has been made and not withdrawn the Uniform Law on 
Sale shall apply to a contract of sale only i f i t has been chosen by the parties to a contract as the law of the 
contract. 
12
 Doc. A/CN/9/126, p. 7 
13
 Doc. A/CN/9/125, p. 6 
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sailing. The question was whether the contract should be made subject to the uniform 
law, or whether the application of the uniform law should be made dependent on the 
will of the parties. 
(7) This issue is not the counterpart of the one whether or not the parties may 
preclude the application of the uniform law (Article 6 of the TEXT). This namely 
amounts to the recognition and the reinforcement of the autonomy of the parties 
empowering them to determine the law governing the contract (and by this preclude 
the application of another law). By their precluding the application of the convention 
by virtue of Article 6 of the TEXT the parties subject their contract to the applicable 
law in conformity with the conflict law of the forum. And the application of this law 
takes place automatically, provided tha t the parties have not precluded the application 
of the convention by recourse to another law.14 
Still if the court of the country of one or the other signatory to the convention 
cannot apply the convention unless the parties agree thereto in their contract, then 
notwithstanding the convention the judge will automatically apply the municipal law 
whose scope of operation exactly the convention intends to restrict.15 
(8) The judicial practice of the courts of the Federal Republic of Germany serves 
the ends of universality more efficiently. In the opinion of this au thor the courts 
correctly give a restrictive interpretation of Article 3 of ULIS. 
In a given case the contracting parties have stipulated the municipal law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany as the law governing their contract, but have failed to 
specify whether they subject their contract to the municipal law of the Federal 
Republic or to ULIS. The court has applied ULIS.16 In other cases the court did not 
consider ULIS precluded by the parties, which appeared from the fact that the parties 
did not even know of the existence of ULIS when they had made their contract.17 
1 4
 The non-mandatory character of the Convention is explicitly stated in Article 5. The parties may 
exclude its application entirely by choosing a law other than this Convention to govern their contract. 
(A/CN/9/116-Annex. II. p. 9) 
15
 The constitutions of a number of countries state that due to the mandatory character of treaties 
and conventions they precede the municipal law. In our opinion, no law is stronger than another 
promulgated by the same legislator. A municipal provision bringing under regulation a definite legal 
relationship is a general rule, a treaty or convention relating to the same legal relationship is in relation 
between the contracting states or their nationals a special rule. Hence the priority of a treaty or convention 
derives from the thesis of Roman law that lex specialis derogat generali. The legislator by ratifying a treaty or 
convention throws difficulties in the way only to its amendment or rescission: as long as his country is 
signatory to the treaty or convention, it has to be applied and a change can be effected only in agreement with 
the other contracting states. The reservation in art. V of ULIS has degraded ULIS: it is with neither 
municipal law nor any other international instrument on an equal footing in the hierarchical order of 
sources. 
16
 Im Zweifel kann deshalb die Wahl des Rechts eines Vertragsstaates nicht als Ausschluß der 
einheitlichen Gesetze gewertet werden. Landsgericht Landshut, 4.07.76. Unidroit Revue, 1977, vol. II, p. 
267 
17
 Ibid., p. 271 
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III. The Uncitral TEXT 
(9) The T E X T of U N C I T R A L is more concise, and though its sanctions are not 
milder, the regulation serves better its end, namely the preservation of the validity of 
the contract. In other words the authors of the TEXT have tried to find other solutions 
for those which detained the developing and the socialist countries f rom acceding to 
ULIS. The Swedish gorvernment, whose delegation had a prominent role in the 
elaboration of ULIS in its comments on the draft admits that " the draf t must be 
regarded as a considerable improvement on the 1964 Hague Convention relating to a 
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS)" . 1 8 
(10) U N C I T R A L has instructed the Working G r o u p it has appointed in the 
course of a revision of the text of ULIS to give priority to Articles 1-17.1 9 These 
Articles define the scope of application of the Uniform Law and the rules to be 
observed at its interpretation. The U N C I T R A L T E X T settles these questions in its 
Articles 1 to 12. In both instances Article 1 provides the positive conditions for 
application. A comparison of the two would be even more useful if we kept in mind the 
ends and principles which guided the makers of ULIS. Such are e.g. the achievement of 
the accession of the possibly largest number of countries, the application of the 
convention even when the states of the contracting parties have not ratified it, the non-
mandatory character of ULIS, the guarantee of the unity of interpretation, in this 
respect the preclusion of the application of both the law of the forum and of the law 
governing the contract according to the conflict rules. It is the consequence of the 
permissive nature of ULIS that any stipulation relying on the express, tacit, or implied 
agreement of the parties has priority before the provisions of ULIS. The statement 
may, therefore, ba made that ULIS is the last member of a hierarchical sequence. In the 
hierarchical sequence the following have priority before ULIS: 
(1) the contract of the parties; 
(2) the practices established in the dealings of the contracting parties; 
(3) usages, international or national; 
(4) the expressly or impliedly accepted standard forms; 
(5) in the event of Article 4 of ULIS all municipal mandatory rules which would 
be applied had not the parties subjected their contract to ULIS; 
(6) thereafter recourse may be had to ULIS as a residuary set of rules. 
Basically, this hierarchical order is in agreement with the situation in the 
majority of states. What gives rise to misgivings in the case of ULIS is the 
"international" character of the legal relationship and the want of established and 
concise definition of commercial usages. Section 2 of Article 9 does not distinguish 
between the usages of the home market and those of an international character and 
opens the gate to recourse to a usage which was known perhaps to neither party, if 
contracting parties in general applied this usage to their contract. The expedient was 
18
 A/CN/9/125. Add. 1; similarly Finland A/CN/9. 126. p. 12 
" See Note 2 
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sharply criticized by Yugoslavia in the debate on the U N C I T R A L text,2 0 and by 
Professor Eörsi in the analysis of ULIS.2 1 
If now to this we add the reservations ULIS recognizes we may have a fair idea of 
the circumstance that the law of international trade compiled with the idea of 
universality may be resorted to in practice in exceptional cases only. 
IV. The sphere of application of ULIS and the TEXT 
(11) Article 1 of ULIS makes the application of the uniform law dependent on 
the joined presence of subjective and objective conditions. The subjective condition 
demands that the places of business of the contracting parties should be in different 
countries irrespective of the nationality of the parties and of whether these countries 
are signatories or not. The presence of a single of the three objective conditions by the 
side of the subjective condition suffices. The three conditions are (1) carriage of goods 
from one country to another; (2) offer and acceptance have been effected in the 
territories of different States; (3) the goods must be delivered to a country other than 
the one where offer and acceptance have been effected.22 
V. Application by way of conflict rules 
(12) It is an item in the historical past of the ULIS text that according to earlier 
drafts, before 1964, the uniform law will be applicable only when in conformity with 
the conflict rule of the forum the law of a State has to be applied which is signatory to 
the convention. 
According to this earlier concept the mechanism would have operated as 
follows: above all the forum settles the conflict in conformity with its own municipal 
conflict law or with rules based upon an international convention. If these suggest the 
law of a country which is signatory to the convention, then recourse will be had to 
ULIS and not to the general rules of sales of the respective country. This is of necessity 
followed by a question of qualification: it has to be decided whether the deal of the 
parties amounts to a sale contract coming within the purview of ULIS. Naturally this 
can be decided only on the grounds of U L I S (secondary qualification) and if the 
decision is a positive one the dispute can be settled in its substance. 
2 0
 A / C N / 9 . 125. p. 59 
21
 The solution adopted in respect of permissivenes and usages is basically correct but operates in an 
unavoidable manner against the unification of law; it diminishes the chances to foresee the applicable law; the 
stronger party benefits from it. (Op. cit. p. 338) (Ital. by author) 
2 2
 In reality, there is yet another objective condition namely that the law can be applied only to 
contracts of sale of goods. Article 1 does not define the notion of sale o f goods, still it defines when the 
contract should be considered international. Instead of a positive definition articles 5 and 6 approach the 
notion of the sale of goods by a method of exclusion. It sets out perhaps from the thesis that omnis definitio 
est negatio. 
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VI. Application by exclusion of the conflict rule 
(13) The conference of 1964 thought that this solution was f raught with a high 
degree of complexity and by accepting the recommendation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany decided that the application of ULIS should be achieved without recourse to 
the conflict rule. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposed that the 
courts of the contracting states should apply ULIS to international sales by setting 
aside any other question. This proposal was then supplemented by one for a 
compromise, which agreed to recourse to the reservations in Article III of the 
Convention, i.e. that a contracting country should apply ULIS only to deals with 
merchants having their place of business in the territory of other contracting state.23 
Accordingly, the application of ULIS became unconditional, and Article 2 
categorically precluded the recourse to the rules of private international law once 
ULIS was applied. 
Since at tha t time already a number of states undertook in conventions to 
establish the law governing international contracts of sales in conformity with uniform 
conflict rules,24 and declined to withdraw from the conventions, as a compromise the 
path was opened to recourse to the reservation in Article IV of the Convention. 
Hence the "uniformity" of the uniform law was undermined by giving possibility 
to recourse to the reservations in Articles II, III and IV, at the very outset. The acceding 
state could, in a manner departing from the wording of the Convention determine 
when it regarded the other state as "different", make the application of ULIS 
dependent on the provision of the conflict of laws, and narrow down the sphere of 
application by applying the uniform law only against another contracting country. 
VII. Open gate to the non-acceding countries 
/ 
(14) The recommendation of the Federal Republic of Germany met the demand 
for universality and would have advanced the spread of ULIS. Apart from the 
reservations it suffices to point out that ULIS is par t and parcel of the municipal law of 
the judge and he can apply it even when the country of neither contracting party has 
ratified the Convention and even when besides the establishment of jurisdiction the 
country of the judge has nothing more to do with the deal.25 
This is a novel "legal effect" in the law of international contracts. All that a 
country can do according to the dominant opinion is to apply a convention it has 
ratified to the other acceding country. A foreign convention cannot be forced upon a 
2 3
 RIESE, О.: Haager Abkommen . . . usw. Rabeis, 1965, p. 1 0 . 
24
 See in particular the Hague Convention of the 15th June, 1955. 
25
 Almost all authors call forth attention to the open gate o f U L I S . ( H O N N O L D , op. cit., p. 3 3 3 ; E Ö R S I , 
op. cit., p. 3 2 7 ; R I E S E , op. cit., p. 11 ; T U N C , Commentary, p. 1 6 ; D Ö L L E , Kommentar, p. X X X I I , etc.). 
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non-acceding country, and if there are benefits stipulated in the convention, a non-
signatory state cannot be granted a share in it. This difficulty can be eliminated 
according ULIS when the acceding country incorporates ULIS into its own legislation, 
or promulgates it as such (Article II of the Convention).2 6 
(15) The misgiving that ULIS is applicable to merchants of countries which have 
not ratified the Convention does not concern the states that have ratified it. They have 
acceded to the Convention exactly because they want to apply it to themselves and also 
to others.2 7 
If the merchants of the non-acceding countries are desirous to avoid the 
application of ULIS to their contracts, they have to avoid the court in an acceding 
country which at the ratification waived the reservation in Article III of the 
Convention, i.e. to apply the Convention only to another contracting country 
only.28-29 
Naturally this is not a safe method for the merchant of a non-signatory state to 
avoid the application of ULIS. The Federal Republic of Germany has ratified ULIS 
with the reservation provided in Article III: the German court will not apply ULIS to a 
case arisen between a German merchant and an alien whose country is not signatory to 
the Convention. Still in this case the law according to the German conflict rule will 
have to be applied. If according to the German conflict rule the law of a signatory 
governs the case which has not made use of the reservation in Article III, then the 
German court will, though by a roundabout way, nevertheless apply ULIS. 3 0 
2 6
 This is not without examples. The Geneva convention on bills of exchange of 1930 is at the same 
time the Hungarian Act on Bills of Exchange. If therefore a dispute under an international bill has to be 
determined according to Hungarian law, this will take place on the grounds of the Geneva conventions even 
when the bill has been signed by persons whose countries have not acceded to the convention. Still there is no 
special Hungarian law of bills, whereas ULIS lives parallel to municipal law. 
27
 . . . these difficulties will be deposited on the doorsteps of non-adopting states. (HONNOLD: The 
Uniform Law etc. Law and Contemporary Problems Durham N. C. 1965, p. 334.) 
28
 Belgium, Israel and Italy have not had recourse to this reservation. If. therefore, the parties can 
foresee that a lawsuit might be instituted against them in any of these countries by invoking Article 4 of ULIS 
they may exclude the application of the reservation. It is, of course, odd to exclude the application of a law 
that does not apply to the parties. On the other hand, if a party intending the institution of a lawsuit hopes to 
win the case on the grounds of ULIS, all he will have to do is to find grounds for the jurisdiction of any of the 
three states, and by this he will have subjected the case to ULIS. This is an occasion for forum shopping and 
an example for the uncertainty of law. 
2 9
 The system of reservations provides facilities for the ratifying state only not to apply ULIS 
unconditionally, whereas no protection is afforded to the non-ratifying country. So e.g. the Dutch act 
introducing ULIS (15th December, 1971) states that ULIS has to be applied even when by either a foreign or 
a Dutch conflict rule Dutch law has to be applied. (DÖLLE: Kommentar p. 4). Hence this ratification also 
decrees the recourse to renvoi: the Dutch court may namely apply Dutch law on the ground of a foreign 
conflict rule when it has met the obligation of renvoi. The Dutch ratification may call into doubt the validity 
of the reservation based on Article III of the Convention of another acceding country. When country A has 
ratified with this reservation, whereas country В has not acceded to ULIS, then the Convention cannot be 
applied in country A in respect of a transaction in country B. Still when, for the one reason or the other, the 
lawsuit is instituted in the Netherlands and according to the Dutch conflict rule the law of country A has to 
be applied, the Dutch judge will apply ULIS. 
3 0
 D Ö L L E : Kommentar, p. 16. A few questions may still have to be answered. E.g. when in the 
acceding country ULIS is applied as foreign law, will it be bound to apply it in conformity with the foreign 
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(16) Hence U L I S will have to be applied: 
(1) between two signatory countries; 
(2) between a signatory and non-signatory when the forum is in the signatory 
country; 
(3) between two non-signatories if the forum is in the territory of a signatory; 
(4) if neither the country of the forum is a signatory, still in conformity with its 
conflicts law the law of a signatory has to be applied to the sales contract (?); 
(5) i f in conformity with Article IV the parties stipulate the application of ULIS 
(?)• 
Even in these cases ULIS cannot be applied 
(1) between two countries if either of them has made use of the reservations in 
Articles II, IV or V; 
(2) between a signatory and non-signatory state if the signatory state has made 
use of the reservation in Article III; 
(3) if the contracting parties preclude the application of ULIS (Article 3 of 
ULIS). 
This multifariousness of the conditions of the application calls into doubt the success 
of ULIS as a legislation bringing under regulation international sale with a uniform 
rule. 
VIII. The solution of the UNCITRAL TEXT 
(17) Much criticism has been brought forward against the provision of ULIS 
which precludes the preliminary settlement of a conflict among the conditions of the 
application of the uniform law.31 There are opinions which want to know that this is 
the reason why the developing countries have declined to accede to ULIS. Also this 
may account for the demand on the par t of U N C I T R A L for the revision of ULIS. Still 
the concept again prevailed in the Conference of 1974, which discussed the wording of 
the Convention on Limitation. 
The U N C I T R A L TEXT, in its Article 1, defines the scope of application as 
follows: "This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose 
places of business are in different States: 
'(a) when the States are Contracting States; or 
'(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law 
of a Contracting State." 
interpretation? Is there chance for legal remedy of the third instance (in case a violation of the law)? 
According to K R O P H O L L E R there is. (Der Ausschluß des IPR im Einheitlichen Kaufgesetz, Rabeis, Jg. 1 9 7 4 , p. 
3 7 8 . ) 
31
 See K R O P H O L L E R , op. cit. p. 3 8 5 . On the contrary C A M M E R E R : " . . . das Haager Kaufrecht . . . soll 
dem Richter und den Parteien bei Kaufverträgen über die Grenzen hinweg die Unsicherheiten und 
Schwierigkeiten des IPR und der Anwendung fremden Rechts ersparen" (Probleme ... usw., p. 122.) 
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Hence the T E X T has taken over the subjective condition of ULIS: the places of 
business of the contracting parties are in two different states; application is precluded 
between enterprises operating in the same country. The nationals cannot avoid the rule 
of their municipal law, except it is agreed to by the permissive rules of municipal law. 
Similarly, the T E X T has taken over the expedient that in the mutual relationship 
between two contracting states the Convention has to be applied unconditionally and 
it would be wrong if the application of the Convention would be made dependent on 
whether the conflict rule of the contracting countries or of either of them "approved" 
the application of the Convention. The approval of this expedient superseded the 
maintenance of the preservation in Article II of ULIS. 
Hence for the T E X T it is sufficient for the application of the uniform law if the 
contracting parties have their places of business in two different countries ratifying the 
Convention. The objective condition is implied in the circumstance that the states of 
the contracting parties are signatories and not in the transaction of the parties. ULIS 
demands for the establishment of the presence of the subjective condition also that of 
any of the three objective conditions (see (11) supra)-. (1) delivery of goods beyond the 
frontier; (2) offer-acceptance across the frontier; (3) close of the deal and performance 
in two different countries.3 2 
(18) Is the scope of application of the TEXT any wider than that of ULIS with 
the abandonment of these conditions? We hardly believe that this is the case. No doubt 
it is the common goal of both instruments to bring abou t the uniform regulation of the 
international sale of goods. Neither the Convention nor the TEXT defines in a positive 
form what a sales contract exactly is.33 Nor do the three objective conditions of ULIS 
help us to a definition of the concept of a sales contract, still they define which contracts 
should be regarded as "international". ULIS uses a rule of extreme complexity to 
define this notion, which is perhaps the least contested question in international 
judicial practice. Since the following articles of both ULIS and the T E X T withdraw 
certain types of the sales contract f rom the ruling of the uniform law, therefore if there 
is incongruity between the spheres of application of the two instruments for this the 
articles creating exceptions account rather than the article 1 of the two. 
Condition (a) of Article 1 will come into full operation only when the forum is 
also in the one or the other contracting country. In the court of a third, non-
contracting country, the Convention cannot preclude the application of the conflicts 
law of the forum. The TEXT will not come into operation if a lawsuit is instituted in 
such a country and in conformity with the conflicts law of that country the law of the 
forum or of another non-contracting country will be applicable. This possibility, 
3 2
 A/CONF/63/16-1975: paragr. 2 o f Art. 3.: Unless this Convention provides otherwise, it shall 
apply irrespective of the law which would otherwise be applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
international law. 
3 3
 "Il a paru aux rédacteurs . . . que le concept 'vente' était suffisamment clair pour qu'il ne dût pas 
être défini dans l'acte international lui-même." RIGAUX E.: Le contrat économique international. Bruxelles, 
1975. p. 70. 
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however, applies also to signatories of ULIS. It may occur, however, that in 
conformity with the law of the forum the law of the one or the other contracting party 
will be applicable. In this case the judge of the non-contracting country will decide the 
case in accordance with the TEXT. Still in this case he will be mindful of the rule that a 
foreign law has to be applied in the same way as the judge of the foreign country would 
apply it. 
Hence condition (a) of Article 1 restricts the sphere of operation of the law to the 
contracting countries. 
IX. The open gate of the UNCITRAL TEXT 
(19) In conformity with paragraph (b) of Article 1 for the application of the 
TEXT it suffices that even if the contracting parties have no place of business in the 
contracting country under the conflict rule of the forum the law of a country has to be 
applied which has become signatory to the Convention. This will, of course, hold only 
when the subjective condition of Article 1 has also been met, i.e. the places of business 
of the parties to the contract are in different countries. 
Here we are: the appetite of the T E X T is not much smaller than that of ULIS. It 
is applicable also in cases where neither the parties, nor the judge is in a contracting 
state, still in conformity with the conflict rule the law of a country has to be applied that 
has acceded to the Convention. Can the forum stem this appetite? Is it lawful that 
when the countries of the judge and of the two litigants are non-contracting countries, 
the case should be determined on the grounds of a convention the countries in question 
have never ratified? Or is it in agreement with the law that the judge applies the foreign 
law in the same way as the foreign judge? And what will be the situation when under 
the conflict rule of the signatory state to the Uncitral Convention it is not the law of 
that state that will prevail? This amounts to a case of renvoi still it may occur that the 
law of the forum precludes the renvoi. I f in such a case the fo rum of the non-contracting 
country ignores the renvoi, then it would not determine the case as the judge of the 
foreign law would have determined it. On the other hand, if this forum takes into 
account the renvoi, then it would infringe its own law. 
Paragraph (b) of Article 1 gave rise to protracted disputes and provoked a series 
of counter-proposals. There were delegates who would have the whole of paragraph 
(b) discarded. Still there were others who brought forward less ambitious suggestions 
according to which the uniform law would not be applicable unless the conflicts law of 
the one or the other contracting state decreed its application.3 4 
The Diplomatic Conference in Vienna has solved the question with a 
compromise. Art. 95 of the TEXT permits a new reservation according to which: 
3 4
 There were governments which thought it would be more appropriate to retain the additional 
requirements as laid down in ULIS (A/CN.9/125-p. 22.) 
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"Any State may declare at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by subparagraph 
(1) (b) of article 1 of this Convention." 
No need to say that differences in the scope of application of any "uniform" rule 
is the proper way leading to " f o r u m shopping". 
X. Limitations of application 
(20) One of the barriers to the application of paragraphs (a) and (b) has been set u p 
by section (2) of Article 1. Accordingly either contracting party has to acquire, in the one 
way or the other , knowledge of the fact that the place of business of the par ty 
contracting with him is in a foreign country. If an agent of the same country as the first 
contracting party closes the deal and fails to disclose his principal in the other country, 
no recourse can be had to the Convention when only after the making of the contract 
the foreign nationality of the principal will become known.35 In o ther words, if there 
are no external signs which would inform the contracting party of the "international" 
character of the transaction, then the Convention must not be applied. At latest at the 
making of the contract parties will have to know that their contract comes within the 
sphere of the Convention. A restriction of this na ture has not been taken up in ULIS. 
(21) Both Conventions appropriately ignore the nationality of the contracting 
parties and whether the deal has been closed in the capacity of merchants or another 
capacity. (ULIS, section 3 of Article 1 and Article 7; section 3 of Article 1 of the 
TEXT.) 
The by-pass of the nationality of the contracting parties has been brought under 
regulation in all earlier drafts of ULIS. Against a provision of identical meaning of the 
T E X T strictly speaking only a single government submitted a counterproposal. This 
government took the stand that the Convention should be applicable to sales contracts 
where the contracting parties are nationals of different countries and their places of 
business are also in different countries.3 6 The committee rejected this suggestion. In 
international economic life nationality comes to be thrust to the background more and 
more. The process is accelerated by that the 'merchant ' appears as natural person on 
rare occasions only. It is the enterprise that takes part in international economic 
relations. As for the juristic person (corporation) the country of the business activity is 
of importance. 
The provision of the T E X T that for the purpose of the Convention it is 
immaterial whether the contracting parties or either of them are no t merchants, is 
3 5
 Yearbook, vol. VII. 1976. p. 97. The ICC approved the incorporation of the conflict rule. In their 
opinion, ULIS by the exclusion of the applicability of the rules of private international law in Art. 2 
introduced complexities into the applicability of the Convention. It opened the gates to reservations and 
operated against universality as it detained many from ratification. (A/CN/9/126-p. 8.) 
3 9
 Yearbook, vol. VIII. 1977. p. 26. 
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uniform with the respective provision of ULIS. Even in the Hague Conference only a 
single recommendation was submitted against this provision of ULIS37 , the same 
provision appeared in every earlier draft, and the conference approved of it.38 
XI. Contracts exempted from under the Convention 
(22) As has been seen U L I S does not define3 9 the notion of an international sale. 
Article 1 merely defines which transactions should be regarded as international. 
Articles 5 and 6 of ULIS, however, seriatim enumerate certain types of contract which 
have to be exempted from under the operation ULIS. The T E X T follows the same 
method and enumerates the exemptions in its Articles 2 and 3. 
This is not a defect of either ULIS or the TEXT. 'Mixed ' contracts are also 
imaginable which are at the same time contracts for work, labour and materials and for 
sale, on which are of sale and donation, sale and barter commingled.4 0 In practice, 
however, such contracts are of extremely rare occurrence to the extent that one million 
contracts will be performed in order before the nature of one would be questioned for 
want of definition. The ' international ' character is that counts . This will determine 
whether the Convention or a municipal law applies to the contract , whether resorting 
to their au tonomy the parties may stipulate the law which they intend to govern their 
legal relationship.41 Even those who are not satisfied with the definition that the legal 
relation is tied up with more than one legal system ( Batiffol), or the presence of more 
than one state can be established recognize that this is an 'approximation grossière, 
suffisant peut-être pour l 'usage courant d u t e r m e . . . ' and tha t "qu'il n'existe pas de 
conception unique de ce qui peut leur conférer un caractère international".4 2 
(23) According to Article 5 the provisions of ULIS cannot be applied to the sale 
of shares, stock, bonds, negotiable instruments, the sale of vessels registered or bound 
to registration, other water crafts or aircrafts, electrical power and to sales by auction 
decreed by the law. Sale by instalments has not been exempted from under the 
operation of ULIS, still the mandatory rules of municipal law serving the safeguard of 
the buyer's interest are applicable contrary to the provisions of ULIS (or the contract). 
3 7
 A /CN.9 . /125-P . 41. 
3 8
 RIESE, o p . cit. , R a b e l s Jg . 1965, p. 19 
3 9
 EÖRSI agrees with U L I S that is has drawn n o line between commercial and consumer's purchase. 
Still in want o f an express provision he is of the opinion that ULIS, nevertheless, does not apply to 
consumer's purchases. He believes that by way of restrictive interpretation the application of U L I S may be 
excluded to such transactions. (EÖRSI, op. cit. p. 342) 
4 0
 See note 20 
4 1
 U n d e r Common law the latter does not give birth to problems o f delimitation. 
4 2
 The French Cour de Cassation finds the international character in the fact that the g o o d s cross the 
frontier, whereas its price passes the other way round. (Rev. Crit. de D I P . 1965. p. 348.) Else this is the 
principle criterion according to § 2 o f the Czechoslovak law of foreign trade o f the 18th December, 1963. The 
law of the German Democratic Republic of the 5th February, 1976 does not define the notion of 
international character for international economic contracts, still according to the commentary to the act a 
contract between two enterprises o f the German Democrat ic Republic may for reasons of connectedness be 
regarded as international. M A S K O W D . - W A G N E R , H . : Kommentar zum GIW, Berlin, 1978, pp. 59 et seq.) 
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According to Article 6 the provisions of U L I S apply to goods to be 
manufactured in the future, except, however, if an essential and substantial part of the 
material necessary for manufacture is supplied by the customer. 
Articles 2 and 3 of the TEXT depar t in several respects from the provisions of 
ULIS stating the exceptions. 
(24) Above all the T E X T exempts f rom the regulation what may be termed retail 
sales, i.e. the case when the customer buys the goods for personal or household use. 
This rule has been taken up for the more precise interpretation of the provision of 
paragraph (3) of Article 1, viz. that for the purpose of the application of the 
Convention it is immaterial whether either of the parties is a merchant o r not. The 
provision itself is indispensable and not merely useful. Sales for consumption are in a 
number of countries governed by special rules which safeguard the interests of the 
buyer, i.e. rules of a mandatory nature. Here recourse would be had to the special law 
against the rules of the Convention. A large portion of such consumer sales come in 
any case within the purview of the municipal law of the place of sale, although cases are 
not unlikely when in response to the catalogues distributed by the great department 
stores the world over orders are incoming from, and deliveries of goods are made to, 
abroad. I f in this case until the deal has been closed the seller has no information of the 
destination of the goods for domestic or personal use, the contract will come within the 
sphere of the Convention. 
(25) Sub-paragraph (b) exempts sales by auction f rom under the operat ion of the 
Convention. The reason for making this exception was that in most countries sales by 
auction had been brought under regulation by special legislation and that it appeared 
to be convenient not to exempt such sales f rom under the ruling of such legislation. The 
reason given for this exemption is not qui te conclusive and the present au tho r sees no 
reason why sales by auction should be withdrawn from the sphere of application of the 
Convention. Auctions of this kind are mostly organized by institutions (exchanges, 
market organizations) which proceed in conformity with their own usages and not 
under national law. And for that matter usages have priority before the T E X T (Article 
9). The goods submitted to auction are the property of the merchant and no t of the 
auctioneer. The alien buyer is in like way a merchant. The auction itself merely serves 
to have an important element of sales, viz. the price established in public. Fo r the rest it 
is an international sale with the same rights and obligations as any other contract 
coming within the purview of the T E X T . There is no reason whatever why the 
Convention should not be applicable to a sales contract come into being in this 
manner. On the other hand, the exemption specified in sub-paragraph (c) relies on solid 
foundations. Sales on execution or by authori ty of law are expressly relying on statute. 
A sale of this kind is one of the cases of forced sales, which cannot be exempted from 
under the operation of the law by which recourse had been to forced sale.43-44 
4 3
 FONTAINE, M.: Le contract économique international, Brussels, 1975, pp. 22, 23 
4 4
 On the other hand, it is true that this is not even a sales contract; the seller is not owner but the 
official agency of the state. The conditions of sale are not defined by the owner as in the event o f an auction, 
but the law. Nor do the rules of warranty prevail. 
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(26) Sub-paragraph (e) exempts vessels, water c raf t s and aircrafts completely 
f rom under the operat ion of the T E X T irrespective of whether these have been 
registered or are not even bound to registration. This definition is fairly vague in 
particular when a wording other than English has been accepted for ratification. In the 
English language namely the terms " s h i p " and "vessel" are used to denote water craft 
of larger dimensions. The question is, how other languages are capable of expressing 
the shades and hues distinguishing the one term from the other. This may explain the 
large number of counter-proposals brought forward against this otherwise laudably 
concise formulation. It has been considered necessary to restrict the rule to craft which 
at the time of sale have already been registered. Such vessels or ships can be sold 
namely only in conformity with the rules of the por t of registration and the special 
s tandard conditions. Any other vessel irrespective of whether or not bound to 
registration comes within the scope of operation of the uniform law of sales. According 
to other recommendations the relevant provisions should be restricted to vessels in 
excess of the gross tons.4 5 
I believe we can agree with those who do not wan t to discover special features in 
contracts for the sale or the construction of ships which would distinguish them from 
all other international sales. Hungar ian shipyards build sea-going vessels of medium 
size, still the machine factories of Hungary are capable of supplying large 
manufacturing plants, oxygen factories, aluminium processing plants, etc. Why should 
the sale of a ship be governed by provisions other than that of an aluminium processing 
plant? The exemption of registered vessels may have its reasons, still since their sale 
takes place on s tandard conditions (which have priority before the Convention), no 
special complexities would arise had water and aircraft been omitted f rom among the 
exceptions, or in o ther words, if the sales contracts covering these had been allowed to 
remain within the sphere of operation of the uniform law. This does not mean that I 
consider it absolutely necessary tha t the contract for sale of a ship or vessel had to be 
governed by the uniform law, the less that this is possible. For this, i.e. the extension of 
the operation of the uniform law to the sale of ships, a traditional a t t i tude would have 
to change which treats ships under the same heading as realty or real estate. (It does not 
consider ships "ob je t s mobiliers. ") 4 6 The sale of small sailboats, or other vessels not 
bound to registration, may, provided the contract serves commercial ends and not 
personal use, drawn with the help of interpretation within the sphere of operation of 
the Convention. This end is served by the recommendations of the Mexican 
government, which sets out f rom the understanding that the rules of registration of 
4 5
 A /CN.9 . /125-p . 25, 41. According to R I G A U X the term "ou à enregistrer" is in contradiction to 
article 2. " . . . la référence à une règle de conflit de lois est ici implicite . . . Comment savoir si un navire . . . est 
enregistré et surtout s'il doivent l'être, s inon par référence à la loi national compétente"? op. cit. p. 84. 
4 6
 Quoiques meubles par nature, les navires et les av ions ont une condition à part, qui tient à 
l'existence d'une attache fix, permettant notemment de les soumettre à un régime de publicité analogue à 
celui des immeubles. Le raisonnement qui conduit à appliquer la lex rei sitae aux immeubles incite donc à les 
soumettre à la loi du pavillon. L O U S S O U A R N - B R E D I N : Droit du Commerce International, Paris, 1969, p. 654 
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larger vessels depart from those of the registration of smaller c ra f t for personal use. 
The latter come within the purview of the rules of local or municipal registration, the 
registration of the latter is of a national character. By virtue of this discrimination then 
the Mexican delegate proposed the exemption of smaller vessels from under the 
operation of the Convention.4 7 
(27) Sub-paragraph (b) exempts electricity, too, from under the operation of the 
Convention. Recommendations have been brought forward also for the cancellation 
of this provision giving as reason that 'electricity would not be regarded as goods ' . 4 8 
This recommendation is proper, still for the likely variants in the translation of 
the uniform law it appears that the exemption of electricity is well founded.4 9 
(28) Sales of livestock have not been exempted from under the operation of the 
TEXT, and the transactions enumerated in sub-paragraph (d) do not include 
documentary sales, i.e. sales of goods by way of instruments representing the goods . 5 0 
This interpretation may, however, come into conflict with the interpretations current 
in certain legal systems which qualify transactions of this kind as sales of securities. 
Still it should have been made clear that the relevant provisions of the T E X T are 
construed so as to extend the force of the uni form law to such transactions. 
XII. Delimitation of contracts others than such for sales 
(29) Article 6 of ULIS regards contracts for goods to be manufactured in the 
future also as coming within its sphere, except, however, the case when the customer 
undertakes the supply an essential part of the materials necessary for production. This 
provision is in agreement with paragraph (1) of Article 3 of the T E X T . Still there is yet 
another rule incorporated in paragraph (2) of the same article, namely that "Th i s 
Convention does not apply to contracts in which the preponderant part of the 
obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of labour or 
other services".51 
Apparently, Article 6 of ULIS and Article 3 of the TEXT are congruous. Still it 
seems as if the T E X T is more concise. It abandoned the sphere of delivery of goods and 
(if not with this designation) exempted the contracts for work, labour and materials 
f rom under the operation of the Convention. 
Recommendations have been brought forward to delete Article 3 of the T E X T . 
Those recommending the cancellation of this article argue that since here we have not 
4 7
 Yearbook, vol. VI, 1975, p. 74 
48
 A/CN.9. / .25-P. 12. 
4 9
 A comparison with the French and English wording will suffice: the English text uses the term 
'goods' to express all that the French text calls objets mobiliers corporels '. The latter defines the object o f the 
T E X T verbatim one may say it is a precise definition. If the term 'goods' is used in this meaning, this is 
qualification, something experience teaches us to avoid. 
50
 Yearbook, vol. VII, 1976, p. 98 
51
 It is in agreement with Art. 6 of the text of Limitation 
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the case of a sales contract there is no reason to fear that even in want of a provision the 
court would apply the Convention to a transaction as specified in Article 3. 
Undoubtedly this is correct. Still it is worth considering that n o clear-cut line can be 
drawn between a sale and a contract for work, labour and materials.5 2 As guidance for 
such marginal cases we may perhaps accept the ratio of the material provided by the 
customer and the productive work he has ordered. This may be of particular 
significance in the case of contracts for the machinery of such turnkey plants where the 
seller undertakes installation work of equipment as well. 
(30) Naturally neither ULIS nor the TEXT settle all problems by the 
delimitation of contracts for work , labour and materials. It is no t clear e.g. whether the 
leasing-contract, which guarantees to the leaseholder an option for the purchase of the 
object of lease, comes within the domain of the Convention. There are legal systems 
which do not consider leasing-contracts without option as leasing. According to others 
an option clause qualifies the leasing contract as sales contract. According to Dölle''s 
Kommentar the hire-purchase contract and in general the contracts where at the 
expiry of the lease the leaseholder acquires the ownership of the leasehold 
(Mietkaufverträge) come under the heading of sales contracts.5 3 
Against the article of the TEXT stating the exceptions by far more amendments 
were moved than against Articles 2 and 3 of ULIS. 
Recommendations have been brought forward for taking up a number of 
specific sales contracts among the exceptions. Such are the hire-purchase contracts, the 
purchase of goods to be acquired subsequently, sales on return, part exchange 
contracts, sales of emblements, etc.54 '55 
While the formulation of the TEXT was in progress only a single amendment 
was moved, namely the exemption of the sales of natural gas, like electricity, f rom 
under the operation of the Convention. The commission rejected the motion. Unlike 
electricity gas was declared to be a corporeal movable which can be purchased also in a 
liquid or solid state and not only in a gaseous state. Instead of a lengthy regulation of 
marginal cases it has been left to the contracting parties to specify in their contracts 
whether or not the Convention should be applied. 
Both U L I S and the T E X T agree that in conformity with the principal rule 
defining the legal form of exemptions the sales contract should as a rule be regarded as 
coming within the purview of the Convention. The party desirous to avoid the 
application of the Convention has to produce evidence to the effect that the concrete 
contract is exempted from under the Convention. 
No rule in agreement with paragraph (2) Article 5 of U L I S has been taken up in 
the TEXT. This rule states that ULIS does not affect the municipal mandatory 
"Even for G A I U S it was A problem to keep emptio-menditio and locatio-conductio operis apart. 
(Institutiones, lib. Ill 147) 
» Op. cit. pp. 9, 28 
5 4
 RIESE: o p . c i t . , p . 19 ; E Ö R S I : o p . c i t . p . 3 4 2 
55
 Yearbook, vol. VIII, p. 27 
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provisions applying to sales by payment of the price by instalments. These rules 
safeguard the interests of the buyer or consumer, and since in conformity with 
paragraph (a) of Article 2 sales of this kind do not come within the purview of the 
Convention, the rule has become superfluous. 
XIII. The autonomy of the contracting parties 
(31) In the sphere of international economic contracts the parties enjoy 
autonomy by far in excess they would enjoy under their respective municipal law. This 
is the case notwithstanding the circumstance that legislation (and here actually the case 
of the socialist countries may be handled together with that of the capitalist world) in a 
number of spheres controls and by this restricts the autonomy relying on the principle 
of laissez-faire. This is what Steindorff calls " the steering function of private law".5 6 
Notwithstanding state 'interference' the autonomy of the parties is even today 
an important precondition of the development of international economic relations. 
The unrestricted recognition of the choice of law is making headway more and more. 
By the application of the chosen law the parties may avoid the application of the 
mandatory rules of the law to be applied in want of a choice of law. They may submit 
their dispute to arbitration and define the rules of procedure of the court of arbitration. 
Moreover the parties may decree that the arbitrators pronounce their award and 
determine the case ex aequo et bono by disregarding any concrete legal order. 
Both ULIS and the T E X T do not affect the freedom of the contracting parties.57 
According to Article 3 of ULIS: 
'The parties to a contract of sale shall be free to exclude the application thereto of 
the present law either entirely or partially. Such exclusion may be express or implied.' 
According to Article 6 of the TEXT: 
'The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 
12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.' 
From a comparison of the two wordings it is apparent that unlike ULIS by the 
last sentence of Article 3 the T E X T does not provide how the parties may exclude the 
application of the Convention. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the Limitation Convention provides that 'This 
Convention shall not apply when the parties have expressly excluded its application'. 
An amendment has been moved for Article 6 of the T E X T according to which 
the words 'by express stipulation' should be added.58 
5 6
 S T E I N D O R F F , E . : Autonomy of Contracting Parties in Interstate Commerce. Oceana Publications, 
1977, vol. I, p. 93 
57
 Man wird als eine die Loi uniforme leitenden Grundgedanken den Satz ansehen dürfen, daß ein 
richterlicher Eingriff in die Vertragsbeziehungen der Parteien nur dort zulässig ist, wo das Gesetz ihn 
vorsieht. D Ö L L E : Kommentar, p. XXXIII 
58
 A /CN.9 . /126-P . II 
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According to the official motivat ion of the Uncitral draft the parties may exclude 
the application of the Convention 'by choosing a law other than this Conven t ion . . . ' . 
By virtue of the amendment moved before the application of the Convention may be 
excluded by express stipulation. According to the motivation this wording is still 
inadequate. The other law should be chosen expressis verbis, as this excludes the 
application of the Convention. The terseness of the formulation has already raised 
issues of interpretation. In any case it is welcome that the TEXT has not taken over 
' implied' exclusion.59 
(32) ULIS has thrown open yet another gate to the autonomy of the parties by 
Article 4. This Article authorizes the parties to stipulate the application of ULIS even 
when the subjective and objective conditions enumerated in Article 1 are not present. It 
adds, however, ' . . . it does not affect the application of any mandatory provision of 
law which would have been applicable if the parties had not chosen the Uniform Law'. 
A similar provision has been taken up in Article 4 of an earlier formulation of the 
Uncitral draft: 'This Convention also applies where it has been chosen as the law of the 
contract by the parties. ' The motivat ion believes the provision to be of use because on 
its score a businessman of a contract ing country may for his transaction with a 
businessman of a non-contracting country stipulate the application of the Convention. 
Still it may be of use also for the businessmen of non-contracting countries if the 
legislation of their country has failed to call into life 'a modern law of sales applicable 
to international contrac ts . . . '6 0 Finally, the stipulation may be of use in the event of a 
local contract associated with an international transaction. This is a recognition of 
the fact that Article 4 of the draf t skirts on the boundaries of the autonomy o'f the 
parties. 
Although the provision does no t incorporate the same closing sentence as Article 
4 of ULIS, still fo r the makers of the TEXT it was not doubtful that the stipulation of 
the parties had the same limitation as the one included in ULIS. An opponent of the 
article correctly argued that 'Even if article 4 of U L I S did not exist, contracting parties 
still could agree on the application of the law of a given country or of any convention, 
and such application would be valid within the limits of optional law as opposed to 
mandatory l aw . . . ' 6 1 Hence the admissibility of this stipulation does not follow f rom 
Article 4 of ULIS. It has its roots in the autonomy of the parties. Consequently, the last 
Uncitral draft has omitted this provision, still by this it has not prevented the parties in 
agreeing on the application of the Convention in their contract within the above limits. 
(33) Does the Convention extend its sphere of operation when the parties within 
the limitations of the previous section consider it the Convention normative for their 
contract? A reply will again be obtained by way of the notion of autonomy. 
59
 For the restrictive interpretation of Article 3 of U L I S see the judgements analysed in notes 
14 and 15 
6 0
 Yearbook, vol. VII,1976, p. 99 
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Strictly speaking we are inaccurate when in the domain of the conflict of laws we 
classify the right of choice of the law by the parties according as the parties (a) may 
choose whatever law without limitation, (b) may choose the law within the limitations 
defined by the law; and (c) cannot for certain contracts or in certain cases choose the 
law. The courts in general disregard the law chosen in contradiction to cases (b) and 
(c), and apply the law of the legal system specified by their own conflicts law. This is not 
a reassuring expedient: the limitation of the autonomy is not equal to the withdrawal 
of au tonomy. In the event of a transgression of the limitation we have to ascertain the 
legal effect of the choice of law. If the law chosen cannot be applied as a law then it 
stands to reason that the contract of the parties is subject to the law applicable in the 
absence of choice. Still it cannot be doubted that the parties wanted the provisions of 
the other legal system to be applied to their contract. Therefore, the provisions of the 
law chosen must be regarded at least as part and parcel or the extension of their 
contract . This means that in the absence of a choice only the mandatory rules of the 
legal system to be applied are applicable to the contract, whereas within its permissive 
rules the provisions of the law chosen by the parties will be valid. 
This is the conclusion which for that matter may be drawn from the correctly 
formulated thesis of Dölle's Kommentar (see note (57)). 
(34) In connexion with Article 4 of ULIS yet another question emerges. Namely 
the right of the parties to choose the law to be applied to their contract cannot be but 
the law of one or the other specified country. This law can be only one which is part of 
the municipal law of a given country. This may be a municipal enactment or a ratified 
and incorporated convention. No rule can be applied as law unless it is backed by a 
state. A dispute under a bill of exchange may be determined by the Hungarian Act of 
Bills. This means that the Geneva Convention on Bills will be applied. Still the 
Convention itself cannot be stipulated as law without the indication of a country, the 
less when in the course of its circulation the bill does not turn up at all in a country 
which has ratified the Geneva Convention. The judge cannot apply it because the 
Geneva Convention on Bills in itself is a series of abstract rules, to which no recourse 
can be had in conformity with any conflicts rule. The freedom of the parties to choose 
the law does not extend to the choice of a regulation abstracted from all states and legal 
systems.62 Actually, in our days this is the technique of private international law which 
with the spread of uniform legislation might undergo changes. 
Wha t happens if the parties stipulate the application of ULIS, although they are 
nationals of non-contracting countries? If the judge's country is a signatory to ULIS 
he will apply it as the law of the forum. Still if this condition is not met ULIS cannot be 
applied as law. If the parties stipulate ULIS as an international convention valid 
somewhere in the world, then it is merely an extension of their contract and not law to 
6 2
 Here the question already comes into contact with the problem of the contrat sans loi, which we 
shall not discuss at this place. (Cf. Le contrat économique international, Brussels, 1975, p. 461; EÖRSI: op. cit., 
P . 3 3 3 . ) 
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which the contract of the parties is subject. If ULIS has been stipulated as the law of the 
one or the other acceding country, then the judge will determine on the ground of his 
own conflict law to what extent he may accept the stipulation as valid. 
Hence on the ground of Article 4 ULIS comes to be degraded to a contract. In 
this case its erroneous application or interpretation is not infringement of law. On this 
count no remedial action is admit ted. The provision of ULIS will not hold when they 
conflict the mandatory rules of a law, etc. 
(35) On the grounds of U L I S there is, however, a chance for applying the 
uniform law as law even when the country of the one contracting party, or only the 
country of the forum have become signatories to ULIS. This is the case when the 
signatory country has had no recourse to the reservation guaranteed in Article III of 
the Convention, i.e. the application does not depend on the status of the other country 
of a Contracting State. The T E X T does not recognize this facility. According to 
paragraph (a) of Article 1 the Convention comes into operation automatically when 
both states are contracting states. In conformity with paragraph (b) the uniform law 
may be applied even if neither state is signatory to the Convention, still in this case 
application will depend on the law of the forum, or possibly on the position the judge 
takes. If the forum is not a signatory, the judge is not bound to apply the Convention: 
he may have recourse to the municipal law of the country. On the other hand, if the 
business place of either contracting party is in a signatory state, then in agreement with 
the other contracting party the uniform law may be stipulated. Any forum will respect 
a stipulation in this sense. 
(36) A comparison of the sphere of application ULIS and the TEXT have 
brought under regulation impresses as if for its simplicity and lucidity the regulation of 
the TEXT had provided better chance for broader acceptance of the convention. While 
as compared to ULIS the T E X T narrows down the sphere of application of the 
Convention, as regards the definition of the subject-matter of the regulation 
considerably extends this sphere. It will suffice to point out that the contract will 
become "international" even when the places of business of the two contracting parties 
are in different states. Not a single of the three objective conditions of ULIS have to be 
met to this end. On the other hand , the T E X T expressly excludes contracts of a 
personal or household character, for else tourists going to a foreign country would for 
almost all their purchases come under the operation of the uniform law. (Under ULIS 
this would be the case only when seller forwards the goods to the address of the alien 
buyer.) 
The provision of paragraph (b) of Article 1, that the uniform law is applicable 
also when in conformity with conflicts law the law of a state is applicable which has not 
become signatory to the Convention, in reality implies the contingency that the 
Convention will be applied even when neither the countries of the parties nor that of 
the forum is a signatory (see ch. 19.). We have to add, however, that this 'open gate' 
does not threaten the non-signatories with absorption. The Hague Convention of June 
15th, 1955 and so also the convention of the socialist countries unanimously decree the 
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application of the seller's law to sale contracts. This connecting factor is making 
headway more and more. Hence the T E X T merely provides a facility for the 
application of the uniform law to non-signatories, still in practice the occurrence of 
such cases is negligible: in practice the state of the one of the parties will be a signatory 
to the Convention.6 3 
XIV. Usages and practices 
(37) In section (10) we have made clear that the uni form law is the last link in a 
hierarchical chain and recourse to it will be had only when f rom the sources preceding 
it the mutual rights and obligations of the parties cannot be established. Of these 
preceding sources the usages have given rise to most disputes, partly because with the 
signature of their contract the parties will find themselves under the ruling of the usages 
even without their express will, partly because both ULIS and the TEXT have brought 
under regulation the application of the usages. The application of the uniform law 
begins where that of the usages ends in a sense that they d o not provide for the dispute 
to be decided. Hence the usages have a dual role: first, they narrow down the sphere of 
application of the law, secondly, by supplementing the contract facilitate the 
interpretation of the contract and of the law. 
The literature defends divergent positions taken in theory as to the origin, 
purpose and application of the usages.64 The scope of the present paper does not allow 
of the taking of a position in the matter, therefore we merely call forth at tention to the 
circumstance that as for their function the usages occasionally rise to the level of a 
provision of law. On other occasions they may supplement the contract, on yet others 
they serve the interpretation of the contract . Theoretically, it has not been settled what 
makes the usages binding on the parties. Does their application rely on statute or the 
contract? This uncertainty may perhaps explain the great variety of names given to the 
institution.6 5 , 6 6 There are civil codes which expressly provide for the application and 
function of the usages.67 Here the source of application can be established. Even this 
does not answer the questions of which of the several usages should be applied, 
whether an internationally approved usage has become international by setting out 
from the national soil, or do usages originate on the level of international traffic.68 
6 3
 In this case the forum is the ordinary court of law; the tribunal of arbitration will give its award in 
conformity with the law the parties have chosen. 
6 4
 E Ö R S I , G Y . : Elkészült az UNCITRAL Egységes Vételi Tervezete (The draft of U N C I T R A L ' s 
uniform law of sales has been completed). Külkereskedelem, . . . p. 146. 
6 5
 D Ö L L E : Kommentar, pp. 41-42; B O N E L L , M . J . : The Relevance of Courses of Dealing, Usages and 
Customs in the Interpretation of International Commercial Contracts (Acts and Proceedings of the 2nd 
Congress of Private Law, Oceana Publ. 1977); J A K U B O V S K Y : New Directions ... etc. p. 550 
6 6
 Usages normatifs, usages interprétatifs, usages conventionels, model-definitions, causal law, etc. 
6 7
 Articles 1340 and 1368 of the Italian civil code; Article 1856 of the Mexican civil code, etc. 
6 8
 . . . certains usages sont assez généraux, et, dans la pratique, assez constamment adoptés pour que 
l'on puisse hésiter entre la qualification légale o u contractuelle. ( L O U S S O U A R N B R É D I N , op. cit., p. 656.) 
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(38) Article 9 of ULIS and Ariele 9 of the T E X T incorporate provisions on the 
binding force of the usages. The two provisions differ f rom each other. According to 
U L I S the scope of application of the usages is wider than that of the T E X T . And since 
the application of the convention begins where that of the usages ends, under the 
T E X T the uniform law has better chances of application. 
ULIS contains three provisions governing the application of the usages: 
(i) the parties shall be b o u n d by any usage which they have expressly or 
impliedly made applicable to their contract . . . 
(ii) the parties are bound by usages which reasonable persons in the same 
situation as the parties usually consider to be applicable to their contract 
(iii) in case of conflict with the law the usages shall prevail unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties. 
Hence the application of the usages may be stipulated: their application may 
follow from the contract , and, finally, from the fact that the usages are normally and 
usually applied by reasonable persons in the same situation as the parties. 
Consequently, it is not necessary tha t the parties should be acquainted with the usages 
o r should have knowledge of their existence at all .6 9 To this we have to add that 
commercial or professional usages develop in the countries with developed economies. 
F o r the mind of a reasonable person always the mind of a merchant of a developed 
capitalist country should be understood. Therefore this rule is ap t to produce 
inequitable results in particular fo r enterprises in developing countries.7 0 ULIS does 
not distinguish between international and national usages, i.e. there is scope for the 
application of both and in practice this rule prevails.71 There are opinions according to 
which such a distinction would be meaningless, moreover even dangerous for the 
obstacles it puts u p to application.7 2 
The Hague conference approved the rule notwithstanding the many objections. 
Moreover, there was a moment when it appeared as if the passage on usages not known 
to the parties would be dropped.7 3 Nevertheless the conference passed the provision 
6 9
 The application of the law of which the parties are ignorant is not analogous with this. First, the 
knowledge of the law after promulgation is a praesumptio iuris el de iure, secondly, the presumed knowledge 
of the law is one of the sources of the freedom of the choice of law. Finally, as regards the content of the law 
the parties have access to professional information. The same cannot be said of the usages of the existence of 
which either party or both may have no knowledge. 
7 0
 KATONA, P.: The extent of an area where a usage prevails is frequently uncertain, diverse usages 
may evolve in one and the same area in respect of one and the same commodity. Unification of the Law of 
International Sales (Legal Problems in International Trade, vol. II, pp. 163-192, Budapest, 1959.) 
7 1
 EÖRSI: The UNCITRAL Draft . . . etc. p. 146 
72
 . . . auf das Rechtsverhältnis der Parteien ist das Haager Kaufrechtsübereinkommen vom 1. Juli 
1964 anzuwenden . . . Dies wiederum entspricht naturgemäß dem Ortsgebrauch im Oftsihandel . . (italics 
by author). Landgericht Duisburg, 16. Juli 1976. (Unidroit Revue, 1977, vol. II, p. 284.) 
73
 JOKELA, H.: Scandinavian Studies in Law, 1966, p. 95 
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with the addition that the parties were bound by the practice which became established 
between them.7 4 
The provision in (iii) that in the event of a conflict between law and usage the 
usage should prevail follows f rom the permissive nature of the law and the priority of 
the usage. 
(39) Article 9 of the T E X T has narrowed down the sphere of the application of 
usages substantially. By this it has widened the sphere of application of the TEXT. It 
has decidedly rejected the application of local usages "by surprise." At the same time, it 
tied the implied application of usages to different conditions. 
The T E X T has in principle accepted paragraph 1 of Article 9 of ULIS. The first 
rule of the applicability of usages is the agreement of the parties. This agreement is not, 
of course, limited to international usages: the parties are free to agree on the 
application of any local or specific usages. Without any agreement the parties are 
bound by any practices established between them. 
Without an express agreement the application of usages based on implied 
agreement depends on the simultaneous existence of two conditions. The one is that 
only usages can be applied of which the parties knew or have reason to know. 
Secondly, usages can be applied only which are widely known in international trade 
and regularly observed by parties to contracts of the type current in the particular trade 
concerned. 
According to the commentary this last half-sentence exactly defines the usages 
the parties "had reason to know," nevertheless it is not quite clear whether such usages 
will in any case have an international character. Paragraph 4 of Article 38 of ULIS 
provides for the application of local usages. The corresponding Article 38 of the T E X T 
does not mention the applicability of usages, the commentary to the Uncitral draf t 
reads as follows: 
'Because of the international nature of the transaction the determination of the 
type and scope of examination required should be made in the light of 
international usages.'75 
It is hard to imagine that for the examination of goods supplied to buyer 
' international' usages should have come to be established. This is possible for goods 
which are traded and sold on the exchange (grain, wool, cotton, metals, etc.) where the 
quality standards have been defined and are controlled in conformity with exchange 
usages. In the major i ty of sales contracts, however, the method of control is tied to the 
locality and may no t only be of as many kinds as goods or commodities may be objects 
of the transaction, but depends on the package, quantity and many other 
circumstances. Unless the parties have agreed on the method of control, the 
application of local usages can hardly be avoided. 
1 4
 D Ö L L E : Kommentar, pp. 3 9 , 4 0 ; RIESE: op. cit., I I . Kapitel. Riese mentions that the cancellation 
was moved by the Bulgarian and Hungarian delegations on the plea that a provision of this kind would put 
obstacles in the way of the unification of law. 
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(40) The contrary opinions brought forward against the provision of the T E X T 
on usages objected, on one hand, the priority of the usages and the frequency of their 
application, while others, on the other hand, objected the narrowing down of the wide 
sphere of application ULIS grants to usages. Already in the preliminary stage of the 
formulation of the Uncitral draft it was suggested that "when redrafting the text of 
article 9 of ULIS it was proposed that after the word 'usages' be included 'even if of 
local or igin '" . 7 6 Recommendations have been forwarded suggesting that the usages 
should be applicable even when a newcomer in the trade is not acquainted with them. 
He cannot, therefore, plead ignorance. Recourse may be had even to local usages 'in 
the case where they are internationally known. ' 7 7 
Others have drawn the conclusion from the actual text ' that usages will be most 
frequently applied, thus derogating from the provisions of the Conven t ion . . . ' and this 
is unwelcome also because the usages have been developed by groups economically 
strong having a power position in the world market .7 8 This, far-seeing argumentation 
cannot, however, be resolved with means the law lends, or only in a very limited 
measure. Law cannot defeat economic power, and, in particular, not a law which is 
optional for the parties, i.e. where their contract can even exclude its application. And 
coercive rules cannot be resorted to for the unification of the law of international trade. 
Nor will such rules help this uniform law to spread. 
(41) The departure of the provisions on the application of the usages of the 
T E X T from those of ULIS is even more accentuated than the difference in the field of 
application of the Convention itself. On the formulation of Article 9 of the T E X T not 
only legal considerations prevailed. Also politics had a word to say. Already at the 
Hague it was suggested that Article 9 of ULIS might become an obstacle to the 
ratification of the Convention by the developing countries. It may be presumed that 
Article 9 of the T E X T has removed these obstacles. 
The legal significance of the TEXT consists in that that with the narrowing down 
of the sphere of application of the usages the sphere of application of the uniform law 
has expanded. Wherever usage has come to be thrust out the contract of the parties 
may enter, and in want of a contract the law will become the ruling factor. It appears, 
therefore, as if the concept of the T E X T had brought us closer to the goal of the 
unification of law. 
XV. Interpretation 
(42) The provisions of both ULIS and the T E X T bringing under regulation the 
method of interpretation are those which have elicited the keenest disputes. Already 
the Hague Conference rejected the motion that the judge should be vested with powers 
1 6
 Yearbook, vol. I, p. 134 
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very much the same as laid down in Article 1 of the Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch.19 The 
outcome of the debate is, nevertheless, a wording coming close to what the Swiss civil 
code formulates as ' . . . soll der Richter . . . nach der Regel entscheiden, die er als 
Gesetzgeber aufstellen würde. ' 
F rom a collation of the relevant provisions of ULIS and the TEXT it is evident 
that for the application of the uniform law the TEXT turns to conflicts law (unlike 
Article 3 of ULIS). Similarly, the last rule of interpretation is the recourse to the private 
international law unlike ULIS. In other words both instruments agree on that 
interpretation has, at first, to rely on the uniform law itself and on the principles 
derived from it, but the T E X T fills up the gap by recourse to conflict rules. 
(43) ULIS sets up two rules of interpretation. The first relates to the 
interpretation of the contract of the parties. Paragraph 3 of Article 9 provides that 
'Where expressions, provisions of forms of contract commonly used in commercial 
practice are employed, they shall be interpreted according to the meaning usually given 
to them in the trade concerned' . 
For the interpretation of ULIS itself Article 17 provides as follows: 
'Questions concerning matters governed by the present law which are not 
expressly settled therein shall be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which- the present law is based. ' 
If we now interpret this rule of interpretation it will be evident immediately that 
it provides guidance for the closing of possible gaps, i.e. for the solution of questions 
for which ULIS does not provide rather than for the interpretation of the written text 
of ULIS. 
Hence ULIS provides only for one half of the interpretation, i.e. for how to fill 
the gaps of law, whereas it fails to bring under regulation the method of interpreting 
the text itself. This is consistent with the principle set forth in Article 2, whereas all 
proposals moved to the effect that for cases not regulated by this law the law applicable 
according to conflicts rule should be taken into consideration, have been rejected. This 
expedient met in particular with the opposition of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
because an additional nest of litigation would be brought about in respect of the 
question whether there is a gap in law.80 Professor Tunc believes the solution to be 
satisfactory for two reasons. First, ' the law is very detailed so that true omission will 
doubtless only be rarely found in it', and, secondly, 'because it contains a large-number 
of provisions it will ordinarily be easy to extract its general principles.'81 This solution of 
ULIS is the source of many doubts. It does not exclude the possibility of a gap of law, 
still it does not authorize a solution by invoking another provision of law, in other 
words, by analógia legis. Such a lex would normally be national or municipal law. 
Instead the rule closing the gap has to be derived from U L I S itself, which is but the 
7 9
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adoption of Article 1 of the Swiss civil code: the judge turns law-giver. Although in the 
debate preceding the formulation of ULIS it was sounded that 'es ist nicht Sache des 
Richters, wie ein nationaler oder internationaler Gesetzgeber aufzutreten, '8 2 Article 17 
nevertheless grants this privilege to the judge. 
(44) Despite the possibility of recourse to analogy the filling of the gap is, 
nevertheless, inevitably legislative activity. ' Im Ergebnis läuft dies zwar auf eine 
Gesetzgebung ähnliche Funktion ' , writes Dölle, when, at the same time, he expresses 
his anxiety that there will be few judges who could free themselves of their training in 
national law and come to conclusions on the ground of principles accepted specifically 
in international commercial life.8 3 The law may exclude the application of conflicts 
law, still the law whose knowledge qualifies the judge as judge cannot be excluded from 
the judgement. This is not a pleading for conflicts law, only an analysis to establish to 
what extent the solution replacing conflicts law has brought us closer to the goal of 
ULIS, i.e. uniform law. Recourse to conflicts law has its risks: there are as many laws 
as there are countries, and as m a n y interpretations and ways to fill gaps of law. And 
there is perhaps no less truth in stating that there are as many laws as there are judges. 
(45) Article 17 of ULIS is no t without examples. Similar rules of interpretation 
and filling gaps of law have been taken up in Article 38 of the Statutes of the 
International Cour t of Justice, in other international instruments and in the legislation 
of a number of countries for the interpretation of treaties and conventions. These have 
a common trait, however, viz. they provide rules for interpretation for a single forum 
only, which may be an international forum or perhaps the supreme court of the one or 
the other country. The Rome Treaty laying the foundations of the European 
Economic Community organized a special court for the application and interpretation 
of the Treaty (Articles 164 and 177). The organization of such a special court cannot be 
hoped for in the event of a convention whose goal is the creation of the uniform law of 
states of different economic systems and degree of development. Not all of the 
signatory states would accept a uniform interpretation originating f rom some sort of 
an international forum, at least not in the present phase of the development of world 
economics. Professor Tunc himself does not seem to indulge in his optimism for he 
expresses his hope 'that an international body of case law will be formed, and that it 
will carry de facto authority, even in the absence of supra-national jurisdiction.'84 
(46) Article 7 of the Uncitral TEXT formulated the rule of interpretation as 
follows: 
'In the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention 
regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity 
and the observance of good faith in international trade. ' This formulation did not take 
into account possible gaps of law. Implicitly it pronounced that any question may be 
solved on the ground of the interpretation of the provisions of the draft , when it is 
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agreed that even before recourse to the relevant provisions of law the contract of the 
parties, the practices established in the course of business relations or the usages give a 
solution into the hands of the judge. The draf t did not seem to reckon with the 
contingency that after or even besides the interpretation of the existing rules further 
tasks may confront the judge. The makers of the draft did not seem to fear what Bacon 
brought up against the Church of Rome: ' . . . pretextu interpretationis Scripturarum, 
etiam addit aliquid quandoque et immutat ." 
Article 13 of the draf t preceding the above rule of the final draft brought under 
regulation the method of interpretation in agreement with Article 7 of the Limitation 
Convention. The passage ' and the observance' has been added by the last conference to 
the rule. 
The Diplomatic Conference in Vienna by establishing the TEXT has finally 
accepted the possibility that neither the text itself nor its general principles could give 
an answer to every question that may arise in the field of international sale. It accepted 
an additional provision for this case by accepting recourse to conflict rules. Para (2) of 
Article 7 reads as follows: 
'Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not 
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law 
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. ' 
ULIS, the Limitation Convention and the Uncitral d r a f t agreed that the law 
according to the conflicts law cannot advance the cause of interpretation. This 
precludes recourse to both the analógia legis and analógia iuris. So far there is no legal 
order of international validity or a convention bringing under regulation related 
scopes which by the means of analogy would provide facilities for the appropriate 
interpretation. It is the condition of analogy that there be ano ther regulation relating 
to an allied scope, the one or the other concrete provision of which may replace the 
missing rule (analógia legis), or from the other law principles may be derived which 
provide a solution for the cases not provided for by the law (analógia iuris). Fo r this 
purpose municipal law or the legal system of a country cannot come into 
consideration. Hence those in charge of the application of law cannot come to a 
solution unless by transgressing the boundaries set by the traditional methods of 
interpretation and creating a new law. We are inclined to believe that a fear of this 
contingency may account for the repeated moving of recommendations which wanted 
to extend the methods available for interpretation by means of the conflict rule. 
(47) The many motions which wanted to obtain an amendment of the article 
seem to have feared the uniformity of interpretation. Above all, they wanted to have 
the guidance of Article 17 of ULIS restored according to which at the interpretations 
of the Convention 'regard is to be had to the general principles on which this 
Convention is based. . , ' 8 5 
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A number of opinions came to be sounded against the mot ion. " A judge would 
undoubtedly wonder what general principles were being referred t o , " whereas others 
called for attention to the circumstance t h a t . . . "if the Secretariat does not define them 
every jurist f rom every country would prepare papers on general principles . . . which 
even the Working Group was unable to define . . , " 8 6 
Many repeatedly moved tha t in such cases, with regard to matters . . . not 
covered by this Convention, the law of the country should be applied where seller had 
his place of business.87 
There were critics who feared lest this provision should deprive the parties of 
their right to define the law governing their contract .8 8 The Working Group approved 
a single amendment only namely the one on ' the observance of good faith in 
international t rade. ' 
The good faith of the parties is a subjective moment and will provide nothing for 
the judge to go by when it comes to interpret the objective content of the law correctly. 
In any event to the judges of countries other than those of the C o m m o n law the notion 
of good faith is not unknown, and since it is not only a legal but also a moral concept, it 
may help to achieve the uniformity of interpretation. 
(48) In the background of this timid prophecy there is the recognition that , 
according to our present concepts, the uniformity of interpretation cannot be achieved 
unless through the agency of some sort of a common forum, something that is today 
still beyond feasibility. Still by adopt ing para (2) of Cart. F. we are facing the risk of 
having as many interpretations as there are countries acceding to the Convention. This 
would mean that as soon as the uniform law comes into operation it would begin to 
differ from itself: it would not be the uniform law which would be applied as such, but 
the uniform law as interpreted in the one or the other contracting country. In other 
words the conflicts of provisions of law would be superseded by the conflicts of 
interpretations. And by this the conflicts of provisions of law, whose elimination is the 
primary goal of any unification, would revive in the law of international economic 
relations and so also would uncertainty and the want of predictability come to life 
again. 
For the purpose of the application of the conflict rules it would have to be 
established in the first place whether there is a gap in the law or not, and whether could 
the dispute be settled by an interpretation of the text. Hence the determination of the 
conflict would be preceded by a question of qualification (primary qualification), and 
by this not only interpretation would come to be atomized in as many parts as there are 
legal systems according to which qualification takes place, but in the one or the other 
concrete case the application or non-application of a municipal law would become 
dependent on a number of uncertainty factors. By widening the ways and means of 
interpretation for the judge the text has narrowed the way leading to uniformity. 
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Perhaps the joining of forces of science and practice might obviate the danger, e.g. in a 
manner that under the auspices of a definite institution a periodical could be started 
with the task to collect judgements passed on the ground of the Convention from all 
parts of the world, publish and mainly discuss them. Perhaps the word of science, even 
if it is fainter than that of a super-forum, might sound sufficiently convincing. 
(49) Neither ULIS nor the TEXT answer the question whether the interpretation 
of the uniform law should be extensive or restrictive. N o r do they deal with the 
question how the rule relating to the recourse to usages should be interpreted. The 
policy of the TEXT is to extend its sphere of application, for in this case we should 
approach universality. This will say that the rule relating to the application of the 
usages should be interpreted restrictively. The Convention will, wherever it comes into 
operation, prevail as a special regulation by the side of the municipal, and an 
exceptional special rule should, with respect to the general, be interpreted restrictively. 
This would mean that in the marginal cases of application the judges would incline to 
determine the case in conformity with their municipal law instead of having recourse to 
the Convention. 
Still we believe, (and with this we would begin the interpretation of the TEXT) 
that Article 7 states with adequate clarity that the Convention has in all cases to be 
interpreted extensively. This is borne out by the emphasis the rule of interpretation lays 
on the need for the promot ion of the trend towards uniformity, by the fact that the 
Convention brings under regulation legal relations of an international nature, i.e. that 
it has been compiled for the general and not special regulation of such legal relations. 
О применении соглашений ULIS и UNCITRAL и правилах 
их толкования 
Л . РЕЦЕИ 
Гаагская конвенция 1964 года о единообразном законе о международной купле-продаже 
движимых, материальных вещей (ULIS) еще не вступила в действие, когда Комиссия ООН по праву 
международной торговле (UNCITRAL) в свою рабочую программу включила разработку проекта 
единого права купли-продажи. За основу разработки этого проекта UNCITRAL принял текст ULIS, 
но во многих отношениях отошел от него. Сходства и различия рассматриваются в статье только с 
точки зрения сферы применения двух соглашений и правил их толкования. 
Оба текста удовлетворяют требования универсальности: применение соглашения должно 
быть распространено на возможно широкий круг; применение национального равно как и 
коллизионного права исключено или сильно ограничено; признается ими автономия сторон и 
диспозитивный характер положений соглашения. 
Текст UNCITRAL является более простым и его санкции — более мягчими. Нет места такой 
оговорки, которая исключает применение соглашения в случае, не регулированном в договоре. 
ULIS ставит объективные и субъективные условия для применения соглашения. Перечень 
объективных условий упустили из текста U N C I T R A L , хотя они включительно содержатся в нем: 
соглашение может быть применено только на куплю-продажу международного характера. Что в 
ULIS появляется как норма права, то здесь только вопрос квалификации. 
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Между двумя текстами есть различие и в отношении видов сделок, не подпадающих под 
действие соглашения. 
Что касается сферы применения, автор статьи делает окончательный вывод, что текст 
U N C I T R A L — по сравнению с ULIS — суживает круг применения, но расширяет круг договоров, 
подпадающих под действие соглашения. Регулирование в нем тоже является более простым и 
обозримым. 
Основное различие по вопросу толкования состоит в том, что при толковании ULIS 
необходимо обращаться к тем основным принципам, которые выясняются из соглашения; значит 
нет внешнего источника права для заполнения хиатуса. Текст UNCITRAL позволяет судье 
обращаться к праву, применяемому по коллизионной норме. Правила толкования по обоим текстам 
представляют судье широкие возможности и вследствие этого есть опасение, что из-за различного 
толкования единообразное право по разному применяется в странах, ратифицирующих соглашение. 
Über die Anwendungs- und Auslegungsnormen der ULIS 
und UNCITRAL Abkommen 
L . RÉCZEI 
Das Haager A b k o m m e n von 1964 über den Kauf von beweglichen Sachen ( U L I S ) trat noch 
nicht in Kraft, als das U N C I T R A L die Ausarbei tungeines neuen einheitlichen Kaufrechtsentwurfs in 
sein Arbeitsprogramm aufgenommen hat. Bei der Ausarbeitung seines Projekts nahm das 
U N C I T R A L den Text des U L I S als Grundlage , jedoch mit zahlreichen Abweichungen. Die 
Abhandlung untersucht die Übereinst immungen und Abweichungen nur aus dem Gesichtspunkt der 
Anwendung der beiden A b k o m m e n , beziehungsweise aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Auslegungsnor-
men. 
Den Anforderungen der Universalität trachten beide Texte nachzukommen: die Anwendung 
des A b k o m m e n s soll sich auf ein je breiteres Gebiet erstrecken, die Anwendung der nationalen Rechte 
soll ausgeschlossen oder stark eingeschränkt werden, genauso was die rechtlichen Zusammenstöße 
anbelangt, es wird die Autonomie der Parteien und der dispositive Charakter der Verfügungen des 
A b k o m m e n s gewahrt. 
Der Text des U N C I T R A L ist einfacher, seine Sanktionen milder. Einen Vorbehalt , der die 
Anwendung des A b k o m m e n s in Fällen, die durch das A b k o m m e n nicht berührt sind, ausschließen 
würde, gibt es nicht. 
Das U L I S knüpft die Anwendung des A b k o m m e n s an subjektive und objektive Bedingungen. 
D ie Aufzählung der objektiven Bedingungen fehlt aus dem Text des U N C I T R A L , implizite sind diese 
jedoch darin enthalten: das A b k o m m e n kann nur für Kaufverträge internationales Charakters 
angewendet werden. Was im U L I S ein Rechtsnorm ist, ist hier ein Qualifizierungsproblem. 
Auch in Hinsicht auf die aus dem A b k o m m e n ausgeschlossenen Geschäftsarten besteht 
zwischen den beiden Texten Unterschied. 
Die Konklus ion der Abhandlung in Bezug auf das Anwendungsgebiet ist, d a ß der Text des 
U N C I T R A L im Vergleich zum U L I S den Anwendungsbereich einengt, das Feld der unter den 
Wirkungskreis des A b k o m m e n s gehörenden Verträge jedoch ausbreitet. Auch seine Regelung ist 
einfacher und überblickbarer. 
Bei der Frage der Auslegung ist die größte Abweichung, daß bei der Auslegung des ULIS jene 
Grundprinzipien gelten müssen, die aus dem A b k o m m e n selbst hervorgehen; es gibt a l so keine äußere 
Rechtsquelle um Lücken auszufüllen. Der Text des U N C I T R A L gestattet jedoch, d a ß der Richter 
von dem gemäß der Kollisionsregel anzuwendenden Recht Gebrauch macht. Die Auslegungsnormen 
gewähren dem Richter gemäß beiden Texten große Freiheit, wodurch die Gefahr besteht, daß das 
einheitliche Recht infolge der abweichenden Auslegungen in den das A b k o m m e n ratifizierenden 
Ländern in abweichendem Sinn zur A n w e n d u n g gelangt. 
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Procedural rules in the Hungarian 
private international law 
J. BACSÓ 
Head o f Department 
Ministry of Justice 
The Presidential Council o f the Hungarian People's Republic has enacted the code o f 
private international law. The Code entered into force o n July 1st, 1979, comprises the entire 
field of the private international law: in addition to the civil law, family law and labour law, 
also the provisions o f international civil procedural law. 
The general provisions of the C o d e are decisive a l so for procedural questions. Foreign 
law is applied if any foreign element is involved in the legal relationship. Although the 
Hungarian courts and other authorities apply, as ma in rule, the Hungarian law in their 
procedures, in exceptional cases the foreign law can be a l so applied (capacity to sue, delivery, 
etc.). The public pol icy may exclude the application o f a g iven concrete foreign procedural rule. 
The Code does not know, however, the reprisal as instrument of the private international law. 
The rules o f jurisdiction can make distinction between cases falling exclusively under 
the jurisdiction o f Hungarian courts and other authorities, they know the parallel jurisdiction 
and in certain cases, they exclude the competence of Hungarian courts and other authorities in 
foreign affairs. 
The C o d e regulates the existence of international pendency and the mode of its 
removal. It regulates the recognition and enforcement o f foreign decisions. With respect to the 
latter, no separate procedure (exequatur) exists. The Hungarian courts and other authorities 
declare the recognition and enforceability by taking the concrete measures. 
The Minister o f Justice issues certificate on any valid (or formerly valid) Hungarian 
statutory provision, o n legal practice and on the lack o f a legal rule for vindicating rightful 
claims abroad. 
The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People 's Republic has enacted in 
1979 the Law-Decree on the Code of private international law. This Law-Decree is the 
Code of Hungarian private international law (Law-Decree No. 13 of 1979, further on it 
will be referred to as "Code") . It regulates comprehensively the complete field of 
private international law, including the provisions relating to the international law of 
procedure, the jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. 
The roots of this Code trace back to 1948. A draf t bill was elaborated just at that 
time, it was not, however, enacted.1 The reason thereof is to a considerable extent that, 
at that time, the international atmosphere did not correspond to the endeavours for 
1
 The draft made by professor István Szászy was rewritten in form of A draft bill. Cf. SZÁSZY, I.: 
Magyar nemzetközi magánjog (Hungarian private international law) Draft bill and motivation, Budapest, 
1948. 
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framing the code of private international law assuming a peaceful coexistence and co-
operation. The other reason of the code of private international law being inopportune 
was that the Hungarian Parliament has enacted in 1949 the Constitution of the 
Hungarian People's Republic underlying the establishment of socialist legal 
institutions, the enactment of socialist codes.2 It is thus obvious that in 1948-1949 the 
code of private international law could no t yet have been enacted since the socialist 
statutory provisions on the internal substantive law and law of procedure serving for 
basis of the code have not yet been enacted. 
The standpoint of codification was therefore that instead of the enactment of a 
uniform code of private international law—parallel to the elaboration of socialist 
codes—the internal statutory provisions should contain also the most important 
provisions of private international law. It has come correspondingly—simultaneously 
with the framing in 1952 of the rules of civil procedure—in the Law-Decree No . 22 of 
1952 validating it to the enactment of the most important rules of international 
procedure, whereas parallelly to the enactment of the family law in 1952, in the Law-
Decree No . 33 of 1952 validating it to the enactment of rules of private international 
law of family relations. Since the family law was in close connection with the personal 
law, the latter law-decree regulated the various questions of personal law (majority, 
legal capacity) and the rules of private international law related closely thereto. 
The provisions of private international law applied subsequently in our 
international treaties (bilateral treaties on legal assistance, other multilateral treaties, 
etc.)—relating also to other legal fields above the fields regulated hitherto. 
As a consequence thereof, such a situation arose that—apart from the 
international treaties—the rules of private international law contained in internal 
statutory provisions regulated only the questions being in close connection with the 
basic statutory provision itself. The general rules i.e. the provisions touching upon all 
fields of the private international law (such as the applicable law, "foreign element", 
renvoi, reciprocity, legal judgement, etc.) were not codified. They survived as 
provisions of international customary law. The statutory regulation of several 
provisions of law of procedure of international relation were similarly lacking. 
With the enactment of Civil C o d e the socialist Hungarian legal system was 
established. Therefore, the idea of the framing of a uniform code of private 
international law came repeatedly up. In addition, the international trade considerably 
increased. The motivation of the code of private international law points out: "The 
international economic relations of Hungary increased to a considerable extent in the 
recent decades . . . Not less dynamically developed the international passanger traffic 
in this period. The concrete results displaying themselves in the practical realization of 
2
 MÁDL, F.: Magyarország első nemzetközi magánjogi törvénykönyvéről (On the first code on private 
international law of Hungary), Állam- és Jogtudomány, 2/1980. 
The first socialist codes are: Civil Procedure, Law No. Ill of 1952; Family law, Law N o . IV of 1952, 
Civil Code, Law No. IV of 1959. 
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the principle of peaceful coexistence: the continually expanding international trade, 
the manysided foreign relations of the citizens and economic organizations obviously 
increased considerably the significance of s ta tu tory provisions concerning the financial 
and personal relations of international character and among them of the private 
international law. ' '3 
In this way, it has come to the enactment of the Law-Decree No. 13 of 1919.A The 
Code not only summarizes the provisions contained hitherto in separate positive rules 
and modernizes them but also considerably extends these provisions with the rules 
contained hi therto mainly in the customary law. Besides, it generalizes and renders the 
part of the Code the provisions contained in bi- and multilateral international treaties 
entered already into. The Code has strived after perfection and aimed a t the 
codification of the complete Hungarian private international law. Therefore, if with 
the decision of any litigation some question of private international law arises, it 
should be examined in the first place whether there is or not bi- or multilateral treaty 
with the country in question, and whether the valid treaty regulates the ma t t e r in 
dispute, respectively. If the valid treaty contains the respective provision, only this one 
may be decisive. This provision namely has priori ty on the Code (Section 2 of Code) . In 
case if—for want of those said above—the C o d e is applied, it should be taken into 
consideration that the Code strived after a complete regulation, therefore if the Code 
itself would not give direct answer, the Code shall be interpreted and explained by the 
general means of legal interpretation. In principle, it is not precluded that the quest ion 
cannot be decided in this way either on the basis of the Code. Then, as a further step, 
the principles laid down in our international treaties shall be also involved in the 
interpretation. 
With respect to the procedural law, the attention shall be drawn to the fact that 
the Code did not affect the Law-Decree No. 7 of 1973 on the procedure necessary in 
case of diplomatic or other immunity. This s ta tu tory provision relates both to na tura l 
persons and juristic persons if the said immunity bears on them according to the 
general rules of international law. The court o r other authority shall proceed according 
to the statutory provision i f in civil or administrative action another state is concerned, 
or some evidence is arisen that the person appear ing in civil or administrative ac t ion as 
a party, resp. in criminal proceedings as accused or civil suitor is entitled to diplomatic 
immunity or other immunity based on international law. In such cases the cour t or 
other authority stays the proceedings and if in the opinion of the supervisory au thor i ty 
the immunity exists, it states the lack of its competence and does not take a decision, i.e. 
in respect of the said person it does not take any measure. 
3
 Motivation to the Law-Decree on private international law. General motivation. First part: 
Official collection of laws and orders, 1979, Budapest, 1980, p. 136. 
* Appreciation of works done in connection with the preparation of the Code. Cf. MÁDL, F.: Újabb 
szakaszban egy korszerű magyar nemzetközi magánjogi kódexért (In a new period for a modern Hungarian 
code on private international law). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 11/1978. 
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General provisions of the Code 
The general provisions of the Code (Sections 1 - 9 ) contain the provisions relating 
to private international law generally decisive a t the emergence of all questions of 
private international law. The effectiveness of the general provisions, the release of 
collision—in respect of procedural law—is considerably delimited by the rule 
according to which to the procedure at Hungarian courts or other authorities—unless 
the Code provides to the contrary—Hungarian law applies (Section 63). It may , 
however, occur tha t despite the above provision the general provisions of the Code are 
applied. 
a) The Code—as generally all laws containing provisions of private inter-
national law—contains also only reference provisions. It does no t contain concrete 
rules of conduct but states, the law of which state shall be applied if in the concrete case 
the law of several countries could be applied for the legal relation. This is characterized 
in the Code by the existence of "foreign element" . This collective term comprises 
foreign persons, foreign assets, legal relations (foreign right). Accordingly, the 
application of foreign law has doub le condition: in the given case some kind of (above-
mentioned) "fore ign element" shall be present a n d the Code empowers the proceeding 
authority or cour t to apply foreign law instead of the Hungarian one. The Code gives 
answer also to the question which from several applicable foreign laws should be 
applied in given case. 
b) The sphere of application of the Code is more closed in respect of procedural 
law than in the field of substantive law. While f rom among the legal relations of 
substantive law it refers equally to the legal relations of civil law, family law, labour 
law, independently of the fact which authority (court or administrative authori ty) 
proceeds, f rom among the procedures such general provision may be settled only for 
the court proceedings whereas f r o m the proceedings of administrative authorities these 
ones fall under the competence of the Code which have civil-law character (e.g. the 
protection against trespass falling under the competence of state administration), 
those having family-law character (guardianship, adoption, etc.), those being of 
labour-law character (procedure of arbitration of labour). The Code does not refer, 
however, to such procedural rules of authorit ies which fall outside this domain 
(taxation, o ther financial procedure and procedures of social insurance). 
c) The characterization means the statement of the fact tha t a legal relationship 
or legal institution is related to or agree with which other legal relationship or legal 
institution (known in the domestic law) i.e. h o w it shall be interpreted when applying 
the Code mak ing use of the Hungarian legal notions. If the Hungarian law does not 
know a legal institution o r knows it with different content or under different 
denomination and this legal institution cannot be defined by the application of the 
provisions of Hungarian law either, in the characterization the foreign law regulating 
the legal institution shall be also taken into consideration. The Hungarian law does not 
know e.g. the revision as a—normal—legal remedy of third instance. Therefore, if such 
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a legal institution occurs, with the application thereof also the foreign legal notion shall 
be correspondingly taken into consideration. The absolute termination of proceedings 
occurs in the given foreign law only after the resort to the legal remedy of third instance 
(revision). The stipulation of foreign law may be, however, important also f rom other 
point of view. Thus e.g. in case of the statement of pendency (Code, Section 65) when 
may the procedure be considered instituted, and pending, respectively, or when can it 
be considered definitely settled. In case of recognition and enforceability namely, it 
may be the impediment to a new procedure and decision in Hungary. 
d) The Code regulates how the content of foreign law shall be defined. 
Previously our procedural law knew it as "evidence of foreign law". This definition is 
rendered more precise by the Code which definitely knows the evidence of foreign law 
by the invitation of expert opinion. This is important because the principle of "iura 
novit Curia " is absolutely valid at the Hungarian court in respect of Hungarian law but 
in case of foreign law—in addition to the acquisition of texts of the respective legal 
rules—also the hearing of expert may occur. 
e) According to the Code, the application of foreign law is excluded in three 
cases: if it commits offence against the public policy (ordre public) if a fraudulent 
connection occurred (for the sake of the application of a foreign law) or the parties 
explicitly requested the application of foreign law. 
From among the above-mentioned cases the fraudulent connection is not 
frequent though it may occur e.g. by change of domicile, by the establishment of 
representation, in order to deprive the case of the competent court . The disregard of 
foreign law may also seldom occur since the Hungarian court proceeds according to 
the Hungarian law, the parties have no possibility for choice in this respect. The 
possibility of occurrence of action or behaviour offending the public policy is, 
however, brought up. When stating whether the foreign law offends the public policy, 
according to the motivation of the Code "the socialist legal systems follow the notion 
that it is exceptional and of protecting character, serves for the protection of the 
existing law and order and cannot be used for discriminatory purposes . . . It is 
therefore declared that the application of foreign law cannot be disregarded therefore 
alone because the socio-economic system of the foreign state in question differs f rom 
that of our state".5 
In the field of procedural law, a statutory provision offending the public policy 
may appear in such cases when it violates significant fundamental rights. Thus e.g. 
according to the Hungarian procedural law the legal capacity to sue corresponds to the 
substantive legal capacity (Civil Procedure Code, Section 48). And according to the 
Hungarian civil law, this is equal for everybody, irrespective of age, sex, race, 
nationality or religious affiliation. A contract or a unilateral declaration restricting 
5
 Motivation of the Code. Detailed motivation to Sections 1-9, point 5/e ib. p. 138. According to 
para (2) Section 7 of the Code: "The application of foreign law cannot be disregarded alone because the 
socio-economic system of the foreign state differs from that of our state." 
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legal capacity shall be deemed null and void (Civil Code, Section 8). According to the 
above rule this is therefore decisive also for the legal capacity to sue. Consequently, any 
restriction or exclusion of legal capacity to sue is contrary to the Hungarian public 
policy, therefore the foreign provision relating thereto cannot be applied. The Code 
defines expressly a rule of public policy for rendering legal assistance (Sections 67-68), 
as well as for the application of foreign legal rules in rendering legal assistance (Section 
68). The Code mentions similarly definitely the public policy as impediment when 
deciding about the recognition of decision passed abroad (Section 73, point a). 
0 Similarly, to the general provisions belongs also the conclusion to be drawn 
f r o m the Code according to which the Code does not contain any provision on the 
reprisal. The Code did not formula te it as an instrument of private international law 
referring also thereby to the improvement of the atmosphere of international co-
operation. This is true especially with the wide-ranging recognition and execution of 
decisions, including among others the release of the much-discussed provision which 
did not previously recognize the judicial decree of divorce passed abroad.6 
Significance of rules of procedure in the Code 
The rules of procedure of the Code are characterized in that they do not remain 
within the framework of court proceedings but comprise also the proceedings of other 
authorities, thus e.g. of the public administration. At the same time, however, this 
range is narrowed down by the definition from the side of substantive law of the effect 
of law (cases of civil law, family law and labour law). Within it, however, the Code 
strived after perfection. It regulated, correspondingly, all procedural questions which 
might come up in international relations. A separate part deals with the jurisdiction, 
with the rules of civil procedure in stricter sense. T o the latters belong the law decisive 
for court proceedings, the legal capacity and disposing capacity to sue, as well as the 
regulation of international pendency, and finally the issue of certificate on law and 
legal practice. The Code regulates the international legal assistance and its letters 
rogatory as well as the recognition and enforcement of the decisions. The regulation is 
characterized in each field, thus also in respect of procedural law, by the versatility, by 
the striving after differentiated solutions. 
There are, however, procedural institutions which are not separately regulated 
in the Code, but at the same time, bi- or multilateral agreements on legal assistance 
contain such provisions. The C o d e does not rule, e.g., on exemption from costs, on the 
conditions of provision for the security for law costs, on the use of native language, or 
generally on the possibilities of institution of an action, and of the performance of 
procedural actions, respectively, fo r foreigner. The fact, however, that no separate 
provisions exist, does not m e a n that these questions would not be settled in 
6
 MÀDL: op. cit. (note no. 2.) 
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international respect. In respect of these questions, namely Section 63 of the Code is 
decisive, according to which, unless provided to the contrary, to the procedure at 
Hungarian courts the Hungarian law applies. It follows that also a foreign national can 
institute a lawsuit before Hungarian court under the provisions of Hungarian law (if 
this is not precluded by the rules of the jurisdiction) and he may be also the defendant in 
a lawsuit instituted in Hungary (if there are rules of jurisdiction and competence for 
this case). Nobody shall suffer any disadvantage because of not having command of 
the Hungarian language—neither a foreign national (Civil Procedure Code Section 8). 
The translation costs of an application submitted in foreign language are advanced by 
the state and they will be charged to the account of the party losing the suit. (Order No. 
7/1972 (XI. 28.) of the Minister of Justice, Section 19). If, therefore, the foreign 
national is the losing party, he shall refund also the expenses of translation. This 
means, however, not some measure rendering more difficult the institution of a lawsuit 
for the foreign nationals, i.e. not a reprisal, but is the consequence of the rule that 
according to the Hungarian law the party losing the suit is ordered to pay the law costs. 
For the exemption from costs and for the provision of security for law costs 
similarly the provisions of Civil Procedure are decisive, provided that a bi- or multi-
lateral international treaty makes no exemption thereto. Accordingly, also a foreign 
national may be relieved of the payment of law costs, if international treaty or 
reciprocity orders in this sense. The provisions of Civil Procedure refer therefore to the 
international agreement, but allow also the reciprocity (Section 85). According to the 
court practice, the designation "foreign national" means in each case a foreign subject, 
and a stateless person resident abroad judged from the same angle, respectively. For a 
Hungarian national the exemption from costs can be granted even in case if he is 
resident abroad. The Civil Procedure expressly provides about the security for law 
costs (Section 89) but in case of a foreign national it similarly refers to the international 
agreement or reciprocity. The foreign national (which means here, too, the foreign 
subject or the stateless person resident abroad) may also be exempted from the 
obligation of providing a security for law costs only on the strength of an explicit 
stipulation of an agreement or of the reciprocity practice. 
Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction "means the division of cases between the states".7 The 
provisions on jurisdiction lay down the authority of which state can act in civil-law 
cases. According to another definition, the jurisdiction is the right originating from the 
sovereignty of the state to act with state means in legal relationship containing foreign 
element (i.e. to decide through the courts or administrative authorities).8 The fact that 
7
 NÉVAI, L.-SZILBEREKY, J.: Polgári eljárásjog (Civil Procedure), Budapest, 1977. p. 169. 
8
 VILÁGHY, M.: Bevezetés a nemzetközi magánjogba (Introduction to private international law), 
Budapest, 1973, p. 71. 
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which state organ, namely the court , the administrative authority or other authority 
proceeds, is decided not by the rules of jurisdiction but by other internal rules, 
provisions concerning the court proceedings. 
Also the Code contains provisions in this sense. While emphasizing in principle 
tha t Hungarian courts or other authorit ies have jurisdiction in any case (Section 54) if 
its jurisdiction is not excluded by the Code itself, it establishes the exclusive and 
excluded jurisdiction, and renders possible the stipulation of jurisdiction, respectively. 
a) The exclusive jurisdiction of Hungarian state means that in the given case 
only Hungarian courts or other Hungar ian authorities may proceed. As a matter of 
course, the Hungarian statutory provisions can oblige no foreign state to abstrain from 
the proceedings in case of exclusive jurisdiction of Hungarian authorities. Whether a 
foreign court or authority proceeds in the given case, is decided by her own code on 
private international law, or other internal legal rules. Accordingly, it may occur that 
foreign courts or authorities proceed, moreover, they pass decisions in such cases, too, 
in which Hungarian law reserved the right to the exclusive jurisdiction. This duality is 
released by the recognition and enforcement of decisions. Consequently, if the courts 
o r other authorities of Hungarian state have the exclusive jurisdiction, the Hungarian 
state does not recognize and enforce at all or recognizes and enforces only in cases 
enumerated in the Code the judgement or other decision of foreign court or of other 
foreign authority. 
In addition to the exclusive jurisdiction, the Code regulates also the excluded 
jurisdiction. This means essentially that a given state observes the exclusive jurisdiction 
of another state and forbids to her own courts and other authorities to proceed in such 
cases.9 It should be decided in this respect whether this enumeration of the Code is 
closed, that means, whether only a separate statutory provision may exclude the 
jurisdiction of Hungarian authorities in cases other than enumerated in the Code. If 
the enumeration is closed, a further conclusion could be drawn that—since no separate 
statutory provision exists today (not to mention, of course, the bi- or multilateral 
international agreements which may contain such stipulations)—besides those 
enumerated in the Code no excluded jurisdiction exists, in other words, the cases not 
enumerated here could not be said to be such ones for which the Hungar ian state has 
n o jurisdiction. 
In addition to the "exclusive" and "excluded" jurisdiction the Code does not 
know such a notion that in given case the jurisdiction "is lacking". It is beyond doubt 
tha t in case of excluded jurisdiction the "lack" of jurisdiction can be spoken about but 
even if the provisions relating to the excluded jurisdiction would be considered a 
comprehensive enumeration, there are cases which have no relation to the personal 
and territorial sovereignty of the Hungar ian state, moreover, the action of Hungarian 
9
 The designation "Excluded jurisdiction" is justly criticized. (Cf. NÉVAI-SZILBEREKY, op. cit. p. 
171.) A more correct expression would be in the Code: the Hungarian states has n o jurisdiction. Otherwise, 
a l so point a) para (1) Section 130 of Civil Procedure speaks about the "lack" of jurisdiction. Later it will be 
separately dealt with. 
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courts o r other authorities would be fully unnecessary because not only abroad the 
decision would not be valid but also in Hungary it could not be enforced. In the 
practice, namely such cases are to be found which are not enumerated in the Code, all 
the same it is by reason presumable that here the category of "lack of jurisdiction" is 
faced. 
As for the internal structure of the Code—comparing Section 55, and Sections 
56-59, respectively—it seems to be obvious that in addition to the exclusive regulation 
of Hungar ian courts or other authorities, the Code recognizes the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts (other foreign authorities) by the fact that in certain cases it excludes the 
jurisdiction of Hungarian courts (other authorities). Sections 56-59 do not contain, 
however, fully identical range with the Section 55—enumeration of exclusive 
jurisdiction. As against the cases falling under exclusive jurisdiction (points a)—g), 7 
categories of cases) four categories of cases are to be found under excluded jurisdiction 
(points a)—c) Section 56, further Sections 58-59 relating to personal status), 
completed by the provision referring to separate legal rule (point d) of Section 56). 
However, no such separate legal rule exists. The bi- or multilateral international 
agreements are not considered namely pertaining, since the Code can be applied only if 
no such agreement exists. 
These cases being investigated, it may be seen that the foreign equivalents of 
three cases from those of exclusive jurisdiction are not contained in the Code among 
the cases of excluded jurisdiction i.e. in this respect the Code does not prohibit the 
procedure of Hungarian courts or other authorities. These three groups of cases are: 
proceedings relating to a) immovables situated abroad, b) foreign assets and c) 
invalidation of negotiable instrument or deed executed abroad . Consequently, the 
jurisdiction of Hungarian courts is not excluded in such cases. 
Before drawing the conclusions thereof, another g roup of cases should be 
investigated. Sections 58-59 of the Code—which sections belong similarly to sections 
under heading "excluded jurisdiction"—speak about lawsuits relating to the personal 
status and to conservatorship. As compared to the previous Section, the matter is here 
not the exclusion of jurisdiction but parallel jurisdiction is stated: Accordingly, a 
Hungar ian court may proceed in cases relating to the personal status if either of the 
parties resides in Hungary (it is noteworthy that only court and lawsuit is mentioned 
here but no authority or administrative procedure is spoken about). Similarly, 
Hungar ian courts may place a non-Hungarian national under conservatorship, may 
end the conservatorship, and the Hungarian guardianship authority may appoint a 
conservator or may relieve the conservator from his function, if the interested party 
has the residence in Hungary. In this respect also the question arises what the intention 
of legislator was. If as a general rule of interpretation it is understood that the 
excluding and restrictive rules shall be narrowly interpreted, it follows that since no 
exclusive provision exists in respect of lawsuit relating to the personal status, the court 
might proceed in a lawsuit relating to the personal status of two foreign nationals 
without any restriction even if neither of them has the residence in Hungary. 
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Nevertheless, f rom the provisions of the above-mentioned Sections 58 and 59 of the 
Code , the conclusion shall be d r a w n that the Code did not want to insert two 
permissive rules: namely did not permit in general to proceed in lawsuit relating to 
personal status of foreign nationals and did not give special provision for the case if the 
foreign party or a t least one party has the residence in Hungary, but wanted to consider 
the latter as permissive rule.10 
The same solution seems to be justified in case of declaration of a person dead. 
The main rule is the exclusion of a foreign person to be declared dead (though no 
explicite rule exists) and the rendering this exceptionally possible all the same if it is 
necessary due to home legal interest (Section 58, para (2)). 
This problem being though solved through interpretation, it is difficult to find 
the answer to the question which solution the legislator wanted to give for foreign 
estates and foreign documents where namely no exclusive rule exists.11 It is, however, 
obvious that the enforcement of a decision relating to an estate situated abroad can not 
be realized. But neither here the jurisdiction of Hungarian court can be considered 
absolutely excluded. If, namely, the proprietary right to the immovables is contestable 
(may it be e.g. in case of succession controversies) or some contract relating to the real 
estate is contested, a decision may be passed also in Hungary in the relation between 
domestic parties. The situation is, however, not so unambiguous if in this connection 
arrangements should be made which would relate e.g. to some registration concerning 
the real estate. Hungarian cour t s or authorities cannot order foreign courts or 
authorities to do it. 
A decision invalidating a foreign deed may have in principle a domestic effect in 
respect of parties resident in Hungary . On account of the legal interest the jurisdiction 
of Hungarian court or other author i ty cannot be therefore definitely excluded. All 
these render problematic the response to the question whether the provision relating to 
the excluded jurisdiction in the C o d e is a closed and exhaustive enumeration or—if not 
so—whether the application of o the r provisions accepted in the private international 
law is justified on the strength of customary law. Such a principle of significance is that 
the precondition of jurisdiction is an effective relation to the Hungarian state.12 Since, 
however, the jurisdiction is in connection with the territorial and personal sovereignty 
of the state, this relation has an effect on the extent of jurisdiction. Obviously, the 
10
 According to Section 58 of the Code "In cases of non-Hungarian nationals relating to, their 
personal status . . . a Hungarian court may proceed, if either of the parties resides in Hungary". The "Code 
does not use such expression as "may proceed only . . . " . Moreover, the interpretation contained in the text 
is supported by that a previous text excluded Hungarian courts to proceed in cases of foreign nationals 
relating to their personal status, and to this rule the cited provision made an exception. 
11
 With respect to inheritance, such provision was contained in Section 2 9 o f the order 6 / 1 9 8 0 (VII. 
1.) IM of the Minister of Justice, according to which the notary public can conduct the administration of the 
will relating to the immovable and movable properties bequeathed abroad of Hungarian national on the 
basis of the injunctions of the Minister of Justice. This provision, however, became void due to Section 75 of 
the Code. 
12
 RÉCZEI, L.: Nemzetközi magánjog (Private international law), Budapest, 1961. p. 107. 
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Hungarian courts or other authorities cannot take such measures which go beyond the 
territory of the Hungarian state. All these being taken into consideration, the 
acceptance of the standpoint seems to be justified that the enumeration in the Code is 
not closed but in cases when none of the parties is resident in Hungary, the asset in 
question itself is not in Hungary or the action was not accomplished in Hungary, the 
lack of jurisdiction shall be stated.13 
May either the Code exclude directly the jurisdiction, or should the rules based 
on international customary law be employed, the result is in both cases identical. The 
matter is the lack of jurisdiction and its consequences f rom the point of view of 
procedural law shall be drawn. 
The consequences of lack of jurisdiction are definitely regulated by the Civil 
Procedure. Therefore, if the court observes the lack of jurisdiction, the petition is 
rejected without issuing a summons (point a) of para (1) Section 130). If, on the other 
hand, the lack of jurisdiction was noticed in the course of the lawsuit, the court shall 
discontinue the lawsuit (point a), Section 157). Against a judgement passed in default 
of jurisdiction and come into force, protest on legal grounds can be lodged by virtue of 
violation of law. Theoretically, it is challanged what effect the judgement passed in 
default of jurisdiction come into force and not contested by protest on legal grounds 
has. The Hungarian procedural law does not know the invalid, resp. void judgement, 
consequently, this would be formally a judgement as valid as it would be if the lack of 
jurisdiction would not exist. 
b) The Code renders possible also the stipulation of jurisdiction, on three 
conditions: 
aa) The stipulation shall be made in writing, i.e. it shall be definite and clear. The 
Code does not order as for the form of stipulation. It may be thus a paragraph of the 
contract, the litigations rising therefrom are e.g. intended to be settled by the court , it 
may be the clause of the contract, or it may be a separate contract relating to the 
jurisdiction of an ordinary court or of an arbitration court . Further, the stipulation 
may consist of two deeds of concordant content. In addit ion to the requirement of 
being written the Code does not require a more severe form (e.g. official document). 
The mode of stipulation may be either exclusive or simple. In case of a simple 
stipulation also the court having generally competence with respect to the given case 
may proceed. For want of contractual stipulation to the contrary, here practically the 
precedence will decide in the choice of the plaintiff. If, however, the stipulation 
contains exclusive jurisdiction, only the ordinary or arbitration court can proceed the 
jurisdiction of which is stipulated by the parties. 
bb) Either the ordinary or the arbitration court can be stipulated only in case of 
contracts of economic content. The designation "of economic content" relates to cases 
of obligation-law character, more precisely, to trade (foreign trade) affairs. In other 
1 3
 VILÁGHY., op. cit. p. 76. 
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cases, i.e. in cases not of civil law character, or such, but not of obligation-law 
character (e.g. with respect to law of succession) no such stipulation is possible. 
cc) The stipulation is possible only for economic affairs of "international" 
relation. Consequently, the foreign element appears in the contract by that one of the 
parties is a foreign national. 
The Code contains no fur ther clause. The contracting parties may be either 
private persons o r juristic persons. In respect of Hungarian private person no such 
stipulation is possible since he cannot enter into economic contract of international 
subject—foreign trade contract (Law No. 11 of 1974, Section 3). 
Irrespective of this fact, a private person could not deprive the ordinary court 
procedure of the case even through the arbitration court since this is excluded by 
Section 360 of Civil Procedure. 
In case of a stipulation corresponding to the Code—if it is exclusive—no other 
court can proceed. The procedural-law consequences thereof may be drawn on the 
basis of Sections 130 and 157 of Civil Procedure. If the wording of the Code is followed, 
the matter is here the stipulation ofjurisdiction. Therefore, if the ordinary court cannot 
proceed in case of exclusive stipulation, the procedural consequences thereof may be 
drawn on the strength of point a) pa ra (1) of Section 130, i.e. on the strength of lack of 
jurisdiction 
In our opinion, however, the provisions relating to the stipulation of jurisdiction 
of the Code involve even two elements. On the one hand, it does not define only that 
some ordinary or arbitration cour t can proceed but at the same time—as the 
stipulation of jurisdiction in strict sense, indeed—to the sovereignty of which state the 
litigation is submitted. The stipulation according to the Code may thus determine both 
the jurisdiction and the judiciary way. 
c) The Code does not mention the parallel jurisdiction. This is, however, not 
necessary since "each case in which the state of the proceeding court or other authority 
does not consider exclusive or does not exclude its own jurisdiction, fall under a 
parallel jurisdiction."1 4 This provision is decisive, in the first place, for cases of 
compulsory character—of economic relation. The fact which court or other authority 
proceeds, depends also thereon whether the internal staturory provisions of the given 
state render possible in such cases the institutions of a lawsuit at home. The answer 
thereof may be found among the provisions of competence. Although the main rule is 
always that the domicile, and headquarters, respectively, of the defendant determines 
the competency, thereto also the Civil Procedure makes exceptions. Thus, among the 
general rules of competence, it knows the competence based on the domicile or 
dwelling-place of the plaintiff (Section 29). Thereby, also the plaintiff residing in 
Hungary and thus the Hungarian subject is put in favourable position because the 
possibility is given him to bring an action before a Hungarian court against the 
defendant who never has had a domicile or dwelling-place in Hungary. The other rule 
14
 RÉCZEI, op. cit. p. 108. 
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of competence (Section 32) relates to lawsuits relating to property rights. According 
thereto namely against a defendant who has neither a domicile nor a dwelling-place in 
Hungary, a lawsuit relating to property rights may be instituted also before the cour t in 
whose territory the subject of lawsuit is si tuated or in whose territory a seizable 
property of the defendant is to be found. In addition, lawsuits relating to property 
rights may be brought against foreign juristic persons also before courts in whose 
territory such foreign juristic person has its permanent representation or the person 
entrusted with the administration of its affairs is domiciled. 
In the concrete case the parallel jurisdiction means also that the plaintiff makes 
the choice, before the court of other authority of which state he will institute a lawsuit. 
At the same time, in case of parallel jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of 
the decision passed by the court (other authority) of another state cannot be refused 
only for the simple reason that the court (other authority) of the own state could have 
proceeded in the case. For other reasons, however, the recognition or enforcement can 
be refused. 
d) Some comments will be now given on certain cases of exclusive and excluded 
jurisdiction: 
aa) Hungar ian courts or other Hungarian authorities have exclusive jurisdiction 
in a procedure against the Hungarian state, against a Hungarian state authority or 
administrative organ. In accordance therewith the jurisdiction of Hungarian courts is 
excluded in a procedure against a foreign state, a foreign state authority or 
administrative organ. This latter means, of course, that in this respect the Code 
recognizes the jurisdiction of the foreign state (point d) of Section 55 and point c) of 
Section 56). 
These provisions bear upon that in respect of jurisdiction and procedural law the 
Code accepts the immunity of state. Accordingly, the state can be judged only on the 
strength of its own laws, therefore against the state no lawsuit can be instituted before 
the court of another state, and no execution can be issued for her property.1 5 The Code 
follows this conception. It does not make difference whether the given case is in 
connection with the public-power activity or with an activity independent thereof of 
the state. 
This provision must not be, however, investigated without the other rule 
according to which the Hungarian civil law makes distinction between the state, the 
state authorities and administrative organs and the enterprises of the state. All of them 
are juristic persons independent of the state, having independent property. State 
enterprises appearing in the foreign trade are not under the effect of state immunity. 
Consequently, in Hungary the absolute immunity asserts itself only in respect of the 
state as a totality, as a sovereign. The provision relating to the substantive law to be 
applied is in connection with this provision. According to the Code (Section 21) the 
own law shall be applied for the state, except for the case if the state agreed with the 
15
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application of foreign law, the legal relationship refers to a foreign immovable 
intended to be acquired by the state, and if the legal relationship refers to the 
participation in an economic organization of foreign interest, respectively. N o such 
exception exists, however, in respect of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in respect of 
the substantive law to be applied, the Code contains no stipulation at all, concerning 
either the organs of state or the administrative organs, or the state enterprises. The 
rules of jurisdiction, however, bring the state-power organs and administrative organs 
under the same category as the state. 
The complete freedom is therefore only due to the state enterprises from among 
the state organs: the obligatory application of some law does not relate—generally— 
to them and no obligatory jurisdiction exists in their respect. 
bb) In the lawsuit relating to the personal status of Hungarian national the 
jurisdiction of the Hungarian courts or other authorities is exclusive—except if a 
foreign decision must be recognized. The Code speaks about the recognition of a 
decision given in the divorce case of a Hungar ian national domiciled abroad, of 
decisions passed in lawsuits relating to conservatorship, and of the decision relating to 
adoption, respectively (Section 71). 
In this respect the contested question may be that there is no Hungar ian 
statutory provision which would lay down what can be qualified as lawsuit or case on 
personal status. In addition to the four proceedings relating to the personal status 
definitely regulated (in lawsuits concerning the marriage, origin, parental supervision 
and conservatorship) other procedures can also be included here. The adoption and 
the declaration of death belong obviously to this range, it is, however, contested 
whether the placement of the child is subject to a procedure relating to personal status. 
In our opinion, this case shall be included here since the placement of the child with one 
of the parents has an effect on the supervisory right of the parent , i.e. on his personal 
status. 
Provisions on procedure 
Chapter X of the Code bears the title "Ru les of Procedure". Although the legal 
assistance as well as the recognition and enforcement of decisions are also connected 
with procedural law, the Code treats these latters in a separate chapter. The chapter 
contains correspondingly only a part of the provisions on procedure and as already 
referred to in the introduction, some of them are not included in the range of 
regulation. 
a) For the procedure—as main rule—the law of the state of the proceeding 
courts or other authorities applies. (Section 63). Other rules of procedure can be 
applied only if the Code itself provides in this sense. Such provisions are to be found 
e.g. with rendering international legal assistance, where, upon the request of the court 
demanding the legal assistance, foreign legal rules may also be applied, provided this 
does not violate Hungarian public policy (thus, the delivery may be effected not only 
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through the post but e.g. through the bailiff and al though in the lawsuit no oath is 
accepted, some statements can be confirmed by extrajudicial affidavits or oaths). 
b) As for the legal capacity to sue the Code has maintained also the previous 
statutory provisions. Accordingly, with respect to the legal capacity and disposing 
capacity, the personal laws of the parties are decisive. According to the Code, the 
personal law derives f rom the law of that state the national of which the person is. In 
case of juristic person the personal law derives f rom the law of the state in whose 
territory the juristic person is incorporated. 
The Code maintains further on the previous rule according to which a foreign 
national who under his own personal law has no or restricted disposing capacity only, 
but would have disposing capacity under Hungarian law, shall be considered as having 
disposing capacity before Hungarian courts and other authorities. N o separate 
provision exists in respect of legal capacity because if somebody would have no legal 
capacity under his own foreign law, the recognition of this fact as restrictive provision 
depriving of rights would be excluded by the Hungarian public policy. 
N o separate provision is contained in the Code in respect of juristic persons. 
Instead of the juristic person having no disposing capacity, its legal representative 
proceeds at all events, and in this connection no provision is contained in the Code. N o 
such rule is, however, known which would render possible that an organ having no 
legal capacity—i.e. juristic personality—would have a legal capacity to sue. This is not 
at all necessary since if the foreign national has legal capacity to sue under his own 
personal law, this fact is recognized by the Code (Section 64). 
c) An old deficiency is remedied in the Code by regulating the international 
pendency (pendency of administrative procedures) (Section 65). According to this 
provision namely, if between the parties a procedure originating in the same factual 
basis and for the same claim is instituted at a foreign court or other authority, in which 
the decision is to be recognized as valid and enforceable in Hungary, at the Hungarian 
court or other authority no procedure can be instituted. The filed petition shall be 
therefore dismissed without issuing summons, and the procedure being pending shall 
be discontinued, respectively. At an organ of public administration, the consequences 
thereof will be the discontinuance of the procedure. 
The Code does not give direction what is to be done if a Hungarian court or other 
authority passed later also a decision in merits. In the opposite relation, if the 
Hungarian court or other authority had passed earlier a decision in merits, the decision 
passed abroad relating to the same parties, with respect to the same right, derived from 
the same facts cannot be recognized (point d), Section 73). 
In our opinion, however, the legal position is settled even if in the above-
mentioned case the Hungarian court or other authority was ignorant of the decision 
passed earlier abroad and passed a decision in merits. If, namely, such a foreign 
decision is concerned which shall be recognized and which is enforceable in Hungary, 
respectively, essentially the same situation occurs as if a Hungarian court or other 
authority would have passed a final decision. The decision passed later by a Hungarian 
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court may be declared invalid due to a protest on legal grounds or due to re-opening of 
the case. If, on the other hand, the foreign decision cannot be recognized, the situation 
is as if no decision would exist, therefore the Hungarian court or other authority may 
proceed. 
d) The Code codified also the rules of issue of certificate on law. This belongs 
further on to the competence of the Minister of Justice. As against the previous positive 
regulation (Law No. LIV of 1912, Section 101) such a certificate can be issued not only 
on the law but on the practice of courts or of organs of public administration. Thereby 
the Code codified not only the positive provisions but also the practice developed 
effective in the meantime. According to the previous dispositions, the certificate could 
be also negative (no statutory provision for the given case existed). Although the Code 
does not mention it, the issue of such a certificate cannot be considered impossible. 
e) With the performance of procedural actions—delivery, evidence, etc.—the 
court or other authority of each state is bound to its own territory, and cannot perform 
such actions in the territory of another state. For this purpose the assistance of the 
other state is required. This assistance rendered by the other state is the legal 
assistance.16 The principles thereof are laid down in the Code when establishing two 
fundamental rules: through which channel the Hungarian and foreign courts or other 
authorities are in contact, on the one hand, and which law shall be applied in the course 
of the procedure, on the other hand. The contact is ensured through the supervisory 
authorities, the applicable law, however,—if it does not violate public policy—may be 
also a foreign law. 
Recognition and enforcement 
The recognition of decisions of courts and other authorities means that the 
judgements or decisions passed abroad become valid at home as if they would have 
been passed here. N o separate judgement shall be passed in Hungary in the case in 
question for the enforcement of the decision contained therein. 
For the enforceability of a judgement or decision its recognition is required at 
any rate. A judgement or decision which cannot be recognized is not enforceable. The 
enforcement has, of course, also other conditions. 
The recognition is informal also according to the Code. This means that no 
formal judicial or extrajudicial procedure is necessary the aim of which would be a 
decision on the recognition. The recognition occurs—if the judgement or decision 
fulfils the conditions—in that way that the state takes the necessary measures—e.g. the 
divorce is entered in the Hungarian register or on the strength of the judgement 
execution is levied.17 
16
 RÍCZEI, op. cit. p. 349. 
11
 Otherwise, it is contested in the theory whether the legal effect o f enforceability is attached to the 
decisions forming the law or to those containing statement. (NÉVAI—SZILBEREKY, op. cit. p. 425.) It was 
therefore mentioned that although no enforcement is here involved, some measures, actions of enforcement 
"character" may occur. 
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The recognition has general conditions being decisive in each case. As a general 
rule, the foreign decision cannot be recognized if the jurisdiction of Hungarian court is 
exclusive. Thereto, however, the Code itself makes exception in divorce suit, in 
procedure for appointing a conservator, in adoption cases and in case of a Hungarian 
diplomatic representative, if the state waives the immunity. 
There are, however, impediments of recognition, namely if 
— recognition would violate the public policy, 
— discriminatory competence reason was applied, 
— the Hungarian party did not participate in the procedure, either because the 
summons has not been served to him because the procedure was unlawful, 
— in the same case in Hungary a judgement or decision in merits was passed 
earlier, 
— there is a pendency because proceedings were instituted earlier at a 
Hungarian court or other authority (Section 73). 
The Code deals only with the enforcement of decisions relating to property right 
and placement of children. In addition thereto, no mention is made about the decisions 
not relating to property rights. This may be attributed to the fact that the decisions not 
relating to property rights are not included to the decisions requiring the enforcement. 
The recognition of these decisions involves namely the measures necessary in this 
respect—being, however, not of enforcement character—such as the entering in the 
register of judgements passed in procedures relating to the origin, to marriage, the 
measures taken by the guardianship authority necessary in connection with decisions 
relating to conservatorship, entering in the land register, etc. 
If these decisions have provisions of property right character (e.g. division of 
common properties of spouses, payment of court costs), provisions decisive for the 
enforcement of decisions relating to property rights shall be applied. 
Decisions concerning property right and placement of children can be enforced 
only in case of international convention or reciprocity. 
Гражданско-процессуальные аспекты 
кодекса ВНР о международном частном праве 
Й . БАЧО 
Презудиум Венгерской Народной Республики в 1979 году принял кодекс ВНР о международ-
ном частном праве. Кодекс вступил в силу 1-го июля 1979 г. и охватывает сферу международного 
частного права в целом, значит кроме гражданского, семейного и трудового права в нем содержатся 
и положения международного гражданского процесса. 
Общие положения кодекса являются руководящими и в процессуально-правовых отношени-
ях. Иностранное право применяется только в таком случае, если в правоотношении содержится 
какой-то иностранный элемент. Хотя венгерские суды и административные органы применяют, как 
правило, к их процедуре венгерского право, в исключительном случае можно применять и 
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иностранное право (процессуальная право-дееспособность, вручение, и т. п.). Общественный 
порядок может усключать применение конкретного иностранного процессуального положения. В 
остальных случаях в кодексе не предусматривается реторсия, как средство международного 
частного права. 
Правила юрисдикции различают дела, подсудные исключительно юрисдикции венгерских 
органов, признают параллельную юрисдикцию и в некоторых случаях исключают юрисдикцию 
венгерских органов по иностранному делу. 
В кодексе регулированы случаи приостановления разбирательства по иностранному делу и 
способы их устранения. Кодекс регулирует, далее, признание и исполнение иностранных решений. 
Что касается последних, здесь нет особого производства (экзекватуры). Венгерский суд или другой 
орган выражает признание и исполнимость путем принятия конкретных мер. 
Для зарубежного пользования министр юстиции выдает свидетельство о наличии действую-
щего (или действовавшего) венгерского законодательного акта, о судебной практике и отсутствии 
какой-нибудь правовой нормы. 
Zivilprozeßrechtliche Bezüge 
des internationalen Privatrechtskodex 
J. BACSÓ 
Im Jahre 1979 hat der Präsidialrat der Ungarischen Volksrepublik das Gesetz über das 
Internationale Privatrecht ( IPR-Gesetz) geschaffen. Der Kodex trat am 1. Juli 1979 in Kraft und 
umfaßt das vol le Gebiet des internationaien Privatrechts, so das Zivilrecht, das Familienrecht, das 
Arbeitsrecht und daneben auch die Verfügungen über das Zivilprozeßrecht mit internationalem 
Bezug. 
Die al lgemeinen Regeln des Gesetzes sind auch in prozeßrechtlichem Bezug maßgebend. 
Ausländisches Recht kann nur angewendet werden, wenn das Rechtsverhältnis irgendein 
ausländisches Element aufweist. In der Hauptregel wenden die ungarischen Gerichtshöfe und 
Behörden bei ihrem Verfahren das ungarische Recht an, ausnahmsweise kann auch das ausländische 
Recht angewendet werden (Prozeßfähigkeit , Zustellung usw.). Die öffentliche Ordnung kann die 
Anwendung eines gegebenen konkreten ausländischen Verfahrensregel ausschließen. Übrigens kennt 
das Gesetz die Retorsion als Mittel des internationalen Privatrechts nicht. 
Die Regelung der Fragen der Gerichtsbarkeit unterscheidet Angelegenheiten, die 
ausschließlich unter die Kompetenz der ungarischen Gerichte gehören, sie kennen aber auch den 
Begriff der parallelen Gerichtsbarkeit und schließen in gewissen Fällen die Kompetenz der 
ungarischen Organe in ausländischen Angelegenheiten auch aus. 
Der K o d e x regelt das Bestehen der internationalen Prozeßanhängigkeit und die Art ihrer 
Abwehr. Er regelt die Anerkennung und Durchführung der ausländischen Beschlüsse. Eine spezielle 
Exequatur bezüglich dieser letzteren gibt es nicht. D a s ungarische Gericht oder die ungarische 
Behörde äußert durch ihre konkrete Verfügung die Anerkennung und die Durchführungsberech-
tigung. 
Der Justizminister stellt für ausländische Verwendung ein Gesetzeszeugnis über eine wirksame 
(oder früher in Wirkung gewesene) ungarische Rechtsnorm, über die ungarische Gerichtspraxis, 
beziehungsweise über die Ermangelung einer Rechtsnorm. 
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Arbitrages entre les sujets de droit des pays 
de l'Est et de l'Ouest 
1. Malgré la tension dans les rapports politiques est-ouest, les relations économiques vont 
progressant et un grand nombre de contrats de vente, de coopération, d'entreprise etc. sont 
conclus entre les firmes des pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest. D'une manière inévitable, des litigés 
naissent des rapports établis par contrats et les parties sont grandement intéressées dans la 
liquidation rapide de ces litiges, afin que les relations puissent se développer sans heurts. Dans les 
cas de litige issus de ces rapports-là, les Tribunaux ordinaires sont moins aptes à répondre aux 
nécessités de la procédure que les cours d'arbitrage. Ces cours, en général, sont composées de 
juges en qui les parties ont confiance, qui disposent de connaissances spéciales, nécessaires, la 
procédure, en général, ne dure que quelques mois et n'entraîne pas de frais élevés. 
2. En Hongrie, la Cour d'arbitrage pour fonctionner auprès de la Chambre de Commerce 
Hongroise a été instituée en 19531. Il a fallu déployer une activité de propagande en faveur de 
l'arbitrage ad hoc.2 
De nos jours l'arbitrage est une institution vivante et en plein essor, dont les résultats 
éminents méritent d'être connus.3 La Cour d'arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce Hongroise 
fait état de progrès notables. Chaque année, elle a examiné 200 à 210 litiges et a statué dans 180 à 
190 cas, sans parler des arrangements, conclus entre les parties.4 Tout ceci explique l'intérêt 
suscité par le séminaire des cours d'arbitrage est-ouest organisé à Budapest du 25 au 27 
novembre 1980 par la Chambre de Commerce Internationale de Paris (par la suite CCI). 
L'objectif du séminaire était de faciliter l'application dans la pratique des conventions 
internationales conclues au sujet de l'arbitrage.5 Ce séminaire—comme nous l'avons mentionné 
— avait été organisé par la CCI de Paris, mais il serait injuste d'oublier de mentionner le travail 
d'organisation dévoué du Secrétariat de la Cour d'arbitrage instituée auprès de notre Chambre 
de Commerce qui a bien contribué au succès du séminaire. 
3. De nombreux rapporteurs se sont occupés des problèmes de la clause d'arbitrage. La 
conférence d'ouverture avait été en fait consacrée à ce problème. Dans la clause d'arbitrage il 
faut stipuler d'avance la forme et le lieu de l'arbitrage. La stipulation a lieu, soit lors de la 
conclusion du contrat entre les parties, soit au moment de la naissence du litige, lorsque les 
parties se mettent d'accord sur un arbitrage ad hoc. En cas de stipulation faite entre les parties 
comme clause du contrat, celles-ci mettent d'accord en général, donc la clause ne sera pas 
1
 Cf. Décret 1/1953. (VII. 28) BkM du Ministre du Commerce intérieur. 
2
 Cf. RÉVAI, T.: A választottbíróság elvi kérdései a szocializmusban (Questions de principe de 
l'arbitrage au socialisme), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2/1963. 
3
 JUHÁSZ, J.: Választottbíráskodás a KGST-ben (Arbitrage au sein du CAEM) Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 11/1980. 
4
 SEBESTYÉN, GY.: Discours d'inauguration du Séminaire sur l'arbitrage ouest-est, Á Budapest du 22 
au 27 novembre 1980. (Megnyitó beszéd az 1980. nov. 22-27-i budapesti Nyugat-Keleti választottbirósági 
szemináriumon. ) 
5
 LITTMANN, M.: A választottbírósági záradékok Írásbeli formája és hatályossága (Forme écrite et 
validité des clauses d'arbitrage), conférence d'ouverture. 
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exactement conforme au cas, tandis qu'en cas de stipulation ad hoc, les parties ont plus de 
facilités à se retrouver et à décider des différentes questions relatives à l'arbitrage.® 
Cette question est bien moins importante en a qui concerne contrats entre les 
organisations des Etats-membres du CAEM car dans ce cas c'est la Convention de compétence de 
Moscou de 1972, qui établit ex lege la compétence de la cour d'arbitrage, notamment celle de la 
cour d'arbitrage instituée auprès de la Chambre de commerce.7 Le choix du droit à appliquer 
figurant dans la clause d'arbitrage est extrêmement important. 
En ce qui concerne la forme de l'arbitrage, il faut mentionner la cour d'arbitrage 
permanente ou institutionnelle et l'arbitrage ad hoc. La Cour d'Arbitrage de la Chambre de 
Commerce Internationale de Paris, membre de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale 
coopérant avec les comités nationaux des Etats-membres est une cour institutionnelle. 
Cette cour d'arbitrage est souvent saisie, aussi bien par les firmes des pays de l'Ouest que 
de l'Est. Elle a établi son Réglement, sur lequel nous nous étendrons par la suite. Des cours 
d'arbitrage permanentes fonctionnent à Londres, en Suède, en Hollande, etc. 
L'avantage de la cour d'arbitrage institutionnelle réside dans la procédure, selon laquelle 
elle a le droit de désigner les arbitres, bien que les parties puissent également se mettre d'accord 
sur la forme à suivre. Son autre avantage, c'est que le Réglement prévoit la procédure et aussi les 
moyens techniques, les locaux, le rédacteur du procès-verbal, etc, nécessaires à la procédure de la 
cour d'arbitrage. Les cours d'arbitrage ad hoc ne disposent pas de tels avantages, cependant les 
parties, dans des cas particulièrement compliqués, recourent à cette forme d'arbitrage. 
4. Il est important savoir si la cour d'arbitrage statue selon la loi ou l'équité. En 
Angleterre, les arbitres doivent procéder selon la loi. En France, par contre, les arbitres sont 
autorisés par la loi à se prononcer en tant «qu'amiables compositeurs». En Allemagne, la 
situation est similaire, les arbitres ne sont pas liés par la loi. Les cours d'arbitrage instituées 
auprès des chambres de commerce des les pays membres du CAEM doivent procéder selon les 
règles du droit matériel unifié du CAEM8 et toute sentence en divergente serait illégale. 
Le choix du siège de la cour d'arbitrage est essentiel, car il peut produire un effet sur la 
détermination du droit à appliquer. Le choix du lieu du siège est important lorsque les parties 
résident dans des pays différents. La CCI désigne un tiers pas neutre, qui généralement est situé à 
égale distance des deux pays des parties en cause.9 
La neutralité, cependant, comporte un trait négatif, c'est que les parties ne connaissent 
pas le droit de ce tiers pays, qui, le cas échéant, serait appliqué. 
Sur le plan international les parties saisissent souvent la Cour d'arbitrage de Londres, 
dont les difficultés de procédure ont été éliminées par la loi anglaise de 1979, sur l'arbitrage. En 
effet, le droit de contrôle du tribunal ordinaire a été considérablement réduit, les parties peuvent, 
exclure selon accord le droit d'appel au tribunal ordinaire, à l'exception de quelques cas.10 
La stipulation d'arbitrage n'a qu'une importance minime dans les rapports juridiques des 
organisations des pays du CAEM par suite de la Convention de Moscou de 1972 sur la 
6
 LITTMANN: op. cit. 
7
 STROHBACH, H.: Convention du 26 mai 1972 sur l'arbitrage dans les litiges relatifs aux rapports de la 
coopération économique, scientifique et technique. Rapport présenté à l'occasion du séminaire. 
8
 Conditions générales de livraison du C A E M , texte amendé en 1979 des Condit ions générales de 
Livraison de 1968/19/75, les conditions générales des services techniques du CAEM de 1962), Conditions 
générales de la spécialisation de la production et de coopération entre pays du CAEM, conditions générales 
de la mise à disposition réciproque des cargaisons de navires et des produits destinés à l'exportation des Etats-
membres du C A E M . 
9
 DERAINS, Y.: Application dans la pratique du réglement de procédure de la Cour d'arbitrage de la 
CCI. Rapport, fait au séminaire. 
10
 LITTMANN, op. cit. 
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compétence des cours d'arbitrage.11 La question de stipulation d'arbitrage n'a d'importance que 
dans le cas ou il s'agit d'une firme d'un pays non-membre du CAEM. La situation est bien plus 
simple lorsqu'il s'agit d'organisations d'Etats-membres du CAEM, car à l'exception de la 
Mongolie et du Viet-Nam, tous sont parties de la Convention de New- York de 1958, sur la 
reconnaissance et l'exécution des sentences arbitrales étrangères ainsi que de la Convention 
européenne sur l'arbitrage de 1961 de Genève. 
En général, la clause d'arbitrage pose le problème de l'obligation de la forme écrite, à 
savoir si la stipulation figure dans un accord par échange de télégramme ou de telex. La forme de 
document écrit ne peut se passer de la signature des parties qui ne figure ni dans un telex, ni dans 
un télégramme et il n'est même pas sûr que le télégramme par exemple ait été expédié par la 
personne figurant comme ayant signé.12 Même cette « soi-disant » forme écrite manque lorsque 
le reguérant introduit sa demande à la cour d'arbitrage et le défendeur ne contestant pas la 
compétence expose sa défense devant la cour d'arbitrage. 
5. Selon la plupart des auteurs d'ouvrages de jurisprudence, dans la clause d'arbitrage on 
doit désigner le litige concret touché par la stipulation ou le rapport juridique dont découlent les 
litiges sujets à éxamen par la voie d'arbitrage. Il est difficile de justifier un avis contraire et on ne 
peut l'accepter.13 Dans les Etats-membres du CAEM les cours d'arbitrage des chambres de 
commerce en de nombreux cas, procèdent sans stipulation sur la base des Conditions Générales 
de Livraison ou de la Convention de Moscou sur les compétences. Sur cette base on peut 
distinguer l'arbitrage spontané d'avec celui obligatoire. 
En ce qui concerne la stipulation de l'arbitrage ad hoc, le séminaire a noté très justement 
que la clause doit être complète, c'est-à-dire doit comprendre le mode et le mécanisme de la 
constitution de la cour d'arbitrage. 
6. Au cours des débats du séminaire on s'est largement occupé de la naissance de la 
Convention de compétence signée à Moscou en 1972.14 Celle-ci remonte au programme 
complexe établi en vue de l'intégration socialiste, objet de la XXVe session du CAEM tenu à 
Bucarest en 1971, qui entre autres prévoit l'élargissement de la compétence des cours d'arbitrage 
des chambres de commerce, au point de vue juridique (chapitre Ier, article 1er et chapitre IV, 
article 13). C'est à la base des mesures mentionnées du programme complexe qu'a été constitué 
la commission juridiqe dite Conférence Juridique du CAEM, dans la cadre duquel des groupes 
de travail ont été constitués pour les différents domaines du droit. C'est ainsi qu'avait été 
constitué le groupe de travail pour les cours d'arbitrage, qui préparait le projet de la Convention 
de compétence de Moscou. Cette convention qui a été ratifiée en Hongrie par le décret loi 23 de 
l'an 1973 et qui est entré en vigueur le 13 août 1973, prévoit la juridiction exclusive des cours 
d'arbitrage des chambres de commerce dans tout litige civil entre les organisations des Etats au 
sujet de la coopération économique, scientifique et technique des membres du CAEM. À notre 
avis, les litiges nés dans le cadre de la co-opération par suite d'actes ou de conduites illégales 
illicites relèvent obligatoirement de la compétence des cours d'arbitrage des chambres de 
commerce, ce qui est contraire à la position reflétée par la jurisprudence, selon laquelle il ne 
s'agisse que de la compétence des litiges découlant des contrats, ce qui ne toucherait pas les 
litiges15 découlant d'obligations delictuelles. 
Bien que au terme des diverses conditions de livraison, la disposition relative aux cours 
d'arbitrage ne soit pas obligatoire on ne peut imaginer une solution à disposition différant de 
cette disposition, par exemple en vertu du paragraphe (2) du préambule des Conditions 
11
 MANOWSKI, Z. L.: Préparation et validité des clauses d'arbitrage, Rapport présenté au séminaire. 
12
 NANOWSKI, op. cit. 
1 3
 Cf. NANOWSKI, op. cit. 
1 4
 STROHBACH, op. cit. 
1 5
 Cf. STROHBACH, op. cit. 
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Générales de Livraison. D'ailleurs la Convention sur les compétences de Moscou est un texte 
plus récent et selon le principe de la lex posterior derogat priori, la stipulation d'arbitrage des 
conditions de livraison constituent une règle obligatoire.16 
Il est notoire que les Conditions générales de livraison et la Convention de compétence de 
Moscou suivent le principe de la partie défenderesse toutefois les parties ont la liberté de se 
soumettre à l'arbitrage de la Cour d'arbitrage de la Chambre de commerce d'une partie tierce à la 
convention et ont feu vert pour saisir des cours d'arbitrage spécialisées (de telles cours 
fonctionnent à Gdynia, à Moscou). Nous ne désirons pas nous étendre en détail sur la 
convention de Moscou, car une étude détaillée y a été consacrée dans la revue « Külgazdaság » 
(Commerce extérieur).17 Il faut cependant mentionner l'article V. de la convention visent refus 
de l'exécution de la sentence de la cour d'arbitrage, et parmi les trois causes mentionnées du refus 
figure l'annulation du jugement dans le pays où siège la cour d'arbitrage. Au cours des 8 années 
écoulées depuis la signature de la convention, non seulement aucune réglementation uniforme 
n'a été formulée au sujet de cette annulation mais aussi les firmes des Etats-membres se trouvent 
en positions inégales. Dans certains Etats-membres, comme par exemple en Tchécoslovaquie, en 
Pologne, en Roumanie la sentence de la cour d'arbitrage peut être attaquée uniquement pour la 
violation des formes substantielles, et en Roumanie on peut même introduire une requête civile, 
tandis que dans d'autres Etats comme par exemple en Bulgarie ou en Hongrie cette possibilité est 
exclue. Sous ce rapport le statut juridique des firmes dépend de l'Etat où la procédure se déroule. 
En Roumanie, la firme hongroise étant une des parties en cause devant la cour d'arbitrage peut 
faire valoir son prétention à l'annulation et peut même introduire une requête civile, par contre 
la firme roumaine apparaissant devant une Cour d'arbitrage hongrois n'a pas tel droit.18 
7. L'autre résultat remarquable de l'activité du groupe de travail pour les cours 
d'arbitrage mentionné ci dessus fut l'élaboration d'un Réglementât uniforme des cours 
d'arbitrage des chambres de commerce, adoptée par le Comité exécutif du CAEM, sous forme 
de recommandation et mise en pratique par les cours d'arbitrage des chambres de commerce des 
Etats-membres en 1975-76. Les différentes cours d'arbitrage ont le droit de dévier des règles 
recommandées, en ce qui concerne des questions de moindre importance, toutefois ces 
différences ne peuvent pas toujours être considérées comme sans importance, car il y en a 
d'importentes aussi.1 ' 
8. L'analyse des questions relatives à la Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI a été un résultat 
notable de ce séminaire. 
La Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI connaît une large variété litiges du domaine du commerce 
international. 
Les membres de la Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI sont des ressortissants de 36 pays. La cour 
d'arbitrage ne tranche pas elle-même les différends mais elle met en marche et de superviser 
l'activité du tribunal. Le président et les arbitres sont ressortissants de pays neutres par rapport 
aux parties du litige. Le siège de l'arbitrage est désigné par les parties, au cas où un tel accord 
n'existerait pas la Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI choisit un pays neutre comme siège du tribunal 
arbitral. 
Cette structure distingue cette Cour d'arbitrage de tout autre cour d'arbitrage 
fonctionnant ailleurs. Des parties de tous les pays du monde saississent la Cour d'arbitrage de la 
CCI par suite de son caractère réellement international. 
16
 SZALÓKY, L.: intervention au séminaire. 
17
 RÉVAI, T.: Egyezmény kizárólagos választottbírósági hatáskörről a KGST tagállamok szervezetei 
közötti polgári jogi vitában. Külgazdaság, 2/1972. Convent ion sur la juridiction exclusive des cours 
d'arbitrage d a n s les litiges de droit civile entre organisations des Etats-membres du CAEM. 
18RÉVAI, T.: Egységes választottbírósági eljárási szabályzat a KGST tagállamokban. Külgazdaság, 
6/1980. Règle de procédure un i forme des cours d'arbitrage dans les Etats d u CAEM. 
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Il faut souligner / 'autonomie des parties, aussi bien pour la désignation des arbitres que 
pour le lieu de l'arbitrage. La Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI n'intervient dans la procédure même, 
que dans le cas où les arbitres ne respectent pas les règles. Cependant, en général, les règles de la 
procédure sont respectée et les sentences sont dans leur majorité ou presque toutes exécutées par 
les parties. 
La procédure elle-même comprend une phase préparatoire, qui se déroule devant la Cour 
d'arbitrage de la CCI, le but de celle-là est d'introduire la réponse et aussi éventuellement 
d'intenter une action reconventionnell permettre au demanteur d'y présenter sa note en réponse 
de constituer le tribunal arbitral devant procéder, de désigner le lieu de laXprocédure et de 
prendre les dispositions financières nécessaires. 
Au début de la procédure apparaissent parfois des obstacles typiques, tels le retard de la 
partie défenderesse à la présentation de sa note en réponse, la contestation relative à la 
convention d'arbitrage, le refus par la partie défenderesse de participer à la constitution du 
tribunal. 
La cour d'arbitrage de la CCI aplanit ces difficultés. Au cas où la partie défenderesse ne 
présente pas sa note en réponse dans un délai 30 jours, la procédure se met en marche. La 
déposition de la moitié de la somme de la provision permet également la poursuite de la 
procédure et le tribunal arbitral saisi statue lui-même en ce qui concerne les questions de 
compétence et de convention d'arbitrage. En ce qui concerne la désignation des arbitres, les 
parties peuvent profiter de tous les avantages relatifs à l'arbitrage ad hoc. En effet, elles n'ont 
pas à se tenir à la liste des arbitres de la CCI, ni à leur nationalité. Il est possible de stipuler que les 
arbitres désignés par les parties (un par chacune) choisissent eux-même leur président. 
L'autonomie des parties est liée à un certain délai et est soumise à la règle prévoyent que chacun 
des arbitres et le président doivent être d'une nationalité neutre. 
Les comités nationaux des différents pays contribuent au travail de la cour d'arbitrage de 
la CCI, ceux-là pouvant proposer des arbitres non seulement en present en considération leur 
neutralité, mais aussi leurs rapports avec les parties. 
La Cour arbitrale de la CCI a adopté, au sujet du droit à appliquer, l'article 7. de la 
Convention européenne et conformément à cela, en vertu de l'article 13, paragraphés 3 et 5. du 
Réglement de la Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI, les parties sont libres de déterminer le droit devant 
être appliqué, et faute d'accord entre les parties, le tribunal applique le droit qu'il juge 
appropriée en l'espèce. Même en vertu de l'article 12" du Réglement de la Cour d'arbitrage 
hongroise, il faut prendre en considération les stipulations du contrat et les usages et coutumes 
commerciaux. 
Le tribunal arbitral décide à la majorité des voix. A défaut de majorité, le président statue 
seul. 
La cour d'arbitrage de la CCI ne peut intervenir dans la décision que pour les questions de 
forme et non pas au fond. Ainsi par exemple elle peut attirer l'attention du tribunal sur le fait 
qu'il ne peut statuer ultra petitu et ne peut adjuger un intérêt moratoire, si la partie demanderesse 
ne Г a pas demandé. 
Certaines réformes de la Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI ont été nécessitées par suite de 
l'augmentation du nombre cas (annuellement 300). En 1980, un réglement interne de la Cour 
arbitrale a été élaborée, celle-ci déférant certains droits de la Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI à une 
commission de trois membres (un président et deux membres) composée de ses propres membres. 
À l'avis de la commission les cas les plus compliqués, à l'avenir aussi, seront du ressort du 
plénum. La commission se réunit deux fois par mois et son activité contribue largement à 
accélérer le déroulement des cas. 
Le tarif des frais a été modifié et est plus avantageux. La partie demanderesse doit déposer 
une provision de 500 dollars, lors de l'introduction de son action et cette somme ne lui est pas 
remboursée, dans la cas où l'affaire est retirée avant la remise du dossier au tribunal arbitral. 
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Mais dans ce cas-ci d'autres frais ne sont pas prescrits. Si l'affaire n'est pas retirée et que la 
procédure suit son cours, les 500 dollars mentionnés seront imputés sur les frais. 
En ce qui concerne les réformes il faut aussi mentionner que la Cour d'arbitrage ne siège a 
précédemment qu' à Paris, bien que les parties demanderesses de n'importe quel pays aient eu la 
possibilité de s'y adresser. Ainsi au cas où la procédure ne se déroulait pas à Paris des difficultés 
techniques se présentaient (salle d'audience procès verbal, etc.) Selon l'une des mesures prévues 
par la réforme, de différents centres seraient désignées à l'intention des cours d'arbitrage. Un tel 
centre fonctionne dès maintenant à Séoul (Corée du Sud) et un autre fonctionnera sous peu à 
Londres. On prépare également l'établissement d'une Cour à New York, des autres en Amérique 
Latine et au Moyen-Orient. Tout ceci bien entendu assure aux parties le droit de choisir 
librement le lieu de la procédure.20 
9. Le fonctionnement des Cours d'arbitrage instituées auprès des chambres de commerce 
des Etats-membres du CAEM est d'une importance similaire, naturellement surtout pour les 
organisations fonctionnant dans les Etats-membres du CAEM. Lorsqu'on compare les 
réglements respectifs, on peut constater une grande similitude entre les Réglements mongols, 
polonais, soviétiques et hongrois, tandis que certaines différences apparaissent dans les 
Réglements de la RDA, de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie.21 Ainsi donc les Cours d'arbitrage des 
chambres de commerce sont devenues des cours d'arbitrage uniformes internationales dans le 
domaine du commerce extérieur. 
Il faut également mentionner que le tribunal arbitral n'examinera que ce qui est exposé 
par les parties. Les faits non exposés, des demandes de preuve non soumises ne peuvent être 
examinées par le tribunal arbitral.22 
Le droit des parties à être entendues est assuré par de nombreuses dispositions de 
règlements des différentes chambres de commerce ainsi que par les (yglements uniformes. 
La personne du représentant n'est nullement limitée, le représentant peut être aussi bien 
être un avocat étranger, un avocat-conseil ou n'importe quelle autre personne. 
La procédure n'est liée à aucune formalité. Selon la pratique l'action peut être introduite 
par télégramme ou telex. 
Le Professeur Stalev a soulevé une question fort intéressante au séminaire. Est-il 
nécessaire de demander, aux termes de la Convention de New York dans un Etat occidental une 
procedure d'exequatur pour l'exécution de la sentence d'une cour d'arbitrage de la chambre de 
commerce fonctionnant dans les Etats-membres du CAEM. A ce sujet, le rapporteur a donné 
une réponse négative expliquant dans le détail son avis.23 
Les participants au séminaire ont estimé au sujet des cours arbitrales permanentes 
existant dans les pays socialistes, que l'intervention est également problématique.24 Cette 
question nécessite donc une solution à l'avenir. 
Le tribunal arbitral saisi décide à la majorité des voix. Le problème de / 'opinion du juge 
mis en minorité n'est pas réglementé de manière uniforme dans les Etats-membres du CAEM.25 
En général, il est nécessaire d'accompagner la sentence de ses motifs. Seule la loi 
tchécoslovaque de 1963 sur l'arbitrage (non pas le réglement de la cour d'arbitrage) permet 
d'omettre les motifs, en cas d'un commun accord des parties. 
20
 STALEV, J.: (président de la c o u r d'arbitrage instituée auprès la Chambre de Commerce Bulgare): 
Solution des litiges maissant des relations économiques internationales: procédure appliquée par les cours 
d'arbitrage fonctionnant auprès des chambres de commerce des Etats membres du CAEM. Rapport fait au 
séminaire. 
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Les cours d'arbitrage des chambres de commerce des Etats-membres du CAEM statuent 
sur la base des lois. 
La loi tchécoslovaque de 1963 sur l'arbitrage, le code de procédure civile polonais, le 
décret du gouvernement de 1975 de la RDA sur l'arbitrage permettent l'invalidation de la 
sentence arbitral, cependant cette possibilité ne figure pas dans les Réglements des cours 
d'arbitrage respectives. En Hongrie l'invalidation ne peut avoir lieu que dans le cas d'un 
arbitrage ad hoc, pour les sentences de la cour l'arbitrage de la chambre de commerce, il n'y a 
aucune possibilité de recours.26 
Nous avons déjà mentionné à ce sujet les lacunes juridiques existant dans les réglementais 
et seul le réglement roumain fait exception, qui de manière particulière assure la possibilité d'une 
action en recours ou même de requête civile extraordinaire.27 À ce sujet on peut mentionner qu'il 
est possible de se pourvoir en appel contre la sentence de la cour d'arbitrage maritime, cour 
d'arbitrage spécialisée fonctionnant à Moscou, auprès du Tribunal Suprême de l'Union 
Soviétique. 
10. En ce qui précédé, nous avons traité surtout les question relatives aux Cours 
d'arbitrage permanentes des pays socialistes. Si nous examinons ce qui se passe au-délà de nos 
frontières, nous constatons que dans les pays occidentaux les parties exécutent de leur gré la 
sentence arbitrale et ceci non seulement en ce qui concerne la Cour d'arbitrage de la CCI mais 
aussi en général et même s'il existe des possibilités de recours, les parties s'y renoncent dans la 
convention ou la clause d'arbitrage.28 On peut constater, que les tribunaux interprètent dans la 
pratique de manière restrictive les causes de refus visée à l'article V. de la Convention de New 
York ratifiée dans notre pays par le décret-loi n° 25 de 1962. 
La validité d'une sentence d'arbitrale doit être jugée selon le droit du pays où la sentence a 
été prononcée. Donc le tribunal du pays chargé de l'exécution ne peut l'annuler, bien que se pose, 
même ici, le problème visé l'article V paragraphe 2 de la Convention de New York, notemment 
que l'objet du litige n'est pas susceptable d'être réglé par la voie d'arbitrage dans le pays où 
l'execution est demandée, ou que la reconnaissance et l'exécution est contraire à l'ordre public. 
Voici une notion qui a été largement discutée au séminaire. La théorie établit une différence entre 
l'ordre public (interne du pays) « sensu lato » et (international) « sensu stricto. » Selon cette 
théorie il n'est porté atteinte à l'ordre public international d'un pays quelconque, que si la 
sentence arbitrale étrangère dont la reconnaissance et l'exécution est demandée n'est pas en 
accord avec les fondements de l'ordre légal intérieur ou avec le sens de la justice.29 
Un rapporteur du séminaire analysant les systèmes juridiques étrangers en a déduit que 
les sentences étrangères aient priorité sur les sentences du pays.30 
Au sujet de la Convention de New York les participants au séminaire ont a souligné 
qu'elle n'est valable que pour les sentences et non pas pour les arrêts et accords arbitraux. C'est 
pourquoi la cour d'arbitrage de la CCI rend ces sentences sur la base de l'accord entre les parties. 
Ce n'est qu'exceptionnellement qu'il est possible de faire un recours régulier en cas de 
sentence arbitrale, ainsi par exemple en France, on peut faire appel contre une sentence arbitrale. 
Cependant dans la plupart des cas les parties y renoncent lors de la stipulation relative à la cour 
d'arbitrage. 
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Par contre dans les différents pays, il existe une large variété de recours extraordinaires 
avec des délais plus ou moins long, allant même jusqu'à 10 ans. Ceci toutefois n'empêche pas la 
reconnaissance et l'exécution selon la'convention de New York. 
Le séminaire a constaté que cet accord a grandement contribué au développement de la 
pratique de l'arbitrage. 
• 
Pour tirer les conclusions des débats du séminaire, outre les questions relatives à la 
convergence de la situation respective à l'Est et à l'Ouest, on peut indiquer ce qui suit. 
a) Au point de vue de la forme, nous devons souligner le déroutement parfait du séminaire, 
sa direction exemplaire, l'excellente traduction simultanée en plusieurs langues des conférences et 
interventions à l'intention des participants, ainsi que la distribution des textes en différentes 
langues. 
b) En ce qui concerne le fond nous devons souligner le niveau élevé des conférences, la 
richesse des connaissances scientifiques et pratiques. Ceci est également valable pour les 
interventions sur lesquelles nous ne pouvons nous étendre par manque de place. 
c) Le séminaire a élargi les connaissances des participants, attirant l'attention des 
personnes présentes sur des faits et constatations ignorées auparavant. 
d) L'arbitrage entre pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest est devenu une institution plus populaire et 
le séminaire a contribué à développer la coopération économique, scientifique et technique entre 
Etats de systèmes sociaux différents. Nous devons également mentionner que parmi les cours 
d'arbitrage des Etats-membres du CAEM, celle de notre pays permet aux parties étrangères 
(donc ressortissantes des pays occidentaux) le choix d'un arbitre étranger en cas de réciprocité. 
De même il est aussi possible — bien que la procédure soit compliquée — selon le règlement 
tchécoslovaque aussi, d'inscrire l'arbitre étranger sur la liste des arbitres. 
e) L'établissement, le développement et la renouveau de liens amicaux, professionnels ont 
également donné une importance non négligeable à ce séminaire. 
0 Pour terminer nous devons mentionner que le séminaire reflète la coopération des 
juristes de systèmes sociaux différents, dans un esprit de coexistence pacifique.31 En fait il serait 
souhaitable que dans la situation politique actuelle tendue les personnalités politiques procèdent 
dans le même esprit. 
Vu ce succès il serait opportun d'organiser régulièrement de tels séminaires. Ce souhait 
justifié est fondé sur les manifestations précédentes. 
T. Révai 
31
 Ment ionné par RÉVAI, T. dans son intervention faite dans la phase finale du séminaire. 
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Recensiones 
PÓLAY, E.:Die Pandektistik und ihre Wirkung 
auf die Wissenschaft des ungarischen Privatrechts* 
I 
Es ist kaum nötig die Bedeutung des 
Themas, das zu analysieren sich E. Pólay zum 
Ziel gesetzt hat, besonders zu betonen. Die 
Pandektistik ist ein besonders wichtiger Teil 
der sogenannten neuzeitlichen Privatrechtsge-
schichte. Diese auf das privatrechtliche Den-
ken über zahlreiche Transmissionen auch 
heute noch wirkende Richtung knüpft sich 
nicht bloß an die universelle Zivilrechtswis-
senschaft, sondern auch an die Romanistik. 
Die katexochen Rolle dieser Anknüpfung 
bestätigt jene Tatsache, daß sich — wie das der 
Verfasser in der Einleitung seines Werkes 
betont — die Terminologie, ja in vereinzelten 
Fällen sogar auch einzelne theoretische The-
sen der Pandektistik in der modernen Zivili-
stik eingebürgert haben. Die hier rezensierte 
Arbeit befaßt sich mit der geschichtlichen 
Grundlage der Entstehung und dem Verlauf 
dieser wissenschaftlichen Richtung, sowie mit 
ihrem Abschluß in Deutschland, ferner mit 
derer Wirkung auf die ungarische Rechtswis-
senschaft aufgrund der zeitgenössischen Lite-
ratur, teils der ungarischen Rechtsliteratur des 
zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Sie ist auf diese 
Weise in erster Linie eine wissenschaftsge-
schichtliche Arbeit. Pólay strebt eine umfas-
sende und komplexe Analyse der Pandektistik 
an. Aus diesem Grund untersucht er nicht nur 
die Gestaltung des „Schicksals" eines gegebe-
nen Rechtsinstituts. Daran liegt es auch, daß 
er die Pandektistik nicht lediglich durch die 
Vorstellung einer hervorragenden Figur der 
Pandektistik—wie z. B. Erik Wolf—charak-
terisiert. Diese im Grunde wissenschaftsge-
schichtliche Annäherung vermengt aber in 
ihren konkreten Elementen — paradoxerwei-
se in geglückter Form — die Institution- oder 
dogmengeschichtliche Anschauungsweise mit 
der Vorstellung einiger bedeutenden Vertreter 
dieser Richtung. Daraus folgt, daß die 
Schlußfolgerungen im Werk von der Beurtei-
lung der an bestimmte Rechtsinstitutionen 
knüpfenden theoretischen Thesen der einzel-
nen Pandektisten abhängig sind. Danach folgt 
die wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Wertung der 
gegebenen Rechtsgelehrten, oder die Zusam-
menfassung der Eigenheiten und Charakteri-
stika der durch sie vertretenen Richtung. 
II 
2. Im ersten, sich mit dem Begriff der 
Pandektistik befassenden Kapitel untersucht 
der Verfasser die Tätigkeit der Glossatoren 
und der Kommentatoren, die Frage der deut-
schen Rezeption, den Begriff des deutschen 
Pandektenrechts und schließlich die allgemei-
nen begrifflichen Merkmale der Pandektistik. 
Von der Tätigkeit der Glossatoren sprechend 
stellt er fest, daß deren Inhalt bloß zum Teil 
privatrechtlichen Charakters ist. Die öffent-
lichrechtliche, ideologische Grundlage des 
auch im Investiturkrieg prägnant zum Aus-
druck kommenden Gegensatzes zwischen dem 
Kaisertum und dem Papsttum wurde eben 
von den ghibellinisch eingestellten Glossato-
ren geschaffen. Irnerius und seine Nachfolger 
formen im Wege der Weiterentwicklung ein-
* Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József nom. Acta Iuridica et Politica, torn. 23. fasc. 6. 
Szeged, 1976, 158 p. 
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zelner Teile der justinianischen Kodifikation, 
und innerhalb deren vor allem der Pandekten; 
durch ihre exegetische Methode ein Rechts-
material heraus, das zwar in sich und tech-
nisch nicht als Pandektenrecht aufgefaßt 
werden kann, doch wird — über mehrseitige 
Vermittlung — zu einer seiner Grundlagen. 
Die Tätigkeit der Kommentatoren, oder an-
ders der Postglossatoren, steht bereits in enger 
Verbindung mit der Praxis. 
Die entscheidende Wirkung der Kommen-
tatoren-Schule auf die Rechtsentwicklung des 
Kontinents wird durch das Eindringen der 
Kommentatoren auf deutsches Gebiet 
ausgeübt. Die verwickelten Fragen der Rezep-
tion des römischen Rechts in Deutschland 
analysierend gelangt der Verfasser zu der 
Folgerung, daß es nicht an einen Akt, an die 
Gerichtsordnung des Reichskammergerichts 
gebunden werden kann. Der Ausdruck „Re-
zeption" bedeutet der richtigen Auslegung 
nach keinerlei „Kulturokkupation", er ist 
vielmehr — in deutscher Relation zumindest 
—ein einer gewissen „Verwissenschaftlichung 
des Rechts" adäquater Begriff, der weder an 
die erwähnte Gerichtsordnung, noch an die 
unklaren Bestimmungen der Legenden des 
Lothars des Ersten gebunden werden kann. 
Die Rezeption beschränkte sich aber nicht 
auf das Material des römischen Rechts, son-
dern erstreckte sich auch auf die „Einverlei-
bung" des Kanonischen Rechts und des 
Langobardischen Lehnsrechts. So entsteht 
das ius commune = gemeines Recht, als ein 
sich auf das öffentliche Recht und Privatrecht 
beziehendes, dem Landesrecht entgegenge-
setztes, mit diesem konkurrierendes Rechts-
material. Die Harmonie zwischen diesem ius 
commune, und den örtlichen Partikularrech-
ten, d. h. die Aufgabe der Adaptierung des ius 
commune zu den „örtlichen" Verhältnissen 
wird durch die sogenannten Praktiker 
durchgeführt. Die kameralistische Richtung 
im Titel und im Inhalt am besten representie-
rendes Werk ist der „Usus modernus Pandec-
tarum" von der Wende des XVII. und XVIII. 
Jahrhunderts von Samuel Stryk. Zwar ist für 
die Praktiker einerseits die zu starke Orientie-
rung auf die deutsche Praxis — was die 
Trennung von den ursprünglichen römischen 
Quellen mit sich bringt —, andererseits die 
kasuistische Untersuchungsmethode kenn-
zeichnend, kann von einer „Pandektenwis-
senschaft", zeitlich als erstes, im Zusammen-
hang mit den deutschen Kameralisten gespro-
chen werden. Der sich an diese Richtung knüp-
fende Ausdruck „Pandektenwissenschaft" ist 
trotzdem richtig, daß die Richtung selbst 
— haupsächlich wegen der immer mehr die 
Vorherrschaft gewinnenden partikularen An-
schauungsweise — zur Weiterentwicklung un-
fähig ist. Allein das im XVII. Jahrhundert 
aufblühende Naturrecht wäre zur Weiterent-
wicklung dieses unfruchtbaren, durch die 
Praktikern gepflogenen „Pandektenwissen-
schaft" fähig. Die Vermengung der „Pandek-
tenwissenschaft" und des Naturrechts tritt 
aber nicht ein, was einerseits auf die öffentlich-
rechtliche Anschauungsweise des Natur-
rechts, andererseits aber auf die hauptsächlich 
philosophische — also nicht rechtliche — 
Einstellung der Naturrechtsprofessoren 
zurückzuführen ist, — wie das durch das 
Beispiel des sich vor allem mit Moralphiloso-
phie befassenden Christian Wolf bewiesen 
wird. 
3. In dem sich mit der Entstehung, Ent-
wicklung und Rückfall befassenden Kapitel 
analysiert E. Pólay vorerst die gesellschaftli-
chen und politischen Gründe der Pandekti-
stik. Er stellt fest, daß diese Richtung durch 
die Ende des XVIII. Jahrhunderts von dem 
berühmten Göttinger Rechtslehrer, Gustav 
Hugo gegründete historische Schule ins Leben 
gerufen wurde. Tatsächlich aber knüpft sich 
der Anfang der Entstehung der Pandektistik 
an das in 1803 veröffentlichte, seinen Verfas-
ser von einem Tag auf den anderen in Europa 
weit zum berühmten Wissenschaftler machen-
de Werk Savignys „Das Recht des Besitzes". 
Die Entstehung der sich an die historische 
Schule knüpfenden Pandektistik wurde durch 
die im XVIII. und XIX. Jahrhundert in 
Deutschland herrschenden wirtschaftlichen, 
politischen und geistigen Faktoren ermög-
licht. Unter der geistigen Richtungen muß der 
mit dem Vernunftsrecht auf radikale Weise 
abtuenden Philosophie Immanuel Kants, so-
wie die Geschichtsphilosophie Herders eine 
besondere Rolle zuerkannt werden. Nicht 
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unbedeutend ist in diesem Bereich die aus dem 
„Neuhumanismus" herauswachsende klassi-
sche Philologie, deren Ergebnis die Textkritik 
von Niebuhr ist. Auf dem Gebiet der rechtli-
chen Faktoren ist vor allem die Abrechnung 
mit dem sich bereits als veraltet erweisenden 
Philosophie des Naturrechts von entscheiden-
der Wichtigkeit. Die Entwicklungsgeschichte 
der Pandektistik untersuchend gelangt Pólay 
zu dem Schluß, daß innerhalb dessen drei 
Epochen unterschieden werden können. Der 
Anfang und der Abschluß der ersten Periode 
ist durch die Publikation der Werke Savignys 
„Das Recht des Besitzes" (1803), bzw. „Obli-
gationenrecht" (1853) gekennzeichnet. Die 
zweite Epoche — die Epoche der Differenzie-
rung — dauert von 1863 bis zur Inkraftset-
zung des BGB. Die dritte Periode — die 
Periode des Rückfalls—beginnt mit dem Jahr 
1900 und kann auch noch in der bourgeoisen 
Privatwissenschaft unsrer Tage nachgewiesen 
werden. 
In dem sich mit der Epoche der Entfaltung 
der Pandektistik beschäftigenden Teil des 
Werkes befaßt sich der Autor mit der umfas-
senden Beurteilung der Tätigkeit Savignys 
und Puchtas. Er betont, daß Savigny — im 
Wesentlichen bereits durch sein seitens Kan-
torowicz als „Begriffsdichtung" apostrophier-
tes Werk „Das Recht des Besitzes" — der 
historischen Schule einen romanistischen 
Charakter verliehen hat. Innerhalb der Schule 
meldet sich aber frühzeitig der germanistische 
Zweig, die germanistische Richtung, siehe 
auch das eine große Wirkung ausübende, in 
1808 publizierte Werk „Deutsche Staats- und 
Rechtsgeschichte" von Eichhorn. Als dessen 
Ergebnis trennen sich die beiden Zweige recht 
bald voneinander. Der Bruch geht aber erst 
Jahrzehnte später, im wesentlichen zum Be-
ginn der 1840er Jahre vor sich. Auch inner-
halb der romanistischen Richtung tritt die 
Differenzierung auf, und zwar derweise, daß 
sich neben der Pandektistik allmählich die 
römische Rechtsgeschichte zu entfalten be-
ginnt. Die römische Rechtsgeschichte wird 
erst ab Mitte des Jahrhunderts, hauptsächlich 
als Ergebnis der mächtigen literarischen 
Tätigkeit Mommsens, selbständig. Die römi-
sche rechtsgeschichtliche Richtung, deren we-
sentlichere Vertreter Angelo Mais, Rudorff, 
Bluhme, Dirksen und Schoell sind, analysiert 
die Quellen des römischen Rechts nicht auf 
dogmatischer Basis. Das Verhältnis zur recht-
lichen Dogmatik bietet die effektive Zäsur 
zwischen der sich auf die Pandekten 
stützenden Pandektistik und der römischen 
rechtsgeschichtlichen Richtung. 
Die Rolle und Bedeutung Savignys darle-
gend, untersucht E. Pólay vorerst die ge-
schichtlichen Vorläufer und Eigenheiten der 
sich auf Systembildung richtenden Bestrebun-
gen dieses Rechtswissenschaftlers. Im Mittel-
punkt des großen Rechtsgelehrten steht die 
Analyse einzelner Institutionen des römischen 
Rechts. Das römische Recht bedeutet für ihn 
die Grundlage, von welcher ausgegangen er 
die umfassende Reform des Privatrechtswis-
senschaft seiner Zeit beginnen kann. Ein 
unabsprechbares Verdienst Savignys ist die 
Erkenntnis der „historischen Trennung", die 
die Basis seiner historischen Denkart bildet. 
Seine Zeitgenossen — so auch Anselm Feuer-
bach — nehmen auf diesen Umstand keine 
Rücksicht, dessen Ergebnis eine anakronisti-
sche Anschauungsweise des römischen Rechts 
ist. Nur zum Teil vermindert den Wert der zur 
Erschließung der Institutionen des römischen 
Rechts gerichteten Forschungen Savignys, 
daß er im Grunde nur die Erschließung des 
justinianischen Rechts befleißigt, infolgedes-
sen die Gesichtspunkte der Interpolationen-
forschung völlig verschwinden. Die bereits 
zwei Jahrhunderte früher erschlossenen Inter-
polationen — die Interpolationenforschung 
ist mit dem Namen des Franzosen Antoine 
Faure verknüpft — sind für Savigny selbstre-
dend nicht unbekannt. Die Abweisung, oder 
genauer die Ignorierung stammt aller Wahr-
scheinlichkeit nach aus der Anerkennung des 
römischen Rechts als positivrechtliches 
Rechtssystem. Zu den paradoxen Erscheinun-
gen des Lebenswerkes von Savigny gehört die 
Forschung der justinianischen Kodifikation. 
Auch noch in dem, in der letzten Periode 
seines Lebens geschriebenen „System" nimmt 
er das Recht der Pandekten, also das kodifi-
zierte Recht, und nicht das „gemeine Recht" 
zum Maßstab der modernen Privatrechtswis-
senschaft. In seiner als Einleitung zu seiner 
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„Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittel-
alter" gedachten „Streitschrift" mit dem Titel 
„Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung 
und Rechtswissenschaft" erachtet Savigny die 
justinianische Kodifikation als ein Produkt 
eines im Verfall befindlichen Reiches, was 
gleichzeitig ein Beweis seines die Kodifikation 
verneinenden Standpunktes ist. Der Wider-
spruch kann nur dadurch behoben werden, 
daß wir beachten, daß für den Rechtsgelehr-
ten die justinianische Kodifikation nur als 
Mittel der Orientierung in dem gewaltigen 
Material des römischen Rechts einen Wert 
darstellt. Die hervorragende Bedeutung des 
Lebenswerkes von Savigny besteht darin, daß 
er die Einheit der Rechtsgeschichte und der 
Dogmatik schuf. 
Die Einheit der Rechtsgeschichte und der 
rechtlichen Dogmatik ist auch für das Lebens-
werk Puchtas kennzeichnend. Es ist wieder 
eine andere Frage, daß er — abweichend von 
Savigny — die von Kant stammende philoso-
phische Kategorie des selbständigen Seins des 
Rechts verwendend, den sogenannten wissen-
schaftlichen Formalismus gründet, dessen 
Folge die sogenannte „Begriffsjurisprudenz" 
ist. Puchtas par excellence „theoretische" 
Einstellung spiegelt sich in seinem Werk 
,,Cursus der Institutionen" wider, in dessen 
philosophische Einleitung — Pólays treffen-
der Feststellung zufolge — das „preußische 
Naturrecht" erkennbar ist. In dem axiomati-
schen System Puchtas — betont der Verfasser 
— existiert das Recht unabhängig von den 
Individuen, in dem hierarchisch aufgebauten 
Begriffssystem geht es dem Begriff des 
Rechtsverhältnisses unbedingt voran. Als 
Folge dieser Denkart trennt sich Puchta von 
der wirtschaftlich-gesellschaftlichen Wirklich-
keit und wird zur führenden Person der 
leblosen, zwar „systematisch klaren" Begriffs-
jurisprudenz. 
Nach der Erörterung der Tätigkeit Puch-
tas und Savignys stellt Pólay fest, daß von den 
beiden die Anschauung Savignys für progres-
siver gilt. Die „Volksgeist"-Theorie Savignys, 
als zentraler Teil der allgemeinen Theorie des 
Rechtsentstehung, ist progressiver, der gesell-
schaftlichen Wirklichkeit mehr adäquat, als 
die eindeutig konservativere Konzeption 
Puchtas. 
4. In der Einleitung des sich mit der 
Differenzierung der Pandektistik befassenden 
Abschnitts hebt der Verfasser hervor, daß 
auch die Charakteristika des germanistischen 
Zweiges durch den romanistischen Zweig 
determiniert sind. Nach dem Muster des 
„heutigen römischen Rechts" fordern auch 
die Germanisten ein „deutsches Privatrecht 
der Gegenwart". Daneben beeinflußen das 
Pandektensystem und die „Konstruktions"-
bzw. „Begriffsjurisprudenz" auch diesen 
Zweig. Der auf der ideologischen Ebene des 
Hegel'schen objektiven Idealismus stehende 
Georg Baseler wendet sich Mitte des vorigen 
Jahrhunderts offen von Savigny und seinen 
romanistischen und germanistischen Anhän-
gern ab. Die auf der Hegel'schen Basis stehen-
den Rechtswissenschaftler aus Kiel wünschen, 
als Folge ihrer Bestrebung zur Schaffung eines 
BGB, hinsichtlich der Rechtswissenschaft, 
deren philosophischen — siehe mutatis mu-
tandis die enge Verbindung der Naturrechts-
wissenschaftler mit der Philosophie — aktuel-
len politischen sowie sozialen Aufgaben Auf-
merksamkeit zu schenken. In den weiteren 
weist E. Pólay darauf hin, daß innerhalb des 
romanistischen Zweiges die römische Rechts-
geschichte gutes halbes Jahrhundert hindurch 
eine Art „Nebenprodukt" ist. Zwar sind die 
Zeichen der römischen rechtsgeschichtlichen 
Richtung bereits bei Savigny nachweisbar, 
jedoch beginnt sie erst mit der Tätigkeit 
Mommsens selbständig zu werden. 
Über die dogmatische Richtung der Pan-
dektistik sprechend befaßt sich der Verfasser 
mit der Tätigkeit von Arndts, Brinz, Wind-
scheid und Dernburg ausführlicher. Die Be-
deutung und die Eigenheiten der dogmati-
schen Richtung umfassend beurteilend hebt 
Pólay das unbedingte Beharran auf der Be-
griffsjurisprudenz hervor. Eine Folge dessen 
ist, daß dem Rechtsverhältnis gegenüber die 
Rechtsnorm in den Vordergrund tritt. Die 
Jurisprudenz Puchtas wird durch die Beto-
nung des Primats des positiven Rechts, so-
wie die Modifizierung des Rechtsverhältnis-
begriffs aufgehoben. Die auf dem Boden 
des Liberalkapitalismus entstandene dogma-
tische Rechtswissenschaft entsprach im We-
sentlichen den zur Zeit ihrer Entstehung 
existenten Verhältnissen. Zur Zeit des Mono-
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polkapitalismus trennt sie sich aber schon von 
den sozialen Beziehungen des Rechts, und 
dieser Umstand macht diese Richtung über-
holt. 
Die als das „caput et finis" der Interessen-
jurisprudenz zu betrachtende Tätigkeit Jhe-
rings analysierend weist Pólay auf die die 
Anschauungsweise des großen Göttingener 
Rechtsgelehrten formenden philosophischen 
und rechtstheoretischen Meinungen hin. Hin-
sichtlich der Betrachtungsweise Jherings war 
die Hegel'sche Philosophie, ferner der Utilita-
rismus Benthams und Austins, sowie Comtes 
positivistische Philosophie von entscheiden-
der Wirkung. Die Wirkung Darwins und 
Stirners kann schon wesentlich schwieriger 
nachgewiesen werden. Wir halten jene Be-
hauptung nicht unbegründet, das Jhering 
gerade deshalb keine Nachfolger hatte, weil 
seine allgemeine Privatrechtstheorie von be-
stimmten philosophischen und rechtsphiloso-
phischen Konzeptionen entstand. Eine Folge 
dessen ist auch, daß die Tübingener Schule die 
dem großen Meister folgend, die lnteressen-
jurisprudenz theoretisch begründete, nicht 
mehr zur Pandektistik gehört. Von den Pan-
dektisten ist Jhering der erste, der den Zusam-
menhang zwischen Recht und Gesellschaft 
mit Nachdruck betont. Seine Trennung von 
der Volksgeisttheorie ist aber schon fast eine 
Kriegserklärung der allgemeinen privatrechts-
theoretischen Konzeption der historischen 
Schule. Die konstruktive Kritik der Besitzleh-
re von Savigny, wodurch die für die Kodifika-
tion so wichtige Besitzlehre im Bereiche des 
Privatrechts auf eine neue Grundlage gestellt 
wird, ist auch von großer Bedeutung. In der 
Frage der Haftung ist seine Konzeption 
weitaus nicht so bahnbrechend. Er wirft zwar 
den Anspruch auf die objektive Verantwort-
lichkeit auf, geht aber nicht über die Konzep-
tion der subjektiven Verantwortlichkeit der 
dogmatischen Richtung hinaus. Die Größe 
Jherings besteht grundlegend darin, daß seine 
Konstruktionen hinsichtlich der einzelnen 
Rechtsinstitutionen den effektiven Ansprü-
chen seines Zeitalters — der monopolkapita-
listischen Periode — entsprechende Antwort 
geben. 
5. In dem den Niedergang der Pandektistik 
behandelnden Teil erschließt der Verfasser 
jene wirtschaftlich-gesellschaftlichen Bedin-
gungen, die das Ansterben der Pandektistik 
verursachten. Den entscheidenden, letzten 
Schlag für die Pandektistik bedeutet die 
Inkraftsetzung des BGB, obzwar die Thesen 
und Konzeptionen der Pandektistik in den 
Paragraphen des BGB inhaltlich — 
hauptsächlich infolge der Zugrundelegung des 
Lehrbuchs von Windscheid — weiterleben 
und weiter wirken. Die sich konkretisierenden 
Kodifikationsversuche führen zur Belebung 
der römischen rechtsgeschichtlichen For-
schungen, das in der Interpolationsforschung, 
in der Untersuchung der sogenannten Volks-
rechte (Mitteis) und in der nach Wenger 
auflebenden vergleichenden antiken Rechts-
geschichte Form gewinnt. 
6. In dem Teil, der die Wirkung der 
Pandektistik auf die Wissenschaft des ungari-
schen Privatrechts zum Thema hat, unter-
sucht E. Pólay die ungarische Zivilrechtswis-
senschaft in der Anfangsperiode der Entfal-
tung der Pandektistik. Dem Verfasser zufolge 
ist die ungarische Rechtswissenschaft vom 
Anfang des XVIII. Jahrhunderts bis zum 
Reformzeitalter um 1820—30 durch Werbö-
czys Tripartitum determiniert. Diese Deter-
miniertheit meldet sich ebenso in inhaltlicher 
Beziehung, als in Bezug auf das sogenannte 
Institutionssystem. Die einzige Änderung ist, 
daß die naturrechtliche öffentlichrechtliche 
Konzeption, von Samuel Pufendorf und Chri-
stian Wolf durch die Vermittlung von Martini 
in Ungarn eingebürgert wurde. Auf dem 
Gebiet des Privatrechts existiert als theoriefor-
mender Faktor ausschließlich die sogenannte 
„denaturierte" — d. h. ihres progressiven öf-
fentlichrechtlichen Inhalts völlig entledigte — 
Kantsche Privatrechtsphilosophie. 
Die historische Schule hat nach der Beur-
teilung des Verfassers zu diesem Zeitabschnitt 
in Ungarn keinen Einfluß, dessen Grund auch 
darin zu suchen ist, daß die ungarischen 
Rechtswissenschaftler in der untersuchten 
Periode mit der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft 
nicht in Berührung gelangen. Weder Imre 
Kelemen, noch in vieler Beziehung sein Nach-
folger, Pál Szlemenics, können als Vorläufer 
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der historischen Schule in Ungarn betrachtet 
werden. Die Trennung von dem Institutions-
system — unter anderen in Szlemenics's 
„Elemente juris Hungarici civilis privati", ein 
Werk von zwei Bänden — akzeptiert Pólay 
nicht als entscheidendes Argument dafür, daß 
er sich der geschichtlichen Schule angeschlos-
sen hätte. Er weist mit Recht darauf hin, daß 
die Aufteilung des Abschnittes „de rebus" in 
Sachenrecht und Obligationsrecht nur in der 
ungarischen Rechtswissenschaft eine Neuig-
keit ist. 
7. Sich mit der in der ungarischen Literatur 
viel umstrittenen Frage befassend, ob nämlich 
die frühe Pandektistik im ungarischen Re-
formzeitalter wirkte, oder nicht, analysiert 
Pólay die Tätigkeit von Ignác Frank. Der 
Verfasser ist der Meinung, daß Frank nicht als 
Befolger der historischen Schule betrachtet 
werden kann. Jene Erscheinungen, die — wie 
es hauptsächlich Pauler behauptete — darauf 
hinweisen würden, sind nicht durchschlagend. 
Der Umstand, daß Frank die Kodifikation für 
ein „sich der natürlichen Entwicklung des 
Rechts widersetzendes kühnes Experiment" 
erachtet (Pauler), kann noch mit der die 
Kodifikation a limine abweisenden Stellung-
nahme der historischen Schule nicht gleichge-
stellt werden. Ein gleichfalls schwaches Argu-
ment ist es aus dem Bruch mit der Hegel'schen 
Philosophie auf den Anschluß zur histori-
schen Schule zu folgern. Das römische Recht, 
welches bei den Vertretern der historischen 
Schule eine Legitimationsgrundlage bildet, ist 
in den Werken von Ignác Frank von 
sekundärer Bedeutung. Bei Frank ist die 
Pandektistik ausschließlich nur in seiner Be-
sitzlehre und — eventuell — in seiner Konzep-
tion bezüglich des Wesens der Rechtsperson 
richtunggebend. Frank spielte, als Bearbeiter 
des feudalen heimischen Rechts, eine hervor-
ragende Rolle. Seine auf keine feste systemati-
sche Basis bauende „geschichtliche" An-
schauungsweise — worüber der Verfasser 
treffend bemerkt, daß es bereits in seiner 
Vernunftsrechts-Periode zur Geltung kommt 
— entstammt den Eigenheiten des ius pa-
trium, und nicht dem Anschluß an die histori-
sche Schule. 
8. In dem sich mit der einheimischen 
Wirkung der frühen Pandektistik befassenden 
Teil weist der Verfasser vorerst auf jene 
„Kanäle" hin, durch die diese Richtung in die 
ungarische Privatrechtswissenschaft „einsik-
kern" konnte. Neben den ungarischen Pan-
dektenwerke fällt dem — das Pandektenkolle-
gium im Universitätslehrgang obligatorisch 
machenden — von Thun-Hohenstein Lehr-
plan, der an Unger's Namen knüpfenden 
„Rezeption" der Pandektistik in Österreich, 
sowie dem Sächsischen Zivilgesetzbuch vom 
Jahre 1863 eine wichtige Rolle zu. Infolge der 
Rückständigkeit der heimischen bürgerlichen 
Entwicklung erlangen aber bloß einzelne 
Elemente der Pandektistik, so insbesondere 
die allgemeinen Grundinstitutionen des Pri-
vatrechts, in der heimischen Rechtswissen-
schaft Bürgerrecht. Pál Hoffmann ist der 
erste, in dessen Werke die Lehren der histori-
schen Schule — ganz besonders die konserva-
tive Rechtsentstehungstheorie — ohne Modi-
fizierung erscheinen. Es muß zugegeben wer-
den — und das ist auch unsere Meinung — 
daß die Doktrinen Hoffmanns isoliert geblie-
ben sind, trotzdem würden sie, wegen ihrer 
Bedeutung und ihres bahnbrechenden Cha-
rakters, verdienen, mit größerer Betonung 
hervorgehoben zu werden. Ein Verdienst 
Hoffmanns ist auch, daß er aus dem Urquelle 
schöpft, im Gegensatz zum Beispiel zu Su-
hayjda, der seine Doktrinen dem Sächsischen 
Zivilgesetzbuch entnimmt. 
9. Die Wirkung der dogmatischen Rich-
tung auf die ungarische Rechtswissenschaft 
analysierend spricht Pólay von der Tätigkeit 
von Imre Zlinszky und Mihály Herczeg. Der 
Verfasser gelangt zur Folgerung, daß die 
theoretische Tätigkeit von Zlinszky und 
Herczeg in vielfacher Hinsicht die Weiterent-
wicklung der Thesen Savignys und Puchtas — 
zwar hauptsächlich nach Windscheid — dar-
stellt. Für ihre Doktrinen ist es unter anderen 
die kräftige Zurückdrängung der Rolle des 
Willens, die Verwerfung der Fiktionstheorie 
bezüglich des Wesens der Rechtsperson, ja in 
einzelnen Fällen — so in der Auslegung der 
Rechtsnormen — sogar die Schaffung einer 
neuen Doktrin charakteristisch. Ihr Verdienst 
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ist die planmäßige, auf einer umfassenden 
Konzeption ruhende „Rezeption" der Pan-
dektistik in die ungarische Privatrechtstheo-
rie, das Jahrzehnte hindurch für die heimische 
Rechtswissenschaft als Wegweiser diente. 
10. In dem Teil des Werkes, in welchem E. 
Pólay die Wirkung der Interessenjurisprudenz 
auf die ungarische Rechtswissenschaft be-
spricht, befaßt er sich mit der Tätigkeit von 
Gusztáv Szászy-Schwarz, dem „ungarischen 
Jhering". Das Lebenswerk von Szászy-
Schwarz knüpft sich in seinen Hauptzügen an 
die durch Jhering vertretene Interessenjuris-
prudenz. Die Doktrinen seines Göttingener 
Meisters entwickelt er in mancher Hinsicht 
weiter. Sein Anschluß an die Interessenjuris-
prudenz erschöpft sich nicht in der fulminan-
ten Kritik der Rechtsentstehungstheorie der 
historischen Schule Er hat sogar bezüglich 
der Anerkennung der Rolle des Gewohnheits-
rechts eine realistischere Anschauung, als 
Jhering. Sein großes Verdienst ist die tiefge-
hende Kritik des nicht auf einheitlicher Basis 
ruhenden Pandektensystems. Ein Produkt 
seiner Bestrebungen zur „praktischeren" Wis-
senschaft ist unter anderen die Objektivation 
des allgemeinen Zielvermögenstheorie und 
der Rechtsgeschäftslehre. Diese Praktizität 
spiegelt sich größtenteils auch in seiner, Jhe-
ring folgenden Besitzlehre wider. In seiner 
Zusammenfassung stellt der Verfasser fest, 
daß, in Betracht des vollen wissenschaftlichen 
Œuvres, in der ungarischen Rechtswissen-
schaft allein Szászy-Schwarz als Nachfolger 
der Jhering'schen Interessenjurisprudenz be-
trachtet werden kann. 
11. Das letzte Kapitel, das das Schicksal 
der Pandektistik in Ungarn in der Periode von 
1920—1945 untersucht, analysiert vorerst die 
Gründe des Rückgangs der Wirkung der 
Pandektistik. In der Zurückdrängung der 
Pandektistik hatte hauptsächlich der die im 
schweizerischen ZBG zum Ausdruck kom-
menden Doktrinen vor Augen haltende Ent-
wurf des privatrechtlichen Gesetzbuches ent-
scheidende Rolle. In der Rechtsliteratur wir-
ken aber auf zahlreichen Gebieten — so in der 
Theorie der subjektiven Rechte, in der Theorie 
bezüglich des Wesens der Rechtsperson, in der 
Rechtsgeschäftsdoktrin, in der Haftungskon-
zeption — die pandektistischen Anschauun-
gen weiter. Im Bereiche der wissenschaftlichen 
Pflege des römischen Rechts gelangen in der 
Periode zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen die 
durch die Pandektistik ausgearbeiteten Kate-
gorien (subjektives Recht, Rechtsgeschäfts-
lehre) und das Pandektensystem zur Rolle. 
III. 
12. Das einen gewaltigen literarischen 
Apparat überblickende und das Material in 
konstruktiver Weise bearbeitende Werk 
Pólays hat den großen Vorzug, daß es das 
zwischen der Pandektistik und der heimischen 
Rechtswissenschaft über zahlreiche Transmis-
sionen zur Geltung kommende, komplizierte 
Verbindungssystem nach neuen Gesichts-
punkten synthetisierend, aufgearbeitet hat. 
Der Leser dieser aus methodischem Gesichts-
punkt tadellosen Arbeit erhält ein neues, 
nuancierteres Bild sowohl über die auf die 
Gestaltung der europäischen Rechtswissen-
schaft eine so große Wirkung ausübende 
Pandektistik, als auch — in deren 
Abhängigkeit über die Entwicklung der ein 
heimischen Rechtswissenschaft. Die in der 
einheimischen Rechtswissenschaft wie auch in 
der internationalen Literatur einen hervorra-
genden Platz verdienende Arbeit kann mit der 
Aufmerksamkeit der Pfleger des Zivilrechts, 
des römischen Rechts und der Rechtsge-
schichte rechnen. 
G. Hamza 
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Beiträge zu den Beziehungen zwischen Gustav RADBRUCH 
und Georg LUKÁCS 
Heute ist es bereits wohl bekannt, welch 
gärende Wirkung das Studium in Deutsch-
land und seine dortigen Begegnungen in der 
denkerischen Entwicklung des 1885 gebore-
nen Georg Lukács gespielt haben. Ab 1906 
verweilt er hauptsächlich in Berlin, wo auf ihn 
Georg Simmel und sein Aussprachezirkel 
einen entscheidenden Einfluß ausübt. Hier 
lernt er auch Ernst Bloch kennen, der ihn im 
Winter 1911/12, gelegentlich ihrer Begegnung 
in Florenz, überredet, seine Studien in Heidel-
berg fortzusetzen. Ab 1912 verbringt Lukács 
tatsächlich zwei Jahre in Heidelberg und setzt 
seine dortigen Besuche auch nach dem Krieg 
fort. Sein größtes Erlebnis ist Max Weber und 
jene Denker, mit denen er — hauptsächlich 
durch Weber — Bekanntschaft macht. Einer 
von ihnen ist Gustav Radbruch. Vorliegende 
Abhandlung befaßt sich — aufgrund der im 
Lukács-Archiv und Bibliothek (betreut durch 
das Philosophische Institut der Ungarischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften) verwahrten, 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland wie 
auch auf dem Gebiete der mit Radbruch 
zusammenhängenden Forschungen bislang 
unbekannten Dokumente — mit der Wir-
kung, die Radbruch auf Lukács ausgeübt 
hat.1 
» 
Unter den Freundschaftsbeziehungen von 
Lukács war seine Beziehung zu dem sieben 
Jahre älteren Radbruch vielleicht die markan-
teste, jedoch ihrem späteren Verlauf nach, die 
am meisten widerspruchsvolle. Radbruch war 
ein Denker der in evangelischer Umgebung 
1
 Die publizierten Briefe kamen im vergangenen 
Jahrzehnt aus dem sogenannten „Heidelberger 
Koffer" zutage und gelangten in den Besitz des 
Lukács-Archiv und Bibliothek. Für die mit densel-
ben zusammenhängende Forschungsarbeit schulde 
ich der früheren Leiterin des Lukács-Archivs und 
Bibliothek, Frau Katarine Lakos, für die Genehmi-
gung der Verwendung derselben dem urheberrecht-
lichen Rechtsnachfolger von Lukács, Herrn Profes-
sor Ferenc Jánossy Dank. 
aufgewachsen ist und bekannt als einer, der 
sich zur Sozialdemokratie angezogen fühlte 
und sich zur relativistischen Rechtsphiloso-
phie bekennt. Er war einer der Ersten, der 
nach der Nazi-Machtübernahme seinen Lehr-
stuhl verloren hatte. Doch fühlte er sich 
persönlich betroffen und auch theoretisch 
verantwortlich dafür, daß sich der Juristen-
stand so bedingungslos und ohne jedweden 
Anstoß dem neuen Regim anpaßte. Dies war 
der Umstand, der Radbruch mit Lukács 
zusammenbrachte und für die Entwicklung 
dieser Beiden auch separat voneinander be-
stimmend war. „Denn damals war in Heidel-
berg ein Kreis gleichgesinnter Gelehrter tätig, 
der seinesgleichen nicht oft findet: Windel-
band (später Rickert), Jellinek, Max Weber, 
Gothein, Troeltsch, Lask."2 
Ihre Verbindung ist im Vorwort des ersten 
wirklich selbständigen rechtsphilosophischen 
Werkes von Radbruch, Grundzüge der Rechts-
philosophie (Leipzig, 1914) verewigt. Rad-
bruch schreibt hier folgendes: „Daß sein 
Verfasser sich entschloß, seine Gedanken 
schon jetzt in skizzenhafter Form vorläufig 
festzulegen, hat er an erster Stelle dem ermuti-
genden und anregenden Zuspruch des Herrn 
Dr. Georg v. Lukács in Heidelberg zu dan-
ken." 
Einige in der letzten Zeit aufgetauchte 
Stücke ihrer Korrespondenz gewähren von 
dieser Wirkung ein sehr klares und vertrautes 
Bild. 
Ein Brief aus Bellaria. datiert um den 
10—12. September 1913 weist bereits auf ein 
gutes Verhältnis hin, die schon auf eine 
gewisse Vergangenheit zurückblickt: 
„Lieber Herr Radbruch, 
Besten Dank für Ihre Nachrichten. Es 
treute mich, daß Sie einen guten Anfang des 
Sommers hatten. Hoffentlich geht es weiter 
2
 .Lebensbeschreibung von Dr. Gustav Rad-
bruch . . . ' (1945), Gedächtnisschrift für Gustav Rad-
bruch, hrsg. Arthur Kaufmann, Göttingen, 1968, S. 
22. 
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auch gut; sowohl für Sie, wie für das Buch, 
dem gegenüber ich eine fast persönliche Teil-
nahme empfinde. 
Mit herzlichen Grüssen 
Ihr 
G. v. Lukács" 
Der nächste Brief — dem Poststempel 
nach vom April 1914 — läßt darauf folgern, 
daß der Umstand, daß Lukács „eine fast 
persönliche Teilnahme empfindet", seiner, 
den philosophischen Relativismus bereits in 
sich bergenden, einer eingehenderen Untersu-
chung würdigen, denkerischen Entwicklung 
zugeschrieben werden kann. 
„Lieber Herr Radbruch, 
bitte fassen Sie es nicht als Interesselosig-
keit von mir auf, daß ich Ihnen so lange nicht 
schrieb; zuerst wollte ich Ihr Buch lesen, 
dann kamen die verschiedenartigsten Hinder-
nisse . . . dazwischen. 
Ihr Buch habe ich mit sehr viel Freude und 
Belehrung gelesen. Ich finde, daß alle Ihre 
Bedenken gegen die Herausgabe des Buches 
gänzlich unbegründet waren. Alle Hauptge-
danken kommen in großer Klarheit und 
Reinheit heraus — und wenn Sie vielleicht 
weniger auf ,Liberatus' eingehen, als Sie es 
wollten, wenn einige Darstellungen fremder 
Systeme (z. B. Hegels) auch tiefer gefaßt 
werden könnten, so sind das Sachen die in 
einer zweiten Auflage spielend ergänzt werden 
könnten. Das Wichtigste ist, daß das Buch in 
seinen originellen Gedanken auf sehr festen 
Füßen steht. Was mich methodisch am mei-
sten interessiert hat — Sie entsinnen sich noch 
aus der Vorlesungszeit — die verschiedenen, 
gleichwertigen Systeme der Rechtsphiloso-
phischen Orientierung und der Rechtsgestal-
tung gefallen mir jetzt vielleicht noch mehr wie 
in den Vorlesungen. Es wäre ein Privatwunsch 
von mir (der sich garnicht auf Ihr Buch 
bezieht, ja dessen seine Oekonomie sprengen 
würde) daß Sie einmal, vielleicht essayistisch 
— diese verschiedene Systeme noch 
ausführlicher darstellen, damit bei verschiede-
nen Axiomen, Maximen und dementspre-
chenden verschiedener Subaltlichkeit, die 
Gleichheit und Gleichwertigkeit ihrer letzten 
Grundlage ganz sichtbar an Tage träte und 
damit die absolute Notwendigkeit Ihrer Rela-
tivismus und dessen Folge der metaforisti-
schen Entscheidung offenbar werde. Freilich 
ist dies in dem Buche selbst hinreichend 
überzeugend gestaltet: es ist dies nur ein 
Privatwunsch von mir — zur eigenen Beleh-
rung; und zur Förderung meiner methodi-
schen Untersuchungen. Über den Rest zur des 
Buches haben wir ja vor den Vorlesungen 
ausführlich gesprochen. Der Schluß, den ich 
aus den Vorlesungen nicht kannte, gefiel mir 
sehr gut. 
Mit herzlichen Grüssen 
Ihr freundschaftlichst ergebener 
Georg von Lukács" 
Nicht bloß diese Briefe,3 aber — in indirek-
ter Weise — auch jene Zeilen sprechen über 
die gärende Wirkung, die Lukács auf die 
geistige Entwicklung Radbruchs ausübte, mit 
denen sich Radbruch am 7. Juni 1914 aus 
Königsberg an Karl Jasper wandte: „Ich 
wünsche mir sehr ein Wort von Ihnen über 
meine Rechtsphilosophie. Ich fürchte: Ihr 
Schweigen ist eine schweigende Kritik. . . . 
Auch Max Webers Schweigen beunruhigt 
schon. Ebenso schweigt Lukacs, Frau Stau-
dinger, schweigt Windelband . . ." 4 Ob dieses 
Schweigen tatsächlich als Kritik aufzufassen 
ist und inwieweit diese begründet ist, darüber 
hier zu entscheiden kann nicht meine Aufgabe 
sein. Jedenfalls ist es interessant, daß die 
einzige Stelle, wo Felix Somló, Lukács's 
Professor in Klausenburg (Siebenbürgen), 
Rechtsphilosoph und Soziologe, in den 1910er 
Jahren Lukács's Freund, in seinem hand-
schriftlichen Tagebuch den Namen Lukács's 
überhaupt erwähnt, verurteilenden Charak-
ters ist, und vor allem in Hinsicht auf Rad-
bruch. Unter der Jahreszahl 1914 ist nämlich 
folgende Eintragung zu lesen: „8. Nov. Die 
neueste deutsche Rechtsphilosophie ist auch 
angekommen: Radbruch, Grundzüge der 
Rechtsphilosophie... Es ist sonderbar, daß, 
laut des Vorwortes, Radbruch seine Gedan-
ken in dieser skizzenhaften Form noch nicht 
3
 LAK M/307. 
4
 Gustav Radbruch, Briefe, hrsg. Erik Wolf, 
Göttingen, 1968, S. 53. 
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dargeboten hätte, hätte ihn dazu in erster 
Linie Herr Georg Lukács nicht ermuntert. Die 
Verantwortung für die Veröffentlichung kann 
nicht dem Ermunterer zugeschoben werden. 
Wenn ich mein Werk nicht zur Publikation 
reif empfinde, würde ich es nicht nur nicht auf 
Ermunterung von Gyuri Lukács, sondern 
keines anderen herausgeben. Das Werk ist 
tatsächlich nicht reif. Erstens ist es in seinem 
Problemenkreis zu eng. Aber auch in der 
Ausarbeitung dieser Probleme nicht umfas-
send genug. Es will auch übertrieben geist-
reich sein. Es will Probleme durch Esprit 
lösen. Es werden Widersprüche leichtfertig 
stehen gelassen. Das ist keine gute Idee. Das 
ist nicht die Rechtsphilosophie mit der die 
deutsche Rechtswissenschaft seit langem 
schwanger war. Das ist bloß eine Fehlgeburt 
der Mutter, die einen Messias zur Welt 
bringen wollte."5 
Was die Wirkung Radbruchs auf Lukács 
betrifft, müssen wir von einer wenn auch nur 
vorübergehenden, jedoch nicht gering zu 
schätzenden Rolle berichten. Aus seinen auto-
biographischen Skizzen6 ist es uns bekannt, 
daß Lukács bereits während seiner Gymna-
sialzeit mit mehreren Werken der Klassiker 
des Marxismus Bekanntschaft machte. Diese 
Bekanntschaft wurde Später mehrmals erneut 
und vertieft. Solange er aber die philosophi-
sche Bedeutung Hegels nicht erkannte, wirkte 
auf ihn auch Marx, vor allem als Volkswirt 
und Soziologe, durch Simmel und Weber 
vermittelt. Die marxistische Wirkung war also 
einstweilen gering und bezog sich auf solche 
Gebiete des gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen 
Denkens, deren Rolle zu dieser Zeit noch 
kaum mehr sein durfte als Zusatzmaterial. 
Ebendeshalb verdient der Umstand besondere 
Aufmerksamkeit, daß die erste Schrift von 
Lukács, in der Marx meritorisch erwähnt 
5
 Tagebuch von Felix Somló, 1914—1917, S. 34. 
f. Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (Nationalbiblio-
thek Széchényi) Handschriftenarchiv, Quart. Hung. 
3038/III. 
6
 Georg Lukács, ,Mein Weg zu Marx', Interna-
tionale Literatur, III (1933) 2, S. 178 ff; Georg 
Lukács, .Vorwort', Geschichte und Klassenbe-
wusstsein, Neuwied und Berlin, 1968, S. 11. 
wird, die Kritik der Geschichtsphilosophie 
von Benedetto Croce ist. Sie ist eine soziologi-
sierend vereinfachte Abfassung des Pro-
gramms des Marxismus, wo Lukács die Rad-
bruch-Methode als Beispiel dahinstellt. 
Lukács wünschte in diesem seinen Artikel, 
mit der neokantianischen Präsupposition der 
Immanenz des Bewußtseins ringend, zu be-
weisen, daß „Dass dies vom Inhalt der axio-
matischen Setzung der Geschichtswissen-
schaft abhängt, haben wie oben zu zeigen 
versucht; wie auch daraufhingewiesen wurde, 
dass deren Inhalte bei wirklich eingehender, 
unbefangener und sorgfaltiger Analyse eine 
merkwürdige Parallelität und Beziehung zu 
gesellschaftlichen Schichtungsverhältnissen. 
Verschiebungen, äusseren wie inneren Aende-
rungen aufweisen, dass sie sich also zum 
Gegenstand der Wissenschaft, deren konsti-
tuierendes Objekt die Formen der menschli-
chen Gesellschaft sind, eignen. Dass der 
historische Materialismus, die bisher bedeu-
tendste soziologische Methode, fast immer zur 
geschichtsphilosophischen Metaphysik wur-
de, darf nicht den epochemachenden Wert der 
ihm zugrund liegenden, nur bis jetzt noch 
nicht klar herausgearbeiteten Methode ver-
gessen lassen. In dem, was Marx das Ideolo-
gienproblem nennt, liegt — freilich seiner 
metaphysischen Begriffsbildung entkleidet 
und methodisch reingemacht — der Weg zur 
Lösung des Problems, das ich hier angedeutet 
habe: die Erkenntnis, was die durch ihre 
eigene Axiomatik formell bedingten Setzun-
gen der Wissenschaften des objektiven Gei-
stes, notwendig mit konkreten Inhalten 
erfüllt. Ich verweise hier auf die sehr interes-
santen Ausführungen Radbruchs, der die 
mögliche Typik der Wertstriiktur, das Funda-
ment rechtsphilosophischer Systeme mit der 
Typologie der parteipolitischen Stellungnah-
men in Beziehung bringt und so, bei Beibehal-
tung der juristischen Immanenz und 
Allgemeingültigkeit juristischer Kategorien, 
ihre konkrete Erfüllbarkeit nicht nur aus 
metajuristischen Quellen herleitet, sondern 
auch den Punkt aufweist, von dem aus sie 
begriffen werden kann (Grundzüge der 
Rechtsphilosophie S. 96 ff.). Ich muss beto-
nen, dass Radbruch das Problem nur von der 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
Recensiones 2 2 5 
Seite der Rechtsphilosophie aufwirft und auf 
seine soziologische Diskussion nicht näher 
eingeht. Für seine Problemstellung mit Recht; 
aber mir scheint dennoch, dass er den metho-
dischen Ort, wo dieses Problem liegt, am 
deutlichsten aufgewiesen hat."7 
Wie aus diesen Darlegungen hervorgeht, 
verwandelte sich dieselbe Radbrucher Typo-
logie, die in dem Brief aus 1914 noch als 
Beweis der „absoluten Notwendigkeit" des 
Relativismus diente, nunmehr in das 
Vorgefühl der gesellschaftlichen Determi-
niertheit der darin enthaltenen konkreten 
Bewußtseinsinhalte. Die aus der Erkennung 
der Untersuchung der gesellschaftlichen 
Zusammenhänge als grundlegendes methodi-
sches Prinzip stammende Anschau-
ungsänderung — zumindest auf der Ebene der 
Problemenbestimmung — strahlte auch auf 
andere Gebiete aus. Sich dieser Periode erin-
nernd schreibt Lukács: „die karge und for-
melle Gegenüberstellung der Legalität und 
der Moralität wirkte durch Kants Vermitt-
lung . . . lange Zeit hindurch stark auf mich, 
hat mich aber nie befriedigt". Es ist klar, daß 
es sich hier um die gesellschaftliche Gebun-
denheit gewisser — in einer gegebenen Art 
objektivierter — Bewußtseinsimmanenzen 
handelt. Das aber bedeutet nichts anders, als 
daß die Inbetrachtnahme des gesellschaftli-
chen Gesichtspunktes die Kant'sche Metho-
denlehre — die auf rein logische Unterschei-
dungen baut — auseinandersprengt. „Der 
untrennbare Zusammenhang der rein formel-
len Pflichtmoral mit den praktischen Anforde-
rungen der jeweils herrschenden gesellschaftli-
chen Lage und Entwicklung, hauptsächlich 
mit dem jeweiligen Rechtssystem war für mich 
nur zu klar."8 Deshalb widmet er jetzt der 
SolowjefFsehen Auflassung der gegenseitigen 
Voraussetzung des Verhältnisses des Rechts 
und der Moral Aufmerksamkeit genauso, wie 
7
 Georg v. Lukács, ,Croce, Benedetto: Zur 
Theorie und Geschichte der Historiographie. 
Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr. \9\S, Archiv für Sozialwis-
senschaft und Sozialpolitik, XXXIX (1914), S. 884. 
8
 György Lukács, ,Előszó (Vorwort)', Utam 
Marxhoz: Válogatott filozófiai tanulmányok (Mein 
Weg zu Marx: Ausgewählte philosophische 
Aufsätze), Bd. I, Budapest, 1971, S. 14. 
auch dem durch Georg Jellinek vertretenen 
ethischen Minimum.9 Das ist die Erklärung 
dafür, daß Lukács bei der Analyse der philo-
sophischen Leistung von Emil Lask jenem 
Experiment weitgehende theoretische Bedeu-
tung zuspricht, in dem Lask den spezifischen 
Geltungscharakter des Rechts ausgearbeitet 
und sein Verhältnis zu den übrigen Sphären 
festgestellt hat.10 
Die in Heidelberg verbrachten Jahre wei-
sen noch ein bemerkenswertes Moment auf. 
Dieses Moment wirft nicht bloß auf die 
damalige ideologische und moralische Ge-
meinschaft von Lukács und Radbruch Licht, 
aber es gibt auch der unmißverständlichen 
Verurteilung des Krieges auf moralischer 
Basis ein Gewicht, das mitgespielt haben mag, 
daß die Ereignisse Lukács binnen eines Jahres 
zur kommunistischen Partei getrieben haben. 
Was ich meine ist, daß Radbruch ein 
kämpferischer Pazifist gewesen ist; seine Ta-
ten wurden durch sein „soziales 
Grundgefühl" gelenkt.11 Ihn sehen wir „als 
freiwilligen Krankenpfleger im Dienste des 
Roten Kreuzes, später als Soldaten und 
schließlich als Offizier an der Westfront"12, 
der sein denkendes Ich in den Dienst der 
Kriegsfeindlichkeit stellte und die Philosophie 
des Krieges in einem einen entscheidenden 
Widerhall auslösenden Studie erörterte.13 
Kaum hatte Lukács diese Schrift gelesen, 
als er seine völlige Identifizierung ausdrük-
kend schon antwortete. 
"Heidelberg, Keplerstrasse 28. 
U/III. 1917. 
Lieber Herr Professor, 
Ihr Aufsatz hat mich sehr interes-
siert. Ihnen und darüber zu schreiben ist mir 
9
 Georg Lukács, .Solowjeff, Wladimir: Die 
Rechtfertigung des Guten. Ausgewählte Werke, Bd. 
II. Jena 1916', Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik, XLII (1916—1917), S. 978 ff. 
10
 Georg Lukács, ,Emil Lask', Kant-Studien, 
XXII (1918) 4, S. 349 ff. 
11
 Gustav Radbruch, Der innere Weg: Aufriss 
meines Lebens, Göttingen, 1961, S. 107 ff. 
12
 Günter Spendel, Gustav Radbruch: Lebens-
bild eines Juristen, Hamburg, 1967, S. 8. 
1 3
 Gustav Radbruch, ,Zur Philosophie dieses 
Krieges', Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, XLIV 
(1918) 
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darum nicht leicht, weil ich mit den meisten 
Ihrer Ausführungen ganz einverstanden bin. 
Einzelne Sachen wollte ich im Sommer 1915 
bevor ich einrücken müsste, in einem unvoll-
endet gebliebenen Aufsatz ,Die Intellektuellen 
und der Krieg' schreiben. So vor allem, den 
mir sehr wichtig erscheinenden Gedanken, 
dass das ganze Problem der , M acht' eine 
hypostasierte methodologische Vorausset-
zung der politischen Geschichtswissenschaft 
ist; auch Ihre Unterscheidung von ,Sinn' und 
,Bedeutung' ist mir vertraut und gehört zu 
meinen Überzeugungen. Für sehr wichtig 
halte ich Ihre Auffassung der ,Schuld'-Frage 
und die symptomatische Bedeutung der ge-
genseitigen Ablehnung der Verantwortung für 
den Krieg (die durch die Analyse des Zusam-
menhanges von Krieg und Diplomatie gut 
vorbereitet ist). Hier liegt in der Tat etwas, das 
nur diesem Kriege zukommt. Doch ich sehe: 
ich schreibe keine Bemerkungen sondern 
einen Auszug: daraus können Sie ersehen, 
dass Ihr Aufsatz mir sehr gut gefallen hat. 
Jetzt, nach einer langen, harten mir liegenden 
Lektüre ist es mir sogar schwer Differenz-
punkte aufzufinden. Doch wenn Sie doch 
nach Heidelberg kommen, wird ja alles sich im 
Gespräch anders Machen? Ihr 
G. v. Lukács" 
Radbruchs Antwort hat einen ähnlich 
warmen, und gleichzeitig dankbaren Ton. Auf 
einer Feldpost-Karte schreibt er am 3. April 
1917: 
„Lieber Herr v. Lukács, 
vielen Dank für Ihren freundlichen Brief. 
Ihre Bemerkungen zu meinem Aufsatz freuen 
mich sehr. Man kann für derartige Gesinnun-
gen ja sich kaum irgendwo Zustimmung 
finden. Sie kann sich selbst ohne allerlei 
innere Widerstand abgewinnen. Nähme nur 
diese Zeit, die einen zu solcher seelisch zer-
mürbenden Zwiespältigkeit, zu lauten hal-
ben Stellungnahmen ständigen reservativ 
mentalis und protestativ facto contrario nö-
tigt, endlich ein Ende! 
Allen Heidelbergern herzlichen 
Grüsse, besonders Ihnen 
von Ihren 
Gustav Radbruch" 
Nach einer solchen Vorgeschichte und 
einem solchen Briefwechsel14 wirkt es überra-
schend, — in Kenntnis der Persönlichkeit der 
Personen und Auseinanderzweigung ihrer 
Wege aber vielleicht doch auch charakteri-
stisch, — daß danach die ehemaligen Freunde 
aufhören für einander zu existieren. Der 
Name Lukács' erscheint nachher weder in den 
zahlreichen Werken Radbruchs, noch in sei-
nen umfangreichen biographischen Schriften. 
Dasselbe gilt für Lukács. Er erwähnt nicht nur 
nicht mehr Radbruchs Namen, hat aber nicht 
einmal soviel für den ehemaligen Berufsgenos-
sen übrig, daß er mit dem bis 1949 lebenden 
und wirkenden — dazu noch als ein zuhause 
gebliebener und zuhause kämpfender 
Märtyrer des Faschismus gepriesenen — deut-
schen Rechtsgelehrten mit enzyklopädischem 
Wissen, mit dem großen rechtsphilosophi-
schen Erzieher von Generationen wieder in 
Verbindung tritt. Er nahm sich auch nicht die 
Mühe, daß er nach seiner Rückkehr nach 
Ungarn, bei der Ersetzung und Entwicklung 
seiner viel gelittenen Privatbibliothek, die er 
zielbewußt, durch Inanspruchnahme seiner 
privilegiert guten Antiquariatsbeziehungen 
herzustellen versuchte, auch nur eines von 
Radbruchs Werken aufs neue anschaffte. 
Cs. Varga 
1 4
 LAK M/246/1. 
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MiHOLics, T.: Arbeitsverrichtungspflicht im Arbeitsrecht* 
Die Arbeitsverrichtung ist vielleicht die 
wichtigste Offenbarung des menschlichen Da-
seins. Es ist seit den ältesten Zeiten bis heute 
eine zentrale Frage, in welchen Rahmen die 
Arbeit verrichtet ist, welche die treibenden 
Kräfte sind, welche die Richtung der Arbeits-
verrichtung ergeben. 
Tivadar Miholics untersucht die Arbeits-
verrichtung in Rahmen der sozialistischen 
Gesellschaft, in solcher Weise aber, daß er von 
Zeit zu Zeit auch die Gesetzgebung einiger 
westlichen Staaten auch in Betracht zieht. 
Seine Darlegungen beruhen dabei in erster 
Reihe auf dem ungarischen positiven Recht, 
was aber nicht ausschließt, daß er als 
Ergänzung seiner Darlegungen auch weiter-
reichende rechtsvergleichende Feststellungen 
macht. 
Der Verfasser untersucht die Frage der 
Arbeitsverrichtungspflicht nur von der Seite 
der Pflichte des Arbeitsnehmers, es folgt dann 
daraus, daß er sich mit der anderen Seite, mit 
der Beschäftigungspflicht der Arbeitsgebers 
nicht beschäftigt. Er geht auf die 
Arbeitsverrichtungsverhältnisse im Rahmen 
von durch andere Rechtszweige geregelten 
gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen ebenfalls 
nicht ein. Diese Abgrenzung seines Themas 
ermöglicht die genaue Beaugenscheinung der 
zu untersuchenden Frage, die Konzentration 
der Aufmerksamkeit auf die, mit der Arbeits-
verrichtung zusammenhängenden grundle-
genden Fragen. 
Der erste Teil des Buches behandelt die 
allgemeinen Fragen der Arbeitsverrichtungs-
pflicht, undzwar in zwei Abschnitten, von 
welchen der erste sich mit dem Wesen der 
Arbeitsverrichtung, als Rechtsverpflichtung, 
mit ihrer Personalpflichtwerdung, während 
der zweite mit dem allgemeinen Inhalt der 
Arbeitsverrichtungspflicht, mit ihren wichti-
geren Inhaltselementen, mit ihrer Bestim-
mungsweise beschäftigt. Nun einige Gedan-
ken aus der diesbezüglichen Beweisführung 
des Verfassers! 
Der Verfasser weist darauf hin, daß man 
über Arbeitsverrichtungspflicht nur infolge 
der Tatsache reden kann, daß die Rechtsnorm 
diese für den Fall bestimmten Bedingungen 
vorschreibt, bzw. sogar die Verwirklichung 
dieser Pflicht schließlich vom zwingenden 
Staatsapparat gesichert wird. Das Arbeits-
recht verwendet sogar über die Rechtsquellen 
hinausgehende Rechtsmittel eben auf dem 
Gebiet der Arbeitsverrichtungspflicht. So z. B. 
spielt in der Bestimmung der Arbeitsverrich-
tungspflicht in Rahmen der Rechtsnorme 
auch die Anweisung des Arbeitsgebers eine 
wichtige Rolle. Die Voraussetzung von all 
diesen ist aber, daß der Arbeitsnehmer mit 
dem Arbeitsgeber in ein Rechtsverhältnis 
eingeht, dessen häufigste Form der Arbeits-
vertrag ist. 
Im Zusammenhang mit einer kennzeich-
nenden Eigentümlichkeit der Arbeitsverrich-
tung aufgrund eines Arbeitsrechts-
verhältnisses, mit dem persönlichen Charak-
ter der Arbeitsverrichtung weist der Verfasser 
im weiteren darauf hin, daß es auch 
Ausnahmsfälle gibt, wenn der Arbeitnehmer 
in die Arbeit auch andere Personen einbezie-
hen kann, bzw. wenn im Verhinderungsfalle 
der Arbeitsnehmer selbst für die Vertretung 
Sorge tragen soll (pp. 53—54). Wir möchten 
nun dies damit ergänzen, daß neuerdings — 
besonders in Amerika—der sogenannte, job-
sharing" — Arbeitsvertrag vorkommt, dessen 
Wesen darin besteht, daß an einer gewissen 
Arbeitsstelle zwei oder mehrere Personen eine 
Aufgabe verrichten, für deren Erfüllung sie 
gemeinsam verantwortlich sind. Diese Form 
des Arbeitsrechtsverhältnisses kommt nicht 
nur im Zusammenhang mit der Büroarbeit, 
sondern auch bei Ingenieuren, Busfahrern, bei 
dem Wartepersonal im Krankenhaus, bei 
Monteuren, usw. vor. Wenn einer von ihnen 
nicht in Arbeit treten kann, verrichtet der 
andere in seiner Statt die Arbeit, einer von 
ihnen muß aber die Arbeit immer ausführen. 
An der Seite des Arbeitnehmers ist der Vorteil 
* Munkavégzési kötelezettség a munkajogban, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1980. 
324 p. 
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dieser Konstruktion die größere Unabhän-
gigkeit bei der Arbeitszeiteinteilung, wäh-
rend bei dem Arbeitgeber der Vorteil dar-
in besteht, daß im Verhinderungsfalle des 
Arbeitnehmers er für keine äußere Arbeits-
kraft sorgen muß. 
Sehr interessant sind die Erörterungen des 
Verfassers auch in der Beziehung, was für eine 
Rolle die sozialistische Moral in der Bestim-
mung der Arbeitsverrichtungspflicht spielt. Er 
weist auf die Fälle hin, wenn die Rechtsnorm 
irgendeine früher in sittlicher Regel gefaßte 
Verhaltungsregel enthält, was im Prozess der 
Rechtsanwendung oft vorkommt. Ein anderes 
Mal verordnet die Rechtsregel nur mit hinwei-
sender Regel die verbindliche Berücksich-
tigung der Sittennorm. In solchem Falle wird 
die Rechtsregel der Vermittler der Sittennorm. 
In solchem Sinne spielen die Sittennormen 
an dem vom Rechts bestimmten Gebiet auch 
unmittelbar eine Rolle. Der Verfasser weist 
auch daraufhin, daß in den arbeitsrechtlichen 
Regelungen der sozialistischen Länder zweier-
lei Methode der Verwendung der Sittenregel 
in der Bestimmung der Verpflichtungen hin-
sichtlich der Arbeit der Arbeitnehmer zur 
Geltung kommt. In einigen sozialistischen 
Ländern ist die Beobachtung der Grundsätze 
der sozialistischen Zusammenarbeit im Zu-
sammenhang mit der Verpflichtungen hin-
sichtlich der Arbeit der Arbeitnehmer mit 
allgemeinem Charakter verordnet. Eine ande-
re Methode der Anwendung der Sittenregel ist 
dagegen, wenn der Inhalt der Teilverpflich-
tungen des Arbeitnehmers hinsichtlich der 
Arbeit mit Begriffen vom unterschiedlichen 
moralischen Inhalt bestimmt ist. Diese letztere 
Lösung kommt auch in der ungarischen 
arbeitsrechtlichen Regelung zur Geltung, 
wenn z. B. die Rechtsregel verfügt, daß der 
Arbeitnehmer die zu seinem Arbeitsbereich 
gehörige Arbeit mit der ihm zumutbaren 
Sorgfalt zu verrichten verpflichtet ist. Die 
Rechtsregel bestimmt aber den Inhalt des 
Begriffes „zumutbare Sorgfalt" näher nicht, 
sondern rechnet mit dessen gesellschaftlich 
entwickeltem Inhalt, in welchem eben die 
Norme der sozialistischen Arbeitsmoral eine 
bedeutende Rolle spielen. Der Verfasser ist 
der Meinung, daß im Kreise der Arbeitsver-
richtungspflicht die Anwendung der morali-
schen Regel in steigendem Masse notwendig 
wäre, sogar die Aufnahme einer Verfügung 
allgemeinen Charakters bezüglich der Anwen-
dung der Regel der sozialistischen Moral, 
besonders der Arbeitsmoral wohlbegründet 
scheint. Damit sind wir vollkommen einver-
standen. 
Die Mangelhaftigkeiten der Arbeitsver-
richtung, die Ungenauigkeiten, der Mangel 
des Pflichtbewußtseins sind oft darauf zu-
rückzuführen, daß die Arbeitsmoral unge-
nügend ist, die Frage ergibt sich nur, ob 
die Aufnahme einer Verfügung allgemeinen 
Charakters bezüglich der Verwendung der 
sozialistischen Arbeitsmoral in die Rechtsre-
gel eine wesentliche Änderung der Lage mit 
sich bringen würde? Unseres Erachtens wäre 
vor allem die Bewußtseinsänderung der Men-
schen in solcher Richtung notwendig, daß sie 
bei ihrem alltäglichen Verhalten den ethischen 
Erforderungen motu proprio genügen. Dann 
werden die sogenannten moralischen Erforde-
rungen zur weiterreichenden Geltung kom-
men. 
Der Verfasser beschäftigt sich mit dem 
Inhalt der Arbeitsverrichtungspflicht im zwei-
ten Teil seines Buches. Dieser ist der umfang-
reicheste Teil des Werkes, was selbstverständ-
lich ist, da das Wesen der Arbeitsverrichtung 
sich im deren Inhalt verkörpert. Da kommen 
solche Fragen in den Vordergrund, was (Ar-
beitskreis), wann (Arbeitszeit), wo (Arbeits-
platz) und wie (Art der Arbeitsverrichtung) 
verrichtet werden soll. 
In Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitskreis 
beschäftigt sich der Verfasser unter anderen 
damit, ob der Arbeitskreis der Arbeitsnehmer 
in dem Vertrag weit oder eng bestimmt 
werden soll, welche Gesichtspunkte für die 
weitere oder engere Bestimmung des Arbeits-
kreises an der Seite des Arbeitgebers bzw. 
Arbeitsnehmers sprechen. 
In Zusammenhang mit der Dauer der 
Arbeitsverrichtung (Arbeitszeit) weist der 
Verfasser unter anderen darauf hin, daß die 
Teilarbeitszeit ebenfalls als normale Arbeits-
zeit qualifiziert werden soll, überdies kann der 
Arbeitnehmer regelmäßig nur nach der 
Abänderung des Arbeitsvertrags, durch die 
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Änderung der Stipulation hinsichtlich der 
Teilarbeitszeit beschäftigt werden. 
Der Verfasser erörtert auch die Frage der 
sogenannten ungebundenen Arbeitszeit, wel-
che auch ein, wenig ausgearbeitetes Gebiet des 
Arbeitsrechts ist. 
Man muß mit dem Verfasser auch in seiner 
Feststellung einverstanden sein, daß in unse-
ren Rechtsregeln von den Grundsätzen hin-
sichtlich der Einteilung der Arbeitszeit die 
Verfügungen bezüglich der Berücksichtigung 
der Ansprüche des Gestamtinteresses fehlen. 
Es soll aber erwähnt sein, daß die Praxis sich 
immer mehr nach diesem Standpunkt richtet, 
so besonders im Falle solcher Unternehmen 
und Ämter, welche mit den Bewohnern in 
unmittelbarer Verbindung stehen. 
Die Erörterungen über die Arbeitsverrich-
tung über die normale Arbeitszeit und über 
deren Grenzen können von mehreren Stand-
punkten aus Interesse beanspruchen. Da un-
tersucht der Verfasser vor allem die Gründe 
der Verordnung der Arbeitsverrichtung über 
die normale Arbeitszeit und die Typen der 
Beschäftigung. 
Der Problemenkreis des Arbeitsplatzes 
kann ebenfalls aus mehreren Standpunkten 
aus Interesse beanspruchen. Der Verfasser 
leitet richtig ab, daß das Begriflfspaar 
ständiger Arbeitsplatz und wechselnder Ar-
beitsplatz nicht alle Fälle umfaßt, sondern als 
Dritte die Kategorie des äußeren Arbeitsplat-
zes aufgenommen werden soll. Der Verfasser 
hält die Bestimmung des Arbeitsplatzes 
(ständigen Arbeitsplatzes) in weiterem Kreise 
als die Anlage nicht begründet, da die prakti-
schen Erfahrungen bezeigen, daß der weiteste 
Kreis der Arbeitnehmer seine Arbeit norma-
lerweise an einem von der Anlage des gegebe-
nen Unternehmens begrenzten Gelände ver-
richtet. Das folgt eindeutig daraus, daß die 
produktive und administrative Tätigkeit bei 
den Unternehmen grundsätzlich an sogenann-
ten angelegten Arbeitsplätzen ausgeführt ist. 
Vom Standpunkt der Arbeitsverrichtungs-
pflicht aus ist die Feststellung des Arbeitsplat-
zes übrigens deshalb bedeutungsvoll, weil der 
Arbeitgeber den Arbeitnehmer innerhalb der 
Grenzen seines Arbeitsplatzes, d. h. seines 
ständigen, äußeren bzw. wechselnden Arbeits-
platzes einseitig auf andere Arbeitsstelle ein-
teilen kann. Damit verbunden beschäftigt sich 
der Verfasser mit den Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen der Arbeitsverrichtung außerhalb 
des normalen Arbeitsplatzes. 
Was nun die Art der Arbeitsverrichtung 
betrifft, stellt der Verfasser fest, daß in dieser 
Frage bisher sich keine einheitliche, auf ent-
sprechenden prinzipiellen Grundlagen beru-
hende Regelung ausgestaltet hat, bzw. sogar 
die literarische Bearbeitung der Frage nicht 
geschehen ist. Dann legt der Verfasser seinen 
Standpunkt hinsichtlich des Kreises der An-
forderungen und der zu beobachtenden Di-
rektiven dar, wobei er feststellt, daß die Arbeit 
in solcher Weise verrichtet werden soll, wie 
das in dem gegebenen Arbeitskreis von den 
Arbeitnehmern im allgemeinen zu erwarten 
ist. Diese Erwartung ist bei den, hinsichtlich 
der Menge und Qualität der Arbeit gestellten 
Anforderungen auch maßgebend, insofern 
diese Anforderung das von den Arbeitneh-
mern im allgemeinen zu erwartende Arbeits-
maß nicht übertrifft. 
Der dritte Teil des Buches erörtert die 
einzelnen Fragen der Befreiung von der Ar-
beitsverrichtungspflicht, wo in zwei Absätzen 
eigentlich die Fälle der Einstellung der Ar-
beitsverrichtungspflicht behandelt sind (Ver-
pflichtungen des Arbeitsnehmers in den Fällen 
der Befreiung von der Arbeit, Vergütung und 
Zeitanrechnung für die wegen Arbeitseinstel-
lung ausfallende Zeit). 
Unseres Erachtens befriedigt das Werk des 
Verfassers in erster Reihe theoretische 
Ansprüche, dadurch daß er gewisse Begriffe 
klarstellt, die diesbezüglichen verschiedenen 
Ansichte analysiert, schließlich seine eigene 
Meinung zusammenfaßt. Gleichzeitig ver-
meidet er die, in der Arbeitsrechtsliteratur 
manchmal vorkommende übertriebene Theo-
retisierung, er strebt überall nach klaren 
Lösungen, und unterläßt die komplizierten 
Beweisführungen. Eben deshalb kann das 
Buch auch bei den praktizierenden Juristen 
Interesse beanspruchen, da sie viele Anleitun-
gen zur alltäglichen Arbeit finden können. 
Das Werk ist mit Literaturverzeichnis, Sach-
verzeichnis, sowie mit russischen und deut-
schen Resümeen ergänzt. 
L. Trócsányi 
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The Tokyo Round and the international trade order 
It is a general view that the Tokyo Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations was the 
most comprehensive held within the GATT 
since its founding in 1948. One of the main 
differences between the Tokyo Round and the 
other six rounds is that the agreements 
concluded during the Tokyo Round covered 
not only tariffs, but also certain important 
non-tariff measures which brought new rules 
into the GATT system, which was practically 
unchanged and partly outdated since 1948. 
Background to the negotiations 
The necessity of further trade negotiations 
was recognized by the GATT already in 1967, 
just after the Kennedy Round.1 It was clear 
that for the further liberalization of world 
trade much more was needed than the mere 
reduction of tariffs. As a result of the six 
earlier rounds, the level of tariff protection 
was drastically reduced. By the end of the 
Kennedy Round, the tariff average on in-
dustrial products was not more than 7,2 per 
cent in the major developed contracting 
parties. The lower the level of tariff protection 
was, the more the trade limiting effects of 
some non-tariff measures were felt. According 
to a non-tariff measures inventory drawn up 
in 1968 by GATT, 800 non-tariff measures 
1
 For details of the history of the Tokyo Round 
see: The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations. I—II GATT. Geneva, 1979. and 1980. and 
GATT Activities in 1979 and Conclusion of the 
Tokyo Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(1973-1979) GATT. Geneva, 1980. 
were notified by exporting countries as ad-
versely affecting their trade.2 
During the Kennedy Round, but espe-
cially in the preparatory years of the Tokyo 
Round, it became evident that the GATT had 
to find the ways and means to integrate the 
developing countries with their special finan-
cial and trade problems into the GATT 
system on a permanent legal basis. Besides the 
questions relating to non-tariff measures, the 
handling of problems concerning the develop-
ing countries provided another main distin-
guishing element of the Tokyo Round. 
The necessity for having a comprehensive 
and new-rule-creating round of trade negotia-
tions was clearly reflected in the basic docu-
ment of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
in the Tokyo Declaration3 which was adopted 
in September 1973 by the ministers of 102 
countries. According to the Declaration, the 
overall aim of the Tokyo Round was "to 
achieve the expansion and ever-greater 
liberalization of world trade.. .". 
Unlike the sixties, the period of the 
Kennedy Round, the economic climate during 
the Tokyo Round was unfavourable. Some 
new and unexpected factors, such as the 
energy crisis, rocketing energy and raw 
material prices, inflation, exchange rate dis-
turbances, inadequate investments, growing 
unemployment, and, as a consequence, the 
increasing protectionist measures combined 
with old controversies among the major 
2
 GOLT, S.: The GATT Negotiations. 
1973-1975: A Guide to the Issues. British-North 
American Committee. 1974. pp. 30-31. 
3
 G A TT Basic Instruments and Selected Docu-
ments (BISD) 20th Supplement, pp. 19-22. 
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negotiating countries (see especially the 
struggle between the United States and the 
Community, concerning the common agricul-
tural policy, or the fight of the EEC and other 
countries to make the USA abolish the special 
countervailing duty legislation, etc.) made the 
negotiations more and more difficult. But 
seeing the possible disastrous political and 
economic consequences of a trade war, the 
leaders of the three big negotiating partners 
(USA, EEC, Japan) recognized that they had 
no acceptable alternative to strengthening or 
at least maintaining some sort of discipline 
and co-operation in the field of international 
trade. That is why, W. Haferkamp, EEC 
commissioner for external relations said the 
Tokyo Round "was condemned to succeed".4 
After removing all the political and legal 
obstacles, it was possible to finalize the 
negotiations on 12th April, 1979. 
Results of the Tokyo Round 
Tariffs 
The total value of trade affected by Tokyo 
Round most-favoured-nation tariff reduc-
tions and by bindings of prevailing tariff rates, 
amounts to more than US S 150 billion, 
measured on mfn imports in 1977. The 
weighted average tariff on manufactured 
products in the world's nine major industrial 
markets will decline from 7.0 to 4.7 per cent, 
representing a 34 per cent reduction of cus-
toms collection. On agricultural products, an 
overall average could not be calculated since 
many commodities are affected by measures 
other than tariffs.5 
Although the tariff reductions are not 
without significance, nevertheless, taking into 
account the already low initial rates and the 
slow introduction of new rates (the intro-
duction of new rates requires 8 years), it is 
most probable that this time the negotiations 
will not be chiefly remembered because of the 
tariff reductions. 
4
 GRAHAM, T. R.: Revolution in Trade Politics, 
Foreign Policy, Fall 1979. p. 52. 
5
 G A T T , The Tokyo Round... 1 . p. 1 2 0 . 
Son-tariff measures 
The greatest achievement of the Tokyo 
Round is the conclusion of the following 
agreements (codes of conduct) covering non-
tariff measures: 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(Standard Code), 
Agreement on Government Procurement, 
Agreement on Interpretation and Application 
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII 
(Subsidy Code), 
Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VII—Protocol to the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII 
(Customs Valuation Code), 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
(Anti-Dumping Code).6 
It was a great success of the Tokyo Round 
that the negotiators were able to find ways of 
making some non-tariff barriers negotiable at 
multilateral level. It is an apparent feature of 
the codes that—except for the Government 
Procurement Code and some provisions of the 
Subsidy and Countervailing Duty Code— 
they provide an international framework for 
the co-operation of governments instead of 
prescribing rigid disciplinarian rules. Each 
code establishes rules and procedures aiming 
at preventing governments from adopting 
trade restricting measures. Some of the codes 
(the best example is the Standard Code) oblige 
governments to inform other signatories 
about the proposed measures and to invite 
their comments on the draft. The codes set up 
standing committees to administer the agree-
ments. All the agreements contain provisions 
for consultation and dispute settlement; they 
also provide for special and more favourable 
treatment for developing countries. 
The codes—with the exception of the 
Customs Valuation and the Government 
Procurement Codes which came into force on 
1st January, 1981—have been in force since 1st 
January, 1980. Their fate and effectiveness is 
going to depend on how they are implemented 
6
 The texts of the agreements concluded during 
the Tokyo Round see: GATT. BISD; 26th Supple-
ment. pp. 3-188. 
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by the signatories. Although experience— 
because of the short time elapsed since their 
entering into force—is limited, nevertheless, 
the implementing legislations of some sig-
natories show how the particular governments 
interpret the agreements. From the point of 
view of our examination, the US approach is 
quite remarkable. The US implementing legis-
lation, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979—in 
spite of para. 1 of Article I of the General 
Agreement which prescribes, in an obligatory 
way, the granting of unconditional mfn to all 
contracting parties—adopted a conditional 
mfn approach denying treatments prescribed 
by the new codes to contracting parties which 
are not signatories of the particular codes.7 It 
is interesting to note that during GATT 
drafting sessions US negotiators character-
ized the unconditional most-favoured-nation 
principle as "absolutely fundamental".8 But 
now the Trade Agreements Act establishes a 
system of open reciprocity in which new 
concessions are extended only in return for 
new concessions received. Though the sig-
natories have not yet finished the examination 
of the national implementing legislations, it 
can be taken for granted that many countries 
are going to challenge the legality of the US 
approach on the basis of the relevant GATT 
provisions. The first case against the US 
conditional mfn treatment concerning the 
Subsidy Code has been brought before the 
GATT by India, because the US, referring to 
the lack of legal relationship between the US 
and India under the Subsidy Code stemming 
from the fact that the United States invoked 
the non-application clause of the Code against 
India, imposed a countervailing duty on 
Indian products without applying the "injury 
test" as provided for by the Code.9 Although 
the dispute is far from being resolved, the 
7
 See the statement of a leading US. official in: 
US. Mission Daily Bulletin. Geneva 30. June 1980. 
8
 Quoted in JACKSON, J. H.; World Trade and 
the Law of GATT, 1969, p. 252. 
9
 For details of the case see: India-America 
Trade. Pulling the Rug out, The Economist, 13. 
September 1980., Handelskriegsstimmung im 
G A TT? Wirtschaftliche Großmächte als Angeklagte, 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11. November 1980. 
attachment of the majority of the contracting 
parties to the mfn is clearly seen, inter alia, 
from the Decision of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES at their annual session in 
November, 1979.10 The developing countries 
and the socialist countries condemned the 
further limitation of the unconditional mfn, at 
other fora as well.11 The lack of clear-cut 
statements on this issue on the part of the 
developed countries belonging to the OECD 
seems to be significant. 
Framework for the conduct of world trade. 
In the Tokyo Round changes in the 
framework of world trade were brought about 
in two ways. Concerning certain non-tariff 
measures, the improvements were effective 
through the above-mentioned agreements. In 
other areas, the negotiations were entrusted to 
the so called "framework" group. Four agree-
ments emerged from the framework group 
and were adopted by GATT member-states at 
their annual session in November, 1979. The 
four agreements are the following: 
—Differential and More Favourable Treat-
ment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, 
—Declaration of Trade Measures Taken for 
Balance-of-Payments Purposes, 
—Safeguard Action for Development 
Purposes, 
—Understanding Regarding Notification, 
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance. 
The first agreement which is by far the 
most important one, is known as the "en-
abling clause", since it—codifying formal 
GATT practice based on provisional 
waivers—permits developed contracting 
parties to give more favourable treatment only 
to developing countries and special treatment 
to the least-developed countries, notwith-
standing the most-favoured-nation provisions 
of Article I of the General Agreement. The 
provisions of the "enabling clause" relating to 
10
 GATT BISD 26th Supplement p. 201. 
11
 UNCTAD TDIВ/770 pp. 34-35, UNCTAD 
TD/B/798 pp. 41-43 . 
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reciprocity reaffirm and strengthen the com-
mitment by developed countries not to seek 
concessions inconsistent with the needs of 
their developing partners in trade negotia-
tions. In turn, the clause states the expectation 
of developing countries regarding their future 
participation in the GATT system in line with 
their increased capacity to do so. This would 
reflect the expected progressive development 
of their economies. 
What the Tokyo Round failed to settle 
According to the Tokyo Declaration, the 
negotiations had to aim to "include an 
examination of the adequacy of the multi-
lateral safeguard system...". 
The practice before the Tokyo Round has 
shown that the GATT's safeguard clause 
(Article XIX) had deficiencies that made it's 
use difficult.12 Article XIX, inter alia, requires 
any action taken to be applied in a non-
selective, non-discriminatory manner, and not 
only against the country whose exports are 
causing injury. The country affected by the 
measure is entitled to take retaliatory, com-
pensatory measures against the country ap-
plying Article XIX. 
The inadequacies of Article XIX led to the 
proliferation of "voluntary" export restraints 
and orderly marketing arrangements outside, 
and in contradiction, to the provisions of the 
GATT. Although the total number of such 
kind of arrangements is not known, their 
number must be very high.13 
During the negotiations, many developed 
countries argued that their governments 
would more willingly accept wide-ranging 
1 2
 For details see: ROBERTSON, D.: Fail Safe 
Systems For Trade Liberalization. Thames Essay 
N o . 12. Trade Policy Research Centre, London , 
1977. pp. 11-72. 
1 3
 According to an author the accumulated 
number of export restrictions applied by Taiwan, 
Columbia and South Korea jumped f r o m 4 in 
1971-73 to 100 in 1974-77. CURZON PRICE, V.: 
Surplus Capacity and What the Tokyo Round Failed 
to Settle, World E c o n o m y , September 1979. p. 310. 
trade liberalization if safeguard measures 
could be taken selectively. The developing 
countries—as the main targets14 of these 
restrictions—strongly opposed that, because 
selective applications might allow easy, arbi-
trary and discriminatory establishment of 
trade barriers. 
The controversies could not be resolved by 
the end of the Tokyo Round. 
After many and unsuccessful negotiations, 
by the decision of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES in November, 1979, a GATT 
Committee was established to continue dis-
cussions and negotiations with the aim of 
elaborating supplementary rules and pro-
cedures regarding the application of Article 
XIX. The negotiations are still in process. The 
unresolved safeguard issue points out a very 
serious problem showing the reluctance of the 
"traditional trading nations" to recognize the 
necessity of structural adjustments. Instead of 
adjusting to the realities, and respecting the 
competitive advantages of the newcomers of 
international trade, they choose the easier and 
less painful solution for the short term, i.e. 
they restrict the "dangerous" imports, inter 
alia, by safeguard measures and for internal 
political reasons, they refuse to carry out the 
necessary changes in the structure of their 
economy. Whatever the final result of further 
negotiations will be, it is sure that it will 
considerably influence the trade order of the 
eighties. 
Not to mention the unresolved questions 
of quantitative restrictions and some other 
serious problems, the agricultural negotia-
tions in the Tokyo Round were not successful 
either. The roots of the problems concerning 
trade in agricultural products are well-known. 
The USA, as earlier, felt that agricultural and 
1 4
 T h e proliferation o f "voluntary" export 
restrictions against the exports o f developing coun-
tries w a s predicted already in 1971. CURZON, G. and 
CURZON, V. The Management of Trade Relations in 
the GATT, Reprinted from Vol . 1. of International 
Economic Relations of the Western World 
1959-1971. Edited by Shonff id , A. The Royal 
Institute o f International Affairs Oxford University 
Press, pp. 275-276. 
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industrial products should generally be 
treated in the same way. The EEC took a 
different view and wanted to separate the 
agricultural questions from the other ones. 
The EEC thought the stabilization of agricul-
tural trade should be achieved through com-
modity arrangements and the preservation of 
an effective common agricultural policy. 
The controversies between the EEC and 
the USA explain why the results in the 
agricultural field (tariff reductions on 25 per 
cent of world trade in agricultural products, 
international arrangements for meat and 
dairy products) were not satisfactory to many 
contracting parties. That is why the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES have kept on 
the agenda of the GATT, along with some 
other unresolved issues, such as the structural 
adjustments and export restrictions, the ques-
tion of agricultural trade in the post-MTN 
period. 
Conclusions 
What seems to be evident, after finishing 
the Tokyo Round, is that the whole inter-
national trade order is undergoing great 
changes. We are witnessing the break-down of 
the so-called GATT-IMF system and the 
emergence of some new tendencies. 
Economic history shows us well that 
international trade does not know eternal 
rules either. Following changes in the 
economic and political structures, the inter-
national trade order, too, should accom-
modate itself to the new requirements. It is 
clear that trade rules satisfying the needs of a 
prospering and rapidly growing world 
economy, led by some "traditional trading 
nations" (between 1945 and 1973) cannot be 
left unchanged if unfavourable economic 
conditions dominate (after 1973) and in some 
trade sectors vigorous new nations have been 
challenging the old trade hierarchy (gradually, 
but especially during and after the sixties).15 
What happened to the trade order is a more or 
15
 Analyses o f the NIC's exports see: LAISHLEY, 
R.: The New Protectionism., South. October, 1980. 
pp. 18-20. 
less necessary consequence of all that has 
happened during the last thirty years in world 
economy. 
What are the major changes in world 
economy and in world trade order? 
1) Growing need for cooperation 
During the period, 1948-1973, aggregate 
world production was increasing at an average 
annual rate of about 5 per cent. At the same 
time, the volume of world trade was expand-
ing at an average annual rate of 7 per cent, 
sixfolding the world trade's volume by the end 
of the period.16 As a consequence, economic 
interdependence of nations was considerably 
increased as well. The participants in inter-
national trade, through the recognition that 
the economic measures of one country greatly 
affect the interests of other countries, became 
aware of the need to increase international co-
operation in trade matters. This development 
challenged the traditional "freer trade" or 
non-governmental approach which attempts 
to create international rules designed gener-
ally to minimize government interference. 
According to the view of professor J. H. 
Jackson, the original GATT reflected the 
"freer trade" approach; "whereas in the MTN 
Agreements, different Codes seemed to take 
differing approaches. Some of the Agreements 
seem designed to establish new mechanisms 
through which governments and international 
bodies can manage trade. The creation of new 
"committees" in many of the Codes leans in 
this direction. Other Agreements, however, 
appear to be more in tune with the first 
approach—that is, with the traditional GATT 
view—and thus, seem designed to limit further 
governmental interference with international 
trade."1 7 Though one could discuss at length 
which one is the prevailing approach, it is 
1 8
 BLACKHURST, R., MARIAN, N., TUMLIR, J. 
Trade Liberalization Protectionism and Interde-
pendence, GATT Studies in International Trade, 
N o . 5. Geneva, 1977. pp. 7 - 8 . 
1 7
 JACKSON, J. H.: The Birth of the GATT-MTN 
System: A Constitutional Appraisal, Law and Pol icy 
in International Business. Vol . 12. Number 1. 1980. 
pp. 37 -38 . 
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evident that increased economic interde-
pendence has definitely changed the character 
of trade rules through the establishment of 
some sort of active co-operation among 
trading governments. As we have seen the 
GATT contracting parties have even re-
cognized that behind their commercial policy 
measures often lurk unsatisfactory national 
structural adjustment practices. That is why 
the GATT, through putting on its agenda 
questions relating to structural adjustments, 
have taken the first step on the road to deeper 
and really meaningful international co-
operation. (The outcome of this step remains 
to be seen in the near future.) 
But there is one fundamental problem 
which can undermine the whole development. 
How to satisfy growing requirements for more 
international co-operation in a world where 
countries tend to neglect other countries' 
interests? 
2) The erosion of M FN 
The unconditional most-favoured-nation 
principle constitutes a corner-stone of the 
whole multilateral GATT system. Despite the 
numerous, more or less accepted exceptions 
(see regional trading blocks, Generalized 
System of Preferences or the US-Canada 
automotive agreement), the unconditional 
mfn remained one of the most, or may-be the 
most important basic principle of the whole 
GATT system. It is a remarkable feature of 
the Tokyo Round that the erosion of the mfn 
has become more serious. As we have seen the 
way in which some countries interpret and 
implement the Tokyo Round Agreements, the 
GATT leads away from unconditional mfn. 
Under this interpretation, benefits, both pro-
cedural and material, are extended fully only 
to code signatories. There are attempts in the 
US professional literature at explaining this 
sudden conversion. According to them, one 
should make a difference between tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers. While tariff concessions 
negotiated with principal suppliers could be 
extended under mfn, without insisting on 
formal reciprocity, "Quite different percep-
tions prevail with regard to non-tariff barriers. 
In order to deal with non-tariff distortions, 
each nation must accept limited international 
discipline, over measures previously regarded 
as internal economic policy tools . . . the 
major nations that were willing to accept 
meaningful international measures demanded 
that such discipline apply equally to their 
trading partners. In order to ensure this 
international quid pro quo, the Tokyo Round 
established the principle of conditional M F N 
as the centre-piece of its work."18 Those who 
would like to prove that the GATT rules, and 
primarily, para. 1 of Article I, cover only 
tariffs do not have an easy task. The first 
contradiction comes from the language of 
Article I and from that of the other articles of 
the GATT. It is absolutely clear that Article I 
and many other GATT articles, see e.g. 
Articles VI-XIV, cover non-tariff measures as 
well, and strictly prescribe the application of 
mfn. In addition, one should not forget that 
the non-tariff measures agreements—which 
generally merely interpret and complete some 
basic articles of the General Agreement—are 
not new phenomena in the GATT system. Or 
a very authentic argument based on past 
GATT practice: the old Anti-Dumping Code 
(concluded during the Kennedy Round) 
although, no doubt, it was a non-tariff barrier 
agreement, was interpreted and applied on 
mfn basis. 
To cut a long story short, the emergence of 
the conditional mfn does not follow from the 
nature of the Tokyo Round agreements. The 
reasons for the interpretation indicated above 
can be found in the changed sphere of interest 
of some countries referred to, as a con-
sequence of the drastic events on the scene of 
world trade. Inasmuch as 35 years ago it was 
in the trade interest of some economically and 
politically powerful countries to have a GATT 
with the "absolutely fundamental" mfn 
clause, to the same extent they are now 
interested in limiting the scope of mfn to a 
18
 HUFBAUER, G. C., SHELTON, ERB J., STARR, 
H. P.: The GATT Codes and the Unconditional 
Most-Favored-Nation Principle, Law and Policy. . . 
Vol. 12. Number 1. 1980. p. 67. 
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group of countries, excluding others which are 
considfered, e.g. politically undesirable and/or 
economically dangerous. 
As we have seen, the precondition of the 
so-called "selective'" safeguard measures is 
also the acceptance of the lack of mfn. The 
issue of selective safeguards is very serious, 
because the possibility of selective or rather 
discriminative safeguard actions makes it 
easier to put off structural adjustments by 
penalizing the most efficient producers. An 
author referring to the dangers of selective 
safeguards rightly said: "To amend the 
GATT to permit discriminatory safeguards 
would open the floodgates of discrimination 
in all kind of circumstances. It would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the GATT system 
which, . . . is based on the principle of non-
discrimination . . . In a discriminating trading 
system market access is not a right to be 
earned through competition and excellence, 
but it is up for grabs through arm-twisting, 
blackmail and favouritism.. ,".19 In our view 
of the situation, we are, unfortunately, not in a 
position to share the optimism expressed by 
an authority who sees a gradual evolution 
from power-oriented trade diplomacy to-
wards a rule-oriented approach.20 
It is clear that the elimination of mfn from 
the GATT system and its replacement by 
reciprocity would drastically change tradi-
tional GATT relations. The developing coun-
tries and the socialist countries have called the 
attention of the international community to 
the dangers of this trend. Under pressure from 
the majority, the GATT CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, too, have taken a decision 
reaffirming the existing GATT mfn rights.21 
1 9
 CURZON PRICE, V . , o p . cit. p. 312 . 
2 0
 "To a large degree, the history o f civilization 
may be described as a gradual evolution from a 
power oriented approach, in the state o f nature, 
towards a rule oriented approach" JACKSON, J. H. 
The Crumbling Institutions of the International 
Trading System. Text o f a lecture, Trade Policy 
Research Centre, London , 1977. 20 October p. 9. 
21
 See note 10. 
3) Different trade rules for different 
group of countries 
It is a very significant fact that the majority 
of the signatories to the Tokyo Round Codes 
are developed countries. It is not by chance. 
The Tokyo Round was dominated by these 
countries, and among them, first of all, by the 
big three (EEC, USA, Japan). That is why the 
MTN codes are shaped in such a way as to 
satisfy, first of all, the trade needs of these 
countries. This explains why the developing 
countries criticized so heavily the Tokyo 
Round already in May, 1979, in Manila, at 
UNCTAD V.22 
If we analyze the results of the Tokyo 
Round, together with other events of world 
trade, it is not difficult to recognize the 
emergence of a strong differentiation in the 
rules governing international trade. There is 
one set of rules, roughly, the GATT as 
amended and interpreted by the Tokyo 
Round for the developed market economy 
countries. Among themselves, in spite of the 
difficult economic climate, and growing unem-
ployment, they try to maintain a fair and non-
discriminatory trade order, to avoid a risky 
trade war.23 Another set of rules was drafted 
for the conduct of trade with the developing 
world. Although the Tokyo Round con-
tributed to the further development of the 
special and differential treatment in favour of 
the developing countries, it would be mislead-
ing to concentrate only on this side of the 
picture. It is remarkable that, parallel with the 
hardening of the economic situation in the 
OECD countries, the number and significance 
of special export limiting arrangements and 
measures is rapidly growing. (See: Multi-
Fibre Arrangement, "voluntary export re-
straints", orderly marketing arrangements, 
safeguard, anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty actions, etc.) These arrangements and 
measures have mainly hit the most com-
petitive and sometimes the world's most 
2 2
 M T N Declaration by the Group o f 77 
UNCTAD TD/268ladd. 1. pp. 9-14. 
2 3
 LAISHLEY. R., op. cit. p. 20. 
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effective producers in some sectors, the newly 
industrialized countries. 
The essence of all this: to preserve the old 
trade hierarchy and to avoid costly structural 
adjustments. The price: the constant violation 
of the old rules which, sooner or later, will 
make its influence felt on relations among the 
developed countries themselves. 
The socialist countries are getting an even 
more restrictive treatment. For political rea-
sons, their exports are restricted in a discrimi-
natory way, even in cases where their exports 
do not harm the economy of the importing 
country. 
* 
No doubt, the international trade order is 
undergoing a serious crisis at present. Tradi-
tional rules are fading, new tendencies are 
emerging. The increased economic interde-
pendence of the participants of international 
trade has enforced a growing trade co-
operation among them. The great question is 
how to continue the co-operation, how to rely 
upon other countries, if all countries follow 
their own narrow, short-term interests. The 
attacks on the mfn mark a turning point in 
trade power relations. Some countries that 
historically not long ago advocated—from the 
position of the stronger side—the full ac-
ceptance of the unconditional most-favoured-
nation treatment, now seem to be going in the 
opposite direction, replacing mfn by reciproc-
ity and endangering the basis of the whole 
multilateral trading system. The limited role 
of mfn could lead to abuse of power and to the 
breakdown of today's multilaterality. The 
emergence of different rules for different 
groups of countries has begun. 
But despite all the negative features in-
dicated above, the Tokyo Round cannot be 
blamed for the crisis situation. On the con-
trary, it is probable that without the Tokyo 
Round abuse of power and spontaneity would 
have played a greater role in the formation of a 
new trade order for the eighties and this would 
have caused a much painful shock for world 
trade. 
P. Náray 
Legal consciousness in a personally non-interactive 
professional group 
The present research was carried out as 
part of a long term project aiming at the 
description of Hungarian legal consciousness. 
(For earlier publications see Acta Juridica, 19 
( 1977) 23 3 ff. and 21 ( 1979) 431 ff. ) The present 
study is intended to investigate the character-
istics of the legal consciousness of a homo-
geneous, personally non-interactive pro-
fessional group. The hypothesis applied was 
that the similarities in the way of life, due to 
the uniform work-conditions and the relative 
social status, result in homogeneous legal 
consciousness. 
Sample 
The non-interactive professional group 
selected was that of the concierges (US: 
janitor). The choice was determined by several 
factors. There is no professional socialization 
in the profession, there are only limited inter-
personal interactions and no tight organiza-
tional control. The concierge is an important 
social element and a symbol for the citizens in 
Budapest, since the concierge was helping at 
poiice-inspections several times in the past. It 
was supposed that due to this historical fact, 
an authoritative tendency and a para-official 
role-self-portrait will be present in their 
opinions. Last, but not least, there is a new 
tendency in the profession: a growing number 
of relatively highly educated young mothers 
are seeking to become concierges in order to 
obtain a decent flat. The existence of two 
distinct groups in the population seemed very 
promising in testing the hypothesis. 
The sample was selected by using a 
random sample of houses in the inner Buda-
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pest area. We have 96 structured deep inter-
views, representing 9 per mille of the total. 92 
per cent were women, with a normal age 
distribution. The average age exceeds 50 
years. Many of the concierges are already 
retired, nevertheless they fulfil some 
concierge-activities. 
36 per cent are of peasant origin, mainly 
the elderly ones. They accepted this kind of 
employment as a means of gaining higher 
status in society and they were active as 
concierges at least from the 1950s. The 
traditional type of concierge is now rapidly 
replaced by a younger generation with previ-
ous industrial and tertiary employments. The 
concierge as a social-professional group stems 
mainly from the upper strata of the manual 
workers. This is clearly testified by the career 
of their adult children. The majority of these 
children are skilled workers and 39 per cent 
are active as white collar workers or 
intellectuals. 
Further analysis confirmed the transitory 
nature of the concierge's social position. 
Using a cluster-analysis it was possible to 
distinguish among family structures on the 
basis of the relative status distances of the 
family members. In the greatest single group 
(29 pier cent) the piosition of the wife-concierge 
is relatively low and she accepted the job only 
to give some suppiort to the family's economy. 
The original hypothesis of the professional 
homogenity was only partially corroborated. 
This situation created an even better possi-
bility for the study of the legal consciousness, 
since it made possible a direct measurement of 
the professional ethos against the background 
variables. 
This professional ethos was influenced by 
the concierges' work load. Their activities 
consist mainly of basic services (cleaning) and 
of the keeping of the public order in the 
building (silence). The greatest single group 
considered her role as one of order-keeping. 
There were signs of poorly concealed status-
inferiority feelings. No particular psycholog-
ical conformism or agression is present in the 
population according to the result of 
Rosenzweig's Picture Frustration Test. 
T h e a t i i l H C of legal с о — c i e a c c 
"Legal conscience" was mainly limited to 
select opinions concerning deviant (law-
breaking) behaviour (for the items see Acta 
Juridica, 19 (1977) p. 233). Using a factor 
analysis technique the items have shown some 
differences; some offences were evaluated 
more as moral wrongs. In order to avoid 
confusion we used two indicators of tolerance. 
The 1.8 average of intolerance means that the 
concierges refused the law-breaking 
behaviours. The refusal was not significantly 
higher than that of the manual workers of the 
same age of our earlier study. On the other 
hand the morally neutral deviances were 
considered punishable by law only by 74 pier 
cent. Even moral blaim was limited among 
those born after 1940. Though the concierges 
were rather homogeneous as far as tolerance is 
concerned, it was possible to establish some 
differences according to their original pro-
fession. Those with relatively high status in the 
family and the originally white collar workers 
were the most tolerant. The different tolerance 
indexes unanimously prove that the personal 
career is the most influential single factor, 
while the social origin is negligible. 
A second index generally applied in our 
surveys is a conformism index. This index is 
intended to measure the respect felt towards 
the suppiosed solution of the relevant legal 
rules. The legal conformism is opierationalized 
by measuring the differences in piersonal 
judgements and the relevant knowledge of the 
law. The index measures also the direction of 
the difference, i.e. whether one is conforming 
with a supposedly tolerant or intolerant 
(punishing) law. 27 per cent of all the answers 
were intolerant-conformist, 18 per cent toler-
ant conformist. We arrive to a similar result 
restructuring the index and comparing the 
present structure only with the answers given 
by skilled and unskilled women of the earlier 
study. In the present study 14 pier cent of the 
concierges are nonconformists, 40 pier cent 
show respect to a law that is supposed to be 
intolerant, 43 pier cent show respiect to a law 
that is suppiosed to be tolerant, while 12 pier 
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cent respect a law which is not characterized 
by any particular inclination towards punish-
ment. Only the conform intolérants have a 
particular social background: the individual 
career (mobility) is significant according to the 
results of the variance analysis. The respect 
towards the law as measured by our conform-
ism index was independent of the psycholog-
ical conformism as measured by the PFT, yet 
those who show an inclination towards the 
opinion of a supposed majority are signifi-
cantly more numerous among conform 
intolérants. 
The motives of the concierges concerning 
their opinions on the measures to be taken in 
front of some deviant acts were content-
analysed. Three main types of motivation 
were distinguished: labeling, pondering and 
moralistic. Pondering (a rational evaluation 
of the consequences) was characteristic of the 
evaluation of corruption and deserting one's 
country, while in the majority of the analysed 
behaviours labeling was applied. 
Conformity alone was not related to the 
motivation-type of the subjects; otherwise 
stated, if the evaluation of the deviance is 
influenced by the law, this is not due to any 
particular motivation, but to the authority of 
the law itself. There is, on the other hand a 
significant relation between a person's 
motivation-system and her tolerance, at least 
as far as intolerance and labeling are con-
cerned. The motivational type was strongly 
related to the background variables: the 
labeling type persons have, typically, a low 
status in their family, while a rational 
approach is very often characteristic of those 
concierges who have a relatively high family 
status. 
Given the relatively high intolerance ob-
served in the group indicated, previously, the 
punitive attitudes of the concierges are not 
surprising. 58 per cent of the answers were 
favouring criminal sanctions against the devi-
ant acts (the opinions were not uniform, 
however, as the very high standard deviation 
(2.08) shows.) Even in the case of the (non-
vagrant) slacker, 15 per cent were favouring 
imprisonment. Given the importance attrib-
uted to imprisonment, it was obvious to 
analyse the function attributed to imprison-
ment. In order to minimize biases, no alter-
natives were mentioned to the subjects. The 
majority of the interviewed concierges had a 
strong conviction as to the function of punish-
ment, and the functions mentioned form 
clearly distinguishable cluster-types: 
prevention of crime only: 5 per cent 
revenge-dominated: 26 per cent 
reeducation of the criminal: 44 per cent 
no clear idea: 26 per cent 
The concept of punishment turned to be a 
basic structural element of the legal con-
science. Those with the greatest respect of the 
law are significantly more numerous among 
the partisans for the prevention and revenge. 
Revenge-oriented concierges are punitive (in-
tolerant), while the "preventives" are not. 
Those who emphasize the educative function 
of a prison sentence score relatively low in 
intolerance. The independence of the indexes 
used is proved by the fact that the prevention-
oriented group scores highest on non-punitive 
disapproval of the deviant acts. The very often 
used explication, namely that revenge and 
punitiveness are a psychological function of 
the personality or an effect of the status-
deprivation or cultural deprivation, was ruled 
out by the lack of correlation with PFT and by 
the very high (highest among the types) 
knowledge of the law observed in the revenge-
oriented group. Neither signs of author-
itarianism (measured on the basis of the 
concierge's child-rearing ideas) were more 
often observed in any particular punishment-
function group. While many (50 per cent) of 
the concierges would agree with the inter-
nation of criminals to an uninhabited island, 
53 per cent would distinguish according to the 
type of the crime committed or the personality 
of the felon. 
Professional activity and legal 
conscience 
In order to measure the legally influenced 
behaviour of the concierges an index of 
professional interference-readiness was con-
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structed. The index is based on the answers 
(and, unfortunately, not the actual behaviour) 
of the concierges concerning their activity in 
certain situations that might require their 
intervention or reporting to the police as in the 
case of child-beating by the dwellers. Fifty per 
cent declared that they had been once or more 
times at the police station to report a deviant 
or criminal behaviour. The personal inter-
ference varies according to the type of conflict. 
Fifty per cent thought that it is not necessary 
to interfere when child-beating was done by 
the parents or at least it is not part of their 
duty, while only 33 per cent were of the same 
opinion in the case of wife-beating. The 
interference index shows great differences in 
the concierges' attitudes. 17 per cent scored 
very high on the scale. No significant corre-
lation was observed between the interference 
and intolerance indexes, and the same can be 
said about conformism. The legal conscience 
is not related to the professional behaviour (or 
attitude), though in this case the professional 
activity was one of legal character. The lack of 
influence of the legal conscience (or of that 
central part which we tried to operationalize) 
on the behaviour corroborates our theory 
about the functions of the legal conscience 
(see Rechtsbewußtsein oder Meinungen von 
Recht? Rechtstheorie, 1981. 1.). It would be 
erroneous, however, to consider it as a de-
cisive proof, when one tries to prove the non-
existence of an influence. 
Personal interference proved to be only 
slightly related to the social background 
variables. The lowest interference level was 
observed in the group consisting of peasant-
descendants. It was surprising to note that the 
interference-readiness was not related to the 
role-concept of the concierges either. 
The surprisingly low acceptance of the 
supposed legal evaluation of the deviant acts 
indicates that even in such a particular group 
as that of the concierges, the opinion, so 
common in legal theory, that law-observance 
is due to the authority of the state, which 
creates the norms, does not prove. In the 
present survey questions were asked concern-
ing the possibilities and rights of the state to 
prohibit the sale of alcohol, to ban private cars 
from the cities and to limit or abolish the 
institution of divorce. Only 14 per cent of the 
sample accepted the regulatory rights of the 
state in all the above cases, while 28 per cent 
thought it inadmissible. 64 per cent considered 
the prohibition of the sale of alcohol as part of 
the rights of the state. (It is perhaps influential 
that 17 per cent of the sample reported 
problems in the family due to excessive 
alcohol consumption). Nearly the same 
amount of the concierges thought it ac-
ceptable to ban the cars from the cities, though 
half of the sample considered the increase in 
the number of privately owned cars pleasant, 
while fifty per cent considered the ban as 
reasonable. As far as the divorce is concerned, 
the sample was very critical. 84 per cent were 
aware of the increase in the divorce-rates and 
thought it was intolerable. 61 per cent had 
even some suggestions what should be done 
against the tendency. (They suggested a more 
restrictive marriage procedure and also re-
strictions in obtaining divorce). The abolition 
of divorce, however, was accepted only by ten 
per cent, yet even in this case 37 per cent 
thought that the state has the power to do so. 
Though there is no reason to believe that the 
concierges do not accept the rules stemming 
from the state bureaucracy which is in direct 
contact with them, the state as an abstract 
entity is not very authoritative for many of 
them. The conformism indexes were not 
correlated with the index created on the basis 
of the acceptance of state authority. 
The differences observed in the acceptance 
of state authority are due to the differences in 
the background variables of the group. The 
similarities towards the administration due to 
the concierges' professional duties did not 
make their attitudes uniform. The concierges 
with relatively high status in the family are 
more inclined to accept the omnipotence of 
the state. A tentative explanation of this 
phenomenon may be that people in lower 
positions are attached to some traditional 
system of values. The lowest observed average 
acceptance was 1.85. This characterized the 
group of those non-peasant descents who 
entered into the service before 1957, while the 
highest average was observed in the group of 
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peasant descents with the same amount of 
professional experience (5.27; the theoretical 
maximum being 10). 
The need for administrative-
regulatory intervention 
In connection with the acceptance of 
government intervention in certain fields of 
private and public life the subjects were asked 
about the efficiency of the administrative 
solutions. The problem is of particular im-
portance since administrative solutions to 
social problems which mainly recreate the 
original problem in another dimension, often 
refer to the expectations of the public opinion. 
As far as the concierges are concerned, they 
agreed with the increase of the price of alcohol 
(a measure taken half a year before the 
survey), though only 10 per cent considered 
that the solution was efficient. 62 per cent 
thought that a further increase would be 
necessary, without, however accepting 
complete prohibition. 17 per cent thought that 
such a measure would result in riots, 32 per 
cent were of the opinion that teetotalling is 
impossible because of illegal destilleries. The 
same doubts were expressed about the pro-
hibitive solution of traffic problems. As far as 
divorce was concerned, 33 per cent expressed 
at their own initiatives, that a restrictive plan 
would decrease the number of divorces, and 
75 per cent agreed with a suggested restriction 
when entering matrimony. 
An additive index was created to measure 
the need for administrative regulatory inter-
vention. 40 per cent scored higher than the 
mid-point on the scale. A significant relation 
was discovered between the index and 
conformist-tolerance. As there is a relationship 
with the acceptance of the state's authority, it 
is not surprising that the same social back-
ground variables are influential in this case 
too. Motivation too seems to be related to the 
acceptance of administrative solutions; 
pondering persons are very wary to accept 
administrative restrictions. Labeling motiva-
tion, however, is related only to a certain 
extent to the acceptance of the administrative 
solutions. This is perhaps the case because 
labeling expresses a stereotype approach and 
in some cases (as in that of divorce) this 
becomes a hindrance to any change of the 
existing and established practice and custom. 
Divorce 
The present study was mainly concerned 
with behaviours which are regulated by the 
criminal law. But even if one confines oneself 
to reactions to the deviance, one should 
consider behaviours and attitudes not gov-
erned by criminal law. Partly following the 
logic of other questions and partly to 
overcome this difficulty, part of the interview 
was devoted to the problems of divorce. 50 per 
cent of the concierges considered the divorce 
resulting from the ill-considered behaviour of 
the youth. 39 per cent of the sample had some 
kind of personal experience of divorce. 
Though mostly partisans of a restrictive 
divorce practice, 63 per cent were against the 
prohibition (inadmissibility) of divorce 
because that would not change the fact of 
separation. Another 22 per cent were against it 
because it would be harmful to the children. 
The main serious cause of divorce acceptable 
for the concierges was habitual drinking (54 
per cent) followed by neglect, emotional 
problems, maltreatment. The combination of 
the causes as established by the cluster-
analysis is the following: 
emotional problems and maltreatment 7% 
alcoholism and immorality 48% 
alcoholism and emotional problems 7% 
alcoholism and neglect 20% 
all causes mentioned 18% 
These types were not differing from each 
other according to the analysed components 
of the legal conscience. This is supporting the 
thesis that "legal conscience" is mainly a 
juristic-speculative construction, which is not 
a (relatively) homogeneous structure of the 
human mind. The above types are not unre-
lated or incidental: they are in a significant 
relationship with (psychological) conform-
ism. 
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Is legal conscience 
related to the value-structure 
of the conscience? 
The observed discontinuities of the sup-
posed legal conscience raise the problem of the 
structure of the analysed elements and that of 
the attitudes. In the present study we tried to 
establish the relation between the value-
system of the individual, or the professional 
group, and the legal opinions. The lack of an 
accepted and validated value-test in Hungary 
made our efforts tentative only. We limited 
our efforts to the study of three value-
reflective everyday activities: professional 
aspirations (both personal and towards one's 
children), the characteristics of the "good 
dweller" and values in child-rearing. Three 
groups were established after the content-
analysis (the technique used was clustering): 
"honesty and family" as main values charac-
terized 68 per cent, 13 per cent chose as leading 
values the "work-honesty-family" trinity; the 
rest of the responses was too heterogeneous to 
be considered as a group with similar values. 
The value-system was significantly related to 
the feeling of being professionally-socially 
recognized. Those with low self-esteem (based 
on work) scored high in disapproval and 
intolerance, yet there is no linear relationship 
between self-esteem and punitiveness, which 
suggests that punitiveness cannot be con-
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legal consciousness as operationalised in the 
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The value-system clusters were unrelated 
to the indexes of legal conscience, with the 
exception of the disapproval index and the 
clusters formed on the basis of answers on 
serious .causes for divorce. 
The above indicates that the legal con-
science is only indirectly influenced by the 
value-system of the individual, even in the case 
of a shared value-system of a profession. The 
work-oriented group had the lowest deviance-
disapproval average, while the group without 
a definite value-system scored highest on this 
scale. This indicates that without a firm value 
system there is a tendency to a non-
discriminative negative judgment of the un-
customary or deviant. For instance, the func-
tion of punishment is not related to any values 
within the limits of the present study. The 
following hypothesis can be outlined: the legal 
conscience is partly an autonomous part of the 
conscience, though its extension is more 
limited than supposed by many theories 
elaborated by legal philosophers and sociolo-
gists of law. The value-system influences 
directly some peripheral or everyday spheres 
of the "legal conscience", as it was clearly 
demonstrated in the case of divorce. Based on 
the relation between aspirations towards the 
sons' careers and the motivation, it was also 
established that the lack of a firm value system 
increases the chances of a relatively autono-
mous legal conscience. Otherwise stated, those 
who desire that their sons become white collar 
workers are inclined to labeling, while those 
without clear aspirations are pondering. 
The above model resumes the hypothesis 
elaborated in the present study on the relation 
between the "legal conscience" and some 
other elements of the conscience. 
A. Sajó 
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AARNIO, AULIS: Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, Springer Verlag, Wien-New York, 1979. 
246 p. 
The legal cognitive activity in terms of legal dogmatical work probably does not meet the 
criteria of scientific cognition, whatever should be meant by that. Cognizing legal rules is, 
therefore, often considered as social technics, respectively knowledge concerning that. As a 
matter of course, such a conclusion postulates some well definable measure of science to exist. 
Science means, first and foremost, cognition. From this point of view it is expedient, first, to be 
fully avare of the preconditions of cognition. Following Kaila, Professor Aarnio of Helsinki in 
this powerful and systematic reconstruction of the legal science (or a possible legal science) 
regards the immutability, systematizability (based upon recurring) and the conceptual 
approachability of the object of observation as such preconditions. The existence of the 
preconditions of cognition does however, not warrant the veracity of knowledge. Jurisprudence 
(legal science), respectively the theory of law ( Rechtslehre) endeavours to be scientific cognition 
fundamentally in terms of verification. But Aarnio sees very correctly that jurisprudence does 
not fulfil the requirements of veracity, according to any of the different criteria. 
Over and above the contents of knowledges, the other fundamental problem from the 
point of view of cognition is the source of obtaining knowledge. Aarnio takes a strong stand 
against the positivistic conception of cognition, especially against the view regarding the 
cognition of exact sciences as the exclusive method of cognition. He thinks the mistake in this 
case is methodological naturalism. After the justified criticism he essentially adopts the Kantian 
preconditions of cognition. 
According to Aarnio, the traditional jurisprudential research may be led back to two 
fundamental problems, viz. on the one hand, to the construction of legal concepts, respectively 
to systematizing legal definitions by means of these concepts, and on the other hand, to 
elucidating the contents of legal definitions, i.e. to interpretation. This is also denominated legal 
dogmatics and this is what Aarnio further on analyzes. Consequently, the task and subject of 
this Rechtslehre are systematizing and interpreting legal rules. Performing this restriction, 
Aarnio has no doubt about not having modern jurisprudence. Modern legal science takes into 
consideration the realization of legal rules, the evaluation of existing institutions and the 
problems of legislation. But these phenomena are excluded from Aarnio's inquiry concerning 
the scientific quality of jurisprudence. 
Under the above, rightly applied restrictions the subject of legal research will be the legal 
norm. As far as the existence of norm is concerned, the author takes the view that only the source 
of law, as a printed text, as an alternation of black and white spots may be characterized as 
factual (empirical) existence. On the contrary, norm seems to be unattainable, like fata morgana 
hiding from you, when you try to catch it (p. 46). Between the statement of norm (Normsatz) 
and norm, however, there is the statutory provision duly enlightening the contents of the norm. 
The difficulties of legal interpretation appears first, if the wording of law is not clear or if it has 
various meanings. Accordingly, Rechtslehre becomes hermeneutics, and Aarnio leads also the 
legal systematizing back to interpretation, or to be more precise, he points out that systematizing 
and interpretation are interdependent. Elucidating the contents of legal definitions is the core of 
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Aarnio's Rechtslehre and book. Interpretation means fundamentally the possibility to find 
certitude conceived in non-positivistic sense and the designation of the methods of its finding. 
The author endeavours to take into consideration the basic types of procedures followed in 
practice (games of language). 
Having analyzed the problems of interpretation of technical norms, Aarnio deals with 
interpretation, more properly intended, i.e. the choice among several interpretational 
alternatives. In the course of choosing fundamentally one of the types of research activity is 
realized, viz. when efforts are made in order to verify a given result. The peculiarity of this 
content-analysis consists in the lack of relevant procedural instruction (command). In a certain 
respect practice itself decides whether or not to follow a given procedural (verificational) model. 
The aim of the analysis is not to transform Rechtslehre, it only endeavours to obtain a technical 
norm by restricting the contents. Consequently, the very meaning has to be found which ensures 
that the given method of procedure is the correct one. As a matter of fact, verification means to 
find adequate arguments. There is, however, no uniform argumentational system and rule: 
Aarnio speaks about very different argumentational games. The argumentative bases cannot be 
founded upon intuition. On the other hand, argumentation relying upon authority is not a 
sufficient reason for accepting arguments. Even authority itself has various meanings in legal 
interpretation, as there is a significant difference between the prestige of state organs and the 
reputation of scientific opinions, even regarding their argumentative power only. In the legal 
community, however, each legal standpoint forms an argument merely by virtue of its existence. 
But this is not enough for the foundation of arguments and sense explanation, even in the case of 
the so-called predominant opinion. All the more as even the nature of predominant opinion is 
problematical. By all means, the authoritarian argumentation is superior to the intuitive one so 
far as the preceding one is at least publicly founded. When, however, the substantiating chain 
reaching the authority breaks, we get very near to that, what in the course of referring to 
intuition is happening. The other party has namely no possibility for argumentation. That is why 
the so-called open argumentation is accepted by the author. 
According to the guiding principle of the book, the critérium of legal veracity is to 
advance valid arguments according to the consensus of a definite audience (auditorium) and to 
apply these in conformity with definite rules. After all, legal reasoning consequently depends on 
the consensus of the relevant public. This supposition is, on the one hand, valuable as it gives 
way to the social background and it takes into consideration that rules always regulate in social 
sense. On the other hand, however, it does not give direction in the question of the conditions of 
the consensus. The audience can otherwise be of any composition but communities like e.g. 
judicial or jurisdictional ones are obviously of special importance. Theoretically, however, the 
whole society can constitute the audience. Although, if there is not other critérium verifying the 
correctness of a legal interpretation but the assent of the audience, i.e. the methodology of 
Rechtslehre does not constitute a closed system of rules ensuring correct interpretation of legal 
texts on the other hand, according to Aarnio, the possibility of rational argumentation remains 
(at least to a reasonable extent) in Rechtslehre, too (p. 122). According to Aarnio, that is made 
possible by the fact that every person taking part in the legal community has a priori given idea 
concerning a "natural order". The elements of this presupposition system can theoretically be 
elaborated and they can be made explicit. Although the cultural community conceived in a 
sociological sense provides certain guaranties on the fidelity of the knowledge based on 
auditorial consensus, this fidelity critérium seems to be simply irrelevant from the point of view 
of logical investigation. It would be more convincing if the author would argue with the social 
needs of consensusformation. 
In a book treating the scientific quality of Rechtslehre, respectively that of jurisprudence 
neither the analysis of inductivity (regarded as a fundamental in the positivistic conception of 
science), nor that of foreseeability connected with that can be missing. Induction in legal science 
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is impossible. While in the natural sciences it may be presumed that invariance is effective, i.e. in 
an unknown case the same behaviour can be expected as in a well-known one, as to law, this is 
not the case. Although it is not impossible to give prognosis concerning law, as emphasized in 
American and Scandinavian realism, this prognosis considerably diverges to the so-called 
prognosis of natural sciences. (And, accordingly, jurisprudence conceived in this sense does not 
fulfil the positivistic requirement of science either, viz. it lacks of capacity to give considerably 
probable prognosis.) 
According to Aamio's conclusion, it is the research activity that can be compared with 
Rechtslehre. In the course of research methodological verifiability and a definite level of 
systematizing are required. As to Rechtslehre, the former is given in the course of interpretation, 
while the latter by a system of definitions. According to Aarnio, Rechtslehre belongs to those 
spiritual sciences which do not provide positivistic certainty. There is no special procedure of 
Rechtslehre. According to Aarnio's second conclusion, the level of systematization determines 
to what extent research is theoretical. The greater part the system has in Rechtslehre, the more 
important are theoretical statements. 
A. Sajó 
G R I F F I T H , E R N E S T S.: The American System of Government, Methuen and Co., London, 1976. 
204 p. 
The author of the work ran into its fifth edition lectured in 1951 -1952 as guest professor in 
Oxford on the American system of government and simultaneously offered courses on general 
economic problems at the universities of Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Swansea. The 
interest was extraordinary, considerable misunderstandings had, however, to be cleared up. 
In the foreword the author emphasizes that the American administration is the 
government of "built in" brakes, which render impossible either for the executive power or for 
the legislators or courts to gain an unduly high ascendancy over the others. In the brief 
comments written to the subsequent editions the author touches upon the changes of 
presidential power during the Kennedy-period, the Johnson and Nixon administrations, and 
points out that he had to rewrite almost completely the chapter on the executive power because 
the importance and character of executive power changed so much. Although the so-called 
"Imperial Presidency" was somewhat relegated into the background by the retirement of Nixon, 
it is not to be questioned that the executive power will become rather stronger than weaker in the 
eighties in the United States. 
As against the British system of government, the American system is less suitable for 
being summed up. It relies upon the written constitution and upon its amendments and these 
rules bind the administration which, due to its federal character, performs only a part of the state 
tasks, the other tasks are to be performed by the individual states and by the local 
administration. It is an undeniable fact that—like according to the British system—also in 
America the majority of essential legislative steps are initiated by the executive power. In 
England all statutory provisions are of the same rank (excepted when the ministerial decisions 
are taken for being of lower rank) whereas in America, all laws shall conform to the 
constitutional norms. The constitution separated the spheres in which the federal administration 
may function, in which the state authorities may perform their tasks and in which the local 
authorities may work. The constitution designates the most important bodies and offices of state 
apparatus and tries to counterbalance the executive power and legislative power. It devolves on 
the Supreme Court to decide what the government can and cannot do and, in this respect, the 
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Supreme Court interprets the law on the highest level. Therefore, those studying the American 
system of government shall pay a special attention to the activity of the Supreme Court. 
First, the author deals with the American constitution which originated in the spirit of 
"natural law" theses of Locke and Montesquieu two centuries ago, and the most important 
provision of which said that the United States of America should be considered a homogeneous 
nation and not a loose confederation of states. The book deals also with the history of the 
constitution and investigates how the American constitution changed during the history due to 
amendments and interpretation. Beyond doubt, the provisions relating to the rights of the 
coloured minority rank among the most essential complementary provisions to the constitution. 
At the beginning of the history of the United States the loyalty to the individual states was 
stable. In the early years of the 19th century Chief Justice John Marshall, relying upon the 
reputation of the Supreme Court, intensified the conception of uniform nation. The victory of 
president Lincoln in the civil war settled thequestion of federation or confederation. Perhaps the 
complexity of economic and social problems and their increase and development at an 
unprecedented rate enforced primarily that the most important problems require today national 
solution. In the original text of the constitution almost no instruction relating thereto is to be 
found. 
The author deals also with the questions of the organization and election of the Congress. 
He stress the important role of the Senate in the ratification of conventions and in the 
appointment of persons proposed by the president. These persons—e.g. lately General Haig, 
Secretary of State—have to get over the "question-barrage" of the members of the senatorial 
sub-committee. 
The work treats in details the system of electorate, its anomalies, as well as the sphere of 
authority, role and activity of senatorial commissions and of those of Congress. It points out 
that the legislative assembly exercises its power primarily through these numerous commissions. 
Then, the procedural order of Congress is dealt with, which is regulated by paragraph I Article В 
of the Constitution, completed by several further rules. The chairmen of commissions were 
appointed up to the recent years on the principle of seniority, since 1975, however, a change 
occurred in this field. 
For the most Europeans it is a puzzle, how the Americans elect the President. James Bryce 
has ironically written: "Why great men cannot be elected president?" Indeed, looking over the 
two centuries of the American history, it may be stated that numerous great politicians or at least 
several excellent administrative experts never reached the White House. 
The work offers a brief survey on the development of the system of presidential election, 
on the evolution and decomposition of "political coalitions". The latest successful coalition of 
this kind, the "coalition" of democratic electors of the Northern and Southern states was 
prospering during F. D. Roosevelt's term of office, during Johnson's Presidency (after three 
decades) it came to a crisis and in our days it stopped to exist or at least it died a political 
apparent death. The work points out that the extent to which the presidents wielded the power 
assigned to them by the constitution depended in addition to their own talent and character 
considerably on the situation in the internal and foreign affairs. The work deals with the self-
righteous behaviour of state bureaucracy and with the proliferation of institutions created by the 
presidential power which characterized especially the sixties. A separate chapter treats the 
means of international policy, the part played by the legislative assembly in the development and 
direct management of the long-range priority of foreign affairs. 
Last but not least, the work enumerates the complex tasks of the local government and 
treats more detailed the tasks of town agglomerations. 
M. Udvaros 
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Stát a právo (State and law). Praha, Academia, 1979. 312 p. 
The present issue of this annual collection of studies contains exclusively papers on the 
protection of the environment. 
The first study, Z. Madar's "Basic problems in the legal regulation of the protection of 
environment in the socialist countries" is of a comparative law character. The author surveys the 
positive law of the environment protection in the European socialist countries taking into 
consideration statements of major importance in the legal literature, too (pp. 5-82). The author 
pays attention, first of all, to the fundamental problems of the protection of environment by the 
socialist state. He points out that the environment protection is of society-wide importance. It is 
a subject of investigation by different disciplines as problems are of comprehensive character 
and so they require global solutions. The role of law, its possibilities and limits in the protection 
of the environment are dealt with. In the followings the author treats the relating legal regulation 
of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Rumania. He comes to the conclusion that the protection of environment is a 
special function of the socialist state. Its legal regulation cannot be assigned to a single branch of 
law. More than one answer is given in the legal literature to the question whether the 
environmental law should be regarded as a separate branch of law. As to the nature of the 
comprehensive norms regulating environment protection there are two ways of solution. One of 
them would be the codification of the legal material as the case was in the fields of the civil law, 
labour law and criminal law. This form of legal regulation involves the disadvantage that due to 
the rush changes in technical and economic conditions it would require frequent amendments. 
The other way is to enact a comprehensive statute setting forth the broad objectives only which 
seems to be more convenient with regard to the character of the material. On the one hand, it 
makes possible to sum up all the main principles concerning the protection of environment, and 
on the other hand, it offers sufficient scope for regulating the particular problems with rules of 
executive character. Finally, the author offers a proposal on the structure of the would-be 
Czechoslovakian statute by setting forth its broad objectives and on the basic problems to be 
regulated by this law. 
The second study entitled "Protection of the environment in the regional planning and in 
the building administration" has been written by a team consisting of M. Hegenbart, E. 
Kruziková and E. Adamová (pp. 83-114). As a preliminary, the attention is directed to the 
material connections between the regional planning and the building administration. After this 
the views concerning certain problems of regional planning and the rules related to building 
activity are expounded. In the followings the authors write about the present-day legal 
regulation in three chapters (common problems, regional planning, administrative activity 
related to building). Finally, they sum up the conclusions. In their opinion, the effectiveness of 
the legal means of the administrative organs and especially those of the national committees has 
recently been significantly increased, due to the consolidation of regional planning, the 
increasing importance of the protection of environment, the accommodation of the regional 
planning documentation to the methodics of national economic planning, the more effective 
extension of regional, building and colaudational procedures over the environmental 
supervision, the consolidating position of state organs safeguarding the protection of particular 
components of the environment and, finally, the increasing of sanctions against the citizens and 
organizations. 
The third study, G. Prenosiis "Protection of the environment and criminal law" devotes 
attention to the role of criminal law in a more effective protection of the environment (pp. 
115-140). First of all, the author describes the possibilities of criminal law related to the 
protection of environment, after this he surveys the institutions of criminal law being, in his 
opinion, usable for environment protection. A separate chapter is devoted to the penal 
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legislation of the European socialist countries concerning the protection of environment. Then 
the most important features of those are made known. The author's conclusions relating to the 
ways of the criminal law protection of environment may also command interest. Finally, the 
author offers concrete recommendations for the legislation and practice, with special regards to 
the development of Czechoslovakian law. 
The fourth study entitled "Administrative protection of environment in the territory of 
Czechoslovakia in the epoch of the capitalism" has been written by L. Bianchi (pp. 141-168). 
The author looks back at the protection of particular components of the environment in the 
past. Thus, the beginnings of the protection of human health and that against air pollution are 
dealt with and also the protection of the soil and the protection of the water are treated. After 
this, further rules having indirectly or directly contributed to the protection and the formation of 
the environment are exemplarily expounded. These rules in most cases regulated certain 
activities in connection with production, building, traffic etc. As a summary, the author points 
out the main features of the rules of the bourgeois states in general concerning the topic. After 
this, some remarks are made on the present-day position of the environmental legislation. 
The fifth study, G. Mencer's "Protection of the environment with respect to the Helsinki 
Conference and the disarmament proposals" (pp. 169-195) draws attention to the necessity of 
international co-operation at various levels and in different forms in order to carry into effect the 
protection of environment. The author refers to the Stockholm Declaration in summer 1972, in 
which the necessity of the international co-operation was pointed out and to the Helsinki Final 
Act in 1975, which paid a special attention to this problem. The author deals with the principles 
of international law to be followed by the states in the co-operation for the protection of 
environment and exposes the legal principles of the developing co-operation. The Helsinki Final 
Act does answer these questions in more than one passage, affording to the author. As to the 
socialist countries, the integration trend in the protection of environment can unambiguously be 
observed and is expressed by a number of documents, agreements, institutions and organs. The 
author gives a detailed account of the environmental activity of UNO. Finally, the attention is 
directed to the destructive effect of armed conflicts for the environment. 
The sixth study entitled "The development of the international law regulation of the 
protection against the pollution of the sea environment" has been written by V. Kopal (pp. 
197-310). The author analyzes primarily the notion and the types of the pollution of the sea 
environment. After this he treats the special international regulations concerning the particular 
types of pollution. Then the attention is directed to the efforts in order to regulate the protection 
against the pollution of the sea environment comprehensively. Finally, the author points out the 
significance of the international protection of the sea environment against pollution from the 
point of view of the development of international co-operation. 
All studies are supplied with an English résumé opening them up for the foreign reader, 
too. 
L. Trócsányi 
Социализм и охрана окружающей среды. Право и управление в странах-членах СЭВ. 
(Socialism and environmental protection. Law and administration in the member-states of the 
C M E A ) , Edited by K O L B A S O V , O. S., M O S C O W , Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1979. 392 p. 
This book is a result of the teamwork of eminent experts at environmental law in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (T. Lyalev, A. 
Tamás, E. Ehler, К. Becher, L. Lustacz, О. S. Kolbasov, A. V. Leontyeva, V. L. Mishchenko, Z. 
Madar, G. Menzer, P. A. Tokareva). Not speaking of its informative and scientific value, the 
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significance of this work can be characterized by the fact that it is in itself a part of the co-
operation of CMEA states at environmental protection, i.e. of a system of relations, without 
which regional environmental protection or even the economic co-operation of socialist states 
would be unthinkable. 
In the first part of the book solutions in the environmental protection of the national legal 
systems are summarized, in the second one the administrative activity of the states in connection 
with environmental protection and in the third part the co-operation of the CMEA countries at 
environmental law and the legal problems of the common protection of the environment are 
discussed. The elaboration is all the more valuable as the reader would find no national essays 
following each other but national solutions are analyzed according to a certain system, in 
thematic grouping. This solution involves, undoubtedly, certain risks as the structural relations 
of the national legal systems may easily be disregarded and so a false opinion may be formed, but 
considering the intention of the book, this structural solution is undeniably the best. At the same 
time, this structure in some instances definitely seems to be an artificial skeleton, not suitable for 
each legal system. E.g. writing about the constitutional foundation of environmental protection 
the citizens' right to appropriate environment and their obligation of protecting it are 
mentioned. The scrutinized constitutional provisions handle sometimes the concerning right, 
sometimes the obligation only, in most cases, however, not even the right to appropriate 
environment is expressly declared by the constitutions. 
In Chapter One of the book the connection of environmental protection and law is 
analyzed in general, with special regard to environmental policy, the notion of environment, the 
principal trends of its protection, and to the socialist principles of environmental protection. The 
socialist unity of environmental protection is assured by the essential conformity of production 
relations and by the planned economy prevailing equally in each socialist country. At the same 
time, the authors write also about the specific principles of environmental protection being 
characteristic of the regulation governing the environmental protection of each socialist 
country, too. The safeguarding of human health and welfare stands in the limelight of principles. 
But principles of different character are also included in the relating specification which should 
be rather qualified as those on organizing and regulation methodics. Such are e.g. the principle of 
complex approach and that of continuous control of power sources. Another cardinal question 
of the theory of environmental law is the legal notion of environmental protection. According to 
the standpoint set forth in the book the law in environmental protection becomes means of 
environmental protection as the most effective regulator of social conditions. 
Surveying the national legal solutions in thematic order, the book sets out from the 
constitutional fundamentals with special regard to the citizens' rights related to environmental 
protection. Complex environmental protection laws as bases of the special regulation concerned 
are discussed in a separate chapter. There the connection between the mentioned acts and the 
branch legislation is analyzed, then an optimal model of environmental regulation is outlined. 
This model postulates close connection with the branch regulation, therefore, according to the 
authors of the book, the special part of the model act can be passed over. At the same time, 
ecological requirements should prevail in each branch of the national economy. 
In the course of surveying the provisions regarding soil, water, forests, atmosphere, 
biosphere, the protection of surroundings and historical relics are separately discussed. The 
authors deal also with problems related to harms resulting from technical improvement (noise, 
vibration, radiations, etc.). Of increasing importance is the prevention in the course of 
regulating. Environmental protection narrowed down as a legal problem cannot be solved. 
Being actuated by this perception the authors of the book scrutinize the means and safeguards 
bringing environmental regulation into effect. Here the concerning planning process is reviewed 
and numerous interesting data about the financing of the environmental protection and about 
the related scientific research are reported. A separate subsection deals with the educational 
activity on environmental protection. 
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As far as the forms of calling to account for breach of environmental requirements are 
concerned, the criminal, administrative and civil responsibility are to read. It deserves attention 
that the liability of legal entities is known in the administrative forms of environmental 
protection' of some socialist countries. Surprisingly, the solutions falling under domain of 
labour-law liability are missing. 
Part Two of the volume treats the state control and management of environmental 
protection. This state activity is realized in the spirit of democratic centralism. The authors 
examine organs performing environmental protection and elaborate principles of their 
classification. The role of central and local administrative organs is specially discussed. The 
problem concerning the possibilities of social organs, respectively those of society to join in 
environmental protection activity is scrutinized in an exceedingly long chapter. 
Part Three of the volume deals with the co-operation between CMEA countries. After a 
historical conspectus and the establishment of principles the problem of organization forms is 
thoroughly analyzed. From the point of view of elaboration the question of co-operation is 
made more involved by the fact that besides the multilateral co-operation within the CMEA the 
bilateral conventions between particular countries, respectively the factual co-operation 
executing the conventions are of not negligible significance. Remarkable is the outlook in 
Chapter Twelve. Here the problem concerning the influence of environmental protection 
activity of socialist countries on the international legal regulation regarding the world's 
environmental protection is analyzed. 
A further help is offered to the reader by the Appendix publishing the most important acts 
of environmental regulation of the member-countries of the CMEA and by the schema of a 
complex environmental model-act in short-term as well as in long-term variants. 
A. Sajó 
Deutsches und sowjetisches Wirtschaftsrecht. (Studien zum ausländischen und internationalen 
Privatrecht. Heft 4.) I. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1981. 
The texts of the lectures and discussions of the first Soviet-West German legal symposium 
have been published under the above title and with the same contents both by the Institute for 
Political and Legal Sciences of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and by the Max Planck Institut 
für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht in Hamburg. The German edition was 
redacted by /. P. Wähler, while the Russian version was prepared by an editorial board 
consisting of four members (Abova, Boguslavsky, Laptyev, Ribanov). This symposium took 
place in October 1979 and dealt with questions of economic law. The second symposium will be 
held in Hamburg in May 1982, and according to the agreement of the parties the economic law 
character will be kept. 
The lectures given at the symposium can be divided according to four subject matters. 
Within the frames of the first subject matter the legal status of the enterprises was discussed, the 
second subject matter was the connection between plans and the contractual relations among the 
enterprises, the third comprised the legal problems of the industrial, technical and scientific 
relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany, finally the international arbitration 
made up the fourth subject matter. The appendices of the volumes embrace the treaties and other 
legal documents concerning Soviet-West German economic co-operation. 
As to the first subject matter, two lectures were delivered on both sides. In his lecture on 
the state enterprises and the industrial associations respectively combinâtes Professor V. V. 
Laptyev dealt fundamentally with the relating Soviet positive law. Whereas Professor B. 
Grossfeld from Münster read a rather ideological paper, in which he explained how the role of 
both the contractor and the ownership fall into the background at the large capitalist enterprises, 
further that new controlling institutions are established, such as state and mass communication 
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control in trust law, the consent with the associations for the protection of common interests and 
the employees' participation. Grossfeld's lecture on enterprise constitutional law was— 
obviously by courtesy—not disputed on the Soviet side, but one of the West German delegates, 
Professor N. Reich from Hamburg, who is well-known for his left social democrat views, called 
in doubt if such a harmonical co-operation can be evolved in the late capitalism among the state, 
large enterprises, associations for the protection of capitalist interests, trade unions respectively 
employees, as expounded by Grossfeld. 
In the second subject matter three lectures were delivered. T. E. Abova, candidate of 
sciences, senior member of the Soviet Institute for Political and Legal Sciences made known the 
planning process of the Soviet national economy, the legal form of the plans and their realization 
in the plan contracts. Professor /. H. Kaiser from Freiburg accounted for state interventions in 
West Germany by the crisis of market-based economy and expounded the principal legal 
elements of the West German structure policy. Professor E. J. Mestmäcker, co-director of the 
Max Planck Institut in Hamburg (who is incidentally one of the most renowned West German 
representatives of the neoliberal economic philosophy of law) dealt in his lecture with the 
contract as the most important means for an enterprise to carry out an independent planning 
and emphasized the—in his opinion—absolute priority of the freedom of contract and that of 
the competition principles. In the discussion it was emphasized on the Soviet side that whatever 
important the independence of the enterprises—based upon the economic clearing of accounts 
(hozrastchot)—may be, this has to be connected with the priority of the central economic 
management and the fulfilment of plan tasks. 
Lectures delivered in the third subject matter may be of special interest for the foreign 
reader. These discourses dealt with the legal concerns of Soviet-West German economic 
relations and contained a number of important economic data. Professor Boguslavsky's lecture 
surveys these relations in general, with special regard to the private international law aspects. 
The lecture of Professor D. A. Loeber from Kiel (which contains an exhaustive bibliography, 
too) thoroughly discusses a special sphere, viz. the importation of technological equipments 
from West Germany to the Soviet Union. K. H. Fink, Director of the International Centre for 
East-West Relations in West Berlin elaborated the specialities of the Soviet-West German co-
operation and licence contracts. 
The most remarks related to this subject matter. So e.g. M. L. Gorodissky, from the Soviet 
Chamber of Commerce dealt with the so-called industrial property, while Professor A. B. 
Altschuler discussed the financial law problems of the co-operation relations. In the discussion 
also some well-known managers (those of enterprises interested in trading with the Soviet 
Union) intervened on the West German side, reciting the possibilities of removing practical 
difficulties emerging in the co-operation—e.g. A. Steiger from the Mannesmann Company. 
In the fourth subject matter Professor Pozdnyakov, who is simultaneously President of 
the Soviet Arbitration Court, made known the Soviet arbitral experiences concerning east—west 
economic relations. The parallel of this lecture was delivered by /. P. Wähler, Soviet rapporteur 
of the Max Planck Institut in Hamburg, on the West German arbitral experiences. In the 
discussion the lectures were supplemented with maritime arbitration by Professor Lebedyev, 
respectively with a few experiences of arbitration within the CMEA by Professor Usenko. 
There were sixty participants at the symposium, among them the 14 members of the West 
German delegation. The participants suitably represented the jurisprudence of their countries, a 
number of internationally renowned scholars took part in the meeting. As explained in the 
preface of the German edition by Professor U. Drobnig, co-director of the Max Planck Institut in 
Hamburg, the success of the first symposium raises solid hopes that in spite of the meanwhile 
significantly piled-up political clouds the Soviet-West German scientific co-operation at 
economic law will be continued. 
A brief observation to the review from the Hungarian side. On the financial basis of the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, making use of the personal relations—established in the 
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course of preparing the International Encyclopedia of Comparative law edited by the Max 
Planck Institut—with the academic institutes for legal sciences of the socialist countries and after 
several Polish-West German symposia, the Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht in Hamburg has now made regular the scientific symposia on 
economic law also with the Soviet Union. With regard to the very fact that West Germany is the 
largest capitalist foreign trade partner of Hungary and that the Hungarian jurisprudence has 
significant dogmatical traditions going back to the German group of laws, the organization of a 
similar economic law symposium on the Hungarian side should be considered. 
T. Sárközy 
Verträge in Wissenschaft und Technik (red. O S T E R L A N D , R.), Staatsverlag der DDR, Berlin, 
1980, 303 p. 
The collective of the authors at the University of Dresden—under the direction of 
Professor Osterland—set for themselves an essentially practical aim. The contractual methods 
play an outstanding role in the organization of inter-enterprise relations and these contracts 
display, especially in the field of the scientific-technical co-operation, such particular features 
which—due to the complexity and individuality of these contracts—raise several practical 
problems. The authors were conducted by the intention to support the contractual practice by 
the publication of this manual being explicitly practice-oriented but also having a solid 
theoretical foundation. 
The authors treat the subject-matter by building partly upon the effective statutory 
provisions and partly upon the analysis and the valuation of the contractual practice. 
The first part of the work contains the introduction and analysis of the fundamental 
notions, categories, contract elements and stipulations. Chapter I (pp. 16-25) outlines the 
functions and the fundamental principles of the contracts entered into in the course of the 
scientific-technical co-operation. Chapter II (pp. 26-51) offers the interpretation of some basic 
categories relating to all contracts. Thus, it offers the concise and clear elucidation of the notions 
and legal norms related to the definition of the subject matter of the scientific-technical services 
and results, to the scope of the typical contractual partners, to the relation between the plan and 
the contracts, to the co-operation and co-ordination tasks preceding the formation of the 
contracts, to the financing, to the fixing of prices, and to the stimulation. The next Chapter (pp. 
59-119) treats partly the fundamental features of the characteristic types of contracts and 
contractual stipulations. Such types of contracts are—without exhausting their scope complete-
ly—the research contracts in the strict sense of the word, the contracts for development (directed 
to the process or to the product), the contracts for projecting and experiments, the contracts 
related to the standardization and to the technical consultation, etc. Among the characteristic 
contractual stipulations the work deals with the definition of the quality, the warranties, the 
intermediate and final terms, the fixing of prices, the delivery and receipt, the warranty for legal 
defects, the protection, the secrecy, the granting of licence, the penalties and damages, the 
novation and the extinction of the contracts. 
A special interest may be laid on the part of the volume (pp. 120-165) disclosing the 
problems of the research associations (Forschungsgemeinschaft) on the one hand, and of the 
contracts for domestic exploitation (Nutzungsvertrag), on the other hand. In connection with 
the first range of questions, the basis of research community and the conditions of its 
establishment, the relation of its activity to the state planning and management, questions in 
connection with its functions, with the development of the membership, with its inner 
organization and decision-making system are analyzed. As for the contracts for exploitation 
(the terminology of the legal literature of the GDR calls "licence contracts" only the contracts 
entered into in the international relations), the authors investigate the stipulations of 
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fundamental nature coming up in connection with such contracts. Thus the question of the 
gratuitousness and onerousness, the various phases, and variants, respectively, of the 
exploitation (Erstnutzung, Nachnutzung, mehrfache Erstnutzung), the details of the obligations 
of information and co-operation, the problems of industrial property rights, the counter-
performance, the warranties and the liability, especially the questions of warranty for legal 
defects. 
The second part of the work makes actually available a remarkably detailed and 
perspicuous check-list for the practice. It surveys the various types of contracts serving for the 
scientific-technical co-operation, introduces the typical construction of these contracts 
distinguishing the particular contractual conditions characterizing the individual contracts, and 
the general conditions of contracts, respectively, as well as the variants and relations thereof. In 
this part also model-contracts are compiled and elucidated. 
The work is well edited, the applied decimal system, the well manageable indices formally, 
whereas the wide-ranging knowledge of the everyday contractual practice as for the content 
ensure, that the research and economic organizations obtain a very useful aid by the reviewed 
book. This aid is, however, not rendered only for the contractual practice of the GDR but offers 
valuable information also in a wider range, for other legal systems. Neither the theoretical 
significance of the work may be underestimated. By the delimitation of the various types of 
contracts, by the analysis of the characteristic contractual stipulations the work elucidates in 
several respects also the general questions of principle of the law of contract—grounding upon 
the Antheus' relation of the practice. 
E. Lontai 
S C H Ö N F E L D , G.: Die Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedstaaten des RGW auf dem Gebiet des 
Erfindungswesens, Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR, Potsdam-
Babelsberg, 1978, 128 p. 
The legal literature of the GDR and especially the Institute for Foreign and Comparative 
Law of the Academy of Legal and Administrative Sciences of the GDR deals actively and 
exhaustively with the problems of the legal fields significant both theoretically and practically. 
One of the recent results of this activity is the book to be reviewed. 
The most dynamically developing field of the integration process within the frameworks 
of the CMEA which attained qualitatively a higher degree especially since the acceptance of the 
Complex Program, is the scientific-technical co-operation and its integrant field, though 
displaying particular features, the co-operation in the protection of industrial property. The 
undoubtedly most important part of this legal field is the system of norms and institutions 
related to the results of technical development, that is the invention-patent law in a broad sense. 
G. Schönfeld, the internationally acknowledged specialist of this field is qualified for the 
complex analysis of these problems on the strength not only of his theoretical activity but also of 
his educational, science-organizing work as well as of his experiences gained in the framework of 
the Legal Conference of the CMEA. 
Chapter I of the work analyzes the place of scientific-technical development in the 
socialist economic integration and the management of this development by the means of law. 
The author elucidates the role of the scientific-technical development with a general character, 
and points not only to the economic aspects thereof, but also to its role played in the socialist 
formation of the man, of the personality, too. He emphasizes that the creation of inventions is a 
significant factor of the technical progress but—as against the traditional protection-centric 
approach—he underlines that the analysis has to comprehend also the phases of the creation and 
utilization of inventions. The inventions mean in the technics the qualitative, the revolutionary 
changes. The international character of science and technics can really assert itself just on the 
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ground of the integration, the perfection of common inter-state management of researches is 
therefore indispensable. The management of researches renders, of course, necessary the 
consideration of several particular features. From among them, the author mentions the role of 
the probability, the risk, the accelerated "moral wear" of research results, and just therefore, the 
significance of the promptness of practical exploitation on a range as wide as possible. 
The author analyzes the possibilities and the role of the law, and the legal means in the 
regulation of the integration process, and the relations developing in the course of it and then 
specifically in the field of the co-operation in inventions in principle and in a generalized way.He 
points out the fact that the socialist law has to perform an active and planned organizing 
function in the interest of producing as well as exploiting the scientific-technical results, (p. 29). 
The provisions of invention law extend to the conditions of protectability, to the state 
recognition of the protection, to the rights and duties of state organs and private persons relating 
to the exploitation and the moral and material stimulation of the creative (inventive) activity. 
The legal regulation has to reckon with the requirement for the considerable internationalization 
of the process of the creation and exploitation inventions, with the increasing importance of the 
common integration interests. These common interests go beyond the frameworks of the 
individual states which means that the recognition, protection and publication of inventions 
shall be provided for in all member-states. 
After this general approach Chapter II analyzes the concrete questions raised by the 
development of the integration relating to the functions, the effect mechanism and the 
development of the protection of inventions. Just in the introductory part of the Chapter the 
author sharply propounds the most fundamental problem of the examined legal field, namely 
the contradiction between the inventions being international (on integration level) as for their 
significance and the territoriality of their protection (pp. 42-45). The raising of the level of the 
internationality in this field may provide for an effective protection against the disturbing 
influence of the non-socialist (capitalist) countries and companies, especially that of the 
multinational companies (this fact is illustrated also by statistical data). The socialist principles 
of state management in the inventive activity which must characterize also the co-operation in 
the integration, are formulated as follows: the creation of favourable conditions serving for the 
extension of inventive activity; utilization of inventions for the benefit of the whole society; the 
provision for the planned exploitation of inventions as a state function; establishment of 
protective forms ensuring both the individual and the social interests; protection of the rights of 
the inventors, their moral and material stimulation (p. 49). In the opinion of the author, the 
"owner" of the inventions is the state and it must confer its owner's rights of disposal to the other 
utilizing member-states for the sake of the efficacious organization of the exploitation (this 
parallel multiple propriety situation is rendered possible by the "immaterial" character of the 
creations). 
In order to ensure the common interest requiring the international multiple exploitation 
(Mehrfachnutzung) of inventions, a suitable collection of legal instruments shall be developed. 
Therefore, the legal form of the protection may not be based on the exclusive rights. The author 
outlines the adequate legal grounds and principles which may serve effectively the above 
requirements. It is particularly the protective form by the inventor's certificate which 
corresponds especially to them. Although the integration on the field of the protection of 
industrial property within the CMEA may give account of considerable progress, several legal 
problems waiting for the solution are still to be found. In this connection the author surveys the 
significant treaties on CMEA-level (the Moscow treaty, the Leipzig treaty, the Havanna treaty) 
and outlines the further tasks. 
These tasks are set forth in detail in Chapter III. The author analyzes again and more in 
details the problems deriving from the principle of territoriality, in connection also with the 
sovereignty. He points to the fact that as against the supra-national solutions, the socialist 
integration is characterized by the integrated co-operation. With respect to the inventions, a 
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remarkable role is played here by the co-operation in procedure and examination, the mutual 
reçognition of protective documents, on the one hand, and the tendency to unify and harmonize 
the relevant legal norms, on the other hand. Here, the author refers also to the problems of 
private international law. 
Only some ideas of the work elucidating a consistent attitude and being rich in ideas could 
be flashed. The views of the author display a comprehensive knowledge and convincing 
arguments which induce the reader to think, even if the reviewer does not personally share them 
completely (first of all the questions in connection with the priorities and valuation of the 
protective forms). The specialists dealing with the examination of the essential theoretical— 
principal questions of the socialist protection of industrial property may accept the publication 
of the reviewed book with congratulations. 
E. Lontai 
B E R N A R D , F. P A V L Á T O V A , J.: Vznik zmëny a skonceni pracovniho pomèru. (Formation, 
modification and termination of labour law relations) Práce, Praha, 1979. 368 p. 
The work consists of four parts. These are as follows: Work relations and their coming 
into being (1st part), modification of work relations (lind part), discontinuation of employment 
(Illrd part), special regulation of certain work relations (IVth part). Within these parts the work 
consists of twenty-three chapters. 
Chapter I.—under the title "Work relations and legal regulation"—deals with definition 
of work relations and characteristic features ofthat, separates work relations from other labour-
law relations (especially from agreements made on works performed out of work relations 
(employment)), discusses legal facts as conditions of coming into being, modification and 
discontinuation of work relations (employment), analyzes furthermore the importance of terms 
and time reckoning for coming into being, modification and discontinuation of employment. 
Chapter II. discusses the theme of the parties of work relations. First of all, this part gets 
us acquainted with the idea and type of the parties of work relations and then deals in detail with 
certain questions of subjects at labour law from the pont of view of the worker and the socialist 
organization. On the workers' side it does not escape the attention of the author to discuss even 
questions as e.g. the incapacitation or restricted disposing capacity of the workers, or the 
foreigners and displaced persons as subjects at labour law. The socialist organizations as 
employers, may be very different; the authors pay great attention to this diversity, as well. 
Chapter III. is to introduce wide range of problems with the labour contracts. After 
analyzing the idea of a labour contract, the authors deal in detail with the contents and form of 
the labour contract, with the obligation of the organizations when employing the workers and 
when concluding the labour contract. This part discusses the general work contracts, too. This 
latter type of contract is concluded by socialist organizations among each other or with a social 
organization to provide the required manpower by the time of peak-works. 
Chapter IV. discusses questions in connection with the date of coming into being the 
work relations (employment) and legal consequences of omitting to take on the work on the day 
stipulated for starting. The Vth Chapter is about rights and obligations originating from 
employment, with regard to workers and managers holding a leading post. The Vlth Chapter 
deals with disputes related to coming into being of the work relations and treat furthermore of 
the real labour relations. Regarding this latter theme the question how far these labour relations 
are operative or inoperative is analyzed particularly. 
Chapter VII. analyzes the modification of working conditions and within the frame of 
this the author deals with contractual modification of the working conditions, with modification 
to be made on the basis of unilateral arrangements of the organization, with modification made 
by the strength of legal rules as well as with modification related to reorganization when the 
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modification of rights and obligations of labour relations is made on the side of the employer 
only. Chapter VIII. treats of the complex question of transfer to another work (another line of 
activity) and then Chapter IX. deals with transfer to another working place. Connecting to this 
Chapter X. gets us acquainted with common rules of these two types of transfer. Chapter XI. is 
about conveyance of rights and obligations of labour relations to another organization while in 
Chapter XII. there is paid attention to disputes arisen because of unlawful transfer to another 
work or working place. 
Chapters XIII-XX. take in spread nearly the half of the whole work (pp. 149-319.). 
Discontinuation of the employment in fact arouses wide range of questions from among of 
which introduction, by the authors, of general question related to discontinuation of 
employment may expect great interest. According to classification that can be read in the book, 
the employment may be discontinued by bilateral legal action (by agreement), by unilateral legal 
action of the worker or the organization (by notice, summarily dismiss, discontinuation of 
employment during the time of probationary appointment), by legal facts (death of the worker, 
withdrawal of residence permit in case of foreigners, etc.) as well as in case of expiration of the 
definite time of employment. Though, further classifications can also be considered in this 
connection, we think the position of the authors, in connection with the categorization, correct 
and logical. The supply of various certificates and the provision of free time to the workers for 
finding a new job are connected to discontinuation of employment. In case of unlawful 
discontinuation of employment, the enforcement of the claims of the worker means a very 
important question. The chapter dealing with discontinuation of employment is closed by 
analyzing the above question. 
Chapter XXI. includes specific questions of secondary employment and the auxiliary job 
in reflect of the Czechoslovakian law. In Chapter XXII. the authors deal with labour relations 
established by election and appointment paying special attention to workers holding leading 
post. Chapter XXIII. pays attention to some kinds of employment falling under special rules. 
Getting acquainted with the book affords much pleasure at least for the very reason that 
similar works have recently been published on this theme in some socialist countries. 
Comparison with them promotes, in presumably one of the most important fields of labour law, 
the comparative legal analyzing works and also facilitates to work up new conceptions in the 
socialist countries.
 L T r ó c s á n y i 
N E W M A N , G R A E M E : Comparative Deviance. Elsevier, New York-Oxford-Amsterdam, 1976. 
332 p. 
The work has been written in the middle of the last decade and deals primarily with the 
judgement of various deviances in six different cultural spheres. The following fundamental 
questions are posed for the definition of the direction of investigation: 
1. Is there any difference between the law and the public opinion in the judgement of 
deviancy? 
2. Is there a uniform or nearly uniform point of view as to what may be qualified as 
deviance? 
3. Are there universal values or taboos? 
4. In which structure the individual notions of deviancy are contained and how is their 
extent measured? 
5. To what extent the classification shall be involved with respect to the judgement of 
these attitudes? 
6. What is the relationship between the modernization, the notion of deviancy and the 
social changes? Is there any perceptible change in the judgement of deviancy? To what 
extent the developed countries diverge in the judgement of deviancy from the 
developing countries? 
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In the chapter dealing with the nature of deviancy the survey of tests is given which were 
made in the United States of America and in other Western countries concerning these forms of 
attitude "departing from the normal one", and their judgement, respectively, in different social 
strata. It is referred to that deviancy means a socially unrecognized status, i.e. such a form of 
attitude which runs across disapproval although its extent varies from country to country, 
according to different social strata. 
The text-books of penal law mention two different categories of crime: the one is the 
"mala in se" (crime as such), the other is the "malaprohibita" (prohibited crime). The sociology 
denies the existence of the former one since "mala in se " assumes absolute values and attributes 
the concept of deviation to the natural law. The work expounds in details the categorization 
methods relating thereto, emphasizing the uncertainty and danger of "mala ambigua". It is also 
mentioned that the judgement of the gravity of crimes against the property varies from one 
epoch to the other. 
A separate chapter deals with the fundaments of the notion of deviancy as well as with the 
structural components of attitudes relating to deviances and with the social reaction developed 
in connection with various forms of deviancy. A survey of the countries, and of the culture of 
these countries, respectively, is given, the deviation problems of which the work intends to deal 
with, namely with the culture and ethnic characteristics of India, Indonesia, Italy, the United 
States of America and Yugoslavia. 
The author points out the fact that in differently developed societies the family acts as an 
institution of social control and is the most powerful weapon in the struggle against the 
deviancy. The various aspects of the correlation between the preferred social sanctions and the 
influencing and direction role of the family are elucidated by means of statistical tables. 
The work deals also with the different judgements of deviance in selected sub-cultures, 
such as in the country sub-cultures of India, Indonesia and Iran, the political and economical 
dimensions of which also the Marxist sociology has dealt with, as well as in the particular sub-
culture of violence and crime on the Island Sardinia in Italy. The better developed countries 
decriminalize sooner a part of criminal conducts than the less developed countries being closer, 
more homogeneous and, at the same time, persisting more strongly to the traditional values— 
points out the work. 
The volume is completed with an ample reference material. 
M. Udvaros 
The Future of the International Court of Justice (ed. by G R O S S , L.) Oceana Publ., 1976. 862 p. 
It seems to be almost a platitude in the special literature that the International Court of 
Justice (the Court) has failed to meet the expectations. The founders had intended to lend the 
highest judicial organ of the United Nations Organization (UN) an important role in 
international relations when they regarded it as one of the outstanding means of settling 
international disputes in a peaceful manner. Since the Second World War we have reached 
significant development in all fields of international law, except the judicial sector. Aware of this 
fact, the American Society of International Law established a Panel in 1971 with the aim to study 
the cause of the Court's atrophy by interdisciplinary means; to diagnose its ills and if possible to 
suggest remedies. In view of the limited space available I can review only the essence of those 
papers I considered as the most interesting. 
R. P. Anand, Indian professor, introduces his study "The Role of International 
Adjudication " (pp. 1 -21 ) by pointing out that the Court has been facing a "crisis of confidence "in 
the recent years, although its functioning is based on a universal need. The fact of the crisis can 
be proved not only by political and legal argumentations but also by the statistical data of the 
cases of the Court. The "potential clientèle" of the Court is much larger than that of its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. While the latter had 68 members out 
1 7 * Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
2 6 0 Inlernationalia 
of which 42 states were bound by the "optional clause" of the Statute of the Permanent Court, the 
same rate was 135:46 in 1972; and 155:45 in 1980, expressed in percentages it gives 61%, 
respectively 33% and 29%. But this rate is also misleading because most of the states made wide-
spread reservations to the compulsory jurisdiction (Article 36(2) of the Statute). The practice 
shows it depends on the states whether they accept or not the jurisdiction of the Court in a 
concrete case. 
Similar reserve can be observed on the part of the General Assembly (GA), the Security 
Council (SC) and other authorized organs and special agencies of the UN concerning the 
advisory opinions of the Court. 
The question arises, what the cause of the distrust can be which is tried to answer by 
almost all papers revealing a rather wide range of the causes. We may agree with Anand's 
opinion that we must search the principal cause of the distrust in the political and ideological 
division of the world. The international community of today has only little connection with the 
so-called tradition of the Hague-system. The socialist states and the new states of the third world 
coming into being in great numbers have brought along quite different legal cultures and 
political attitudes. 
One of the issues is the law applied by the Court, i.e. the international law. The developing 
countries—to a certain extent the socialist states, too—think that the present system of 
international law is unsuitable for making equitable decisions in the cases belonging to the 
Court. They refer to the fact that the traditional international law is a product of the western 
civilisation. F. J. C. Northrop in his book written about this problem (Philosophical 
Anthropology and Practical Politics, 1969) emphasizes that only that international law may be 
effective which is based upon ideological and cultural pluralism and offers an adequate synthesis 
way. Further he states that no nation will ever accept any decision made by third party on the 
base of the positive international law which violates its own effective law norms. In theory, this 
standpoint is assailable and refutable, nevertheless, the practical experiences of the international 
relations will rather bear him out. Anand holds the opinion, the developing countries have no 
common conception either in the question of the applicability of international law, but neither 
they give an alternative. In my view, the idea of the developing countries that the international 
law of today is the product of imperialism is not quite acceptable because the decisive part of its 
material emerged after the Second World War or has been filled with new content. To prove this 
idea let some data stand here: 16,000 international treaties were concluded in the past 35 years 
from which the agreements which came into being among states with different social systems are 
important sources of international law certainly represent a significant number. 
Various charges were levelled at the Court by the "new" states that it is too conservative, 
too static, a defender of the status-quo, meanwhile the "old" states consider that stability is one 
of the essential elements of law. The states respect the achievement of the Court in the 
development of international law which activity, however, postulates its modern interpretation in 
certain questions. This leads the Court into a hardly resolvable dilemma—as C. W. Jenks points 
out (Hersch Lauterpacht—The Scholar as Prophet. 38 British Year Book of International Law, 
1969. p. 31)—i.e. if the Court does not apply the international law in a flexible way then it has to 
work with such body of law which is no longer quite appropriate to contemporary needs. In the 
opposite case, on the other hand, the Court can be accused of a limited legal uncertainty ranging 
from inconvenience through confusion to chaos. The members of the Panel agree in the 
conclusion that a more intensive codification is needed in international law. 
D. Ciobanu treats an interesting problem analyzing the litispendence between the Court 
and the political organs of the UN. It goes without saying that the SC and the GA are political 
organs where the states endeavour to assert their own politics through their representatives. But 
the Court is a body of independent judges. Under the international legal regulation it depends on 
the states' free discretion whether they turn over the given case to political or legal field. Practice 
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shows that the leaders of foreign policy prefer the former to the latter. Yet the question arises 
whether litispendence can be imagined in this relation. For the sake of preventing contentious 
procedure one can refer before the Court—on the one hand—to the fact that the given case is not 
a legal but a political one therefore it can be at the very most taken before one of the political 
organs of the UN, under Article 33(1) of the Charter, on the other hand, the interested parties 
will decide which of the peaceful means they opt for in settling their disputes. At the same time, 
the objections lis pendens and res judicata may never be concurrent, consequently, they exclude 
each other of estoppel. This legal problem was raised sharply in the Court's decision which was 
taken in the Namibia case and caused a lot of disputes. The question was whether the Court had 
to take into consideration the former resolution of the SC in the same case. Judge Gross 
expressed in his separate opinion that "from the viewpoint of law, the description 'situation' 
used by the Security Council has no effect so far as the Court is concerned." 
Leo Gross wrote the final paper entitled "Conclusions" containing recommendations. 
Regarding the role of the Court Gross states that "in view of the terms and impact of Articles 
2(3), 33, 36 and 92 of the Charter of the UN, recourse to the Court is an exercise and not 
surrender of sovereignty, is not an unfriendly act, ensures the equality of states before the law, is 
particularly desirable and suitable in disputes relating to the application or interpretation of 
bilateral and multilateral conventions, is valuable and integral part of the processes of 
diplomacy and peaceful settlement of disputes." The authors insist on the states' having recourse 
to the Chambers of the Court which would be competent in the cases having a special character. It 
is an interesting and thought-provoking proposal that the contributors of the Panel intend to 
authorize the Court to bear and decide appeals against decisions given by some other 
international tribunals. Article 72 of the 1972 Revised Rules of the Court makes this already 
possible to a limited extent. 
Concerning the jurisdiction of the Court also considerable suggestions emerged. They 
propose that the International Law Commission of the UN should study the problems of the 
"optional clause" since just those states which accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
under Article 36(2) of the Statute made many reservations to their declarations which practically 
nullified the very purpose of that Article. The Panel emphasizes further that the states should be 
reminded that the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court may be accepted by two states or groups 
of states with respect to their mutual disputes, particularly disputes relating to the interpretation 
or application of specified bilateral and/or multilateral conventions. The authors propose that 
Article 36(3) of the Charter of the UN should be used more frequently, suggesting that the 
interested states in a given conflict should accept by a previous commitment the re-
commendations made by the SC as binding which means under the Article in question the 
submission of the legal disputes to the Court. 
Regarding the enhancement of the advisory jurisdiction of the Court the authors propose 
that a wider range of the international organizations should have access to the highest judicial 
organ of the UN but they would assure this right also to international commissions of 
conciliation as well as to tribunals established by multilateral conventions. Under Article 22 of 
the Charter of the UN they suggest the establishment of such a committee—as a subsidiary 
organ of the GA—which would request the advisory opinion of the Court on behalf of the 
organs entitled thereto mentioned before. At the same time, this committee would be authorized 
to forward the questions of the high courts of states in connection with international law to the 
Court in view of getting advisory opinion. 
For the sake of enforcing the decisions of the Court, in accordance with Article 94 of the 
Charter of the UN, the authors propose that the states parties to the Statute should make 
provisions in their respective national laws to secure it. The Panel makes three proposals which 
would necessitate the amendment of Article 55(2) of the Statute since "the decisions reached by 
the casting vote of the President were unsatisfactory" (Report of the rapporteur of the Legal 
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Committee of the UNG A, Doc. A/8328, Dec. 11,1970. p. 14., 32). The authors move that "if the 
Court is equally divided in contentious cases the Court would declare that the application has 
been rejected, in advisory proceedings the Court would declare itself unable to give the requested 
opinion." In my opinion, these proposals can be accepted, but the suggestion aiming at the 
amendment of Article 34(1) of the Statute ("Only states may be parties in cases before the 
Court") has much less chance. For the sake of enhancing the contentious jurisdiction of the 
Court the Panel proposes that the international organizations, as well as the private individuals 
have access to the Court. Both the Soviet Union and also France opposed heavily this suggestion 
in their responses to a circulated UN questionnaire. No doubt, such proposal could not lead to 
any reasonable result. The third proposal aims at the amendment of Article 38 of the Statute 
which lays down the sources which the Court can rely upon. The Panel expressed its view that 
Article 38 should be revised in order to find an appropriate place for declarations and resolutions 
of the GA in order to fortify their law-making character. To carry through such a proposal 
would come up doubtless against great difficulties as it is a generally recognized principle that the 
resolutions of the GA of the UN are not legally binding. (See Article 10 of the Charter.) 
Leo Gross summarized the recommendations of the Panel in 26 points but many more 
proposals and ideas can be found in the collection of essays. The authors call upon the scholars 
of different nations to dispute, as well as to study various issues. Neither the Hungarian—and as 
far as I am informed—nor the socialist special literature on international law deals in due 
measure with the unsatisfactory role of the Court in international relations. Probably this 
conception of the theory comes from the practical fact that the socialist states do not resort to the 
Court. In my opinion,—for the sake of developing international law—we cannot renounce to 
studying this very complex theme and we must search the solutions which may lead us to the 
implementation of the aims of the United Nations, as envisaged in connection with international 
adjudication. 
/ . Szilágyi 
Principii fi forme juridice ale cooperârii economice internationale (Principles and legal forms of 
international economic co-operation), Ed. D . P O P E S C U , Bucureçti, 1979. Edit. Academ. 211 p. 
Under the present-day conditions of technical and economic development international 
economic co-operation is of capital importance. The studies contained by the book discuss in 
general the problems of the principles and the legal means continuously developing in the 
relations mentioned above, according to the Rumanian political standpoints and views. 
Hereinafter we restrict ourselves to mention only the names of the authors and the subjects of 
their studies. 
The article of V. Duculescu is entitled "The new universal economic order as a suitable 
frame for the promotion of reasonable co-operation of every state in the world". 
In his article R. Munteanu writes about the international co-operation in the field of the 
industrial development. The author analyzes its place and role in our age, its legal frames and the 
concerning practice in Rumania. 
A. Nastase's article is entitled "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)". It is 
about the legal nature and the structure of GATT, the principle of disregarding discrimination 
and other principles. 
O. Capafina and V. Tânàçescu have written about mixed companies with Rumanian 
participation. 
The article of Br. Çtefànescu and I. Rucâreanu is entitled "Non-governmental 
international economic organs of the member-states of the CMEA". 
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О. A. G. Crauciuc discusses the topic of the transfer of technology dealing with the 
concerning activity of the UNCTAD and other UNO organizations and that of other 
organizations respectively. 
D. Popescu's study is entitled "Protection of the environment and the reasonable 
exploitation of natural resources". The author has chosen a problem, which is perhaps the most 
timely and of great importance in the present epoch of the scientific and technical revolution. 
Political and legal aspects concerning the problem of environment are elucidated. The author 
emphasizes the global character and significance of this question and connects it with the 
foundations of a new universal economic order. On the one hand, special attention is devoted to 
the sovereignty concerning natural resources. On the other hand, the importance of co-
operation among the states in connection with the protection of environment and the 
exploitation of natural resources is also emphasized. 
M. Lázár 
T S I E N , T C H E - H A O : La Chine «Comment ils sont gouvernés», Tome XXVIII. Paris, 1977. 
Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 742 p. 
For all that China's ancient development and present stand in the forefront of 
international interest, both subjects seem to be unexplored enigmas. Researchers feeding on the 
cultural traditions of the western hemisphere often seek for their own values in the Chinese 
development. Therefore also the approach of problems can easily be distorted as they can be set 
in the connections of a different system. On the other hand, researchers with Chinese traditions 
perhaps take into respect exclusively their own traditions, mediating only these and so risking 
that no real communication comes into being as a result of their work. 
Under such circumstances the issue of Dr Tsien's work was expected by scholars as a great 
sensation. The author is an expert of comparative law, politology as well as administrative 
sciences, who lived in China until 1949. He renewed his acquaintance in the course of his study 
tours in 1972 and 1975. For three decades now he has been one of the most famous specialists in 
France on China as senior staff member of the National Centre of Scientific Research. He has 
published his knowledges based upon wide documentation in dozens of books about the 
political, administrative and legal development of present-day China. 
The writer of the present note is neither an amateur nor a dilettante relating China-
research. He is simply a student of theory of law endeavouring to analyze jurisprudential 
problems of law, in conformity with the basic methodological requirements of a social science 
theory and on the basis of comparative analyses extended in space and time. He has got 
acquainted with the problems of China's legal development only among others and with the 
mediation of secondary sources. Therefore his position is hardly excusable as he is striving to 
express his doubts, which were increasing all the time during reading. 
The book embraces a wide subject matter indeed. In Part One the geographic and 
historical frames of China's development are outlined. Part Two summarizes the thoughts 
influencing the present-day Chinese development. In Part Three the institutions are expounded. 
The book is closed with a number of valuable appendices. Among the documents one can find 
three articles of Mao Tse-tung, such as the party decision about the cultural revolution dating 
from 1966, the Statutes of the Communist Party of China from 1973, the Constitution of 1975 as 
well as Tshou En-lay's government account from 1975. China's development since the middle of 
the last century is recapitulated by chronology. The basic Chinese and non-Chinese literature 
dealing with the subject is reviewed by bibliography. Finally, the book is closed with useful 
registers besides the index, such as a chronological index of sources having the force of the law, 
an index of Chinese proper names and that of Chinese slogans and ideological key-notions. 
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After all the reader gets an enormous quantity of information but not a coherent, 
scientifically utilizable view. The author seems to have performed the simplest work: having 
elaborated a systematics logically, he systematized and made known the disposable documents 
in a positivistic way, according to the previously separated subject matters. 
The work is by itself a whole but it is not utilizable as a handbook or reference source 
either. The elaboration is devoid of the demand of historical approach. Numerous Chinese party 
documents deal with the considerable effect of the quondam struggle between the set and unset 
variants of social norms (viz. between the li and the fa) on the development of the socialist China. 
This struggle appeared once when China introduced a number of European institutions after 
1949 with Soviet mediations and showed another side when, having started the cultural 
revolution, all of them were rejected. These questions are even not formulated by the author, 
perhaps as they would not be suitable for his system inspirated by the present. At the same time 
everything is natural and given for the author in the way it appears. He is devoid of both critical 
distance-keeping and the demand to contemplate from out. This manifests itself not only in his 
theoretically unfruitful, positivistic approach but it influences his frequent emotional valuations 
as well. The author is a champion rather than an analyst of the subject of his investigations, as 
already ascertained by another reviewer ( M . J . M E I J E R , in Review of Socialist Law, IV [1978] No. 
3, pp. 299-300) as well. 
In my opinion, the fundamental problem is that within the framework of a series of books 
destined for introducing the governing of various states of the world the author deemed it 
sufficient to describe the formal institutional frames in a positivistic way and to introduce the 
ideological manifestations systematically instead of analyzing the actual reality. The conception 
of the series was defined as one of comparative character but the present elaboration is not 
suitable for any comparison as the analyzed phenomenon, respectively its formal and verbal 
manifestations, are seen as sufficient in themselves. In this way, however, the present work 
cannot be regarded as a politological one either because even the readiness for reflecting with the 
facts of practice does not appear in it. Neither can it be taken for a juridical work for the law as 
such—apart from occasional mentions—does not appear in it. Provided that the two basic and 
universally known means for the state direction of society are the administration and the law, 
this book discloses only a little about direction of society as the chapter devoted to 
administration is one of the shortest and meagrest ones and law is one of the least significant and 
specified categories in it. 
As far as the problem of law is concerned, the following view can be composed from the 
various sparse references: the distinction between the li and the fa was simply a hypocritical 
means of the imperial reigning (p. 42). It can be discovered by the organigrams constructed by 
the author on the basis of the Constitutions from 1954 and 1975 that formerly the supreme 
power was lodged in the national assembly, at present, however, it is in the hands of the president 
of the party. According to the new Constitution, the party is the supreme organ of state power 
and this is also expressed in respect of commanding the armed forces, as announced already at 
the 10th Party Congress in August 1973 in Tshou En-lay's account (§§ 2,16 and 15, especially pp. 
212-213). The national assembly is the exclusive organ of legislation but no law has been enacted 
by it since the new Constitution was passed. "In the first years of the People's Republic of China 
a number of laws were voted for by the legislative organs, so much the more as the Communist 
Party had repealed all codes originating from the former regime. A lot of lengthy bodies of the 
law published in that era testify the comprehensive legislative activity. But having filled the 
demands relating law texts the legislative activity was diminished to such a degree that it became 
unsignificant. Since the regime rests upon the fact that all Chinese people know and attain the 
legislation perfectly, there is no need for modifying the texts incessantly and for establishing a 
complex legislative system requiring the collaboration of specialists. On the other hand, the 
fundamental laws have been passed from the outset with regard to the future development and 
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relatively in the recent past and that is why the necessity of modifying has not come up yet" (p. 
463). This impression is confirmed by the indices in the end of the book, too. Namely no proper 
legal rules have been enacted since 1966 but the new constitution (p. 664). Still the author treats 
the functioning of political forces, administration and jurisdiction separately and without any 
correlation, as if they had no common linkage points. Finally, as far as the role of law (discerned 
from that of politics) is concerned, only some uncertain references may be found. They inform 
that "Legality is respected in China as far as there are laws (and connected texts) and legal rules 
which are observed and brought into operation." At the same time, the principle "nullum crimen 
sine lege" or that of the prohibition of analogy in criminal law are not even raised in the Chinese 
legal conception. "Judgement rests upon the Constitution, the rights and obligations of citizens 
laid down in the Constitution, the sum of legislative texts and special laws. . . and in the same 
way upon the policy of the party, the principles of marxism-leninism and Mao Tse-tung's 
thoughts, further upon 'experiences which can be drawn from previous decisions'" (p. 498). 
The lesson, what the Chinese way of the building up of society could give for western 
theory and practice, continues essentially to be an unexplored enigma. 
Cs. Varga 
GUARINO, A.: La rivoluzione délia plebe. Société e diritto di Roma 1. (The revolution of the plebs. 
Society and law of Rome 1.) Liguori Editore, Napoli, 1975. 336 p. 
The book of this internationally renowned Neapolitan legal romanist scrutinizes one of 
the most significant periods of Roman history. As to the title of the book analyzing the questions 
of the "revolution" of the plebs, it refers in itself to a certain problem of terminology. With 
respect to the fact that, on the one hand, the technical term of revolution is generally sharply 
separated in the literature of ancient history and, on the other hand, that the book embraces 
approximately one and a half centuries, viz. the period from 510(509) till 367 B. C., it would have 
been perhaps more correct to write about evolution. Such a period extending almost one and a 
half centuries precludes namely the possibility of the justified using of the expression 
"rivoluzione". It is a debatable point further, to what extent it is reasonable to apply the 
categories of class struggle and classes in an undifferentiated way. In our opinion, it is an over-
simplification to use these notions without a prudent historical analysis. 
The author analyzes in details the period of transition from the epoch of kingdom to that 
of republic. In his opinion, the expulsion of the last Etruscan king, Tarquinius Superbus did in 
itself not create the republican constitution. The institution of kingdom remained also after 
ceasing the Etruscan rule and certain reforms meant the only change. On the basis of the sources 
being at disposal it is unfortunately not possible to retrace this transition period respectively—to 
be more precise—its characteristics. Guarino takes the view that the basic cause of the contrast 
between patricians and plebeians has to be found in the particular closed clan system of 
patricians. The organization relying upon the scheme of familia-gens-curia-tribus remained 
dominant also after the expulsion of the last Etruscan sovereign and it constituted the basis of 
monarchy resting upon a certain kind of election. This hypothesis is in our view verified by the 
fact that the importance of the senators, viz. patres-auctores grew considerably in this transition-
period and its contents already known in the time of Latino-Sabine kings was recovered. Having 
disappeared after Tarquinius Priscus' reign for some decades, the auctoritas patrum came in 
sight again in a form documented by Livius and this points to the institution of an elected king. 
Sticking yet to the subject of the institution of auctoritas patrum, the enrichment and expansion 
of the contents of this institution was already broken off at the turn of the 5th and 4th centuries 
B. C. and also this fact confirms Guarino's thesis. Consequently, the course of the widening of 
the contents broke off just in the time of the plebeians' obtaining equal rights with the patricians. 
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Making the two strata also legally equal, the lex Publilia Philonis originating from 339 B. C. and 
the lex Maenia passed in the 3rd century B. C. transformed the auctoritaspatrum, which became 
a notion referring to the rights of both patrician and plebeian senators equally from this period 
(according to De Martino's very plausible view). 
Guarino thinks that plebeians were originally a group having a politically independent 
settlement (in the mons Aventinus) and later falling victim to the conquering Romans or more 
precisely Quirites. So the stratum of plebeians can be sharply separated from that of clientes 
being already previously subjects of the Quirites. Servius Tullius' reform, which according to the 
predominant view in literature the system of comitia curiata established, concerned exclusively 
the army—supposes the author. Therefore the reform did not mean any significant change as far 
as the separation of the two strata is concerned. Plebeians had no political rights further on 
either. Later this circumstance conduces fundamentally to the revolution of the plqbs, which, 
however, could not achieve any decisive effect even after Tarquinius Superbus' expulsion. As to 
the private law, the "ius Quiritium ' ' concerns henceforward definitely the norms regulating the 
legal position of "cives". Establishing the system of an army divided into curiae demanded, in 
our opinion, also the reform of the comitia. It seems to be very hypothetic to separate the 
exercitus centuriatus from the system of comitia curiata. It must not be forgotten namely that 
also the exercitus centuriatus itself had authority concerning private and public law. On this basis 
it is hardly feasible that soldiers of plebeian origin would not have suffragium in the domain of 
the ius publicum. 
According to Guarino the comitia centuriata appeared in the time of passing the leges 
Liciniae Sextiae (367 B. C.) on the model of the exercitus centuriatus. In conformity with this 
supposition the centuries old contrast between patricians and plebeians could come to an end 
only after passing these laws. This thesis of Guarino, viz. connecting the ceasing of the 
antagonistic form of the class struggle with the leges Liciniae Sextiae leaves the significant 
reforms appearing even in the analyzed period out of consideration. On the basis of this view, the 
significance of several provisions concerning the plebeians definitely favourably—among others 
some of the Twelve Tables—fell into the background. Also the lex Canuleia de connubio patrum 
et plebis (from 445 B. C.) and besides that a number of reforms taking into consideration the 
interests of plebeians were disregarded. It has to be remarked that there is no question that the 
author deals with these reforms. E. g. the above-mentioned plebiscitum suggested by the people's 
tribune Canuleius is analyzed on several pages. Guarino attaches almost exclusive importance to 
the leges Liciniae Sextiae regarded by him as the most significant compromise eliminating the 
contrast between patricians and plebeians. The author does not take in respect the 
documentable fact that organizing an army on financial grounds inevitably involves also the 
reform of comitia organized on the same grounds as separating rigorously the two reforms from 
each other would be unhistorical. It cannot be led back exclusively to the compromise mentioned 
above that—as clearly described by Guarino in the last chapter of his book—in the time of 
Pyrrhic wars Rome was a state having approximately one million inhabitants and about twenty 
hundred square kilometres. The leges Liciniae Sextiae regarded as the "punto di rottura" of the 
constitution of the patrician state is undoubtedly of great importance but its role related to 
creating the "peace between the classes" is by no means exclusive. 
In spite of the critical observations above we can ascertain that Guarino's book—which is 
the first volume of a series analyzing the connection of society and law under the conditions of 
ancient Rome—describes very clearly and also in details the course, main features and results of 
the political struggle between the both strata enduring indeed for centuries. Relying upon results 
of the latest historical researches, the book is a reinterpretation rich in ideas of the achievements 
of previous investigations. The original elaboration of a subject concerning equally the domain 
of ius publicum and ius privatum can rightly command the interest of the historians as well as of 
the representatives of the jurisprudence. 
G. Hamza 
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BisCARDi, A.: Ordinamento, prassi e giurisprudenza alia luce del diritto romano. Sommario 
didattico e antologia di testi a cura di Franco Gnoli (Order, practice and jurisprudence in the 
light of Roman law), Cisalpino-Goliardica, Milano, 1975, 1 + 70 p. 
The book of the excellent representative of the science of Roman law analyzes the 
questions of legal system, legal practice and jurisprudence in the field of the Roman law. The 
legal system—as pointed out in the foreword of professor Biscardi's work—means the legal 
norm structure. The legal practice refers to reality, to the field of the application of legal norm 
which—especially in the sphere of vulgar law—may withdraw from the statutory legal 
regulation. Finally, the jurisprudence is the concept signifying the "science" of law, its theory, 
the sum of knowledges relating to the law which refers to the so-called interpretatio iuris. The 
characteristic of this jurisprudence interpreted as "interpretatio шгй" consists in that it may play 
essentially the part of the link between the legal practice and legal system. 
The first part of the work falling into two main parts deals with the particularities and 
characteristics of the legal system. The second part, however, analyzes in details the relationship 
between the legal system, legal practice and jurisprudence by way of a concrete example, namely 
of the introduction of the principle of "emptione dominium transfertur" as historical paradigm. 
In the part investigating the characteristics of Roman legal system the author states that 
the Roman law is characterized by a kind of pluralism, expressed partly in the differentiation of 
social groups (gentes, familiae, civitas), and partly in the numerous groups of legal norms (ius 
civile, ius sacrum, ius honorarium, ius gentium). The first-mentioned form of pluralism is the so-
called institutional pluralism ("pluralisme istituzionale"), whereas the second form means the 
normative pluralism. On the strength of the analysis of D. 50.16.195.2. (Ulpianus), Biscardi 
arrives to the conclusion that, as a matter of fact, a distinction should be made between the so-
called familia proprio iure and the so-called família communi iure. The basis of distinction is given 
by the dissimilarity of bonds keeping together the members of family (namely the power 
[mancipium ] of pater familias, and the agnatio, respectively). Examining the legal significance of 
gens the author refers to the part played by this category in the order of succession of tutela 
légitima as well as of the Twelve Tables' Law. He poses, in addition, the question much discussed 
in the literature that the significance of gens might be probably in the delimitation of patricians 
and plebeians ("plebei gentes non habent"). It should be noted that Biscardi takes no 
unambiguous position in this question. Analyzing the information contained in Gaius' 
Institutiones (Gai. Inst. 1.3.) the author emphasized the legal independence of plebs, being 
manifested partly in leges sacratae founded on ritual traditions, and partly in plébiscita accepted 
on concilia plebis. The author refers besides to the fact that the Nomen Latinum refers actually to 
a certain kind of independence—namely during several centuries. In the field of the so-called 
"aliae civitates", Biscardi calls the attention to the differentiation between peregrini alicuius 
civitatis and peregrini dediticii. Summing up, he notes that the so-called institutional pluralism 
manifests itself on the level of civitas, on the one hand, and within the civitas, on the other hand. 
The institutional pluralism comes to a role, in addition to the above-mentioned relations, e.g. in 
the relation of Church and state, too. 
Analyzing the normative pluralism the author investigates first the relationship between 
ius and lex, as well as ius civile and ius legitimum. He refers to the fact that the ius means originally 
the mores integrated by pontificium interpretatio. At the same time, lex appears in the archaic age 
as "impediment" of ius ("sipresenta come un argine"). With respect to the close connection 
between ius civile and pontificium interpretatio, the known fragment of Pomponius (D. 1.2.2.12.) 
is cited ( " . . . est proprium ius civile, quod sine scripto in sola prudentium interpretatione 
consistit"). In the opinion of the author, the distinction between ius civile and ius sacrum acquires 
a greater importance in the period of the republic. The distinction between ius sacrum and fas is 
also of great significance. As positive examples of ius sacrum, Biscardi mentions the so-called 
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leges lucorum (lex luci Lucerina and lex luci Spoletina in the 3rd century B.C.). lus divinum and ius 
pontificium may be considered the synonyms of ius sacrum (Cic. Brutus 42.156.). The author 
points out that ius sacrum is occasionally—especially in the last century of the republic and 
during the imperial period—treated so to say "monographically". As examples the work of 
Servius "De sacris delestandis" and that of Trebatium "De religione" are mentioned. On the 
strength of the non-legal sources (Quintilianus, Inst. orat. 2.4.33-34.) ius sacrum means some 
kind of independent concept to be compared with ius privatum and ius publicum. Biscardi while 
investigating ius civile and ius honorarium mentions as example the actio Publiciana which is 
unambiguously the result of the legislative activity of praetor. 
When comparing ius civile and ius gentium the author comes to the conclusion on the basis 
of the analysis of legal and non-legal sources that ius gentium having several senses is united to 
one single concept basically by the reference to naturalis ratio. The delimitation of ius publicum 
and ius privatum does not cause any problem. The author refers to the fact that the terminus 
technical "publicus" stands near implicitly, as for its meaning to "populus". The distinction 
between ius ordinarium and ius extraordinarium is based essentially on the difference between the 
formular proceeding and extraordinaria cognitio. At the delimitation of iura and leges Biscardi 
refers to the antitheses pair of the Greek legal koiné nomos and diataxis. 
Dealing with the ample meaning of the word lex the author points out that it may 
basically refer to lex publica, to the agreement between the parties (as e.g. lex commissoria or lex 
locationis), to legis actio and, finally, to the so-called lex dedicationis. The author deals especially 
minutely with the sources of Roman law. He adverts to the fact that in the classical age the 
senatus consulta and the imperial constitutiones range with lex. He emphasizes that the jurist's 
responses become obligatory on the basis of auctoritas principis which binding force has lastly as 
basis ius respondendi issued by Augustus. The great significance of praetorian edictum is referred 
to by the fact that it is occasionally called "lex annua" by the sources (Cicero, in Verrem 
11.1.42.109.). Further on, the author analyzes the relationship between lex and consuetude. 
Finally, it deals with the question that with Justinian those of laws may be considered practically 
"eternal" which are based on "naturalia iura" (lust. Inst. 1.2.11.). 
In the next part of the book Biscardi analyzes briefly the relationship between the Roman 
law and the local popular laws. Within the range of this theme he refers to the great significance 
of Constitutio Antoniniana. 
In the part investigating the relationship between legal system, legal practice and 
jurisprudence the author analyzes in details the principle of "emptione dominium transfertur"as 
a paradigm which correctly represents the connection with each other of these three concepts. 
When analyzing the effectiveness of the above-mentioned principle, the author refers to the fact 
that in the archaic Roman law—this is the case with the mancipatio meaning the cash 
settlement—the purchase contains in se the conveyance of title to the buyer. In the next phase of 
the development of law—as it may be concluded primarily on the strength of sources issuing 
from Gaius—the purchase as transaction is markedly separated from the conveyance of title. In 
the third phase—in the post-classical age—the purchase contract runs already close the act of 
purchase. As a result thereof the purchase which became contractus alienationis, leads 
automatically to the conveyance of title. Finally, it is Justinian—this is the last, fourth phase of 
development—who returns to the classical standpoint and insists—in addition to contractus 
(pactum)—on the independent act of conveyance of title. This concept is expressed especially 
clearly in Codex Iustinianus (2.3.20. Impp. Diocl. et Max. a. 293.). 
The book of Biscardi, founded on the substantial analysis of the sources and literature, 
elaborates in an original manner the complex problem of the relationship between legal system, 
legal practice and jurisprudence in Roman law. This work may be usefully read by research 
workers of law and those interested therein. 
G. Hamza 
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общих правилах административного процесса 
№ IV от 1957 г.] ÁI. 6/81: 518—582. 
F I C Z E R E Lajos: Gazdaságirányítás és közi-
gazgatás. [Management of the economy and 
public administration. Руководство народным 
хозяйством и публичная администрация ] JK. 
6/81: 445—453. 
F Ü R C H T Pál: A megyei komplex felügyeleti 
vizsgálatok fejlesztésének kérdéseiről. 2. [On the 
problems of developing the complex supervision 
surveys in the counties. Вопросы развития 
комплексных проверок в порядке администра-
тивного надзора в комитатах. 2.] AI. 10/81: 
880—892. 
F Ü R C H T Pál—HAJDÚ István: Eszmecsere az 
ügyrendi és igazgatási bizottságok munkájáról. 
[Discussion on the work of the agenda and 
administrative committees. Консультации о ра-
боте комиссии по вопросам регламента и комис-
сии по правовым и управленческим вопросам ] 
ÁI. 12/81: 1123—1128. 
G A J D Ö C S I István: Az Országgyűlés Jogi, 
Igazgatási és Igazságügyi Bizottságának vélemé-
nye a törvényjavaslatról. [Statement of the 
Legal, Administrative and Judicial Committee of 
the Parliament on the bill of the public admini-
stration procedure. Мнение Юридического, Ад-
министративного Комитета Государственного 
Собрания о законопроекте ] AI. 6/81: 494—505. 
H O L L Ó András: Gondolatok a vb-titkári 
törvényességi felügyelet továbbfejlesztéséről. 
Egy vita tanulságai. [Ideas about the develop-
ment of the supervision of lawfulness of the work 
of the executive committee secretaries of the 
councils. Некоторые соображения о дальней-
шем развитии надзора над законностью, осу-
ществляемого секретарями исполкомов 
советов.] Á1. 9/81: 791—799. 
H O L L Ó András: „Contra legem" méltá-
nyosság vagy méltányos törvényesség? ["Contra 
legem "equity or equitable legality? Справедли-
вость «против закона» или справедливая 
законность?] JK. 11/81: 919—929. 
H O R V Á T H Albert: A megyei szintű igazgatási 
osztályok 1981. évi munkaterveiről. [The plans 
of work of 1981 for the county-level administra-
tion departments of the councils. О планах 
работы административных отделов уровня ко-
митата от 1981 г.] ÁI. 8/81: 716—720. 
Joó Ernő: A tanácsi szervezetben működő 
munkakollektíva mozgalom tapasztalatai. [The 
experiences of the working teams operating in 
the council organisation. Опыты движения кол-
лективов работы в организации советов.] AI. 
8/81: 728—733. 
K E C S K É S László: Az állam gazdasági tevé-
kenysége és az immunitás. Az immunitás-
problémák átfogóbb szemléletéért. [Economic 
activity of the state and immunity. For a 
comprehensive view of immunity problems. 
Хозяйственная деятельность государства и им-
мунитет. За более широкое понимание пробле-
мы иммунитета.] GazdJogtud. 1—2/81: 179— 
213. 
K I L É N Y I Géza: Alapelvek az államigazgatási 
eljárásban. [Basic principles in the public admini-
strative procedure. Основные принципы в адми-
нистративном процессе.] AI. 7/81: 593—602. 
K I L É N Y I Géza: Az államigazgatási határo-
zatok bírósági felülvizsgálata a szocialista jog-
fejlődés tükrében. [The judicial revision of the 
administrative acts in the mirror of socialist legal 
development. Судебный пересмотр администра-
тивных решений в свете социалистического 
правового развития.] J К. 8/81: 653—667. 
Kiss László: A tanácsrendeletalkotás fej-
lesztésének néhány időszerű kérdése. [Some 
actual problems of improving the development 
of council statutes. Некоторые актуальные воп-
росы развития принятия постановлений 
советами ] ÁI. 11/81: 972—982. 
Kiss M. Erzsébet: A városkörnyékiség 
elméleti kérdései és gyakorlati tapasztalatai. [The 
theoretical questions and practical experiences of 
the suburban environment. Теоретические воп-
росы и практические опыты, касающиеся 
пригородов ] ÁI. 10/81: 937—948. 
K Ó P I Á S Mihály: A testületi határozatok 
végrehajtása. [Carrying out corporative deci-
sions. Исполнение коллегиальных решений.] AI.  
11/81: 1033—1037. 
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K O L L Á T H György: „Kisajátított" egysze-
rűsítési elgondolások. ["Adapted" simplification 
schemes. «Присвоенные» представления об 
упрощении ] Al. 7/81: 621—636. 
K O L L Â T H György: Igazgatási felügyeleti 
ellenőrzések tapasztalatai. 1—2. [Experiences of 
the administrative supervisionary control activi-
ties. 1—2. Опыт контроля в порядке админист-
ративного надзора. Часть 1—2.] ÁI. 10/81: 
893—905.; 11/81: 961—971. 
A közigazgatási tudományok nemzetközi 
intézetének XVIII. kongresszusa. [XVIIIth Con-
gress of the International Institute of Public 
Administration. XVIII-й Конгресс международ-
ного института административных наук.] Ál. 
12/81: 1115—1119. 
M A D A R Á S Z Tibor: Arten der Regelungsform 
im Verwaltungsrecht. [Types of regulation in 
public administrative law. Виды способа регули-
рования в административном праве.] = Anna-
les Bp. Tomus 22: 99—122, —Rés. franç.; Русск. 
содерж. 
M A D A R Á S Z Tibor: Az államigazgatási jogi 
szabályozás komplex, tartalmi-funkcionális elem-
zéséről. [On the content-functional analysis 
of public administrative law regulations. Об 
анализе по содержанию и по функциям 
административно-правового регулирования.] 
JK. 10/81: 817—832. 
M A R K Ó J A Imre: Az államigazgatási eljárás 
általános szabályairól szóló törvény módosítása. 
[The amendment of the Act on the general rules 
of public administration procedure. Изменение 
закона об общих правилах административного 
процесса.] ÁI. 6/81: 482—493. 
M I H Á L Y Lajos: A népességnyilvántartás 
fejlettségi szintje és felhasználtságának lehetősé-
gei. [The development level of the population 
registration and the possibilities of its usage. 
Уровень развитости учета населения и возмож-
ности его использования.] ÁI. 9/81: 823—829. 
M Ó Z E S Pál: Kapcsolatok a város és a vá-
roskörnyéki községek között. [Connections 
between cities and the villages of their agglomer-
ation. Взаимоотношение между городом и 
окружающими его селами ] Al. 8/81: 681—692. 
P A P P Lajos: Az eljárási törvény és az állam-
igazgatás korszerűsítése. [Modernization of the 
Act on procedure and the public administration. 
Процессуальный закон и совершенствование 
государственного управления ] ÁI. 6/81: 500— 
505. 
Р А Р Р László: Országos tudományos diák-
köri konferencia az Államigazgatási Főiskolán. 
Budapest, 1981. március. [National conference 
of the scientific student circles in the College of 
Public Administration, held in March, 1981. 
Всевенгерская конференция студенческих науч-
ных кружков в Высшей административной шко-
ле. Будапешт, марта 1981.] ÁI. 10/81: 930—936. 
PiRi s i János: A városkörnyék irányításának 
néhány tapasztalata. [Some experiences of mana-
ging suburban areas. Некоторые опыты по 
управлению пригородами.] ÁI. 10/81: 949— 
959. 
S Á R K Ö Z Y Tamás: Az ágazati irányítás 
fejlődésmenete, fejlesztési koncepciói különös 
tekintettel az iparirányításra. [Way of develop-
ment and conceptions of development of the 
sectoral guidance with special regard to the 
management of industry. Тенденции развития и 
концепции отраслевого управления (вопросы 
управления промышленностю).] GazdJogtud. 
1—2/81: 13—55. 
S O L T É S Z István: A helyi érdekek képviselete 
a megyei tanácstestületek tevékenységében. [The 
representation of local interests in the activity of 
the county-level council bodies. Представление 
местных интересов в деятельности комитатских 
советов.] ÁI. 12/81: 1096—1108. 
S P R É M István: A környezetvédelmi jogal-
kotás történeti fejlődése és eredményei Magya-
rországon. [The historical development and the 
results of the creation of law for the protection of 
environment in Hungary. Историческое разви-
тие и достижение правотворчества в области 
охраны окружающей среды в Венгрии.] = Kör-
nyezetvédelem és jog: 239—264. 
S Z A M E L Katalin: A minisztériumok helye és 
szerepe a tudományirányítási rendszerben. [Role 
and place of the ministries in the management 
system of scientific research. Место и роль 
министерств в системе управления наукой.] JK. 
6/81: 486—495. 
S Z E L E S T E Y György: Testületi előterjesztések 
társadalmi vitái. [Public debates of the proposals 
of different bodies. Общественное обсуждение 
коллегиально вносимых предложений.] ÁI. 
9/81: 782—790. 
S Z E N T P É T E R I István: Vezetés- vagy szervezés-
tudomány? [Management science or organiza-
tion science? Наука руководтсва или 
организации?] ÁI. 11/81: 1017—1026. 
S Z I J J Á R T Ó S Z A B Ó Antal: A városi tanácsigaz-
gatás szervezete, egységes ügyvitele és nyilván-
tartása. [The organisation, unified administra-
tion and registration system of the councils in the 
cities. Структура управления городского совета, 
его комплексное делопроизводство и учет.] ÁI. 
9/81: 830—837. 
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SziRA József: A közigazgatás szervezésének 
hatása a munkahelyi környezet alakulására. 
[The effect of organizing public administration 
on the development of workplace environment. 
Влияние' организации публичной администра-
ции на сложение окружающей среды рабочих 
мест.] ÁI. 11/81: 983—990. 
A törvényjavaslat vitájában elhangzott fel-
szólalások. [Contributions addressed at the de-
bate on the bill on the public administration 
procedure. Выступления в ходе обсуждения 
законопроекта об общих правилах администра-
тивного процесса.] ÁI. 6/81: 506—517. 
V Á G Ó László: A hatósági ügyintézés adatai. 
[Data of the management of the authorities. 
Данные по ведомственному делопроизводству.] 
ÁI. 6/81: 583—592. 
V A R G A Emil: Az építésügyi igazgatás jogi 
szabályozásának másfél évtizede. [One and half 
decade of the construction administration. Пол-
тора десятилетия правового регулирования уп-
равления строительным делом.] AI. 7/81: 646— 
653. 
V E R E B É L Y I Imre: A közoktatás és A közigaz-
gatás kapcsolatrendszere. 1—2. [The connection 
system of public education and public admini-
stration. Система связей народного образова-
ния и государственного управления. 1—2 часть.] 
Al. 9/81: 769—781.; 10/81: 865—879. 
V I D A István: Az államigazgatási végrehajtás 
újraszabályozása. [The new legislation of execu-
tive procedure in public administration. Новое 
регулирование исполнения в государственном 
управлении ] ÁI. 11/81: 991—1001. 
Z O L T Á N Ödön: A természetvédelem és а 
vadászat viszonya jogi aspektusból. [Environ-
ment protection and hunting: a legal point of 
view. Соотношение охраны природы и охоты в 
правовом аспекте.] JK. 10/81: 848—857. 
Z S U F F A István: Új intézmények az eljárási 
törvényben. [New institutions of the law of 
procedure. Новые институты в процессуальном 
законе.] Ai. 7/81: 603—611. 
IV. Financial Law 
IV. Финансовое право 
Books — Книги 
Beruházási jogszabályok. Összeáll. Cseres-
nyés Ágnes—Németh Ferenc. [Legal rules on 
investments. Правовые нормы о капиталов-
ложениях] Bp. Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 
1981. 275 p. 
Articles — Статьи 
B O R G Ó Y Sándor—SZATMÁRY Árpád: A 
Pénzügyminisztérium Bevételi főigazgatóságá-
nak hatósági tevékenysége. [Activity of the 
Revenue Bureau of the Ministry of Finance 
proceeding as an authority. Ведомоственная 
деятельность Главного отдела Министерства 
финансов ] ÁI. 10/81: 920—929. 
F E R E N C Z Y Endre: Az állampolgár és a 
pénzügyi igazgatás közötti kapcsolatról. [Con-
nections between citizens and the administration 
of finances. Взаимосвязь между гражданином и 
финансовым управлением.] ÁJ. 3/81: 386—404. 
— Rés. franç.; Русск. содерж. 
F E R E N C Z Y E[ndre]: Quelques questions théo-
riques des lois fondamentales des finances des 
pays socialistes. [Theoretical problems of the 
basic financial laws in the socialist countries. 
Некоторые теоретические вопросы основных 
законов о финансах социалистических стран ] 
AJurid. 3—4/417—437. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. 
summary. 
L A L U S K A Pál: A szocialista pénzügyi jog 
tárgya. [The subject matter of the socialist 
financial law. Предмет социалистического фи-
нансового права.] JK. 8/81: 712—714. 
M E Z N E R I C S Iván: Garantees for foreign in-
vestors. = Internat. Congress of Comp. Law, 10. 
81: 331—353. 
V. Civil Law 
V. Гражданское право 
Books — Книги 
J A C S Ó Péter: A szoftver jogi oltalma. [Legal 
protection of software. Правовая охрана 
"softwear"-a.] Bp. SZÁMOK ny. 1981. 63 p. — 
Eng. summary; Русск. содерж. 
A polgári törvénykönyv magyarázata. 1— 
2. köt. Szerk. Eörsi Gyula—Gellért György. 
Lezárva: 1981. jún. 30. [Commentary to the Civil 
Code. Vols 1—2. Closed: June 30, 1981. Ком-
ментарий гражданского кодекса. 1—2. том. До 
30 июня 1981 г.] Bp. Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 
1981. 1079, 1081—2216. p. 
S Á R K Ö Z Y Tamás: A szocialista vállalatelmé-
let jogtudományi alapjaihoz. [Remarks to the 
legal foundations of the socialist theory of 
enterprises. О научно-правовом основе социа-
листической теории предприятий.] Bp. Közgaz-
dasági és Jogi Kiadó, 1981. 610 p. — Bibliogr. 
563—580. Eng. summary; Dt. Zusammenfas-
sung. 
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V I D A [Sándor] A.: Trademarks in develo-
ping countries. Transi. E. Ruszthy. Publ. for the 
Licensing Executive Society International. То-
варные знаки в развивающихся странах.] Bp. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981. 204 p. — Bibliogr. 14— 
17. 
Articles — Статьи 
F I C S O R Mihály: A tudományos-technikai 
forradalom és a szerzői jog válsága. [The 
scientific-technological revolution and the crisis 
of the law of copyright. Научно-техническая 
революция и кризис авторского права.] JK. 
12/81: 983—993. 
H A N A K András: A könnyűlovasság támadá-
sa. [Sárközy Tamás: Koncepció a felelősség 
érvényesítésének realitásokhoz közelítéséről a 
népgazdaságban c. tanulmány alapján rendezett 
tudományos ülésszakról.] [Report on a scientific 
meeting discussing T. Sárközy's study entitled: 
"Concept of approaching the enforcement of 
responsibility to the realities in the national 
economy". Научная дискуссия о статье Тамаша 
Шаркёзи: Концепция о ближении отвественнос-
ти в нархозяйстве к реалитетам.] JK; 10/81: 
895—897. 
H A R M A T H Y A[ttila]: Relations between eco-
nomic regulators and contracts. Связь экономи-
ческих регуляторов и договоров.] AJurid. 3— 
4/80: 327—345. — Русск. содерж.; Dt. 
Zusammenfassung. 
H A R M A T H Y Attila: Szerződés, közigazgatás, 
gazdaságirányítás. [Contract, public administra-
tion, economic management. Lecture. Договор 
— публичная администрация — управление 
хозяйством. Доклад] Recensed by — Рец. Фе-
ренци Э. ÁI. 8/81: 745—747. 
H A R M A T H Y Attila: A gazdaság állami befo-
lyásolásának jogi eszközeiről. A kapitalista 
országok gyakorlata. [Legal means of influenc-
ing economy by the state, Practice of the 
capitalist countries. Правовые средства воз-
действия государства на экономику. Практика 
капиталистических государств.] GazdJogtud. 
1—2/81: 85—127. 
H A R M A T H Y Attila: Szerződés — közigaz-
gatás — gazdaságirányítás. Meznerics Iván, 
Kálmán György és Csanádi György hozzá-
szólásával. [Contracts — public administration 
— management of the economy. With contribu-
tions. Договор — публичная администрация 
управление хозяйством.] JK. 6/81: 453—468. 
J O B B A G Y I Gábor: Euthanázia — egy élő 
probléma polgári jogi szempontból. [Euthana-
sia: civil law aspects of a living problem. 
Эвтаназия — живучий вопрос с точки зрения 
гражданского права ] JK. 11/81: 949—958. 
N O V O T N I Zoltán: A mezőgazdasági 
növénybiztosítási szerződésjogi természete. [The 
legal nature of agricultural plantinsurance con-
tracts. Правовая природа договора страхования 
сельскохозяйственных культур.] JK. 8/81: 685— 
696. 
P Á L O S György: A hangkép-berendezések 
használata és a szerzői jog. [The use of video-
recorders and copyrights. Использование видео-
звуковых оборудований и авторское право ] JK. 
9/81: 788—797. 
S Á N D O R Tamás: Kártérítés szerződéssze-
gésért a német jogban, különös tekintettel a 
hibás teljesítésre. [Damages for breach of con-
tract in the German law, with special regard to 
faulty performance. Возмещение убытков, при-
чиненных нарушением договора в германском 
праве, с особым учетом ненадлежающего 
исполнения.] ÁJ. 3/81: 405—441. — Rés. franç.; 
Русск. содерж. 
S A R K Ö Z Y Tamás: A gazdaságirányító szer-
vek felelőssége vállalatirányító tevékenysé-
gükért. [Liability for company management 
of the bodies of economic administration. От-
ветственность органов управления экономикой 
за свою деятельность по управлению 
предприятиями ] ÁJ. 2/81: 159—200. — Rés. 
franç.; Русск. содерж. 
S A R K Ö Z Y Tamás: Népgazdasági jogi kuta-
tóhálózat kutatási-fejlesztési társulás keretében. 
Egy társadalomtudományi kutatásszervezési 
kísérlet. [Network for the research of the law on 
national scale within a pool for research and 
development. An experiment for a research 
organization in the social sciences. Научно-
исследовательская сеть по изучению юридичес-
ких вопросов народного хозяйства — в рамках 
коллективов по исследованию и развитию.] 
MTud. 7—8/81: 593—603. 
ScHAGRiN Tamás: A szocialista vállalkozás 
formái — új üzemeltetési formák a kereskede-
lemben. [The forms of socialist entrepreneurship 
— new management forms in the commerce. 
Формы социалистического предпринимательст-
ва — новые эксплуатационные формы в 
торговле.] JK. 9/81: 740—746. 
S Ó L Y O M László: A polgári bíróságok kör-
nyezetvédelmi ítélkezése és a polgári jog új 
lehetőségei a környezetvédelemben. [The juris-
diction of civil law-courts and the new possibili-
ties of civil law in the protection of environment. 
Правосудие гражданских судов в области охра-
ны окружающей среды и новые возможности 
гражданско-правовой охраны окружающей 
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среды.] = Környezetvédelem és jog: 148— 
179. 
S Ó L Y O M László: Az injuria és A személyiségi 
jogok. „Semlegesség" és technika. [Injury and 
personal rights. "Neutrality" and technics. Inju-
ria и личные права. «Нейтралитет» и правовая 
техника.] ÁJ. 2/81: 219—262. — Rés. franç.; 
Русск. содерж. 
S Ó L Y O M László: Az általános személyiségi 
jog. „Tulajdonos" és „személy". [General law of 
personality. "Owner" and "person". Общие 
права личности. «Собственник» и «лицо».] ÁJ. 
3/81: 344—385. — Rés. franç.; Русск. содерж. 
S Z E N T P É T E R I Ádám: Védjegylajstromozási 
kérdések a bírósági gyakorlatban. [Problems of 
trade mark register in jurisprudence. Вопросы 
регистрации товарных знаков в судебной 
практике.] JK. 12/81: 1057—1059. 
T A K Á T S Endre: Innováció és iparjogvéde-
lem. [Innovation and the protection of industrial 
property. Новаторство и охрана промышлен-
ной собственности.] GazdJogtud. 3—4/80: 
333—345. 
V É K Á S Lajos: Fogyasztóvédelem a fejlett 
tőkés országokban. [Consumers' protection in 
the developed capitalist countries. Защита инте-
ресов потребителей в развитых капиталистичес-
ких странах.] GazdJogtud. 1—2/81: 57—84. 
V Ö R Ö S Imre: A védjegyjogi oltalom néhány 
kérdése a tisztességtelen verseny jogának meta-
morfózisa tükrében. [Some questions of trade-
mark protection in the mirror of the metamor-
phosis of the law of unfair competition. Некото-
рые вопросы защиты по праву на товарный знак 
во свете метаморфоза правовых норм о нечест-
ном соревновании.] JK. 12/81: 1024—1033. 
VI. Labour Law 
VI. Трудовое право 
Books — Книги 
B O G Y A I Géza: Jogi ismeretek szakszervezeti 
tisztségviselőknek. [Legal reader for trade union 
functionaries. Правовые знания для профсоюз-
ных деятелей.] Bp. Táncsics Kiadó, 1981. 381 p. 
A magyar szakszervezeti mozgalom határo-
zatai. 1—2. köt. Szerk. Zsiga László. [Resolu-
tions of the Hungarian trade union movement. 
Vols 1—2. Венгерское профсоюзное движение в 
решениях. 1—2. том.] Bp. Táncsics Kiadó, 1981. 
435, 657 p. 
Munkajogi ismeretek. Szakszervezeti tiszt-
ségviselőknek és munkaügyi teendőkkel foglal-
kozóknak. 1—2. köt. Szerk. Nagy Zoltán. [La-
bour law reader for trade union functionaries 
and those concerned with labour law problems. 
Vols 1—2. Трудовое право. Справочник для 
профсоюзных деятелей и специалистов по тру-
довому праву.] Bp. Táncsics Kiadó, 1981. 573, 
375 p. — Bibliogr. passim. 
A társadalombiztosítási bizottság kéziköny-
ve. összeál l . Borosi Lász ló—Kalocsa i Tibor-
né—Keresztes Béla. [Manual for the social 
insurance committee. Справочник по общест-
венному страхованию.] Bp. Táncsics Kiadó, 
1981. 144 p. /Szakszervezetek Országos Taná-
csa./ — Bibliogr. 140. 
Articles — Статьи 
A B O N Y I Géza: öregek és rokkantak 
társadalombiztosítási helyzete. [State of the 
elderly and disabled persons under social securi-
ty law. Положение стариков и инвалидов в 
области общественного страхования ] JK. 7/81 : 
601—609. 
H Á G E L M A Y E R Ida: Labour law protection of 
working women. Защита трудящихся женщин 
по трудовому праву.] = Annales Bp. Tomus 22: 
37—60. Русск. содерж.; Dt. Zusammenfas-
sung. 
Kiss György: A munkaügyi vita és a mun-
kaügyi eljárás fogalmának néhány elméleti 
problémája. [Theoretical problems of labour 
disputes and the procedure in labour law. 
Некоторые теоретические проблемы понятия 
трудового спора и производства по трудовым 
спорам.] JK. 6/81: 510—518. 
P E T H Ö Róbert: Az üzemi demokrácia a 
szakszervezetek tevékenységének jogi szabályo-
zásában [Workshop democracy in the legal regu-
lation of trade union activity. Роль производ-
ственной демократии в правовом регулировании 
деятельности профсоюзов.] GazdJogtud. 1— 
2/81: 155—178. 
S Z A B Ó Endre: A közalkalmazottak szak-
szervezeti mozgalmának néhány időszerű felada-
ta. [Some actual tasks of the trade union 
movement of public employees of the civil 
service. Некоторые актуальные задачи профсо-
юзного движения государственных служащих.] 
ÁI. 12/81: 1068—1076. 
T R Ó C S A N Y I László: Környezetvédelem — 
munkavédelem. [Protection of environment — 
labour safety regulations. Охрана окружающей 
среды — охрана труда.] = Környezetvédelem és 
jog: 219—238. 
T R Ó C S A N Y I László: A munkahelyi környezet 
védelmének normarendszere. [System of norms 
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in the protection of the environment in the 
.working places. Система норм охраны окружа-
ющей среды места работы.] ÁJ. 3/81: 327—343. 
— Rés. franç.; Русск. содерж. 
T R Ó C S A N Y I László: A fiatalkorúak munkajo-
gi helyzete az európai szocialista országok jogá-
ban. [State of the juveniles under labour law in 
the European socialist countries. Положение 
несовершеннолетних по трудовому праву в 
законодательстве европейских социалистиче-
ских стран.] JK. 7/81: 638—645. 
VII. Family Law 
VII. Семейное право 
Articles — Статьи 
B A C S Ó Jenő: Az örökbefogadás. [Adoption. 
Усиновление ] JK. 7/81: 609—616. 
C S E H - S Z O M B A T H Y László: A mai magyar 
család típusai és ezek működése. [Types and 
function of the Hungarian families today. Типы 
современной венгерской семьи и их функ-
ционирование.] JK. 7/81: 561—567. 
CsiKY Ottó: Családjogunk fejlődésének 
újabb tendenciái. [Recent tendencies in the 
Hungarian family law. Новые тенденции в 
развитии венгерского семейного права.] JK. 
7/81: 553—561. 
F I C Z E R É N É S I R K O Alexandra: A család stabi-
litása és a jog. [Stability of the family and the law. 
Стабильность семьи и право ] JK. 7/81: 567— 
571. 
H A R T A I László: Szerződés a házassági va-
gyonjogban. [Contracts in the matrimonial 
property law. Договоров в брачном имущест-
венном праве.] JK. 7/81: 584—590. 
K A T O N A N É S O L T É S Z Márta: A házassági jog 
fejlődésének új szakasza a fejlett tőkés országok-
ban és ennek tanulságai. [New stage in the 
development of the law of matrimony in the 
highly developed capitalist countries and its 
consequences. Новая фаза развития брачного 
законодательства в развитых капиталистичес-
ких странах и её уроки ] JK. 7/81: 623—634. 
RÉV Erika: Az első magyar házassági tör-
vény és a vétkesség. [The first Hungarian law of 
marriage — Act XXXI of 1894 — and the 
culpability. Первый венгерский закон о браке и 
виновность.] JK. 7/81: 635—638. 
S O M F A I N É F I L Ó Erika: A szülői felügyeleti 
jogot érintő állami gondoskodás. [State-care 
limiting parental supervision. Государственное 
попечение, затрагивающее право родительско-
го надзора.] JK. 7/81: 616—622. 
Szűcs Béla: Gyámügyi illetékességi szabá-
lyok és nyilvántartások korszerűsítése. [Updat-
ing the guardianship competence rules and 
recordkeeping. Совершенствование правил и 
регистров по компетенции органов опеки ] Á1. 
8/81: 721—727. 
W E I S S Emilia: Vétkesség, feldúltság és a 
házasfelek közös megegyezése a múlt és a ma 
magyar házassági bontójogában. 1—2. r. [Fault, 
breakdown and mutual consent of the spouses in 
the past and present law of divorce in Hungary. 
Part 1—2. Вина, расстройство, общее согласие 
супругов в прошлом и сегодняшнем венгерском 
законодательстве о расторжение брака. Часть 
1—2.JJK.7/81: 571—583.; JK. 11/81: 901—919. 
VIII. Land Law 
VIII. Земельное право 
Articles — Статьи 
D Ó M É Györgyné: A környezetvédelem föld-
jogi vonatkozásai. [Land law aspects of the 
protection of environment. Земельно-правовые 
аспекты охраны окружающей среды.] = Kör-
nyezetvédelem és jog: 202—218. 
J Ó J A R T László: Az idegen területre történő 
építkezés ingatlannyilvántartási vonatkozásai. 
[Real estate registration aspects of building on 
alien soil. Аспекты земельной регистрации слу-
чаев строительства на чужой территории.] ÁI. 
7/81: 654—663. 
Kiss István: Földtulajdon vagy földtulaj-
donjog? [Land property or land property rights? 
Собственность на землю или право собствен-
ности на землю?] JK. 6/81: 533—536. 
KORONCZAY Miklós: Néhány gondolat a 
Földkódex előkészítéséhez. [Some ideas for 
preparing the Land Code. Несколько замечаний 
к подготовке Земельного кодекса.] ÀI. 11/81: 
1002—1007. 
S E R E S Imre: The system of land tenure and 
leasehold [in] the Hungarian People's Republic. 
Система собственности на землю и землеполь-
зования в Венгерской Народной Республике.] = 
Annales Bp. Tomus 22: 157—175. — Русск. 
содерж. Dt. Zusammenfassung. 
S E R E S Imre: A racionális földhasználat és a 
földtulajdonjog néhány kérdése. [The rational 
use of land and some problems of the land 
ownership law. Некоторые вопросы рациональ-
ного использования земель и земельной 
собственности.] ÁI. 12/81: 1077—1083. 
T A N K A Endre: A termőföld áruminősége és 
árujellegének jogtudományi tükröződése. [Land 
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as goods and its goods character as reflected by 
the legal sciences. Земля как товарь, её товарный 
характер в правовой науке.] GazdJogtud. 1 — 
2/81: 257—285. 
T A N K A Endre: A mezőgazdasági föld 
termelőeszköz-jellegének főbb fejlődési tenden-
ciái népgazdaságunkban. [The main tendencies 
of development of the means of production 
nature of agricultural land in Hungary's econo-
my. Основные тенденции развития сельско-
хозяйственной земли в качестве средства произ-
водства во венгерском народном хозяйстве.] 
JK. 9/81: 746—755. 
IX. Law of Co-operatives 
IX. Кооперативное право 
Articles — Статьи 
BAK József: Néhány gondolat a szövetke-
zetek jogi szabályozásának felülvizsgálatához. 
[Some remarks concerning the revision of the 
legal regulation of the cooperatives. Некоторые 
мысли о пересмотре правового регулирования 
кооперативных организаций.] JK. 8/81: 668— 
675. 
P R U O B E R G E R Tamás: A szövetkezeti önigaz-
gatás demokratizmusának néhány problémája. 
[Some problems of the democratism of self-
management in the co-operatives. Некоторые 
проблемы демократизации кооперативного 
самоуправления. AI. 9/81: 812—820. 
T R Ó C S Á N Y I László, ifj.: A szövetkezetek feletti 
állami törvényességi felügyelet tapasztalatai. [Expe-
riences of state control on the co-operatives. Опыты 
государственного надзора над законностью в 
отношении кооперативов.] AI. 8/81: 693—704. 
X. Criminal Law. Criminal Sciences 
X. Уголовное право. Вспомогательные 
науки уголовного права 
Books — Книги 
F Ö L D V Á R I József: Einige Bemerkungen zum 
neuen ungarischen Strafgesetzbuch. [Remarks to 
the new Hungarian Criminal Code. Act No. IV 
of 1978. Замечания к новому уголовному кодек-
су Венгрии. Закон IV от 1978 г.] Pécs, Pécsi 
Szikra ny. 1981. 23 p. /Studia iuridica auctoritate 
Universitatis Pécs publicata 96./ — Bibliogr. 
passim. 
Articles — Статьи 
G Ö D Ö N Y József: Hüsz év (1960—1980) kri-
minológiai és kriminalisztikai kutatásairól. 
[Twenty years of research in criminology and 
criminalistics (1960—1980). О криминологичес-
ких и криминалистических исследованиях двад-
цати лет (I960—1980).] = Krim, tanúim. 18: 5— 
40. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. summary; Dt. 
Zusammenfassung; Rés. franç. 
G Ö N C Z Ö L Katalin: An attempt to classify 
offenders. Попытка классификации совершите-
лей преступления.] = Annates Bp. Tomus 22: 
19—35. — Русск. содерж.; Dt. Zusammenfas-
sung. 
H O R V Á T H Anna: A büntetőjogi felelősség 
szigorításának tendenciája a társadalmi tulajdon 
védelmében. 1. Szovjetunió. [Trends of criminal 
responsibility aggravation in the interests of 
social ownership protection. 1. Soviet Union. 
Тенденция усиления уголовной ответственности 
в интересах охраны общественной собственнос-
ти. 1. СССР.] ÁJ. 2/81: 201—218. — Rés. franç.; 
Русск. содерж. 
IRK Ferenc: A társadalmi rétegződés krimi-
nológiai és büntetőjogi vetületeinek rendszere. 
[The system of the aspects of criminology and 
criminal law of the social stratification. Система 
криминологических и уголовно-правовых ас-
пектов общественного расслоения.] = Krim, 
tanúim. 18 : 90—120. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. 
summary; Dt. Zusammenfassung; Rés. franç. 
K I R Á L Y Tibor: A büntetőjog és a garanciák. 
[Criminal law and the guarantees. Уголовное 
право и гарантии.] GazdJogtud. 1—2/81: 1—12. 
K R A N I T Z Mariann: A korrupció törté-
netéből. [On the history of corruption. Из 
истории коррупции.] = Krim, tanúim. 18: 255— 
298. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. summary; Dt. 
Zusammenfassung; Rés. franç. 
K R I S T O N Lászlóné: A textilmikronyomok 
kriminalisztikai vizsgálata. [The forensic exami-
nation of microscopic textile fibres. Кримина-
листическое исследование текстильных мик-
роследов.] = Krim, tanúim. 18: 376—408. — 
Русск. содерж.; Eng. summary; Dt. Zusammen-
fassung; Rés. franç. 
K R I S T O N László—PUSZTAI László: A rönt-
genvizsgálatok felhasználási lehetőségei a kri-
minalisztikai iratvizsgálatban. [The possibilities 
of using X-ray techniques for the forensic 
examination of documents. Возможности ис-
пользования рентгеноскопий в криминалисти-
ческих исследованиях документов.] = Krim, 
tanúim. 18 : 409—420. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. 
summary; Dt. Zusammenfassung; Rés. franç. 
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M Á R K U S Ferenc: Az emberi környezet 
büntetőjogi védelme. [Protection of human envi-
ronment under penal law. Уголовно-правовая 
охрана окружающей человека среды.] = Kör-
nyezetvédelem és jog: 180—201. 
M O L N Á R József: Az ifjúkori bűnözés hely-
zete, a megelőzés társadalmasításának formái 
és lehetőségei. [The present state of juvenile 
delinquency and the forms and possibilities of 
prevention. Состояние преступности несовер-
шеннолетних, общественные формы и возмож-
ности предупреждения.] = Krim, tanúim. 18: 
228—254. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. summary; Dt. 
Zusammenfassung; Rés. franç. 
MoNORi Bulcs: Az eutanasia mint a jelen élő 
problémája. [Euthanasia as a living problem of 
the present. Эвтаназия как живущая проблема 
настоящего времени.] JK. 8/81: 696—702. 
R A S K Ó Gabriella: Amit a cigánykrimina-
litás megértéséhez tudnunk kell. [What should 
we know in order to understand gipsy criminali-
ty? Что мы должны знать для понимания 
цыганской преступности.] JK. 9/81: 755—762. 
R A S K Ó Gabriella—SIMOR Pál: Alkohol és 
bűnözés. [Alcohol and criminality. Алкоголь и 
преступность.] = Krim, tanúim. 18: 41—89. — 
Русск. содерж.; Eng. summary; Dt. Zusammenfas-
sung; Rés. franç. 
T A V A S S Y Tibor: A szigorított őrizetbe utalt 
sokszoros visszaesők tényleges társadalmi beil-
leszkedésének körülményei. [The circumstances 
of the actual social readjustment of multiple 
recidivists committed to preventive detention. 
Обстоятельства действительной общественной 
ресоциализации многократных рецидивистов, в 
отношении которых был назначен усиленный 
арест.] = Krim, tanúim. 18: 188—227. — Русск. 
содерж. Eng. summary; Dt. Zusammenfassung; 
Rés. franç. 
VÁG András: Álláspontok a társadalmi 
struktúra és a bűnözés kapcsolatáról. [Views on 
the connection between social structure and 
criminality. Точки зрения о связи между общест-
венной структурой и преступностью.] = Krim, 
tanúim. 18: 121—155. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. 
summary; Dt. Zusammenfassung; Rés. franç. 
V E R M E S Miklós: Büntetési rendszerünk új 
vonásai. [The new features of the Hungarian 
system of punishment. Новые черты нашей 
системы наказаний.] = Krim.tanulm. 18: 156— 
187. — Русск. содерж.; Eng. summary; Dt. 
Zusammenfassung; Rés. franç. 
V I G H József: The effects of the principle of 
determinism on establishing criminal responsi-
bility. [Концепция детерминизма и уголовное 
привлечение к ответственности.] = Annales Bp. 
Tomus 22: 205—239. — Русск. содерж.; Dt. 
Zusammenfassung. 
ViGH József—TAUBER István: A gondatlan 
bűncselekményekért kiszabott szabadságvesz-
tés büntetés hatékonysága. [Effectiveness of 
imprisonment for negligent crimes. Действен-
ность наказания лишением свободы за преступ-
ления по неосторожности.] JK. 6/81: 502—510. 
XI. Juridical Organization 
XI. Судоуствойство 
Books — Книги 
B Á L Á S Alajos—MARAIGE Vazul—MINARIK 
György: Könyvszakértők kézikönyve. [Manual 
for chartered accountants. Справочник судебно-
бухгалтерских экспертов.] Bp. Közgazdasági és 
Jogi Kiadó, 1981. 444 p. 
Articles — Статьи 
B A R T U S Imre: A tanácsi jogalkotás törvé-
nyességének ügyészi felügyelete. [The legality 
supervision of the prosecutor on the council 
legislation. Прокурорский надзор над законнос-
тью правотворческой деятельности советов.] 
ÁI. 10/81: 906—919. 
SÍK Ferenc: Die Tätigkeit von Lajos Kos-
suth als "assessor tabulae" in Zemplén. [Lajos 
Kossuth's activity in the county Zemplén as an 
"assessor tabulae". Деятелность Лайоша Кошу-
та как assessor tabulae в комитате Земплен.) = 
Annales Bp. Tomus 22: 177—203. — Русск. 
содерж.; Rés. franç. 
XII. Civil Procedure 
XII. Гражданский процесс 
Books — Книги 
Polgári eljárásjogi füzetek. 11. [köt.] A pol-
gári perbeli tárgyalás időszerű kérdései. Szerk. 
Névai László. [Studies on civil procedure. Vol. 
11. Topical problems of the civil law proceeding. 
Очерки по гражданскому процессу. Том 11. 
Актуальные вопросы гражданского процесса.] 
Bp. ELTE Soksz. 1981. 166, XVIII p. — 
Bibliogr. passim. /Eötvös Loránd Tudománye-
gyetem, Állam- és jogtudományi kar, Polgári 
eljárásjogi tanszék./ 
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Articles — Статьи 
A R A D I Béla: Az állam javára marasztalás 
szankciója. [Condemnation in favour of the state 
as a sanction. Присуждение в пользу 
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Some aspects of the relation 
between law and state 
Prof. V . PESCHKA 
Institute for Legal and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences 
The paper starts from the approach of the special substance and general relevance of law and 
surveys the difficult social and legal process, in which the law itself appears and becomes reality. It 
surveys the law from the aspect of the role played by the state in this process—this role is special and 
important indeed. Followingly it actually analyses the legislative activity of the state, the social and 
state framework of this activity, furthermore the realization process of law and the significant 
influence of the coercive power of the state in this process. 
In order to clarify and understand some aspects of the relation between state and 
law, with other words their interdependence one have to set out f rom the basic inner 
controversy of the law itself, which has a social nature. To put it philosophically that 
means: the substantial specialty of law permanently contradicts the general nature of its 
validity. It means that one given law system in a certain social order is valid, i.e. the 
legal norms are valid for the society as a whole generally; the legal regulations are to be 
kept by every member of the society: regarding the totality of the given society the law 
is generally valid. Above all this generality of the validity of the law substantiate the 
ontological statement that the law as social objectivation has an overwhelming very 
significant category: its generality. This categorial predominance of the generality in 
the law means the following: in the law as a special social objectivation, both in its 
origin and in the processes of its realization everything is under the generality, part ly as 
its object, partly as an instrument, which promotes the realization of the law. The 
actual legal sociological surveys prove in spite that in the general validity of the law 
does not come out the substantial generality of the society as a whole, but as a 
consequence of the sociological stratification of the society only the specialty of certain 
social class, strata and groups is expressed. Quite simply we experience that the 
generality of that one law, which solely valid in the society does no t express directly the 
general interest and intention of the society, but it expresses the needs, interests and 
intentions of that special social class, stratum or group, which possesses such political 
prevalence in the society, which enables it to create and realize of a monist law and legal 
system, which is generally valid for the society. All of this means that in the law a 
special social substance expresses itself, which represents special social interests and 
intentions with general validity for the whole society. 
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As Rudolf Jhering aptly put it1 "The funct ion of the law is generally expressed in 
its realization". Tha t basic inner controversy of the law that it expresses a special social 
substance, i.e. value judgement with general validity and this way it touches just 
exactly the funct ion, realization of law as it was emphasized by Jhering. Namely when 
the special social interests and values—as they are formulated in the law regulations— 
are valid and binding for the whole society, for each member of the society, a whole set 
of controversies emerge between the speciality of the social substance expressed by the 
law on one hand and the special interests, intentions and values of the individual social 
classes, strata and groups on the other. Among others the purpose of the law is to find a 
kind of compromise among the different or even controversial special social interests 
and values in order to make it possible for the society to live without troubles and 
friction. Natural ly this requires first of all that the special substance expressed by the 
law should not be merely valid as a law, but it should generally prevail in the actual 
practice of the everyday life of the society as well. That inner structural characteristics, 
that in the law as social objectivation the general has categorial predominance, tha t in 
the law everything is subjected to the generality, partly as its object, partly as an 
instrument of its realization, finally emerges for the very reason that the validity of law 
ought to prevail above everything and the law generally must prevail. Just how t rue is 
that very well illustrated by the process of creation of law, the legislation, in which the 
legal contents and forms always shaped accordingly to the aim and destination tha t the 
realization of law in the life of the society should be as easy and undisturbed as 
possible. 
Both the expression of the special social substance in the law with general 
validity, and the general realization of the special social substance in the social life— 
needless to say—involves an extraordinarily difficult and complex set of sociological 
and legal processes, in which the state as a very special social organ has an impor tan t 
role and significance. It is sufficient to take a look at the legislative activity of the state 
and instantly we see the whole complexity of the legal-sociological process. I had 
already referred to the fact that the realization and prevalence of the law permanently 
influences or even determines the legislative activity. First of all we mean tha t in 
shaping the special social content expressed by the law ought to be done very 
prudentially and carefully by the state authorities as far as sociological arguments are 
concerned. It would be a mistake of vulgarization to think that the political ruling 
classes, strata and groups can directly reveal their interests, values and intentions with 
general validity if they expect the steady and undisturbed prevalence of law. The great 
role of the state in shaping the social substance of law appears—among others— 
exactly in that special, objectivated characteristics that with its apparatus, which 
alienated f rom the society, can present itself as it would stand above the special social 
interests and values, therefore it would be suitable to reconcile the prevailing political 
special interests and values with other interests of the various classes, strata and groups 
1
 J H E R I N G , R.: Geist des römischen Rechts, Leipzig, 1873. Erster Teil 49. p. 
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of the society. Moreover the task of the state legislative organs and activity to blunt the 
controversies in the classes, strata and groups themselves, which possesses the political 
power and this consensus ought to be expressed in the law with such quality and form, 
which assures its undisturbed prevalence generally in the society. 
It is worth to stay awhile at this problem and without striving to be complete at 
least refer to the important moments which appear in the complex state, legal and 
sociological processes of the social substance of the law. First of all we ought to raise 
the attention to the fact that the united interest of a class—even the politically ruling 
class—is not equal to the cumulative individual interests of those persons, strata and 
groups. Here it is a dialectical controversy between the interests of the individuals 
(class members) and the special interests of class. Already Hegel had pointed out that 
the general is not equal with the sum of the individuals, it is not equal with the merely 
common, but it means common substance.2 Therefore when the legislative organs of 
the state formulate the interests of the special ruling class as law regulations, they strive 
for such generality, which expresses the substantial common in the individual interests. 
Meanwhile it hides in itself the possibility of contradictions among the class 
individuals, the strata and groups, which belong to the class and among the class and 
group interests as they are expressed in the law, as special social content. Its 
importance shows itself in the realization processes of the law. The situation is getting 
even more difficult if we survey the daily, direct interests of the political ruling class 
considering the special social content of law, and furthermore we survey the differences 
due to those long-range interests, which are originated from the social-historical 
destination of this class. In such case the danger of departure f rom the direct, concrete 
and individual interests of the persons, strata and groups, who belong to a certain 
class, clearly emerges and that measure is always problematic, which is used by the 
legislator—considering the realization process of the law—in the course of preferring 
the long-range interests of the class against the direct daily class interests, or even more 
the individual interests of those persons, who belong to that class. 
If it is possible at all, the situation is even more difficult regarding it 
sociologically and the legislative system of the state faces even more delicate task 
considering the fact, that—as I mentioned—during the legislative activity, shaping the 
social value content of the law they have to consider not only the interests and values of 
the political ruling classes and groups, but they have to think a b o u t the fact that the 
diverging classes and groups of the society have their own interests, intentions and 
values too. Therefore in the state-controlled legislative activity the political ruling class 
or group always ought to create compromises among the different class and group 
interests in order to shape out such a particular social content of law, which expresses 
mainly the interests of the ruling class in such way that the realization process of law is 
2
 HEGEL, G. F.: A filozófiai tudományok enciklopédiájának alapvonalai. I. rész. A logika. (The 
Outlines of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. The Logics.) Budapest, 1950. Appendix, pp. 
153-154. 
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sociologically more-less assured in the given state of the classes a n d groups, with other 
words, the state of the social totali ty. Thus it would be a big mis t ake to think that the 
particular social content of the law is directly and clearly express the interests and 
values of the ruling class, which has the political power. In the sociological level of the 
interests a lot of bargaining and compromises are necessary. Their sociological 
significance is expressed ult imately by the existence of law and this is extraordinarily 
important for building and developing the political rule at all. 
In this connection I would like to mention only that f inding the channel for the 
law while practicing the guidance of the society and polit ical rule itself means 
limitation, particularly as far as its sociological content is concerned . What we should 
think about this limitation? Firs t of all it means that the legal f o r m , the codification of 
legal norms, i.e. the legal expression of the interests of the political ruling class or g roup 
by itself gives certain f r amework , limits for the political activity of the ruling class. If 
we merely think about that cer ta in political ideas, concepts, p rog rammes and promises 
are expressed in legal fo rm—even if they are not directly expressed—then we 
understand at once that this legal format ion means l imitat ion in the course of 
practicing the political rule fo r the politically ruling classes and groups, because they 
always have to find the h a r m o n y between their political activity and their earlier 
politics, which is already expressed in legal fo rm. This limitation is even more obvious 
in its sociological aspects, because—as I mentioned—in the legislative activity of the 
state it must be always a t ten t ion paid to the diverging interests of the classes and 
groups and it fixes compromises while making legislation regard ing these interests. The 
fact that the politically ruling class or g roup cannot give limitless prevalence to its 
particular interests in legal f o r m , but it has to consider the given outer and inner 
circumstances for the sake of ruling optimal rule, obviously means the legal and 
sociological limitation of the political rule. Natura l ly this inner sociological l imitation 
of the political power is not only necessity for the political rule, b u t in the same t ime it is 
an essential condition of the realization and prevalence of the legal regulation as well. 
The competent organs of the state in the course of legislation no mat te r how 
much they consider the diverging class and g r o u p interests, n o ma t t e r how much they 
yield and accept compromise solutions, all of this does not e l iminate the basic inner 
controversy of the law, which exists between the particularity o f the social content of 
law and the generality of its validity. This inner ontological controversy of the law—as 
maybe already appears—is based on sociological foundat ions, namely on that simple 
social fact that both the individual interests of those persons, w h o belong to the ruling 
class and the particular interests of the diverging classes and the particular interests of 
the ruling class or group, which is expressed in the law with general validity, are still 
different to each other. Expressing it philosophically: the part iculari ty of the social 
content of law is dialectically oppos ing both with the individual interests of the persons 
living in the society and the part icular interests of the diverging classes and groups. 
This contradict ion is expressed by the law such way that the l aw—the particular social 
content of it—is possessing general validity for the total of the society and its each unit 
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as well. No matter how carefully and sophisticated way the competent state organs are 
doing their job during the legislature, this inner contradiction of law always remains, 
obviously continues to exist, therefore the prevalence and realization of law never can 
be perfect, complete and free of troubles. From the aspect of positive law this peculiar 
legal and sociological fact was observed by Hans Kelsen in a very witty and remarkable 
way: "The relationship which exists between validity and efficacy of a legal order—it 
is, so to speak, the tension between the "ought" and the "is"—can be determined only 
by an upper and lower borderline. The agreement must neither exceed a certain 
maximum nor fall below a certain minimum." 3 This assertion by Kelsen indicated two 
important legal and sociological points: on one hand it shows well, when the social 
behavioural patterns will be in complete harmony with the legal norms, i.e. the legal 
norms are followed and obeyed in every case—to put it philosophically the 
particularity of the social content of law becomes real social generality—the validity 
and existence of law cease at once, because it becomes unnecessary sociologically. On 
the other hand if the legal norms are broken so of ten that its prevalence could be 
regarded as minimal, the legal norm also loses its validity, because the competent 
organs of the state cannot enforce the legal prescriptions. 
Talking about the connection between state and law, it is obvious, that now we 
are interested about that part of the Kelsen-norm, which talks about that case, when 
the harmony between the validity and the prevalence of law falls under the minimum. 
The reason for doing this we suppose the inner contradiction of law with the existence 
of law between the particularity of its social content and the generality of its validity. 
Consequently the existence of this contradiction necessarily involves the eventuality 
and existence of such human behaviours, which do not follow the law, but break it. It is 
also obvious that in case these illegal activities are sporadic, their number is negligible, 
this does not affect the validity of law. Furthermore the validity of the law also remains 
untouched in case of such illegal activities, which d raw legal reprisals. And this is the 
very point, where the decisive role and importance of the state in connection with law 
comes to the attention. Namely the validity of law is given by the state and the state 
enforcement: the state with its enforcement agencies and institutions—as the prisons 
and other institutions—stands up fot the sake of the validity and prevalence of law and 
those sanctions, which are prescribed for illegal behaviour by law, are put into action 
by the state. The law can realize its actual regulatory function with the help of this 
enforcing power of the state. In this case there is not only the general prevalence of the 
state enforcement—directly and simply—what we are talking about, but what we have 
in mind the chance, which always exists, that the state generally prosecute the 
perpetrators according to the sociological experiences. 
The role of the state enforcement in order to m a k e the law prevail brings up two 
inseparable problems both sociologically and as far as the validity of law is concerned: 
on one hand it asserts that according to the inner contradiction of law those state 
3
 K E L S E N , H . : General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge (Mass.) 1949. 120 p. 
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measures and sanctions, which are used against the deviant and illegal behaviours, 
necessarily involve enforcement. I already mentioned that without the state-sponsored 
enforcement the existence and validity of law is inconceivable. Therefore the state 
enforcement is needed, f rom the aspect of validity and prevalence of law it is a 
necessary evil. On the other hand we also have to see that merely the enforcement 
apparatus and the enforcement itself from the state cannot assure the validity of law. 
Mutatis mutandis: for the connection between state and law we also can use the 
appropriate witticism of Talleyrand: "One can do everything with bayonets except of 
sitting on them". To put it in other words: the enforcement and power of the state is an 
indispensable precondition of the validity and prevalence of law, however merely the 
use of state enforcement itself cannot assure the (validity and) prevalence of law. This 
lack of completeness as far as the state enforcement is concerned in connection of the 
validity of law brings the attention to the factor, which—combined with the state 
enforcement—assures the troublefree and smooth prevalence of law. I am talking 
about the social base and the sociological content behind the law and in the law, as it is 
expressed by the law. It is not unintentional that I emphasized earlier the significance of 
the compromises between the divergent class and group interests in connection with 
the particularity of the social value content of the law. Now I have to add that naturally 
it is inseparable the extent of the social particularity of law and its place in the totality 
of the society, especially f rom the aspect of, validity and realization of law. If the social 
class, classes or groups, as the special link between the individual member of society 
and the generality of the society, which classes and groups create and support the law 
include such wide layers and spheres of the society that with the exemplary law-abiding 
behaviour they enforce the individuals, who belong to other classes, layers and groups 
of the society, then we can talk about such social base of the law, which—combined 
with the state enforcement—can assure the validity and prevalence of law. But if the 
political ruling class or group is narrow and closed compared to the totality of 
society—not to mention that case, when even inside that class there are significant 
tensions and controversies—and in case the political ruling class cannot put its 
interests into accord to other group or class interests, the sociological base of the law is 
getting weak, it get down so narrow that the law-abiding behaviours, which exist in 
that circle, are not able to influence the individuals, who belong to other classes in 
order to assure the prevalence of law for a longer time. Then the role and significance of 
the state enforcement and power increase. However in the long range the state 
enforcement cannot assure the validity of law without the proper social base, without 
such sociological medium, which is able to influence the totality of society with its social 
behaviour, moral views, legal consciousness and political creed. The form of the state 
intention, which is assured with state enforcement, namely the legal norm can declare 
any social content as generally valid law. But as I mentioned if the particularity of the 
social content of law getting too thin, it includes too narrow circle of human beings, the 
validity of the law of such social content sooner or later, slower or quicker vanishes. 
Such law, which contradicts or ignores the sociological conditions—no mat ter how 
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much the state enforcement tries to support it—sooner or later loses its validity. 
Mutatis mutandis it is true for the law too, what so properly was told by Thomas Mann 
about the tyrannical power: 
"The mankind may bent in front of the success, the fait accompli of power, no 
matter, how did it develop. But basically it does not forget the inhuman ugliness, the 
violent and brutal injustice, which happened in its own sphere and without its 
sympathy finally no power or sly success cannot be durable." 
Till now the relation between law and state was discussed mainly from the aspect 
of state enforcement support and assure the realization of law. In this relation the state, 
which supports the prevalence of law, appears as such organ, whose social aim is to 
assure the existence of society free of troubles, saving the society f rom devouring itself 
in its inner controversies. Therefore in that meaning the s tate is such a social 
objectivation, which is absolutely necessary for the social life and reproduction. As we 
have seen—the assurance of validity and prevalence of law is an organic part of this 
activity of the state. But as I referred to it, for the very reason tha t the state is able to 
fulfill its social role and task because it is an alienated public power with institutions, 
because it is a separable group of people, which possess efficient enforcing means, 
therefore in its objectivated form undoubtedly separates itself f r o m the everyday life of 
the people, even more: it has its independent typical inner movements, interests and 
characteristics against the rest of the society, another aspect of state connected with 
society and the individuals of the society appears. Namely till now we discussed the 
case that the state makes sure tha t the society should not devour itself, now the 
question appears: what makes sure that the state does not devour the society. To put it 
shortly: there is the problem of defending the individual citizen, the member of the 
society against the raw, open violence of the state. Now we arrived to the rather 
delicate, paradox problem of the connection between state and law. We face the 
strange social and legal situation that we expect the realization and defense f rom the 
very same social institution, which actually may injure or endanger these rights. 
Namely that the state, which s tands behind the law, assures the valid positive law even 
with force, including the citizen's rights prescribed by law on one hand, but this 
enforcement activity sometimes should have been conducted against itself, against its 
own organs. The legal form, that the law explicitly prescribe the rights of the citizens 
and the legal limits of state intervention and action as well, undoubtedly has an 
outstanding social importance. But as I have mentioned just now, we keep in mind that 
the prevalence of law, including the prevalence of citizen's rights, civil liberties then the 
validity and prevalence of those civil rights are becoming questionable, which in the 
history were injured or denied by the state itself, because the same state organs would 
have to stand up for the civil liberties, which break these rights. N o w we know it very 
well that the division of the state power is merely a division of l abour and it does mean 
the actual division of the state power at all, because in spite of every eventual inner 
contradiction, the state shows up as a unified power in front of the society. Followingly 
in the labour division of the state activity some institutions of the state, for example, 
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the court, the public prosecutor etc. have the duty prescribed by law to stand up against 
the injurers of civil rights, even in those case when they happen to be certain organs or 
representatives of the state. This process is not smooth and free of obstacles even in 
those cases when the citizens' rights are not injured by those state organs, which have 
the actual task of defending the civil liberties, but other state organs, which work on 
some other field of state activity just because the mentioned unity of state power. The 
case is even more problematic, if the rights of the citizen are injured in the very same 
jurisdictional activity and process, which would have the task to defend these rights. ín 
such case the defense and the injury of the citizens' rights happen in the same activity 
sphere of the state. Of course this legal and sociological fact does not change a bit the 
importance and significance of the aim that the state must codify and assure legally the 
rights of the citizens' as widely and as detailed as possible, which rights exist against the 
state, too, on one hand, and the division of labour in the state activity and the actions of 
the state organs against each other in defending the civil liberties have tremendous 
social and legal importance as far as the validity and prevalence of the citizens' rights. 
Meanwhile it cannot be denied that in case the civil rights got injured by the state, there 
is a legal "vicious circle" (circulus vitiosus) comes to existence because the validity and 
prevalence of these rights are the aim of the state enforcement appara tus too. There is 
the outcome: in certain cases the state assurance and defense of the citizens' rights 
really get dubious, getting weaker or even cease to exist: this way it is proven that the 
law without the support of state enforcement is equal with nothing. 
From all of these we can see that this problem—as any other problem of some 
part of the social complexity (economy, moral, aesthetics, etc.) cannot be understood 
and solved merely within the inner activity circle of these par ts . In order to break 
through the paralyzing wizardry of the vicious circle, which sometimes emerges in the 
course of assuring the mentioned citizens' rights by the state, we have to cross the 
borders of the given social and political objectivations (law and state). The activity 
sphere of the legal and state objectivations have to be surpassed into the direction of 
the social totality, which includes these part-complexes, considering the basic social-
ontological law that "the whole has priority against the parts , the whole complex 
against its partcomplexes."4 If we take this necessary step, it will become obvious at 
once that the defense of law, especially the defense of civil rights and their assurance 
depends mainly on the social class, layer or group, which consti tutes the social base 
and content of the law and state, depends on that sociological factor, political power 
and base, which rules the given society. For assuring the rights and civil liberties those 
political conditions are becoming decisive directly, which connect the ruling class or 
classes and groups with the other classes and layers of the society, furthermore with the 
state apparatus itself and the totality of the society. Therefore the sociological and 
political question arises that whether there is such a social-political power in the 
4
 L U K Á C S , G Y . : A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról. II. köt. (About the ontology of the social existence. 
Volume II.) Budapest, 1976. p. 286. 
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society, which is able to stand up against the eventual tyranny and overzealousness, or 
illegality of the state itself. As I have already mentioned, it is not sufficient to appeal for 
defending the citizens' rights to the state alone. This sociological-political fact, which 
has such a great importance in realizing the civil rights, brings about the following 
social alternative as far as the political conditions and the prevalence of law as a 
process are concerned: Either the political ruling class, classes, strata are so powerful 
in the society, that they are able to resist the state-incited injustices, which in the same 
time proves that the political rule of the society and the state are not necessarily the 
same, there are contradictions, even if the both are usually and basically in harmony 
with each other. Or in other case this social and political power actually supports and 
agrees with the activity of the state, which injures the civil rights. Then the defense of 
the rights of the citizens can be imagined only as a consequence of such social-political 
changes, in which against the politically ruling classes and groups, which controll the 
state such social and political powers gather, who are able to oust the state and political 
power either legally, or through non-legal, revolutional way and to develop such 
political and state power, which respects the civil rights. It is clear that this social-
political progress, which influences the legal system too, exists in several grades and 
forms, from the resistance and movement against the state, the social reforms to the 
revolution. As far as the prevalence of law, especially as far as the prevalence of the 
rights of citizens are concerned, it is important , that the defense, realization and 
assurance of these rights do not depend solely on the state organs, the competent state 
enforcement, but through these factors and together with these ones they depend 
ultimately on the movement of the whole society, the social totality. 
Некоторые аспекты соотношения государства и права 
В . П Е Ш К А 
Исходя из специального содержания права и его всеобшего действия автор изучает сложный 
социологический и юридический процесс, в котором право складывается и реализуется. Изучение 
осуществлено с такой точки зрения, что какую специальную и важную роль играет государство в 
этом процессе. В ходе этого автор подвергает конкретному анализу законодательную, правотвор-
ческую деятельность государства, общественные и государственные пределы данной деятельности, 
а также процесс реализации права и значительное содействие в этом государства, в особенности же 
его принудительной силы. 
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Einige Aspekte der Beziehung des Staat.es 
und des Rechts zueinander 
V . P E S C H K A 
Ausgegangen von dem besonderen Inhalt und der Allgemeingültigkeit des Rechts untersucht die 
Abhandlung jenen komplizierten soziologischen und rechtlichen Vorgang, in welchem sich das Recht 
herausformt und realisiert, und zwar aus dem Gesichtspunkt der äußerst wichtigen Rolle des Staates in 
diesem Vorgang. Im Zuge dessen analysiert er die gesetzgebende und rechtsschaffende Tätigkeit des Staates 
in konkreter Form, die gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Rahmen und Grenzen dieser Tätigkeit, sowie den 
Realisierungsvorgang des Rechts und die daran besonders stark mitwirkende zwingende Kraft des Staates. 
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Die Persönlichkeitsrechte. 
Entwicklungstendenzen und Widersprüche 
L . SÓLYOM 
leitender wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter 
Institut für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaften der Ungarischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften 
Die Studie ist als Einführung zu einer Untersuchung der theoretischen Grundlagen der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte geplant. 
Teil II. bietet eine kritische Neubehandlung der in der sozialistischen Rechtswissenschaft 
bisher vordergründig diskutierten Probleme: des Zusammenhanges der Persönlichkeitsrechte mit 
den Vermögensverhältnissen, sowie der Beziehung zwischen der Generalklausel des allgemeinen 
Persönlichkeitsrechts und den einzelnen besonderen Persönlichkeitsrechten. Verf. stellt die These 
auf, daß der moderne Persönlichkeitsschutz gegen Ende des 19. Jh. wirtschaftlich begründet wurde 
und als Eigentümerschutz (als Ausgleich der Verschlechterung der Chancen einer Selbstverteidigung 
— im Sinne des Liberalismus) entstanden ist. Somit ist auch der damalige politische Inhalt des 
allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts gegeben: es war eine der antiliberalen Generalklauseln. 
Demgegenüber können die besonderen Persönlichkeitsrechte als politisch neutral aufgefaßt werden. 
Teil III. zeigt die gegenwärtigen Tendenzen des Persönlichkeitsschutzes auf. Die Entwick-
lung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg ist durch die Politisierung und Verallgemeinerung der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte bestimmt, in dem Sinne, daß der zivilrechtliche Schutz mit den Grundrechten 
der Verfassung verbunden wird. 
Im Teil IV. wird versucht, die Persönlichkeitsrechte durch ihre inneren Widersprüche zu 
charakterisieren. Im Spannungsfeld zwischen der Autonomie des Individuums und der Integration 
in die Gesellschaft können die Persönlichkeitsrechte — selbst Mittel des Schutzes und Quellen der 
Gefährdung — der Person einen erträglichen Bewegungsraum sichern. 
I. 
Der rechtliche Schutz der Persönlichkeit erscheint in aller Welt als dringende 
Aufgabe. Die Persönlichkeitsrechte werden auch in Ungarn als rechtspolitisch sehr 
wichtig angesehen. Dies bezeugt die umfassende und spektakuläre Neuregelung in der 
Novelle zum ungarischen Z G B von 1977., die fast alle früheren Bestimmungen 
erweiterte, und auch inhaltliche Neuerungen brachte. Das Ziel war die Belebung dieses 
Rechtsinstituts: die Novelle hob alle Hindernisse auf, die die Literatur als ursächlich 
fü r sein Nichtfunktionieren ansah. M a n erklärte nämlich die geringe Zahl derartiger 
Prozesse damit, daß die Betroffenen von der Möglichkeit eines Zivilverfahrens nicht 
wußten, weiterhin, daß — eben im Falle eines Prozesses — die adäquate Sanktion 
fehlte, denn das Z GB kannte den Ersatz eines Nichtvermögensschadens nicht; und 
schließlich damit, daß die Generalklausel des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts wegen 
ihrer ungewöhnlichen Breite und Unbestimmtheit den Gerichten Schwierigkeiten 
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bereitete.1 Die Novelle hat sich beeilt die „technischen" Hindernisse zu beheben: ein 
Ersatz von Nichtvermögensschäden wurde eingeführt, und der Katalog der „einzel-
nen, besonderen Persönlichkreitsrechte", die der Generalklausel im Gesetz folgen und 
sie konkretisieren, wurde detaillierter gefaßt bzw. erweitert. 
Der direkte gesellschaftliche Anlaß für diese Aktualität der Persönlichkeits-
rechte in Ungarn ist sehr schwer greifbar. Ganz allgemein können wir darin eine 
Wirkung des Demokratisierungsprozesses erblicken. Außerdem müssen wir den 
Einfluß des internationalen Aufschwunges des Persönlichkeitsschutzes als solchen 
Faktor nennen.2 Die Einführung des Nichtvermögensschadens wurde von der 
juristischen Praxis sogar erzwungen. Als Grund dafür könnten wir die Veränderungen 
in der Wertordnung annehmen, die seit dem Experimentieren mit einem sozialistischen 
Marktmechanismus spürbar sind. Die Verbreitung der elektronischen Datenverarbei-
tung, und besonders die theoretischen Untersuchungen anläßlich der Pläne zur 
Komputerisierung der Staatsverwaltung haben glücklicherweise auch die damit 
verbundenen Gefahren bewußt gemacht. So bestimmt jetzt auch die Novelle, daß „die 
elektronische Datenverarbeitung die Persönlichkeitsrechte nicht verletzen soll" (§ 83). 
Es ist teils den Ansprüchen der ungarischen pharmazeutischen Industrie (d. h. den 
Problemen der klinischen Pharmakologie), teils aber wiederum der internationalen 
Aktualität des Themas zuzuschreiben, daß sich die Literatur mit persönlichkeitsrecht-
lichen Aspekten der ärztlichen Tätigkeit reichlich auseinandersetzte.3 
Der Schutz der Persönlichkeit stellt also ein eindeutiges rechtspolitisches Ziel 
dar. Seine zivilrechtlichen Mittel — nun vervollkommnet — stehen zur Verfügung. 
Gleichzeitig haben wir aber vom Wesen und von den Möglichkeiten der Persönlich-
keitsrechte nur oberflächliche und zerstückelte Vorstellungen. Es ist zu fragen, ob diese 
populären Auffassungen der Entfal tung des Persönlichkeitsschutzes als Grundlage 
dienen können. 
1
 ERÖSS. P.: Emberi mivoltunk polgán jogi védelme (Zivilrechtlicher Schutz des Menschenseins) 
Magyar Jog, 1972. p. 688.; T Ö R Ő , К . ; A személyiségvédelem helye és szerepe A polgári jog rendszerében. 
(Stellung und Rolle des Persönlichkeitsschutzes im System des Zivilrechts.) Magyar Jog, 1970. p. 79.; T Ö R Ő , 
К.: A személyiség polgári jogi védelme bíróságaink gyakorlatában (Der Persönlichkeitsschutz in der 
ungarischen Gerichtspraxis) Magyar Jog, 1971. p. 667. 
2
 Dazu zwei wichtige Schlagworte: Persönlichkeitsrecht als Menschenrecht, bzw. Gefahrdung der 
Privatsphäre durch die moderne Technik. Anstatt der unübersichtlichen Literatur S. den UNESCO-
Bericht: International Commission of Jurists. The Legal Protection of Privacy: A Comparative Survey of 
Ten Countries. UNESCO International Social Science Journal, 1972. p. 417.; Max-Planck-Institut für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht: Der zivilrechtliche Persönlichkeits- und Ehrenschutz in 
Frankreich, der Schweiz, England und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Tübingen, 1970.; reiches 
vergleichendes Material enthält der englische Report of the Committee on Privacy (sog. Younger-Report), 
London, 1972. Für die neuere sowjetische Auffassung s. den SammelbandMAnEílH(Red.): Гражданскопра-
вовое положение личности в СССР. Moskwa, 1975. Zu einer völkerrechtlichen Regelung s. MURPHY: An 
International Convention on Invasion of Privacy. New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, 1976. p. 387. 
3
 N I Z S A L O V S Z K Y , Е . : A szerv- és szövetátültetések joga. (Das Recht der Organ- und Gewebetrans-
plantation). Budapest. 1970. 
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Die theoretische Erfassung der Persönlichkeitsrechte ist in der sozialistischen 
Literatur herkömmlicherweise äußerlich. Sie wurde auf die Frage eingeengt, wie diese 
NichtVermögensrechte in das Zivilrecht, also nach der herrschenden Lehre in das 
Recht der Warenverhältnisse eingeordnet werden können. Eben die Verbindung der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte mit den verfassungsmäßigen Grundrechten führte zu der 
Fragestellung, ob selbst die Persönlichkeitsrechte nicht eventuell dem Staatsrecht 
angehören. 
Diese Studie möchte demgegenüber zu einer inhaltlichen Untersuchung der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte beitragen. Dies zieht nach sich, daß diese Rechte in die 
Entwicklung des ganzen Zivilrechts eingefügt werden müssen, inbegriffen besonders 
die „Politisierung" des Zivilrechts. Ihre erwähnte formelle Behandlung hängt nämlich 
damit zusammen, daß diese Theorie die Stelle der Persönlichkeitsrechte in einem 
herkömmlich aufgefaßten, „neutra len" Zivilrecht suchte. (Wie wir sehen werden, 
haben die Persönlichkeitsrechte eben in diesem — letzten Endes liberalen — Modell 
historisch keinen Platz.) 
Während die Umwandlung des klassischen Zivilrechts auf dem Gebiet des 
Eigentumsrechts oder der Verträge mit allen ihren politischen Bezügen heute schon 
selbstverständlich ist — konnte die Theorie der Persönlichkeitsrechte keinen 
wirklichen, inhaltlichen Zusammenhang zwischen der vom Liberalismus ererbten 
abstrakten „Person", als Rechtssubjekt, und dem in den letzten hundert Jahren 
entwickelten und aufblühenden Persönlichkeitsrecht schaffen. Soll etwa die Hauptfi-
gur der „autonomen Struktur" (wie Eörsi die Welt des Zivilrechts kennzeichnet4) — 
auch im 20. Jahrhundert seine Eigenschaft als citoyen verleugnen? Und nachdem die 
sozialistische Theorie endlich die Unabhängigkeit der Persönlichkeitsrechte von den 
vermögensrechtlichen Verhältnissen anerkannte, bleibt diese „Person" des Zivilrechts 
weiterhin ein „denaturierter" Bourgeois, der allen menschlichen Eigenschaften entkleidet 
ist? Die Studie wird jedoch nicht auf das Verhältnis der „verfassungsrechtlichen" und 
„zivilrechtlichen" Persönlichkeitsrechte, oder auf die Drittwirkung der Grundrechte 
eingehen. Sie hat — was ihr Ziel betrifft — die eigene, inhärente Politik des 
zivilrechtlichen Persönlichkeitsschutzes zu entwickeln, und so die Frage nach der 
Funktion und den Perspektiven dieser Rechte aufzuwerfen. 
Zur Einführung befassen wir uns mit zwei dogmatischen Problemen, die in der 
sozialistischen Rechtswissenschaft eigentlich als Hauptfragen der Persönlichkeitsrech-
te betrachtet werden. Wir werden sehen, daß schon durch die angezeigte Akzentver-
schiebung in der Fragestellung auch diese Probleme, d. h. einerseits der Zusammen-
hang der Persönlichkeitsrechte mit den Vermögensrechten, und andererseits das 
Verhältnis zwischen dem allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht und den einzelnen 
besonderen Persönlichkeitsrechten, zu wichtigen inhaltlichen Erkenntnissen führen 
können. 
4
 E Ö R S I , GY . : A szocialista polgári jog alapproblémái. (Grundprobleme des sozialistischen 
Zivilrechts) Budapest, 1965, p. 27.; Eine Zusammenfassung der sowjetischen Rechtsentwicklung gibt 
ЙОФФЕ: Развитие цивилистической мысли в СССР. Leningrad, 1975. pp. 77. ff., 91. ff., und 116. ff. 
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II . 
1. Der Zusammenhang der Persönlichkeitsrechte 
mit den Vermögensverhältnissen 
a) Für die sozialistische Rechtswissenschaft stellte sich als Hauptproblem der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte die Frage, wie diese in das die Vermögensverhältnisse regelnde 
Zivilrecht eingegliedert werden können. Und die Hauptleistung dieser Wissenschaft 
war, daß sie die Unabhängigkeit der Persönlichkeitsrechte von den Vermögens-
verhältnissen begründete. 
Mit diesem Ergebnis müssen wir einverstanden sein. Wir behaupten sogar, daß 
der wichtigste Zug der neueren Entwicklung der Persönlichkeitsrechte die Emanzipie-
rung des Schutzes von der Eigentümerposition der Person war. Am Anfang der 
gegenwärtigen Periode der Entfaltung des modernen Persönlichkeitsschutzes, d. h. am 
Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts, — abgesehen von einigen „zeitlosen" Injurien, die 
modernisiert werden sollten — dienten alle neubegründeten Persönlichkeitsrechte in 
der Tat der Sicherung von wirtschaftlichen Positionen.5 Ihr „Nichtvermögens"-
Charakter war von der damaligen fortschreitenden Immaterialisierung vermögens-
rechtlicher Stellungen untrennbar. Das Wettbewerbsrecht und das Persönlichkeits-
recht waren anfangs auch formell verflochten. Dieselbe Schutzaufgabe aber, die 
hinsichtlich der wirtschaftlichen Stellung schon offensichtlich war, wurde nur zögernd 
auf die Position der von dieser Beziehungen unabhängig aufgefaßten Person erweitert, 
d. h. auf den Schutz des Menschen vor nicht nur wirtschaftlicher, sondern auch 
politischer, organisationeller usw. Übermacht. Diese breitere Schutzgewährung ist 
aber schon ein Zeichen des Funtionswandels des Zivilrechts selbst. 
Paradoxerweise geht es für die sozialistische Rechtswissenschaft nicht um diesen 
Prozeß, wenn sie vom Zusammenhang mit und Verselbständigung von den materiellen 
Verhältnissen spricht — sondern um einen rein rechtsdogmatischen Streit, der in 
unserem Falle schon in sich zum Konservativismus neigt, umso mehr, als er die Stelle 
der Persönlichkeitsrechte in einem herkömmlicherweise aufgefaßten Zivilrecht sucht. 
(Für die „sozialistische Rechtswissenschaft" ist auf diesem Gebiet die sowjetische 
Theorie repräsentativ: sie hatte bestimmenden Einfluß, und hinsichtlich des Umfangs 
der Produktion ragt sie weit über die Literatur anderer sozialistischer Länder hinaus.) 
Bis zum Ende der 1950-er Jahre konnten die Persönlichkeitsrechte die 
Einheitlichkeit „des Gegenstandes des Zivilrechts: der Vermögensverhältnisse" nicht 
einmal in Frage stellen. Daraus folgte die Aufgabe, daß man wenigstens einen 
„Zusammenhang" der Persönlichkeitsrechte mit den Vermögensverhältnissen nach-
5
 In dieser Studie verstehen wir unter „Persönlichkeitsrecht" die im letzten Drittel des 19. Jh. 
zustandegekommenen „modernen" Persönlichkeitsrechte, die nicht in aller Rechtsordnung mit dem 
herkömmlichen Ehrenschutz Einheit bildeten. Der Ausdruck Persönlichkeitsrecht (und in Amerika das 
privacy) wurde anfangs nur für diese neuen Rechte vorbehalten. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 
Persönlichkeitsrech te 3 0 1 
weise. Dementsprechend waren die sog. „re inen" Persönlichkeitsrechte entweder vom 
Zivilrecht ausgeschlossen, oder aber mit überspannten Verallgemeinerungen ohne 
Anerkennung ihres eigenen Wertes darin erhalten geblieben. Erst nachdem die 
„Grundlagen der Zivilgesetzgebung der Unionsrepubliken" 1961 den Schutz der Ehre 
und der Würde vorgeschrieben haben (und einige Republiken diesen Schutz noch auf 
manche klassische Rechte erstreckt haben, wie auf den Schutz von Tagebuchaufzeich-
nungen) änderte sich die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft. Diese Rechte wurden jetzt als 
„Unabhängig von den Vermögensverhältnissen" aufgefaßt, es galt also ihre 
Zugehörigkeit zum Zivilrecht in ihrer dieser Eigenschaft zu begründen. Da aber die 
Konzeption des Zivilrechts unverändert blieb, mußte die Erklärung formell ausfallen. 
(Z. В.: Die Persönlichkeitsrechte werden aus bloßen Zweckmäßigkeitsgründen im 
Zivilrecht reguliert; oder: die reparative Sanktion bzw. „die Methode der Regelung" 
verknüpft sie mit dem Zivilrecht. Am meisten entwicklungsfähig wären diejenigen 
Auffassungen, die die persönlichen und die Vermögensverhältnisse in der „autonomen 
Struktur" des Zivilrechts auf gemeinsamen Nenner brachten, zu einer tieferen 
Auseinandersetzung ist aber diesbezüglich nicht gekommen. Auch die historische 
Betrachtung kam nur insoweit zu Wort, als — wie es hieß — das ursprünglich für die 
Warenverhältnisse ausgebaute Zivilrecht „infolge der relativen Selbständigkeit der 
rechtlichen F o r m " sich mit der Zeit auch auf Nichtvermögensverhältnisse erstreckte.) 
Diese Laufbahn der Persönlichkeitsrechte im sowjetischen Zivilrecht ist durch 
geschichtliche und ideologische Ursachen bedingt, die wir hier nicht einmal 
andeutungsweise vorführen können. Nur ein Fak to r soll kurz berührt werden, um zu 
veranschaulichen, wie die Persönlichkeitsrechte mit der Konzeption der gesellschaftli-
chen Aufgaben des Zivilrechts untrennbar verbunden sind. Das Persönlichkeitsrecht 
wurde in der Sowjetunion zum ersten Mal in der Zeit anerkannt , als auch das 
Zivilrecht, dessen Existenzberechtigung im Sozialismus bis dahin bestritten wurde, 
gegenüber der aus anderen Gründen zurückgedrängten Konzeption des Wirtschafts-
rechts, am Ende der 30-er Jahre selbst offizielle Anerkennung fand. Im Gegensatz zum 
Wirtschaftsrecht, das nur Kollektive kannte, und das Individuum verneinte, betonte 
man die Bedeutung der Persönlichkeit, und der „Rechte des wahren, lebendigen 
Menschen" für das Zivilrecht. Andererseits wurde durch diese Gegenüberstellung die 
„klassische", „Warenverhältnis"-Struktur des sozialistischen Zivilrechts auch 
geprägt.6 In der Theorie des Persönlichkeitsrechts hätten diese zwei Gesichtspunkte 
abgestimmt werden müssen, was aber wegen der historischen Andersartigkeit der 
beiden Komponente nicht gelingen konnte. Der eigentliche wirtschaftliche Zusam-
menhang der Persönlichkeitsrechte, d. h. der Schutz der „wirtschaftlichen Persönlich-
keit" konnte in den diesbezüglichen Diskussionen nicht geklärt werden, solche 
Gedanken waren dem damaligen System der Planwirtschaft fremd, und tauchten auch 
deswegen nicht auf, da das sozialistische Recht die geschichtlich hierzu gehörenden 
sozialen Probleme in anderen Konstruktionen gelöst hat. 
6
 Vgl. S Ó L Y O M , L . : The Decline of Civil Law Liability. Alpen aan den Rijn/Budapest, 1 9 8 0 . Kap. VI. 
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Auch unter solchen Umständen hatte der neue Standpunkt von der Verneinung 
eines Zusammenhanges zwischen Persönlichkeitsrecht und Vermögensverhältnissen 
eine positive Rolle: Der Kreis der geschützten Rechte konnte von den „materiellen 
Aspekten" unbehindert erweitert werden. In der sowjetischen Literatur kann man 
wieder über die Notwendigkeit eines allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts,7 oder 
wenigstens über das Recht auf die Privatsphäre8 lesen. Solange wie diese Rechte jedoch 
in einem Zivilrecht von klassischer Struktur (und vor „klassisch" funktionierenden 
Zivirgerichten) ihre Stelle suchen müssen, ist die Ansicht folgerichtig, die den 
Persönlichkeitschutz im ganzen dem Verfassungsrecht zuweist.9 
b) In Ungarn hatte der Widerspruch der Konzeptionen vom „Zivilrecht" und 
von „Persönlichkeitsrechten" keine Folgen.10 De r „materielle Zusammenhang" ist als 
stereotype Erklärung in den Schulbüchern verblieben. Das Z G B erkannte schon 1959 
das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht an, und seine Novelle aus 1977 zeigt auch die 
prinzipielle Unabhängigkeit der Persönlichkeitsrechte. Andererseits erlangten bei der 
Novellierung auch die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte der Persönlichkeitsrechte gewisse 
Betonung: der Schutz wurde auf juristische Personen im allgemeinen erstreckt, auch 
Geschäftgeheimnisse und gewerbliche Rechte im allgemeinen wurden hier geregelt. 
Inzwischen ist aber die eigentliche Frage, der Zusammenhang mit den 
Vermögensverhältnissen als ein dogmatisches Problem, in Vergessenheit geraten, was 
nur zu begrüßen ist. 
Doch kann das Verhältnis der Persönlichkeitsrechte zu den Vermögensrechten 
nicht einfach außer Acht gelassen werden. Die Frage ist sowohl theoretisch 
interessant, als auch — wenn richtig gestellt — eine Grundfrage des Instituts des 
Persönlichkeitsrechts. 
c) Der Zusammenhang mit einem Vermögensverhältnis ist bei zahlreichen 
Persönlichkeitsrechten offenkundig (wie z. B. beim Autorenrecht, oder dem 
geschäftl ichen Name) . Der allgemein verbrei te ten Ansicht nach sollte die 
Anerkennung des gegebenen materiellen Interesses die ältere sein, deren Schutz später 
bis zum immateriellen Recht hin erweitert wurde. Von näher betrachtet stellt sich aber 
heraus, daß dieser Prozeß keineswegs automatisch ist; es geht um die Wirkung 
historischer Kräften, durch die die erwähnten Schutzerweiterungen verursacht 
wurden, und erklärt werden können. 
Die geschichtlichen Zusammenhänge können am Beispiel des allgemeinen 
Persönlichkeitsrechts erläutert werden, obwohl die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte gerade 
7
 MALEIN, p. 29. Als eine Reaktion gegen die wirtschaftsrechtliche Schule, war das Verlangen nach 
einem allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht in der Sowjetunion Ende der 30-er Jahre ganz allgemein. — Der 
„Kompromiß" mit der Zivilrechtskonzeption bedeutete die Betonung des „Zusammenhanges mit den 
Vermögensverhältnissen". 
8
 С У Х О В Е Р Х И Й : О развитии гражданскоправовой охрани личных неимущественных прав и 
интересов граждан. Правоведение, 1972. 3. р. 27. 
9
 ВОЕВОДИН: Содержание правового положения личности в науке советского государствен-
ного права. Советское Государство и Право. 1 9 6 5 / 2 . 
10
 Die Ablehnung des Ersatzes des immateriellen Schadens wurde mit dieser Frage nicht verknüpft. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 
Persönlichkeitsrech te 3 0 3 
dieses Rechtes gewöhnlich nicht erwähnt werden und dieses Recht häufig für die 
Ideologie einer den materiellen Werten gegenübergestellten „Persönlichkeit" reser-
viert zu sein scheint. Zur Zeit und am Ort des Entstehens des allgemeinen 
Persönlichkeitsrecht (Schweiz, Ende des 19. Jh.), war das Übergewicht des direkt 
wirtschaftsbezogenen Persönlichkeitsschutzes eindeutig. § 55 des alten Obligationen-
rechts, der 1881 für die „Verletzung in persönlichen Verhältnissen" einen Anspruch 
auf Genugtuung im Geld gewährte, wollte eigentlich das Recht des Ersatzes des 
Nichtvermögensschadens in der Schweiz eidgenössisch vereinheitlichen und erweitern. 
Die zeitgenössischen Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichts bezeugen aber, daß neben 
wenigen zeitlosen Injuriensachen (Verleumdung, Verletzung der Ehre) die überwie-
gende Mehrheit der Prozesse wegen Boykottes eingeleitet wurde. Eben in einem 
solchen Fall hat das BG allgemein „das Recht auf Würde und Geltung der 
Persönlichkeit" anerkannt.1 1 
Die schweizer Boykott-Entscheidungen — als Repräsentanten der Praxis — 
zeichnen die allgemeinen Änderungen ab, die auch die moderne Phase der Persönlich-
keitsrechte beginnen ließen. Die Anerkennung des Schutzes der Persönlichkeitsrechte 
bedeutete inhaltlich nicht weniger, als einen staatlichen Eingriff in die freie liberale 
Wirtschaft. Nicht nur die erwähnte Rechtsprechung, sondern auch die Materialien der 
Kodifikation und die Literatur sprechen dafür. Laut Huber ist der Schutz der 
Persönlichkeit die Grundlage „der ganzen sozialen Gesetzgebung"1 2 , und schon zur 
Zeit der Vorbereitung des Zürcher Privatrechtlichen Gesetzbuches, in den 1850-er 
Jahren, wurde die allgemeine Regel über den Arbeiterschutz (d. h. Arbeitsschutz) auf 
ihn gegründet.1 3 
Das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht war also sowohl hinsichtlich seines 
Anlasses und seiner Ideologie, als auch in der Praxis ein „Schutzinstitut", das in 
wirtschaftlich ungleichen Situationen — mit dem heute gängigen Ausdruck — den 
„Schwächeren" schützte. Sein politisches Modell ist das gleiche, wie das der (zu jener 
Zeit sich verbreitenden) objektiven Haf tung und des Wettbewerbrechts.14 
Diese wirkliche Verbundenheit des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts mit den 
Vermögensverhältnissen zeigt uns das Politikum der frühen Persönlichkeitsrechte, 
zugleich aber auch ihre Grenzen. Sie führt uns zu der Erkenntnis, daß das allgemeine 
11
 BG. 32/2. 367. (1906). — Das Recht der Persönlichkeit auf Geltung in dem Wirtschaftsverkehr 
wurde vom BG schon 1896 anerkannt. 
12
 HUBER: Das schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch und die Presse. Jahrbuch der schweizerischen Presse, 
1905/1906. p. 32, 35. 
13
 KELLER: Rechtsethik und Rechtstechnik in der modernen kontinentaleuropäischen Zivilgesetz-
gebung, am Zürcher Privatrechtlichen Gesetzbuch erläutert. Aarau, 1947. p. 120. 
14
 Hier müssen wir den sehr variablen Inhalt der Persönlichkeitsrechte und ihre Verwendbarkeit für 
sehr verschiedene Zwecke merken — d.h. ihre Züge, die von den anderen neuen Rechtsinstituten abweichen. 
Für solche „übernommenen Funktionen" gibt das schweizerische Recht schon früh Beispiele. Die Theorie 
faßte z. B. folgende als Persönlichkeitsrechtschutz auf: Schadenersatz für Eisenbahnunfall, Anfechtung des 
Vertrages wegen Irrtum, Nichtigkeit von lebenslängigen Vertragsverhältnissen, sowie viele der Gleichbe-
rechtigung dienende, und noch mehr der konservativen Regeln des Familienrechts. 
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Persönlichkeitsrecht durch das Schutzbedürfnis gegen sozial ungerecht empfundene 
Wirkungen des liberalen Systems begründet wurde. Doch kann man sofort sehen, daß 
die Schutzfunktion begrenzt war: gegenüber ihrem theoretisch sehr weitgefaßten 
Aufgabenkreis beschränkte sie sich praktisch nur auf den Schutz einiger Aspekte der 
wirtschaftlichen Persönlichkeit. (Daneben deckte dieses Institut nur die — aus 
unserem Gesichtspunkt jetzt unwichtigen — Ehren Verletzungen.) Es mag ein Zufall 
sein, daß sich das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht in der Schweiz eben im Zusammen-
hang mit der Boykott-Rechtsprechung stabilisieren konnte (was dadurch gefördert 
wurde, daß das alte Obligationenrecht ein Handelsgesetzbuch war). Wenn wir aber das 
Prinzip suchen, das dieser Praxis wie auch den nur theoretisch formulierten 
Schutzaufgaben zugrunde legt, so besteht es darin, daß diese frühen Persönlichkeits-
reehte die Person als Eigentümer schützen. Dadurch unterscheidet sich das allgemeine 
Persönlichkeitsrecht des OR vom heutigen. Die staatliche Intervention rechnete mit 
der liberalen Konzeption ab, d a ß die Gesellschaft der Selbstregulierung des Marktes 
überlassen werden könnte. Darin hatten auch die Persönlichkeitsrechte ihre Rolle — 
ohne aber die Liquidierung jener Seite der liberalen Konzeption, daß der Mensch der 
in seinem Eigentum gegebenen Garantie überlassen werden konnte. So korrigierte der 
Schutz der „wirtschaftlichen Persönlichkeit" nur die Ungleichheit der Eigentümer-
Positionen — man könnte sagen: er glich die Verschlechterung der Chancen der 
Selbstverteidigung aus. 
d) Auch die besonderen Persönlichkeitsrechte des ausgehenden 19. Jahrhun-
derts, das Recht am eigenen Bild und Namen, zeigen klar die Verbindung mit den 
Vermögensverhältnissen, bzw. mit deren Wandlung. Die Anerkennung des Rechts am 
eigenen Namen bedeutete den Schutz des Handelsnamens, und bald seine Erweite-
rung auf den Namen schlechthin. Darin wirkte nicht nur die so charakteristische 
Immaterialisierung von Wirtschaftspositionen mit, sondern auch die Streiten um die 
Rechtsstellung der unehelichen Kinder.15 In Amerika meldeten sich massenhafte 
Ansprüche auf Bild- und Namensschutz wegen der unerlaubten Nutzung von 
Bildnissen und Namen für Reklamzwecke. Die Schutzgewährung war nicht nur vom 
Staat zu Staat unterschiedlich, sondern auch — sehr unerwartet — innerhalb der 
einzelnen Staaten. Dahinter aber stand dieselbe Grundsatzfrage, wie hinter dem 
allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht in der Schweiz. Die Anerkennung eines Rechts an 
eigenem Bild war nämlich davon abhängig, ob das Bild „für Handelszwecke verwendet 
wurde", also auf diese Weise letzten Endes davon, ob man eine Intervention in die 
Freiheit des Wettbewerbes (d. h. als dessen Mittel, der Reklame) zulässig hielt.16 
Auch die theoretische Erklärung dieser neuer Rechte verwendete anfangs 
Analogien zum Eigentumsrecht. Das lag auf der Hand: diese — wie sie Cohn in seiner 
damals berühmten Studie genannt hat — „neuen Rechtsgüter" erschienen von der 
Person abgetrennt als „Sache"; ein Bi'd, eine Schallplatte. 
15
 COHN: Neue Rechtsgüter. Das Recht am eigenen Namen. Berlin, 1902. 
16
 WINFIELD: Privacy. The Law Quarterly Review, 1931. p. 23, 35. ff. 
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2. Die einzelnen, besonderen Persönlichkeitsrechte 
und die Generalklausel des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts 
a ) Natürlich gab es solche Teilbereiche der Persönlichkeitsrechte, die durch die 
Epochenwende, die Liquidierung des Liberalismus unmittelbar nicht berührt wurden, 
so z. B. die uralte Injuria der Ehrverletzung. Selbst die Verletzung des Rechts am Bild 
und am Namen kann als Ehrverletzung aufgefaßt werden. In der Schweiz lösen die 
Gerichte den Schutz des Bildnisses bis heute auf diese Weise. 
Es ist wahr, daß die neuen technischen Mittel, wie Fotografie und das 
„Grammophon" , andererseits die gesellschaftlichen Neuigkeiten, wie die Reklame 
und die Unterhaltungs- und Klatschpresse, die Gefährdung der Kontrolle der — bis 
dahin gesicherten — Verfügung über das eigene Bild und den Namen erheblich 
vergrößert haben. Diese Gefährdung war, im Gegensatz zur Gefährdung der sog. 
wirtschaftlichen Persönlichkeit und zu den damit verbundenen zunehmenden 
Eingriffen des Staates in das Wirtschaftsleben, unpolitisch. Die heute sog. klassischen 
Persönlichkeitsrechte — Ehre, guter Ruf , Recht am Namen und am eigenen Bild — 
sind politisch neutral. 
Die „Neutrali tät" wird auch durch ihre Geschichte belegt. Die Tatbestände der 
rein persönlichen Delikte (wie z. B. Ehrverlehrung) unterscheiden sich im wesentlichen 
nicht von den Injurien des antiken Roms. Sie waren es, die am längsten ihre 
archaischen Züge beibehalten haben. Sie wurden von der Umwandlung des alten 
Deliktrechts zu reinem zivilrechtlichen Institut nicht mitgerissen. In ihnen erfolgte die 
Trennung der zivil- von den strafrechtlichen Elementen nur aus eigentlich äußerlichen 
Gründen, anläßlich der Modernisierung des Strafrechts am Ende des 19. Jh. (aber 
dann zugunsten des Strafrechts).17 Wegen ihrer Neutralität konnten die klassischen 
Persönlichkeitsrechte in alle Zivilrechtsordnungen aufgenommen werden. Ihre 
Einfügung in das Zivilrecht ist unbedenklich, da sie für die meist konservative 
Zivilrechtspflege keine Funktionsstörung bedeuten, obwohl sie theoretisch nicht 
hineinpassen. (Diese Neutralität läßt natürlich den Klassencharakter des Rechts 
unberührt , was zahlreiche Fälle zeigen, in denen sich die Höhe der Genugtuung für 
Ehrverletzungen nach der Klassenzugehörigkeit der Verletzten richtete.) 
Demgegenüber ist das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht seinem Wesen nach 
politisch. In der Schweiz entstand es als Ausdruck ausgesprochen antiliberaler 
Tendenzen. In Ungarn wurde das Persönlichkeitsrecht nicht so verwendet, da das 
Wettbewerbsrecht und die Anfänge eines Sozialrechts in speziellen Normen 
niedergelegt wurden. Trotzdem sind auch hier auf Persönlichkeitsschutz gegründete 
wettbewerbsrechtliche Urteile zu finden. Das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht spielte 
17
 In Frankreich wurde der zivilrechtliche Anspruch in Adhäsionsverfahren verhandelt, Vorausset-
zung des Schadensersatzes war der Vorsatz. Nach altem ungarischem Injurienrecht (bis 1880) bekam der 
Verletzte einen Teil der Geldbuße. Nach Inkrafttreten des StGB wurden die strafrechtliche Schuld und der 
Vermögeschaden Voraussetzung eines zivilrechtlichen Anspruches. 
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in Ungarn eine vorwiegend deklarative Rolle. Einerseits sollte es aussagen, daß 
der Schutz der Persönlichkeit nicht auf die (schon praktizierten) klassischen Rechte 
beschränkt, sondern grundsätzlich unbegrenzt ist. Anderseits figurierte es als ein 
Symbol der modernen d. h. antiliberalen und sozialen Konzeption der privatrechtli-
chen Kodifikation. Dies geht aus den verschiedenen Entwürfen des Allgemeinen 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches Ungarns, sowie aus den Protokollen des Kodifikations-
ausschusses sowie aus der Literatur klar hervor. „Eine auf richtigen Grundlagen 
beruhende Rechtsordnung kann sich nicht auf den Schutz von Vermögenswert 
darstellenden Gütern der Personen beschränken, sie soll höheren ethischen Gesichts-
punkten entsprechend auch solche Güter der Personen schützen, die eventuell nur 
einen rein ethischen Wert haben, aber eben als solche, für jedermann wertvoller sein 
können, als die Vermögenswerte" — steht in der Begründung zum Entwurf 1901. Und 
die Theorie bewahrte noch lange eine solche abstrakte Gegenüberstellung des 
Persönlichkeitsrechts mit dem „schroffen Materialismus" des Liberalismus.18 Unter 
dem Vorwand abstrakter Werte ging es aber auch hier um die Intervention in die 
Wirtschaft und um die Arbeiterfrage. Der Kodifikationsausschuß betonte, daß der 
Persönlichkeitsschutz auch der Entfaltung und Geltung der Persönlichkeit im 
„gesellschaftlichen" — d. h. nach den angeführten Beispielen im wirtschaftlichen — 
Leben dienen soll, weiterhin, daß für den Schutz der berechtigten Interessen der 
Arbeiterschaft auch mittels der Persönlichkeitsrechte zu sorgen ist: „gesell-
schaftsgefährdenden Tendenzen können wir nur so Einhalt gebieten". Unter 
Hinweis auf Anton Menger schreibt Meszlény, ein Vorkämpfer der Persönlichkeits-
rechte in Ungarn, daß diese „aus dem Gesichtspunkt des gesellschaftlichen Kampfes" 
bedeutend sind, sie schützen die Interessen der Besitzlosen gegenüber den Wohlhaben-
den.1 9 
Die Gegenüberstellung „neutrale klassische Rechte" — „politische General-
klausel" ist für die formative Periode des Persönlichkeitsschutzes bezeichnend. Das 
Schema ist natürlich zu grob. Beispielweise ist in der — zum Schlagwort „Persönlich-
keitsrecht" nachträglich zusammengestellten — französischen Rechtsprechung20 
das Wogen der Säkularisierung klar zu verfolgen. Ein anderes Beispiel ist die häufig 
vorkommende Nichtigkeitserklärung von die verschiedenen (Gewissen-, Bewegungs-
18
 MESZLÉNY, A.: A személyiség védelme (Der Persörilichkeitsschutz). Magyar Jogászegyleti 
Értekezések, XVI. 7. (217). Budapest, 1903. p. 289, 295. Auf diesem Weg kommt BÁLÁS, P. E. zu einer 
vollständigen Trennung der persönlichen und Vermögensrechte. Személyiségi jog (Persöniichkeitsrecht) in: 
Szladits (Red ): Magyar magánjog (Ungarisches Privatrecht) I. Budapest, 1941. p. 625. 
19
 MESZLÉNY, A.: Magánjog-politikai tanulmányok (Zivilrechtspolitische Studien). Budapest, 1901. 
p. 33, 57. Während der „Verhandlungen des Kodifikationsausschusses über die Hauptfragen des Entwurfes 
des Allgemeinen Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches Ungarns" (Bd. 1. Budapest 1909, p. 31.) warf man die 
Anwendung der Persönlichkeitsrechte nicht nur für die Arbeiter, sondern auch gegen sie auf: wenn die 
Arbeiter die Entlassung von Streikbrechern oder „ihnen nicht gefallenden Angestellten" erzwingen, sollte 
die Gewerkschaft diesen Schadenersatz leisten, denn sie habe ihre „Erwerbstätigkeit", d.h. ihr 
Persöniichkeitsrecht angegriffen. 
20
 In Frankreich wurde die Kategorie Persöniichkeitsrecht erst vom ersten Jahrzehnt des 20 Jh., und 
bis 1970 nur von der Theorie angewendet. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 
Persönlichkeitsrech te 3 0 7 
oder Eheschließungs-) „Freiheite" beschränkenden verträglichen und letztwilligen 
Bedingungen wegen Verstoßes gegen die ordre public. Auch in der Schweiz wird auf 
die antifeudale Tendenz der „Unbeschränkbarkei t der Freiheiten" hingewiesen 
(worunter die Nichtigkeit des lebenslängigen Dienstvertrages zu verstehen ist). Aber 
solche Beispiele machen das von den Persönlichkeitsrechten oben entworfenen Bild 
nicht verzerrt, vielmehr beleben sie es. (Sie heben die Einseitigkeit der Vorstellung eines 
„neutralen Liberalismus" hervor, — von dem wir ja in unserem Schema ausgingen. 
Die Verteidigung gegen den Marktmechanismus und die Ausbreitung des Marktes auf 
die ganze Gesellschaft fielen schon zeitlich zusammen. Nennen wir ein technisches 
Beispiel: es is gerade das klassische Muster der liberalen Haftungsrechte, das 
französische Recht, in dem sich schon von 1830 ab die Billigkeitspraxis des Ersatzes 
eines moralischen Schadens entwickelte.) 
Die Politisierung der Persönlichkeitsrechtsprechung (und des ganzen Zivil-
rechts) im Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts macht den Gegensatz „neutral—polit isch" 
relativ. (Jedes genügend weit interpretierbare Recht kann eine politische Funktion 
haben). So hat sich in den USA das „privacy" — ursprünglich fü r den Schutz des 
Bildes und guten Rufes zustandegebracht — mit der Zeit die gleiche Rolle erworben, 
wie auf dem Kontinent das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht. Auch wenn für die 
Gegenwart die Verwischung der Grenzen des Unpolitischen charakteristisch ist, 
können wir auch heute zu dem originellen Gegensatzpaar der neutralen und 
politischen Persönlichkeitsrechte Beispiele finden. Diese Beispiele zeigen immer, daß 
der Persönlichkeitsschutz (und die Konzeption der gesellschaftlichen Funktion des 
Zivilrechts) noch traditionell sind. 
b) Die These kann im ungarischen Recht auf die Probe gestellt werden. Das 
ungarische ZGB von 1959 enthielt außer den klassischen Persönlichkeitsrechten nicht 
nur die, im ungarischen Recht schon bekannte Generalklausel des allgemeinen 
Persönlichkeitsrechts, sondern nahm auch das Verbot der Diskriminierung, und der 
Verletzung der Gewissens- und persönlichen Freiheit auf. In der Praxis lebten aber nur 
die klassischen Rechte (und diese auch kaum) — weder die erwähnten politischen 
Rechte, noch die Generalklausel wurden angewandt. (Die letztere lehnte man 
ausdrücklich ab: obwohl hier ausnahmsweise die Möglichkeit gegeben war, neue 
besondere Persönlichkeitsrechte anzuerkennen, erwarteten die Gerichte die Bestim-
mung solcher Rechte vom Gesetzgeber).21 Aus der Begründung zum ZGB und auch 
aus der Literatur geht hervor, daß man mit einer über den Schutz der klassischen 
Rechte hinausgehenden Verwendung dieses Instituts nicht rechnete. Auch die 
dogmatischen Erklärungen des Verhältnisses des zivilrechtlichen Persönlichkeits-
schutzes zu dem straf- und verwaltungsrechtlichen verraten, daß man nur an die 
Auseinandersetzungen von Bürgern untereinander dachte (deswegen hätten die 
Rechtswege in einem Schutz vor den „gesellschaftlichen Gerichten" vereinigt werden 
können.2 2) Die aktuelle Aufgabe des Persönlichkeitsrechtes, der Schutz vor politischer 
2 1
 V g l . E R Ö S S , P . o p . c i t . 
2 2
 Vgl. Begründung zum ungarischen ZGB ( 1 9 5 9 ) ; E Ö R S I , p. 2 8 — 2 9 . 
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und organisatorischer Übermacht, tauchte in den 60-er Jahren nicht einmal auf. 
Zeichen einer Änderung zeigt erst die Novelle des ZGB — wovon schon die Rede war. 
Das Zivilrecht der Sowjetunion schützt nur wenige klassische Persönlichkeits-
rechte. Gegen die Generalklausel des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts e rhob man 
den Einwand, sie bedeute richterliche Rechtssetzung. Der Persönlichkeitsschutz wurde 
neuerlich auch rechtspolitisch für wichtig erklärt. Dies wurde jedoch nicht mit einer 
Revision der Aufgaben des Zivilrechts und der Zivilgerichte begleitet. Dieser 
Widerspruch erklärt unserer Meinung nach die theoretischen Stellungnahmen zum 
Persönlichkeitsrecht. Mann stellt z. B. den Persönlichkeitsschutz aus verschiedenen 
Rechtszweigen mosaikartig zusammen. Auch wenn neulich die Anerkennung und der 
Schutz der Privatsphäre, sogar die Anerkennung des allgemeinen Persönlichkeits-
rechts verlangt wird, versteht man darunter alle klassischen Rechte, bzw. höchstens die 
Einführung des Ersatzes für immaterielle Schäden, im Bereich von ausdrücklich nicht-
politischen persönlichen Verhältnissen.23 Von den Vermögensverhältnissen 
unabhängige politische Rechte gehören weder der alten, noch der neuen Auffassung 
nach zum Zivilrecht. Die neueste Ansicht , die auch solche Rechte zu den 
Persönlichkeitsrechten zählt, weist den ganzen Persönlichkeitsschutz dem Staatsrecht 
zu.24 
III. 
Die Politisierung der Persönlichkeitsrechte 
1. Die Untersuchung des Zusammenhanges der Persönlichkeitsrechte mit den 
Vermögensverhältnissen in ihrer modernen Entfaltungsperiode führ te zu der 
Erkenntnis, daß zu dieser Zeit die Entwicklung durch diese Verbindung bestimmt war. 
Der Zusammenhang mit den Vermögensverhältnissen, d. h. der Schutz der 
immateriellen Wirtschaftsposition hat das Institut des Persönlichkeitsrechts (dessen 
früherer Bestand, die Injurien, infolge der Modernisierung des Strafrechts für das 
Zivilrecht kaum noch die geringste Bedeutung hatten) neu belebt und wichtig gemacht, 
indem der Persönlichkeitsschutz auf diese Weise am ökonomischen und politischen 
Ereignis der Auflösung des Liberalismus und des Aufbaues des Monopolkapita-
lismus Anteil erlangte. Selbst klassische Persönlichkeitsrechte verrichteten Ei-
gentümerschutz, und diese Eigenschaft erleichterte die Ausweitung des Schutzes 
gegen die neuen, technischen Gefährdungen (Foto, Tonaufnahme), wo die Verletzung 
eines Vermögensinteresses fehlte. Das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht war 
ausdrücklich gegen den Liberalismus gerichtet, es war schon eine der typischen 
Generalklauseln des Monopolkapi ta l ismus. Es hing aber von der jeweiligen 
Rechtsentwicklung ab, ob, und wie lange das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht als 
Wettbewerbs- oder sozialrechtliches Institut wirkte. Die allgemeine Tendenz war, daß 
2 3
 M A L E I N , p . 2 9 — 3 6 . ; S U H O V E R H I J , o p . c i t . 
2 4
 VOEVODIN, Op . cit. 
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in erster Linie die Arbeiterfrage, aber auch der Wet tbewerb durch politisch direkt 
beeinflußbare Sondergesetzgebung geregelt wurden. 
Also: der Z u s a m m e n h a n g mit den Vermögensverhäl tnissen machte die 
Persönlichkeitsrechte zum Poli t ikum, wie es oben am Beispiel der schweizerischen und 
ungarischen Entwicklung gezeigt wurde. Aber aus demselben G r u n d e wurde d a s 
allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht in das — ausdrücklich eine liberale Wer tordnung 
vertretenden — deutsche BGB nicht au fgenommen. Dafür spricht auch, daß die 
deutschen Persönlichkeitstheorien des 19. Jh. leere Spekulation geblieben sind, bis sie 
mit sozialen Inhal t erfüllt wurden. 2 5 Die bislang erörterte Rolle des allgemeinen 
Persönlichkeitsrechts ist aber zeitgebunden. Nach dem ersten Weltkrieg werden seine 
antiliberalen Züge sinnlos, umso mehr , da — wie schon gesagt — wichtige Aufgaben 
durch selbständige Rechtsinstitute abgenommen wurden. Das so entleerte allgemeine 
Persönlichkeitsrecht wurde von der — im allgemeinen idealistischen — Interpretat ion 
der „Persönl ichkei t" erobert .2 6 
2. Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg begann eine neue Phase in der Entwicklung der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte, die in wichtigen Punkten das Gegenteil der früheren ist. 
Entscheidend ist jetzt die Ausweitung der Persönlichkeitsrechte, die solche Aspekte 
aufweist, wie die Verallgemeinerung des Persönlichkeitsschutzes (Generalklausel 
anstat t der besonderen Rechte), die Politisierung, das Unwichtigwerden des Zusam-
menhanges mit materiellen Verhältnissen usw. T ro t z zahlreicher faßbarer Neuigkeiten 
ergibt sich von der neuen Periode noch kein so definitives Bild, wie von der f rüheren. 
Sie kann am besten durch ihre Widersprüche beschrieben werden. (S. Punkt. IV.) 
Doch scheint wenigstens die Politisierung und Verallgemeinerung dieser Rechte 
eindeutig zu sein. Die Politisierung geschieht auf zwei verschiedenen Wegen. Einerseits 
kann das Persönlichkeitsrecht bei der extensiven Auslegung der traditionellen 
Grundrechte , bzw. bei der Abgrenzung der staatl ichen und der Privatsphäre als 
prinzipielle Grund lage dienen (dies ist für die Praxis des Obersten Gerichts der U S A 
kennzeichnend). Andererseits aber kann selbst der Grundwer t der f rüheren zivilrecht-
lichen Persönlichkeitsrechte, die Ehre und W ü r d e (mit der weitesten sozialen 
Interpretation: das Recht auf ein menschenwürdiges Leben) zum verfassungsmäßigen 
Grundrecht e rhoben werden, als die Unantas tbarke i t der menschlichen Würde, oder in 
positiver Fassung, als ein Recht auf die freie Entfal tung der Persönlichkeit. 
(Bekanntestes Beispiel ist Art. I. des Grundgesetzes des BRD, s. aber auch die neue 
schweizerische Verfassung.) Diese zweite Lösung schafft der weitesten Auslegung des 
zivi lrechtl ichen a l lgemeinen Pe r sön l i chke i t s r ech t s eine ve r fassungsrech t l i che 
Grundlage. (Zugleich wirft sie die Frage der Dr i t twi rkung der Grundrechte auf, auf die 
wir hier nicht eingehen können.) 
25
 Gut ersichtlich aus LEUZE: Die Entwicklung des Persönlichkeitsrechts im 19. Jahrhundert. 
Bielefeld, 1962. 
26
 Neue politische Rolle bekommt das Persönlichkeitsrecht erst im Nationalsozialismus, als 
Ausdruck und Mittel der integrierten Rechtsstellung des Individuums in der Volksgemeinschaft. 
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a) (USA) Die zwei Richtungen der Politisierung sind wesentlich unterschied-
lich. Die erste beschützt die Person vor dem Staat, sie ist die Weiterentwicklung der 
traditionellen Garantien. 
aa) Was hier als offensichtliche Politisierung erscheint, könnte letzten Endes als 
offentsichtliche Entpolitisierung gedeutet werden. Politisch erhelblich ist z. B. in den 
USA die Verdrängung der staatlichen Kontrolle aus den inneren Angelegenheiten 
eines für die Rechte der Schwarzen kämpfenden bürgerrechtlichen Vereins,27 die Be-
schränkung des Hausdurchsuchungsrechts bei den auf Bewährung Entlassen,28 sowie 
daß die Verfolgung des Lebens und Handels der Bürger „in der Privatsphäre" von 
Ermittlungs- und Gerichtsorganen mit technischen Mitteln für ungesetzlich erklärt 
wird, und so erhaltene Beweise nicht verwendet werden dürfen.2 9 Und von politischer 
Relevanz ist die Nichtigkeitserklärung von Verwaltungsakten, die dem Gericht als 
„unbegründet", „willkürlich" erscheinen, d. h. die Fälle, wo das Gericht die 
Selbstbestimmung der Person höher wertet als das die Regelung begründende 
staatliche Interesse. Auf diese Weise wird in erster Linie gegen den behördlichen Druck 
in alltäglichem Leben, gegen die Beschränkung von „kleineren Freiheiten" Schutz 
gewährt, — wie gegen die Einmischung in den persönlichen Lebensstil, oder sogar in 
die Haartracht . 3 0 (Auch dies kann politisch von Belang sein, z. B. die erfolglosen 
Klagen von Weißen gegen Schwarze, die in ein bis dahin von Weißen bewohntes 
Viertel einzogen. Aber der Kampf um die persönliche Geltung in Kleinigkeiten aller 
Art — die an die „angeborenen Rechte" auf beliebige Kleidung und Nahrung aus dem 
18. Jh. erinnern — beeinflußt auch das politische Klima: ob der Staat die Uniformität, 
die Intoleranz gegen die Abweichenden unterstützt?) 
Andererseits kann durch diesen Weg der Politisierung der Persönlichkeitsrechte 
der Staat von der Entscheidung von lebenswichtigen sozialpolitischen Fragen 
ausgeschloßen werden — wie z. B. Geburtenkontrol le .3 1 Diese (tatsächliche) 
Entpolitisierung, Reprivatisierung kann m a n natürlich nur aufgrund der konkreten 
Situation positiv oder negativ werten.32 
27
 Für Beispiele s. ASKIN: Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First Amendment 
Adjudication. Stanford Law Quarterly, 1970. p. 196. 
28
 Striking Balance Between Privacy and Supervision. Note, New York University Law Review, 
1976. p. 800. 
2 5
 Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Note, Harvard Law Review, 1977. p. 945.; GROSS: Privacy: Its Legal Protection (revised ed.) 
Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., 1970. 
3 0
 W I L K I N S O N ; W H I T E : Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles. Cornell Law Review, 1977. 
p. 563. 
31
 EMERSON: Nine Justices in Search of A Doctrine. Michigan Law Review, 1965. p. 219.; Kommers: 
Abortion and Constitution. United States and West Germany. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
1977. p. 255, 282. 
32
 Der Fall Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) ermöglichte mit dem Schlagwort „individuelle Freiheit" 
eigentlich die Ausbreitung der von den Mittelschichten schon praktizierten Geburtenkontrolle auf die 
Armen und Benachteiligten. S. MCKAY: The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations. Michigan Law 
Review, 1965. p. 259, 282. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 
Persönlichkeitsrech te 3 1 1 
bb) In den USA bewahrte man nicht nur die herkömmlichen verfassungsrechtli-
chen Grundlagen für den Persönlichkeitsschutz, sondern auch die ihnen zugrundele-
gende liberale Konzeption. Es ist kein Zufall, d a ß sich diese Art derPolit isierung in 
den USA entwickelte, wo der liberale Mythos noch über starke Bastionen verfügt. Es 
taucht aber die Frage auf, ob der Persönlichkeitsschutz wirklich auf einer strikten 
Trennung von Staat und Gesellschaft, auf einem „staatsfreien" Handlungsspielraum 
für den Bürger beruht und also ein gegen den Staat gerichtetes Freiheitsrecht ist. Ist das 
Erscheinen eines verfassungsrechtlichen Persönlichkeitsschutzes nicht ein Zeichen 
dafür, daß das alte liberale System des Schutzes der Autonomie der Person doch nicht 
hinreichend funktionierte? In der Tat mischte sich der Staat mehr und mehr in die 
früher als au tonom geltenden persönlichen Bereiche ein. So wurde die eindeutige und 
formale Abgrenzung der staatlichen von der privaten Sphäre überholt. Man mußte 
neue Grenzen abstecken. Das Persönlichkeitsrecht erwies sich als äußerst geeignet zu 
dieser Aufgabe. Da die formalen Garantien nicht funktionsfähig durch richterliches 
Ermessen abgelöst wurden, boten seine Unbestimmtheit und seine Elastizität, 
andererseits aber sein anerkannter Wertinhalt Möglichkeiten für ein Abtasten der 
neuen Grenzen der Autonomie. 
Der ursprüngliche Eigentümerschutz und der moderne Persönlichkeitsschutz 
hängen historisch zusammen. Die Frage ist also dieselbe, wie sie vor 100—150 Jahren 
in Bezug auf das Eigentumsrecht lautete. Konnte dieses durch das öffentliche Interesse 
begrenzt werden? Alle bestimmenden Faktoren der ersten Phase der europäischen Per-
sönlichkeitsrechtsentwicklung, und besonders, daß es um Eigentümerschutz unter 
ungleichen Kräfteverhältnissen ging, daß man die Garantie der menschenwürdigen 
Existenz in dem Eigentum sah, sind in der politischen Geschichte des Schutzes der 
Privatspäre in Amerika ebenfalls vorzufinden. Dem staatlichen Eingriff — selbst in 
hoheitlichen Funktionen wie die Strafverfolgung — setzte die Unverletzbarkeit des 
Eigentums Schranken. (Für Hausdurchsuchung und Durchsuchung von persön-
lichen Sachen war aus diesem Grund eine besondere Ermächtigung notwendig.) 
cc) Hieraus ergibt sich die Frage, weshalb zur Anwendung der einschlägigen 
Verfassungsbestimmungen immer mehr das Persönlichkeitsrecht herangezogen 
wurde. Die Tatsache, daß gegen die neuen technischen Eingriffsmittel der herkömmli-
che Eigentumsbegriff nicht mehr verwendbar war, (z. B. gegen die Abhörung ohne 
„physisches Eindrungen") war nicht der einzige Grund für die Umstellung des 
Schutzes auf persönlichkeitsrechtliche Grundlage. Die „neue Technik" kann allein 
schon deswegen keine ausschließliche Ursache der Politisierung sein, da sie die 
Erfindungen des ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts bedeutet, und gegen diese, unter 
Privaten, schon damals für Schutz gesorgt wurde, sowohl in Europa, als auch in den 
USA. 
Außerdem können die technischen Gefahren höchstens teilweise die Politisie-
rung begründen: die Freiheit der individuellen Wahl (Empfängnisverhütung, 
Lebensstil, was also über die traditionellen Freiheitsrechte hinausgeht), die gleichzeitig 
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mit dem Schutz vor den technischen Gefahren in den Schutzbereich einbezogen wurde, 
können sie nicht erklären. 
Die Erweiterung des Schutzbereiches der Persönlichkeitsrechte wurde also von 
der allgemeinen Rechtsentwicklung, insbesondere von der Auflockerung der subjekti-
ven Rechte vorbereitet.3 3 Zwar ist es zuzugeben, daß die Früchte für den 
Persönlichkeitsschutz erst später reif wurden. Die Anerkennung der Berechtigung der 
staatlichen Intervention ins Wirtschaftsleben trennte in Amerika die persönlichen und 
die Vermögensrechte voneinander, und während man bei den letzteren den Eingriff mit 
dem gesellschaftlichen Interesse relativ f rüh rechtfertigte, blieb es hinsichtlich der 
persönlichen Güter bei den alten, formellen Garantien.3 4 Auch der Zweck der 
Garantien wurde unterschiedlich aufgefaßt. Sie dienten bei Vermögensrechten der 
Integration in das öffentliche Interesse — bei persönlichen Rechten hätten sie dagegen 
die Unabhängigkeit, die Individualisierung zu fördern.3 5 Aber nachdem sich die 
Auffassung allgemein durchsetzte, daß das M a ß der staatlichen Intervention dem 
richterlichen Ermessen unterliegt, erwies sich der Begriff des privacy, der für die 
Verhältnisse von Privatpersonen schon genutzt wurde, als sehr nützlich für die 
Unterstützung der Position der Bürger in den die individuelle Freiheit betreffenden 
Sachen. Das privacy hat auch im Privatrecht keine klaren Konturen, es ist „juristisch 
unschar f ' . 3 6 Auf dem Gebiet des Schutzes der Freiheitsrechte paßt es so sowohl zur 
Interessenabwägung, als auch zu der Aufgabe, die verschiedensten Sachverhälte auf 
gemeinsamen Nenner bringend, den Schutz zu verallgemeinern. 
Freilich ist die Unbestimmtheit zweischneidig: auch der Schutz wird unsicher, 
wenn die Garantien gelockert sind. Deswegen hat man die unbedingte Zusicherung 
eines Minimums des Rechts auf die Privatsphäre, die genaue Definition dieses Rechts 
für notwendig erklärt.37 
dd) Es ist noch daraufhinzuweisen, d a ß dieser Weg der Politisierung den Schutz 
der Persönlichkeitsrechte verdoppelt. Obwohl die allgemeine Gerichtsbarkeit in 
Amerika die Unterschiede nicht so scharf hervortreten läßt, wie der Schutz z. B. in 
Westeuropa nach dem ordentlichen, verwaltungs- und verfassungsrechtlichen Wege 
zerstückelt würde, — so ist doch die Verschiedenheit des privacy im Deliktsrecht, d. h. 
als tort, und im Verfassungsrecht augenfällig, natürlich auch was seine praktische 
Bedeutung anbelangt. 
Der Schutz der Persönlichkeitsrechte begann Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts im 
tort-Recht, praktisch mit einem den klassischen Rechten entsprechenden Schutzkreis, 
33
 Diesem Prozeß, der in der Tat viel komplizierter is, können wir jetzt nicht folgen. Vgl. aber 
Constitutional Privacy, Harvard Law Review, 1977. p. 964. 
34
 COMMONS: Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924). Clifton, 1974. p. 337, 342. (Z. B. due process 
bedeutet auf dem Gebiet der Wirtschaft nicht due procedure, sondern due purpose.) 
3 5
 E M E R S O N , P . 2 2 4 . 
3 6
 KALVEN: Privacy in Tort Law. Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 1966. p. 326. 
37
 Constitutional Privacy, Harvard Law Review, 1977, p. 985. 
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und diesen Charakter hat es trotz der Erweiterung des Schutzes, der Erhöhung seiner 
Bedeutung und seiner technischen Vereinheitlichung nicht verloren.38 Es ist neutral 
geblieben. 
Ein richterlicher Schutz der heute als Persönlichkeitsrechte aufgefaßten 
verfassungsmäßigen Freiheiten gab es natürlich auch im 19. Jh., — auf dem Grund des 
Eigentumsrechts. Der erste Versuch, die nicht mehr ausreichende eigentumsrechtliche 
Begründung durch das privacy zu ersetzen, war 1928 unternommen (Olmstead v. U. 
S.) setzte sich aber erst in den 60-er Jahren durch (Katz v. U. S.). Wie in Europa der 
Inhalt des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts nicht genau bestimmt ist, ist in den USA 
der Inhalt des verfassungsrechtlichen privacy unsicher: es wird für zu viele Zwecke 
angewandt. Es ist fraglich, ob es nicht zweckmäßiger wäre den Gesetzgeber zu Wort 
kommen zu lassen.39 Andererseits ist das Recht auf die Privatspäre, das privacy doch 
sinngemäß enger, als das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht. Eine Verbindung zur 
Privatsphäre wird oft durch gekünstelten, ja manchmal grotesken Kunstgriffen 
geschaffen. (So auch in dem leading case Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, in dem 
niedergelegt wurde, daß es das verfassungsmäßige Recht der Ehepartner ist über die 
Anwendung von Empfängnisverhütungsmitteln zu entscheiden. In der Begründung 
dieses Rechts dient die häufige Erwähnung des Schlafzimmers nur dazu, zu dem 
„privacy" eine Brücke zu schlagen.40 (In der Tat, wenn man nach den gemeinsamen 
Zügen aller privacy-Fälle, privat- oder verfassungsrechtlich, fragt, so findet man sie 
nicht in der Privatsphäre, sondern im Schutz der Individualität und der Würde 4 1 — 
was also auch Inhalt des (kontinentalen) allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts ist. 
b) (BRD.) Der andere Weg der Politisierung ist völlig neu, er verbindet sich auch 
nicht äußerlich mit liberalen Strukturen. Es geht hier also nicht um eine relative 
Trennung privat- und verfassungsrechtlichen Persönlichkeitsschutzes, auch nicht um 
gegen den Staat gerichteten Freiheiten. Im Gegenteil: es handelt sich um die relative 
Verschmelzung von Grundrechten und zivilrechtlichem Persönlichkeitschutz, und um 
die Drit twirkung der Grundrechte.4 2 Diese Entwicklung berührt hauptsächlich das 
38
 Die Entwicklung des privacy in der amerikanischen Rechtsprechung und Theorie behandelt der 
berühmte Aufsatz von PROSSER: Privacy. California Law Review, 1960. p. 383. Neben der Studie von 
Warren und Brandeis (The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review, 1890), die die Karriere des privacy 
startete, hat die Arbeit von Prosser die Rechtsprechung entscheidend beeinflußt. Prosser faßt die privacy-
Sachverhälte in vier allgemeineren Gruppen zusammen: Das Eindringen in die Privatsphäre anderer, die 
Veröffentlichung vertraulicher Daten, jemanden vor der Öffentlichkeit in falsches Licht stellen, und den 
Mißbrauch von Namen, Bild usw. 
3 9
 Es begann schon, der Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 1968 tritt im Vergleich zu dem 
trendmäßig erweiterten privacy zurück, wobei er sich auf die öffentliche Sicherheit beruft. 
4 0
 DIXON: The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy? 
Michigan Law Review, 1965. S. 197, 214. 
4 1
 BLOUSTEIN: Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: an Answer to Dean Prosser. New York 
University Law Review, 1964, p. 962, 1005. 
4 2
 R A I S E R : Grundgesetz und Privatrechtsordnung ( 1 9 6 6 ) . In: Die Aufgabe des Privatrechts. 
Kronberg/Ts., 1977. p. 162.; MÜLLER: Die Grundrechte der Verfassung und der Persönlichkeitsschutz des 
Privatrechts. Bern, 1964. p. 160. 
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allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht, ist aber auch für einzelne besondere Rechte, wie die 
Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit usw. wichtig. 
Das beste Beispiel dafür ist das Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. An der 
Spitze des Grundgesetzes stehen die Unantastbarkeit der menschlichen Würde und das 
Recht auf freie Entfal tung der Persönlichkeit. (Deren Hervorhebung ist, wie auch die 
weltweite Aufschwung der Persönlichkeitsrechte nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg, eine 
Demonstration gegen den Faschismus.) Dieses Recht benutzt der BGH schon 1954 um 
ein zivilrechtliches subjektives Persönlichkeitsrecht zu begründen. Dieses „allgemeine 
Persönlichkeitsrecht" tritt zu den „besonderen Persönlichkeitsrechten", z. B. Recht 
auf Ehre, Recht an Briefen und privaten Aufzeichnungen, hinzu. Gleichzeitig 
gestattete der BGH den Ersatz von nichtmateriellen Schäden für Persönlichkeitsverlet-
zungen.4 3 Diese Entwicklung durchbricht also das herkömmliche liberale System des 
BGB zweifach. Das setzt eine Abkehr von der liberalen Zivilrechts- und auch 
Verfassungskonzeption voraus. Persönlichkeitsrecht (auch als Grundrecht) bedeutet 
hier nicht die Abgrenzung der staatlichen und der Privatsphäre. Die Würde des 
Menschen wird nicht nur vor der politischen, sondern vor aller wirtschaftlicher oder 
organisatorischer Macht jeder Ar t geschützt. (Charakteristisch ist, daß man die 
Drittwirkung des Rechts auf Würde zuerst im Arbeitsrecht anerkannte.4 4) 
Der Verfassung- und der davon untrennbare zivilrechtliche Persönlich-
keitsschutz kann schon wegen seiner Allgemeinheit nicht so formell garantiert, 
werden, wie einst die liberalen Freiheiten: auch andere Grundwerte der Verfassung 
haben ihre „Dri t twirkung", das Gericht kann die eigene Interessenabwä-
gung nicht vermeiden. Andererseits zweifelt man auch in der BRD, ob alle formellen 
Garantien den freien Ermessen geopfert werden sollen.4S 
Diese Version der Politisierung führte in der Praxis zu einer Befreiung des 
Persönlichkeitsschutzes im Zivilrecht von technischen Beschränkungen. Ihr politi-
scher Gehalt, von Pressesachen abgesehen, enttäuscht uns jedoch. Die Rechtspre-
chung haftet zu sehr an den klassischen Rechten. Im deutschen Recht wirkt nämlich 
eine andere Tradit ion beschränkend. Eben umgekehrt, wie in den USA, wo die 
Gerichtsbarkeit zusammenfaßt, die Rechtsgrundlage aber zergliedert, fließen hier die 
Rechtsgrundlagen zusammen, während die Persönlichkeitssachen vor verschiedene 
Gerichte gehören. So entziehen dier Verwaltungs- und Arbeitsgerichte die „politi-
schen" Angelegenheiten der Zivilgerichtsbarkeit. Kein Wunder, daß der Theorien-
streit um den politischen Inhalt des zivilrechtlichen Persönlichkeitsschutzes zu dem 
„wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang" zurückkehrt. In diesem Stellungskrieg wird auf 
einer Seite behauptet, daß die „freie Entfaltung" auch Eigentums- und Vertragsfrei-
heit beinhaltet, andererseits aber sagt man, daß das Persönlichkeitsrecht erst dann 
4 3
 BGHZ 13, 344., bzw. BGHZ 26, 349. 
4 4
 Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau im Arbeitsvertrag, BAG, Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift, 1955. p. 607. 
4 5
 R A I S E R , p . 1 8 4 . A n m . 4 3 . 
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verwendbar ist, wenn diese Institute dem „wirtschaftlich Schwächeren" zu der 
„Entfal tung" nicht ausreichen. Erinnern wir uns an den politischen Inhalt der ersten 
Entwicklungsphase der Persönlichkeitsrechte, so können wir sehen, daß ihr aktuelles 
Politikum nicht darüber hinausgeht; auch dann nicht, wenn die „soziale" Intervention 
jetzt nicht nur vom Gesetzgeber, sondern auch von den Gerichten erwartet wird.4 6 
IV. 
Widersprüche des Persönlichkeitsrechts 
1. Das Wesen der Persönlichkeitsrechte kann am besten durch Darlegung ihrer 
immanenten Widersprüche erfaßt werden. Die folgenden Gegensätze durchdrin-
gen und wiederholen einander. Sie könnten als eine Fragestellung aufgefaßt wer-
den: was sind die Persönlichkeitsrechte, was sollen sie, und sind sie überhaupt mög-
lich? 
a) Massenansprüche, Schutz für den Durchschnitt — individuell, außer-
gewöhnliche Leistung. 
Das Rechtsinstitut „Persönlichkeitsrecht" steht im Zeichen der „Autonomie" , 
alle Formulierungen seines Zieles — wie die freie Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit 
(neuerlich auch in den Motiven der Neufassung des ungarischen ZGB), die 
Unantastbarkeit des Individuums usw. — besagen dasselbe. Der Aufbau der 
autonomen Persönlichkeit ist aber eine außerordentliche Leistung. Sie ist höchstper-
sönlich und kann „von außen her" — und noch weniger rechtlich — nicht 
gewährleistet und nicht bestimmt werden. Sie ist von den Umständen verhältnismäßig 
unabhängig, da ihr Maß das Individuum selbst ist. Das Recht verspricht hier etwas, 
das es nicht geben kann; und das Persönlichkeitsrecht funktioniert natürlich auch 
nicht in der Weise, als ob es dies sichern wollte. Nur der Ideologie des Persönlichkeits-
rechts kommt es zugute, daß in allgemeinen Begriffen viele Interpretationsmöglichkei-
ten enthalten sind. Der rechtliche Persönlichkeitsschutz kann höchstens die „äußeren" 
Voraussetzungen einer „menschenwürdigen Existenz" garantieren, wobei 
„menschenwürdig" nicht näher bestimmt und nur durch die jeweilige öffentliche 
Meinung umrissen wird. Daher ist es einerseits weniger anspruchsvoll, andererseits 
entspricht es aber den durchschnittlichen und Massenanforderungen. Dieser Schutz 
tritt als die Verwirklichung der individuellen, höchstpersönlichen und sicherlich 
außerordentlichen Autonomie auf. 
Dieser Widerspruch folgt nicht aus dem Gegensatz zwischen den Möglichkeiten 
des Rechts und einer ideellen Zielsetzung, er ist vielmehr Ausdruck des Antagonismus, 
4 6
 Zur Übersicht s. S C H W E R D T N E R : Das Persönlichkeitsrecht in der deutschen Rechtsordnung. 
Offene Probleme einer juristischen Entdeckung. Berlin, 1977. p. 125—179. 
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der die Stellung des Individuums in der immer mehr organisierten, integrierten 
Gesellschaft kennzeichnet. Dieses Problem können wir hier nicht erörtern, und auch 
bei der Besprechung seiner juristischen Aspekte werden wir sehr wesentliche politische 
Fragen außer Acht lassen. Wir gehen davon aus, daß der Persönlichkeitsschutz 
dadurch bedeutend wurde, daß die Entwicklung sich objektiv gegen die Autonomie 
richtete. Im Zeitalter des Liberalismus war der „Selbstschutz der Gesellschaft" gegen 
die Herrschaft des Marktes notwendigerweise von wirtschaftlichem Charakter , sie 
wollte der Persönlichkeit wirtschaftliche Garant ien geben. Heute ist die Schutzrich-
tung durch die staatliche Regulierung der Wirtschaft und den Ausbau der sozialen 
Funktion des Staates verlagert worden: sie ist gegen die übermäßige Regelung 
gerichtet. Aus diesem Zusammenhang ergibt sich auch die heutige direkte Politisie-
rung des Persönlichkeitsschutzes. 
b j Die Expansion der rechtlichen Regulierung — rechtsfreie Privatsphäre 
Aus dem „Regulierungskomplex" ergeben sich weitere Fragen für die 
Persönlichkeitsrechte. D a ß die Privatsphäre die zentrale Kategorie des Persönlich-
keitsschutzes wurde, ist bezeichnend: sie zeigt die Richtung der Gefahr . Die 
verschiedenen Auffassungen über die Privatsphäre sind darin einig, daß sie unter 
Privatsphäre das (physische und spirituelle) Gebiet verstehen, das vom Individuum 
kontrolliert wird, also von äußerer Steuerung frei ist. Es geht hier um den Schutz gegen 
die staatliche Einflußnahme; um eine Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen aufgrund der 
Begründetheit des Eingriffs und der rechtlichen Regelung. Die Notwendigkeit der 
Regulierung und der Schutz gegen die Regulierung fallen zusammen, die Regulierung 
verschlingt alles, während sie Schutz gegen sich selbst gibt. Die Regulierung ist nicht 
Ursache, nur Symptom der „Eingriffe", die durch den Integrationsprozeß bestimmt 
sind. Und diese Eingriffe stammen nur zum Teil vom Staat. Andererseits vermehren 
sich die das Individuum unmittelbar berührenden Tatbestände, die, durch die 
technische Entwicklung ermöglicht, sofort praktiziert werden — Organtransplanta-
tion, neue Methoden der Geburtenkontrolle, die Datenspeicherung —; und daher in 
die Ordnung der Gesellschaft eingebaut, d. h. geregelt werden müssen. 
Der Persönlichkeitsrechtsschutz tritt also heute für die Freiheit von der 
Regelung auf, diese Forderung ist aber nicht mehr zeitgemäß. Der Schutz der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte betont eigentlich die Garantien der Regelung, dies ist seine 
aktuelle Aufgabe. Im Falle neuer Tatbestände (Organtransplantation, medizinische 
Versuche) bzw. bei nicht-staatlichen Eingriffen im allgemeinen (Datenbanken oder die 
Anwendung psychologischer Tests am Arbeitsplatz) sind es unter Anderen die 
Persönlichkeitsrechte, die die Regelung verwirklichen. Auf schon geregelten Gebieten 
wird die Begründetheit der Regelung mit dem Mittel des Persönlichkeitsrechts 
überprüft: so wird die Frage des begründeten Eingriffs vor einem anderen Forum, dem 
Gericht, und in einem anderen, d. h. öffentlichen Verfahren kontrolliert. Vergessen wir 
nicht: de r 'Drang nach der Eliminierung des Rechts, nach dem Autonomieschutz 
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bringt das Recht in die Intimsphäre hinein bis zum Grenzfall der Regulierbarkeit, zur 
Frage des Lebens und des Todes. Schon mit einer einmaligen richterlichen 
Schutzgewährung wird das verwirklicht. 
c) Selbstgarantie — organisatorische oder Regelungsgarantie 
Es gibt nämlich keine andere Schutzmöglichkeit. Die Chancen des Selbstschut-
zes sind zusammengeschrumpft, der Mensch ist auf die „äußerliche" Sicherung sei-
ner Persönlichkeitsrechte angewiesen. Auch deshalb geriet dieses Gebiet unter die 
Herrschaft des Rechts. 
Die „klassischen" Persönlichkeitsrechte setzten ursprünglich solche Verhält-
nisse voraus, in denen die Parteien einander von Angesicht zu Angesicht gegen-
überstanden; sie entsprangen der Schattenseite einer noch persönlichen Welt, der 
Kehrseite der Idylle: Klatsch, Beleidigung, gefallene Mädchen, verlassene Bräute. 
Die nicht-rechtlichen Regeln sind hier wichtiger als die rechtlichen: die Moral, Sitte 
und Brauch, die innere Ordnung und Sanktionen einer Familie, Gemeinde, Kleinstadt 
kommen hier zur Geltung. Der Beleidiger und der Verletzte kommen oft aus den 
gleichen oder nahestehenden gesellschaftlichen Kreisen, ihre Kräfte sind nicht 
unproportionell verschieden, und es gibt die Möglichkeit einer außerrechtlichen 
Genugtuung. Bis zum Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts war auch die Struktur der 
Öffentlichkeit anderes (eben in ungarischen Kleinstädten gab es z. B. mehrere örtliche 
Presseorgane.) Die liberalen Ideen unterstützten den Selbstschutz; „die Garantie des 
Vermögens, aber wenigstens des Talents, der Vortrefflichkeit ist in jedermann 
vorhanden". (So können wir den duellierenden Bürger des 19. Jahrhunderts nicht 
eindeutig für lächerlich halten.) Das Recht kam hier nur ergänzend zu Wort , es 
zivilisierte die Rache, gab der Genugtuung besonderen Nachdruck, glich eventuell den 
Unterschied zwischen den ungleichen Kräftepositionen der Par tner aus. (In den 
Privatklage-Sachen, die die Atmosphäre dieser Welt bewahren, ist es heute noch so.) 
Letzten Endes hat man dieses Modell weitergeführt, als der Schutzkreis des 
Persönlichkeitsrechts rasch erweitert wurde. Wie schon mehrmals erwähnt, hatte m a n 
diesen modernen Persönlichkeitsschutz anfangs ausdrücklich zur Reparation der 
erschütterten Garantierolle des Eigentums, oder zum deren Ersatz verwendet. Un te r 
solchen Umständen ist der Schutz des Persönlichkeitsrechts mit der Ideologie der 
Autonomie noch nicht in Widerspruch geraten. 
Seit dem Aufschwung der Persönlichkeitsrechte nach den zweiten Weltkrieg 
wird aber der Selbstschutz aus zweierlei Gründen erschwert. Einerseits schwindet das 
Medium des außerrechtlichen Schutzes dahin; die Gemeinschaften, die nicht rechtlich 
zusammengehalten werden, lösen sich auf, und die nichtrechtlichen Normensysteme 
verlieren an Kraf t . Andererseits, und das ist die wichtigere Ursache, verändert sich der 
Charakter der Eingriffe, denen die Person ausgesetzt ist. An Stelle der persönlichen 
Beleidigung tritt eine unpersönliche, oft technische Gefährdung, die schon deshalb das 
Kräftegleichgewicht der Parteien zerstört, und das umso mehr, als sie regelmäßig — im 
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Verhältnis zur Einzelperson — aus Übermacht, im allgemeinen aus einer Organisation 
hervorgeht. Die Gefahr ist also auch in diesem Sinne unpersönlich. (Die Beispiele 
gelten schon als Gemeinplätze: Abhörungs- und andere Überwachungsgeräte, 
elektronische Datenverarbeitung und das mit deren Hilfe hergestellte Persönlichkeits-
bild, im Gegensatz zur einstigen unabhängigen lokalen Presse die konzentrierten 
Massenmedien in der Hand des Staates oder von Großorganisationen.) Weiterhin 
wird, wie gesagt, die Persönlichkeit häufig durch die Unbegründetheit einer Regelung 
verletzt. Gegen all diese sind die überkommenen Selbstgarantien irrelevant, sie waren 
in einem anderen System wirksam. Wir müssen auch beachten, daß die „klassischen" 
Verletzungen vielmals eindeutiger als Verletzungen qualifiziert werden konnten, als 
die heutigen, weil ihr Deliktscharakter offensichtlich war. Jetzt verrelativiert sich das 
„Böse", das Übel in den vielfältigen Zusammenhängen, und der Aspekt wird 
vorrangig, bis zu welcher Grenze die Person im Widerstreit der Interessen die Eingriffe 
dulden muß. 
Wie die Gefahr ist, so ist auch die Abwehr . Die Tatsache aber, daß an die Stelle 
des Selbstschutzes der Schutz der Persönlichkeit etwa als „staatliche Leistung" tritt, 
kann höchstens in der Ideologie mit dem Programm der Freiheit vom Staat , der 
„Autonomie" übereinstimmen. 
Dieser aktuelle „organisatorische" Schutz wirft neue Fragen a u f — die dor t wo 
das Recht „die Schwächeren" schützt, im allgemeinen vorzufinden sind. Ein solches 
Problem ist. z. B. die Alternative des zivilgerichtlichen Weges oder der verwaltungs-
rechtlichen Regelung, die im Falle massenhafter und typischer Verletzungen schon in 
der Vergangenheit zu entscheiden war (siehe Arbeitsunfälle), und heute z. B. auf dem 
Gebiet des Datenschutzes oder der Medikamentenversuche besonders aktuell ist. Der 
gerichtliche Schutz setzt eine individuelle Klage voraus. Dadurch, und auch wegen der 
individueller Wirkung des Urteils ist eine Rückkoppelung zum Selbstschutz 
festzustellen. Hauptproblem dieses Gerichtsweges ist heute die Passivität der 
Verletzten. (Die Empfindlichkeit der Menschen gegenüber den Persönlichkeitsverlet-
zungen zu erwecken und sie zur Klage anzuspornen, heißt sie demokratisieren.) Der 
Gefahr entsprechend könnte man die Organisierung der Betroffenen versuchen. Eine 
Bürgerklage ist auch in der höchstpersönlichen Sachen der Persönlichkeitsrechtsver-
letzung denkbar (wenn z. B. es um die Erzwingung einer normativen Regelung, oder 
um die Anfechtung von Verwaltungsbeschluß geht: wie Einsichtrecht in die Daten, 
Berichtigungsrecht). Der Selbstschutz ist also nicht einmal in der Klageerhebung 
ausschließlich. Und zum Schluß: die unbestreitbare Priorität des organisatorischen 
Schutzes schließt die Anwendbarkeit von materiellen Garantien nicht unbedingt aus.47 
47
 S. z. B. REICH: The New Property. In: Schwartz; Skolnick (red.): Society and the Legal Order. 
New York/London, 1970. p. 595. 
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d) ,,Normative Rechtsprechung", allgemeine Verhaltensnormen — individuali-
sierter, billiger Schutz 
Die Ideologie der Autonomie ist natürlich in zahlreichen Eigenschaften des 
Persönlichtkeitsrechts ausreichend begründet. Die Interpretation liegt auf der Hand, 
daß der zivilrechtliche Schutz des Menschen durch den Persönlichkeitsrechtsschutz 
von der „abstrakten Person" auf die konkrete Person verlagert wird. An die Stelle des 
Eigentümerschutzes (oder daneben) tritt der Schutz des Menschen unabhängig von der 
Eigentümerqualität. Ein Aspekt desselben Prozesses ist es auch, daß die Qualifizierung 
des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts als subjektives Recht, sogar deren Möglichkeit 
bestritten ist. Das subjektive Recht verwirklicht in seiner Eindeutigkeit, und so in 
seiner Rationalität, die Idee der Selbstregulierung, und macht deshalb das richterliche 
Ermessen überflüssig — es sind also Ideen des klassischen Zivilrechts, und deshalb 
können wir im 19. Jahrhundert von der Herrschaft des materiellen Rechts sprechen. 
Nach dem Liberalismus kehrt sich aber alles um. Das System der subjektiven Rechte 
lockert sich auf, die richterliche Ermessenfreiheit dehnt sich aus. Das formelle Recht 
(d. h. das Verfahrensrecht) gewinnt an Bedeutung: die vom subjektiven Recht 
unabhängige „Klagbarkei t" rückt in erster Linie in den „Schutzaufgaben" des 
Zivilrechts (der Zivilgerichte) in den Vordergrund.4 8 Die mit der Billigkeit erscheinen-
de Individualisierung wurde im Persönlichkeitsrechtschutz noch durch den individuel-
len Charakter dieser Verhältnisse verstärkt. Hier hat die Individualisierung und 
Konkretisierung in der Tat kein Ende: es hängt selbst vom subjektiven Urteil ab, ob 
die Persönlichkeit überhaupt verletzt wurde. Auch rechtstechnisch scheint eine sehr 
individualisierte Interessenabwägung geboten: weder die Ehre, noch der gute Ruf, und 
noch weniger das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht geben dem Ermessen ein greifbares 
Maß; der Richter kann nur aufgrund aller Umständen des Einzelfalles Entscheidung 
treffen. Demnach ist das Maß der Persönlichkeitsrechte die Person selbst. 
Aber der Schein trügt. Wie der Persönlichkeitsschutz durch den Antiindividu-
alismus gefördert wurde, wie dieses Selbstbestimmung und Unabhängigkeit verspre-
chende Institut durch Erstreckung des staatlichen Eingriffes hochgewachsen wird, so 
ist auch die Privatsphäre keine Privatsache. Dies wäre hinsichtlich der gesellschaftli-
chen Funktion der Persönlichkeitsrechte ebenso undenkbar , wie technisch. Die 
rechtlichen Grenzen des Eingriffes, der Regulierung und der Lenkung (d. h. von der 
anderen Seite, die der Selbstkontrolle) können und sollen nur allgemein bestimmt 
werden, diese Grenzen können ausschließlich so garantiert werden. Auch im 
zivilrechtlichen Persönlichkeitsschutz geht es nämlich um die Festlegung der 
Rechtsstellung des Bürgers (ebenso wie früher mittels der abstrahierten 
Eigentümerstellung bzw. deren Möglichkeit, der Rechtsfähigkeit); aber heute schon in 
4 8
 So die Bürgerklage oder die class action im Umwelt- und Verbraucherschutz. Für Ungarn s. 
SÓLYOM, L.: Der zivilrechtliche Umweltschutz und die Möglichkeit einer Bürgerklage im ungarischen 
Recht. Acta Juridica, Acad. Sei. Hung. 1980, p. 19. 
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einem Zivilrecht, dessen „Autonom-Struktur" weit über die Vermögensverhältnisse 
hinausreicht. 
Die Verallgemeinerung und die Standardisierung sind andererseits auch 
technisch notwendig: im Rahmen des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts schafft der 
Richter Recht. Anders ausgedrückt, die Eigentümlichkeit der Generalklausel des 
allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts (oder des privacy) spricht gegen die Individualisie-
rung. Diese Generalklausel ermächtigte den Richter „besondere" Persönlichkeitsrech-
te zu konstituieren. Daher erklärt sie alle Werte, die der Entwicklung und der 
Autonomie der Persönlichkeit anhaften, grundsätzlich für gleichrangig mit allen hier 
geltend gemachten Gegeninteressen; — darüber hinaus enthält sie aber keinen 
konkreten Gesichtspunkt für die richterliche Interessenabwägung. Selbst die 
deliktische Generalklausel bietet mehr Anhalt, wo das Vorhandensein eines 
„Schadens" im allgemeinen die Rechtswidrigkeit begründet. Beim Persönlichkeits-
recht wird der Richter oft ein subjektives Recht deklarieren, soweit er eine 
Verletzungshandlung als rechtswidrig qualifiziert, d. h. die Persönlichkeitsrechtsver-
letzung feststellt, oder aber die Anwendbarkeit des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts 
beschließt. Bei der persönlichkeitsrechtlichen Generalklausel hilft auch das Verschul-
den wenig. Es ist aus geschichtlichen Gründen nicht in allen Rechtsordnungen 
Voraussetzung der Verantwortlichkeit, und wenn ja, auch dann bereitet es Schwierig-
keiten. Das Verschulden und Rechtswidrigkeit sind hier besonders schwer abgrenzbar. 
Der für die Verteilung von Vermögensrisiko ausgestaltete standardisierte 
Fahrlässigkeitsmaßstab paßt nicht zu den hier überwiegenden moralischen Elementen 
und Nichtvermögensschäden. Überhaupt müßte zuerst entschieden werden, ob die 
Verletzungshandlungen hier zweckmäßigerweise unter dem subjektiven Begriff des 
Verschuldens vereinigt werden sollten, oder der Schutz auf objektiven 
Interessenabwägung gegründet werden soll. Unter solchen Umständen ist es also 
verständlich, daß der Persönlichkeitsrechtsschutz von der uralten (und primitiven) 
Technik der Verallgemeinerung beherrscht wird: von der Versteifung und Entpersön-
lichung konkreter Tatbestände, d. h. von der Anerkennung neuer und neuer 
besonderer Persönlichkeitsrechte. Die Feststellung des Tatbestandes ersetzt die 
Anwendung der „Rechtswidrigkeit", der „Rechtsfertigungsgründe", sogar des 
„Verschuldens", man arbeitet hier mit der Abgrenzung, mit der Definition eines neuen 
Rechts. 
All das kann anhand eines bekannten Beispiels erläutert werden. Das Recht am 
eigenen Bild — wenn das Bild von der Massenmedien verwendet wurde — wird 
gegenüber der Freiheit der Information abgewägt. Für den Fall, d aß dieses letztere 
Interesse sich als das stärkere erweist, wendet man nicht die Konstruktion des 
absoluten Schutzes des Rechts am eigenen Bild und die Geltendmachung eines 
Rechtsfertigungsgrundes an, sondern dieses Recht selbst wird so ausgebaut, daß es 
sich auf „öffentliche Auftrit te" oder auf „Personen der Zeitgeschichte" schon von 
vornherein nicht erstreckt. Es gehört auch zur Methode der Verallgemeinerung, der 
Konstituierung eines Persönlichkeitsrechts, daß das Gericht die Kriterien des 
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öffentlichen Auftrittes oder der Qualifizierung als Person der Zeitgeschichte aufgrund 
objektiver Interessenabwägung, also im allgemeinen, und nicht im Hinblick auf die 
individuelle Empfindlichkeit des Klägers festlegt. (In der Rechtsprechung steht fest, 
wo die Grenzen der „Öffentlichkeit" sind, oder wie lange es dauert bis der 
„öffentliche" Charakter erlischt.) 
Wenn demnach jemand vom Durchschnitte abweicht, d. h. „autonom" handelt, 
verliert er sein Recht auf „Autonomie". Die technischen Fragen zeigen also auch, daß 
das Persönlichkeitsrecht dem Durchschnitt dient. 
Zum Schluß weisen wir noch darauf hin, daß nicht nur die Generalklausel, 
sondern auch die engeren Tatbestände häufig auf objektiven Kriterien aufgebaut sind. 
(In den USA ist z. B. die Veröffentlichung von persönlichen Daten einer der 
grundlegenden privacy-Tatbestände. Entscheidend ist immer die „Veröffentlichung"; 
der Schutz wird durch die die Veröffentlichung erlaubenden Privilegien umgrenzt, und 
nicht durch die Intimität der Data.) 
Es ist erst der erste Schritt zum Schutz, eine grobe Abgrenzung der besonderen 
Persönlichkeitsrechte, was auf diese Weise geschieht; die so gegebenen objektiven 
Grenzen sind weit genug um weiteren Abwägungen Raum zu geben. Aber die Gerichte 
geben auch hier keinen wirklich individualisierten Schutz, sie bemühen sich vielmehr 
um die Entwicklung allgemeiner Standardé. Prüften wir die Persönlichkeitsrechte aus 
der besonderen Sicht der Haftung her, könnten wir sehen, daß hier nicht nur 
Rechtswidrigkeit und Verschulden, sondern auch noch Schaden voneinander nicht 
trennbar sind, und daß sie einander gegenseitig definieren. (Um den Schutz zu 
genießen, soll der Verletzte „normal" empfindlich sein.) Die Grenze des Persönlich-
keitsrechts ist also im allgemeinen die Vernünftigkeit. Auch das richterliche Ermessen 
ist nicht völlig individualisiert. Es strebt notwendigerweise danach Standardé zu bilden 
oder anzuwenden.4 9 Wir haben den Eindruck, daß das Institut des Persönlichkeits-
rechtsschutzes, während es den rechtlichen Schutz auf f rüher von dem Selbstschutz 
beherrschte Gebiete ausdehnt , diesen Lebensverhältnissen quasi ein „Gesetz ge-
ben" will — an Stelle der obsoleten gesellschaftlichen Normen, oder den 
existierenden entgegen. Dieser Prozeß ist technisch noch widerspruchsvoll und 
ungelöst.50 
4 9
 K A L V E N macht es lächerlich, daß im verfassungsrechtlichen Persönlichkeitsschutz der USA 
innerhalb von 20 Jahren mehr Regeln aufgestellt wurden, als während 200 Jahren im Deliktsrecht. (The 
Reasonable Man and the First Amendment. The Supreme Court Review, 1967. p. 267, 299.) Diese 
Normsetzung, Standardisierung ist aber natürlich. Für das sowjetische Recht s. Ф Л Е Й Ш И Ц ; Й О Ф Ф Е (red.): 
Комментарий к ГК РСФСР. Moskwa, 1970., zum § 7., wo betont wird, daß es nicht vom subjektiven 
Empfinden des Verletzten abhängt, ob ein Persönlichkeitsrecht verletzt wurde, oder nicht. Darüber 
entscheidet das Gericht, „aufgrund der Moral der den Kommunismus aufbauenden Gesellschaft und der 
Regel des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens, unter Beachtung des kulturellen Niveaus und des Bewußtseins 
des Verletzten". 
50
 Die abstrakte Kasuistik der Ausbauperiode der Persönlichkeitsrechte entsprach den garantiellen 
Aufgaben. Doch ist es schon heute zu fragen, wie man (etwa als Ersatz für den dogmatisch festen 
,,Schadens"-begrifT) das Minimum des Schutzes dogmatisch formulieren könnte, und zwar umso mehr, da 
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e) Die Konstruktion ähnlicher Gegensatz-Paare könnte fast unbegrenzt 
fortgeführt werden. Dadurch aber würden wir einerseits nur die Überdeckungen 
vermehren, und andererseits würden wir dieselben Probleme immer nu r aus ein wenig 
veränderter Sicht, immer nur ein wenig anders beleuchtet sehen. Mit Recht können wir 
also fragen, ob nicht derselbe Widerspruch variiert wird, und o b anstatt der 
Vermehrung, diese Widersprüche nicht auf einen wesentlichen Widerspruch reduziert 
werden könnten. U . E. lohnt es sich nicht. 
Das Grundproblem des Persönlichkeitsrechts ist nämlich selbst von sehr 
allgemeiner Natur . Es handelt sich um grundlegende Lösungen des Verhältnisses 
zwischen Individuum and Gesellschaft, Gesellschaft und Staat, bzw. Staat und 
Individuum, wobei für die Persönlichkeitsrechte nur das charakteristisch ist, daß sie 
diese Verhältnisse sehr unmittelbar ausdrücken. D a rau s ergibt sich einerseits, daß 
das Persönlichkeitsrecht sehr eng und empfindlich mit der jeweiligen geschichtlichen 
Situation verbunden ist, und deshalb sein konkreter Inhalt und seine Funktion sehr 
veränderlich sind. Weiterhin, da es nicht allein die erwähnten grundlegenden 
Verhältnisse rechtlich erfaßt, sind sein Verhältnis zu den anderen grundlegenden 
Rechtsinstituten, sowie seine Wichtigkeit auch geschichtlich bedingt variabel. (Z. B. 
sein Verhältnis zu den Grundrechten der Verfassung oder zum Eigentumsrecht.) 
Gleichzeitig aber — ebenfalls historisch eng determiniert — scheinen die Ideologie des 
Persönlichkeitsrechts, und sein Wert inhal t beständig zu sein. Die Persönlichkeitsrech-
te können also immer unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Verhältnisses zwischen 
individueller Freiheit und Autonomie sowie der Macht analysiert werden. Diese 
Analyse würde sicherlich zur Klä rung der rechtlichen Natur der Persönlichkeitsrechte 
beitragen. An dieser Stelle behandeln wir nicht diese allgemeinen Probleme, sondern 
die Widersprüche, die für das Persönlichkeitsrecht als Rechtsinstitut spezifisch sind. 
Deshalb setzen wir die Reihe der Widersprüche for t — diesmal aber ohne detaillierte 
Erörterung. Durch diese Beispiele wollen wir die Funktionsweise des Persönlichkeits-
rechts im allgemeinen beschreiben. Wir systematisieren die verschiedenen Aspekte 
indem wir die Gegensätze gemäß den heute wichtigsten Typen der Persönlichkeitsrech-
te einordnen: nach dem „politischen" und dem „neutra len" Persönlichkeitsrecht. Die 
einzelnen Persönlichkeitsrechte k ö n n e n natürlich nicht als ausschließlich „politisch" 
oder „neutral" gewertet werden; beide Seiten des Widerspruchs sind ja in jedem 
enthalten, auch wenn deren eine vorherrscht. Es geht also genauer gesagt um zwei 
möglichen Anwendungsarten, um zwei Funktionen eines beliebigen Persönlichkeits-
rechts. Trotzdem wählen wir bei de r Aufstellung der folgenden Tabelle die für die 
einzelnen Seiten repräsentativen Rechte als Beispiel. 
die Schutzansprüche die festen Tatbestände häufig sprengen. (So wurde z. B. die strikt definierte defamation 
im amerikanischen c o m m o n law von dem privacy durchgebrochen. Das Kriterium der reasonableness löst 
andererseits die Garantien auf, und verbindet den Schutz zu eng mit der konkreten gesellschaftlichen 
Situation.) 
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Beispiele: Das allgemeine Persönlich-
keitsrecht und die sich davon abtren-
nenden neuen Rechte 
„politisch" 




„Entfa l tung" 
alltägliche Aktivität 
individuell, nach „Autonomie" stre-
bend 
subjektiv (Selbstbestimmung) 
das Gegebene gestaltend, umformend 
kreativ, kritisch 
unsicherer Schutz 
„Neugebiete" der rechtlichen Rege-
lung, Grenzfalle 
Die Lösung des individuellen Konfl ikts 
ist zugleich auch eine neue Kompetenz-
verteilung, „Normgebung" 
In der Entscheidung sind die konkreten 
Tatsachen und die jeweilige Rechtspoli-
tik maßgebend 
subjektives Recht, Übergang zu den 
Freiheitsrechten und den reinen politi-
schen Kategorien 
die „klassischen", bzw. allgemein ak-
zeptierten einzelnen besonderen Per-
sönlichkeitsrechte 
„neu t ra l " 
Abgrenzung und Schutz der Privat-
sphäre 
Passivität, Aufrechterhaltung des gege-
benen Status 
Verinnerlichung, Ausschluß der Au-
ßenwelt 
außerordentliche Gefährdung, äußerer 
Angriff 
die Stellung im Kollektiv sichernd 
objektiv (gesellschaftliche oder Rechts-
normen) 
in das Gegebene integrierend, das 
verstärkend 
der bestehenden O r d n u n g entsprechend 
die Gerechtigkeit verwirklichend 
sicherer Schutz 
gewöhnliche, alltägliche Tatbestände 
Der individuelle Konfl ikt wird im 
beständigen, kollektiven Rahmen 
geschlichtet, dieser Rahmen wird da-
durch verstärkt 
Die Entscheidung enthäl t viele formelle 
Elemente 
subjektives Recht, Übergang zu reiner 
sanktionierender Rolle des Zivilrechts 
a u f g r u n d inhaltgebender anderer 
Rechtsnormen („schützt nur") 
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Nach der Tabelle wiederholen wir so fo r t , daß wir d a r i n die Widersprüche 
aufgezeigt haben , die zum Wesen der Persönlichkeitsrechte gehören , also für ein jedes 
Persönlichkeitsrecht gelten, und daß diese Widersprüche nicht erstarrt sind. Gegebe-
nenfalls kann auch ein „klassisches" Persönlichkeitsrecht „pol i t i sch" funkt ionieren, 
und umgekehrt . Diese Widersprüche lassen sich sehr leicht ineinander uminterpretie-
ren; „Pr iva tsphäre" und „Gesel lschaf t" , „ A u t o n o m i e " und Integra t ion" sind eigent-
lich voneinander nicht t r ennbar . Das gilt f ü r alle, oben erör te r ten charakteristischen 
Widersprüche, wie individuelle Selbstverwirklichung — durchschnitt l icher Schutz , 
Freiheit von der Regulierung — rechtlicher Schutz usw. Es ist z. B. offensichtlich, d a ß 
der für Anerkennung seines Rechts auf individuellen Lebensstil Auftretende seine 
innere und äußere Unabhängigkei t betont, und seinen eigenen Weg geht. Gleichzeitig 
drückt er aber schon dadurch , d a ß er rechtlichen Schutz begehrt , seine Bereitschaft zur 
Integration aus, und tut den ersten Schritt d a f ü r , daß sein momen tan in Augen der 
Mehrheit noch deviant geltendes Verhalten allgemein ane rkann t und zum Bestandteil 
der herrschenden Ordnung werde. Es ist d a h e r kein Zufall, wenn solche Begriffe wie 
Regulierung und Selbstbestimmung, oder Grenzfal l und Alltäglichkeit auf beiden 
Seiten der Tabelle vorzufinden sind. (Zur Erk lä rung des letzteren denken wir z. B. 
daran, d a ß die erwähnte „Devianz" gesellschaftlich sicherlich einen Grenzfa l l 
darstellt, wird aber als Persönlichkeitsrecht anerkannt , so wird es Grundlage des 
tagtäglichen Lebens der Person . — Eine Ehrverletzung bringt d a s Individuum durch 
die Erschüt terung seines S ta tus in Grenzsi tuat ion, solche Fäl le sind aber gesellschaft-
lich alltäglich, und mit dem Schutzmechanismus zusammen rutinmäßig.) 
Diese Relativität m a c h t aber die Unterscheidung der Funktionsweisen des 
Persönlichkeitsrechts nicht sinnlos. Im Gegenteil : es sind eben die Relativität der 
Unterscheidung, und ihre Grundlage , die ununterbrochene „ A u f h e b u n g " des Indivi-
duellen und des Autonomen in der Gesellschaft , die das Wesen des Persönlichkeits-
rechts am bildhaftesten ausdrücken . Die „pol i t ische" Funktionsweise ist die Avan t -
garde. Sie strebt der Sicherung der Selbstverwirklichung, de r Autonomie nach — 
obwohl diese mittels des Rechts , das dazu e infach ungeeignet ist, nie erreichbar sind. 
Dennoch kann man die prakt i sche Leistung Persönlichkeitsrechte und ihre Mögl ich-
keiten nicht hoch genug einschätzen. Zwischen den Ex t remen der „moral ischen 
Genial i tät" , die zur Verwirklichung der A u t o n o m i e notwendig wäre und des rest los in 
die Gesellschaft bzw. den S taa t integrierten Individuums bedeute t das Persönlichkeits-
recht die Vermittlung. Es gewähr t einen erträglichen Spielraum: „das Recht a n der 
Nuance" , wie der ungarische Dichter Gyula Illyés sagt. Das bedeute t ein Recht au f das 
Versuchen, das Suchen des eigenen Weges, a u f die Anerkennung der Alternative, des 
„Gesetzes des Morgens". S o g a r in einem versteiften „klass ischen" Persönlichkeits-
recht können wir das Prinzip der Individualisierung entdecken; auch es bewahr t vor 
der völligen Einschmelzung in die Gesellschaft. 
Solange wir die N a t u r und das Funkt ionieren des Persönlichkeitsrechts so 
abstrakt untersuchen, kann die Betonung und die positive Bewertung der e rwähn ten 
Vermittlerrolle als willkürlich erscheinen. Theoret isch könn ten wir auch die andere 
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Seite hervorheben. Demnach wäre das politische Persönlichkeitsrecht gar keine Avant-
garde, es diente im Gegenteil dazu, der politischen oder andersartigen Avantgarde 
eine Falle zu stellen, diese zurückzuhalten. Es verspräche nicht Autonomie, sondern 
die Verminderung und Milderung der Konflikte.5 1 Welche Verinnerlichung der 
„äußeren Macht" , welche Identifikation mit der Rechtsordnung ist notwendig um 
hinzunehmen, daß die Grenzen durch das Persönlichkeitsrecht gezogen werden, die 
das Individuum nicht mehr zu den Hobbes'schen „inneren Vorbehalten" zwingen! 
Die Dialektik der Persönlichkeitsrechte entartet offensichtlich unvermeidlich zu 
Sophistik — wenn wir nämlich die Widersprüche nicht in ihrer Einheit auffassen; wenn 
wir in den völlig abstrakt entworfenen Mechanismus heimlich — gleichfalls abstrakte 
— Werte hineinbringen (die Abschätzung des Kompromisses, oder das Lob der 
Vermittlung); wenn wir trotz der Erkennung der Natur der Persönlichkeitsrechte 
diesen entgegengesetzen Forderungen stellen, wenn wir vom Persönlichkeitsrecht 
etwas verlangen, wozu das Recht nicht fähig ist. Die prinzipielle Klärung der 
Wesenszyge des Persönlichkeitsrechts war die Voraussetzung seiner praktischen 
Handhabung. Aber jede weitere Wertung ist nur in gesellschaftlichem Kontext 
sinnvoll. Der gesellschaftliche Hintergrund der Persönlichkeitsrechte ist heute, zur 
Zeit ihrer weltweiten Verbreitung, ziemlich heterogen — besonders wenn wir es mit 
dem einheitlichen Gesellschaftsbild, Menschenbild und Wertordnung vergleichen, 
die dieses Recht jahrhundertelang begleiteten. Jedenfalls stehen ihre „politische" 
Deutung und Praxis in Einklang mit der jüngsten Geschichte, und mit den Ursachen 
der Blüte der heutigen Persönlichkeitsrechte. 
2. Diese empirische Mündung unserer theoretischer Untersuchung ist not-
wendig, sie ist sogar selbst ein theoretisches Ergebnis. Es stimmt mit den Resultaten 
unserer historischer Studien überein. Das Persönlichkeitsrecht dar f nicht nur von der 
konkreten geschichtlichen Situation nicht abstrahiert werden, sondern auch nicht von 
der vorausgesetzten Wertordnung (Gesellschaft- und Menschenbild). Diese Feststel 
lung wäre Gemeinplatz wenn wir nicht hinzufügten, daß die heutige Unsicherheit und 
Widersprüchlichkeit der Persönlichkeitsrechte mit der Unklarheit dieser Grundlagen 
zusammenhängen. Unsere allgemeine Untersuchung müßte demnach mit der Prüfung 
der Persönlichkeitsrechte in den einzelnen Rechtsordnungen, unter Berücksichtigung 
des gesellschaftlichen Hintergrundes und der herrschenden Ideologien fortgesetzt 
werden. Dies ginge natürlich über den Rahmen dieser Studie weit hinaus. Wir 
schließen die vorliegende Arbeit mit der Hervorhebung eines sehr wichtigen Gesichts-
punktes: die Persönlichkeitsrechte müssen in die totale Entwicklung des Zivilrechts 
eingefügt werden. 
a ) Wir sahen, daß die isolierte Untersuchung der Persönlichkeitsrechte nicht 
zweckmäßig ist, und daß der Zusammenhang dieser Rechte mit dem Zivilrecht auch 
51
 Aufschlußreich ist in dieser Beziehung die Konzeption von L U H M A N N über die Gewissensfreiheit. 
Er schlägt vor, unter Gewissensfreiheit anstelle liberaler Phrasen das zu verstehen, daß der Staat seinen 
Bürgern keine zu Gewissenskonflikt führenden Entscheidungen auferlegt. Die Gewissensfreiheit und das 
Gewissen. Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 1965. p. 257. 
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nicht auf systematische Probleme reduziert werden kann. Es bringt vielmehr Ergebnis, 
wenn die Persönlichkeitsrechte als Teil der Wandlungen des Zivilrechts gesehen 
werden. Die heutige Wichtigkeit der Persönlichkeitsrechte ist z. B. Symptom der 
neueren Zivilrechtsentwicklung, und auch umgekehrt: die Eigenheiten der Entfal tung 
des Persönlichkeitsschutzes beleuchten und interpretieren die Tendenzen im Zivil-
recht. Als Beispiel nennen wir die ständig ausgeprägter werdende Schutzfunktion des 
Zivilrechts, die sich in den Persönlichkeitsrechten, im Verbraucher- und im Umwelt-
schutz realisiert. Diese alle zeichnen sich durch eine „Allgemeinheit" aus. Die 
Bedeutung der Sache kann über die Interessensphäre der Parteien hinausgehen. Ihre 
Schutzwirkung umfaßt auch Andere. Die Inanspruchnahme des Schutzes kann von 
der Verletzung eines subjektiven Rechtes unabhängig werden. Die Rolle des Richters 
im Vergleich zu den nur die Parteien berührenden Rechtsstreiten verändert sich. Die 
organisierende, allgemein normsetzende, sogar rechtssetzende Funktion des Richters 
wird betont, da er in solchen Fällen immer grundsätzlichen Interessen und Werte 
konkretisiert bzw. abwägt, und zwar hinsichtlich beider Parteien. (So muß er z. B. das 
Interesse der Produktion gegenüber dem der Umwelt abwägen. In Persönlichkeits-
rechtsachen können sich beide Parteien auf die Grundrechte der Verfassung berufen.) 
Die Interessenabwägung ist häufig unmittelbar politischer Natur , aber mittelbar ist sie 
immer. In dieser Perspektive ist die Entwicklung des materiellen und des Prozeßrechts 
zusammen zu betrachten. 
Die Wandlungen sind besonders aufschlußreich hinsichtlich der Weiterentwick-
lung der zivilrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit. Durch ihre Klä rung können wir Ge-
sichtspunkte gewinnen um zu sehen welcher Schritt auf die Entfal tung der schon gut 
bekannten Entwicklungstendenzen (wie die Objektivierung der Haftungsgrundlage, 
die durch Einschaltung von Schadensverteilungsmechanismen ausgebauten Systeme 
der Schadensregulierung) folgen soll. Statt des Schadenersatzes werden andere 
Sanktionen in den Vordergrund treten, wie z. B. das Verbot oder die Einstellung einer 
bestimmten Tätigkeit, oder aber eine positive Regulierung der Sache durch die 
Bestimmung des künftigen Verhaltens der Parteien. Der heutige Mechanismus der 
zivilrechtlichen Haftung ist auf einer vom Schadenersatz ausgehenden Risikovertei-
lung aufgebaut. Es ist sehr problematisch, ob und wie die Grundbegriffe dieses Systems 
in einer ganz anderen Interessenabwägung genutzt werden können, und — anstelle des 
Verschuldens — wie diese Interessenabwägung standardisiert werden kann. 
Die erwähnten Neuigkeiten sind schon — wenigstens in ihren Anfängen — auch 
im ungarischen Recht vorzufinden. In der Rechtsprechung der Zivilgerichte verbreitet 
sich die indirekte Revision von Verwaltungsbeschlüssen. Die Novelle des Z G B von 
1977 brachte den (wenn auch sehr bescheidenen) Versuch eine Bürgerklage auf dem 
Gebiet des Verbraucherschutzes zu institutionalisieren. Daß die neue Aufgaben der 
Richter, und besonders ihre Rolle als Gegengewicht der Verwaltung zukünftig nicht 
mehr umgangen werden können, zeigt auch die Neuregelung der Persönlichkeitsrechte 
in der ZGB-Novelle. Diese bestimmt, daß die elektronische Datenverarbeitung die 
Persönlichkeitsrechte nicht verletzen soll, die Daten Unbefugten nicht herausgegeben 
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werden dürfen, weiterhin, daß über die gespeicherten Daten der Betroffene auf 
Verlangen informiert werden soll. Diese Information kann ihm nu r verweigert werden, 
wenn dadurch „staatliche Interessen oder die Interessen der öffentlichen Sicherheit 
verletzt würden". Der Betroffene hat auch Recht auf die Berichtigung. (ZGB § 83.) — 
Die weitere Bestimmung aber, nach der es den Ministerien ermöglicht wurde , 
hinsichtlich des Berichtigungsrechts den Verwaltungsweg der gerichtlichen Geltend-
machung voranzustellen, kann rechtspolitisch nur als Rückschritt gewertet werden 
(Einf G. ZGB § 3.). Und zur Zeit steht noch auch die Grundsatzfrage offen: ob die 
Gerichte auch darüber entscheiden können, daß durch die Ausgabe der Information 
wirklich Staats- und Sicherheitsinteressen verletzt würden? 
b) All diese Änderungen beeinflussen den Status der zivilrechtlichen 
Rechtsverhältnisse unter den anderen Rechtsverhältnissen: sie verlangen eine 
Bewußtmachung des aktuellen hohen Wertes der „Autonomst ruk tu r" des Zivilrechts. 
Das klassische Zivilrecht war wirklich das Recht des Bürgertums, und seine zentrale 
Rolle war auch berechtigt in einer Gesellschaft, die von dem M a r k t beherrscht wurde. 
Die Veränderung des Charakters des Zivilrechts (die oft bis zur Aufgabe seiner 
Identität reicht) ist allgemein bekannt, und allgemein anerkannt — jedoch nur in 
Bezug auf die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse, deren Politisierung jedermann zur 
Kenntnis nimmt. 
Was aber die Lebensverhältnisse anbetrifft, die etwa außerhalb der Haupts t rö-
mung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung geblieben sind, ist die Ungleichmäßigkeit der 
Entwicklung auffallend: sie bilden ein Reservat aus dem 19. Jahrhundert . Als solche 
können wir z. B. die schadensrechtlichen Sachverhälte nennen, die keine Beziehung zu 
den Betriebs- und Verkehrsunfällen (oder anderen „technischen" Schäden) und so zur 
objektiven Haf tung haben; aber auch die „neutra len" Fälle des Persönlichkeitsschut-
zes. In den sozialistischen Ländern, in denen ein selbständiger Rechtszweig „Wir t -
schaftsrecht" gebildet wurde, büßten die dem „Zivilrecht" übriggelassenen 
Verhältnisse ihre Bedeutung ein. 
Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung pausierte aber auch in den Sphären außerhalb 
der „großen Wirtschaft" nicht. N u r weil die „au tonome S t ruk tur" des Zivilrechts 
immer noch mit den „Warenverhältnissen" identifiziert wird, können die nach ihrer 
Gleichheit modellierten Rechtsverhältnisse der Bürger—die Institute des tschechoslo-
wakischen ZGB hier als Symbole verwendend — auf „persönliche Nutzung von 
Wohnräumen" oder „Verkauf in Läden" reduziert werden. 
Die Notwendigkeit der schon erwähnten Schutzfunktion, und deren neue 
Rechtsinstitute weisen auch auf die Unhaltbarkeit solcher „Reservat"-Auffassun-
gen hin. Die verschiedenen „Schutz"-Institute funktionieren als Vermittlung zwischen 
den Sphären der Politik bzw. der schon politisierten Wirtschaft und andererseits der 
„autonomen Struktur" ; sie politisieren die letztere und erweitern ihr Wirkungsfeld 
weit über die ursprünglichen Vermögensverhältnisse hinaus. D a f ü r ist der häufige 
Funktionswandel von dieser althergebrachten Sphäre angehörenden Instituten wie 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
I 
3 2 8 L. Sólyom 
die des Nachbarrechts (im Umweltschutz) oder des Schutzes der Ehre (in zahlreichen 
politischen Rollen) ein Zeichen. 
Die gleiche Position der Parteien im Zivilprozeß und die „Gleichheit" der 
autonomen Struktur können heute zu Korrekt ion der faktischen Ungleichheit der 
(Kräfte) der Parteien nutzbar gemacht werden. Eine in diesem Geist arbeitende 
Zivilrechtsprechung ist in Unga rn umso mehr zu wünschen, als das hiesige System die 
Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit nicht kennt, und der neuerlich vom Staat auf die Bürger 
verschobene Schutz52 vor den Zivilgerichten realisiert werden sollte. Die oben 
besprochene Politisierung der Persönlichkeitsrechte, die eigentlich Gruppeninteressen 
dienenden Prozesse, wie die Bürgerklagen im Umwelt- und Verbraucherschutz zeigen 
die noch vorhandenen Möglichkeiten der au tonomen Struktur in der Entwicklung der 
Demokratie. Ein mehr konkreter Umriß dieser Perspektive verlangte die praktische 
Entfaltung der „Schutz"-Institute. Dieser Gedankengang führt aber schon zu unserem 
Ausgangspunkt zurück: zu der rechtspolitischen Wichtigkeit der Aktivierung des 
Schutzes der Persönlichkeitsrechte. 
Права личности. 
Тенденции развития и противоречия 
Л. Шойом 
Во второй части автор подвергает пересмотру те вопросы прав личности, которые чаще всего 
обсуждены д о сих пор в социалистической цивилистике, а именно — взаимосвязь прав личности с 
имущественными отношениями и соотношение о б щ и х и отдельных специальных личных прав. 
Автор на такой позиции, что права личности сложились в конце XIX века для защиты владельцев 
(ведь они компенсировали упадок шанса самоохраны в либеральном смысле слова). В то время это 
дало политические содержание правам личности: указанное право явилось одним из антилибераль-
ных генеральных клаузул. По сравнению с этим специальные личные права были центральными 
с политической точки зрения. 
В третьей части представлены современные тенденции прав личности. После второй мировой 
войны личные права охарактеризованы приобретением политического и всеобщего характера, в 
особенности же — связыванием с конституционными правами и свободами. 
Четвертая часть — попытка для характеристики прав личности их внутренними противоре-
чиями. В крайних пределах автономии личности и полной ее интеграции в общество права личности 
— являясь одновременно средствами охраны и источниками опасности — могут обеспечить 
бестягостный простор личности. 
52
 Die Schutzfunktion kehrt sich um: Nach der Stabilisation der Macht ist nicht mehr der Staat 
gegen die Bürger, sondern der Bürger vor dem Staat zu schützen. (S. neuer § 349 ung. ZGB über die 
Staatshaftung; E Ö R S I , GY . : Tézisek a polgári jogi felelősségről) (Thesen über die zivilrechtliche Verantwort-
lichkeit). Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1976. p. 185, 200. 
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The privacy. 
Development trends and controversies 
L . S Ó L Y O M 
The paper is an introduction to the theoretical survey of personality rights. 
Part II critically examines the most debated problems of privacy in the Soviet civil law literature: the 
relation of privacy to the property rights and the relation between the "general personality right" and some 
special torts of privacy. According to the author the right of privacy emerged at the end of the 19th century as 
the protection of owner (i.e. the deterioration of the self-protection in the liberal sense was compensated that 
way). Then this gave the political substance of general personality right: this right was one of the anti-liberal 
general clauses. On the contrary the special privacy rights are politically neutral. 
Part III presents the recent trends of privacy rights. After World War II the privacy rights are 
characterized by their political substance and generalisation, especially their growing connection with the 
constitutional rights o f freedom. 
Part IV is an attempt to characterize the privacy by their inner controversies. Between the extremities 
of individual autonomy and the total integration to the society the privacy rights—they are protective means 
and sources of danger themselves—ensure acceptable margin for the individual to an antonomous activity. 
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Kann die Rechtswissenschaft 
Gesellschaftswissenschaft sein? 
A . SAJÓ 
Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter des Staats- und Rechtswissenschaftlichen Instituts 
der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
Die Übernahme der modernen gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Kenntnisse ging in den 
verschiedenen Zweigen der kontinentalen und der sozialistischen Rechtswissenschaften in 
abweichendem Maß vor sich. Die Übernahme spielte sich unter unterschiedlichen geschichtlichen 
Umständen ab, dementsprechend spiegeln sich in den rechtswissenschaftlichen Zweigen die zur Zeit 
der Übernahme herrschenden gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Erwartungen. Darin daß die 
Rechtswissenschaft effektiv zur Gesellschaftswissenschaft wird, bildet auch jene gesellschaftliche 
Funktion ein Hindernis, die die Rechtswissenschaft zu erfüllen berufen ist. 
Die Auffassung der Wissenschaftlichkeit als Fahndung nach der Gesetzmäßigkeit verursacht 
für die juristische Theoriebildung Schwierigkeiten. Dazu müßte nämlich der Jurist sein eigenes Fach 
überschreiten, oder müßte sich in die sterile Welt der rechtlichen Strukturen verschließen. 
Rechtstheoretisch ist es hinreichend, wenn Hypothesen mit erklärender Kraft zur Verfügung stehen, 
und es muß nicht das „Wesen" der rechtlichen Erscheinungen erschließen werden. In der 
Rechtswissenschaft vereinfacht sich das Programm der „Wesenserschließung" zur Begriffsfor-
schung. 
Der Vorgang, daß die Rechtswissenschaft zur Gesellschaftswissenschaft wird, hat 
immanente Schranken (z. B. Antropomorphismus). Das ändert aber nichts an der Sache, daß die 
Rechtswissenschaft als Wissenschaft behandelt werden soll (d. h. daß die Kenntnisse durch 
Mitwirkung eines offenen wissenschaftlichen Publikums entwickelt werden), und es bedeutet nicht 
daß es nicht möglich wäre auf dem Gebiet der Theoriebildung weiter zu schreiten. 
1. Entwicklungen in der Gegenwart 
Ist es vorstellbar, daß die durch die Freirechtschule verpöhnte „Kryptosoziolo-
gie" (d. i. die verhehlte Inachtnahme der gesellschaftlichen Tatsachen unter dem 
Deckmantel der begrifflichen Subsummierung) ihren Platz in der Rechtswissenschaft 
der Pseudosoziologie räumt? Verbirgt sich hinter der Losung „Wirklichkeitsan-
spruch" die Willkür oder in besserem Fall eine traditionelle dogmatische Darlegung, 
verhüllt in moderne Terminologie? Es gibt Zeichen, die das glauben lassen, besonders 
in den Fachrechtswissenschaften, wo der überwiegende Teil der Mitteilungen einer 
normativen und nicht einer gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Paradigma entspricht. Die 
rechtstheoretische Rechtssoziologie produziert bis heute bloß Theorien darüber , wie 
sie aussehen könnte wenn sie wüßte, wie sie aussehen soll, aber im Vordergrund der 
Forschungen steht die Inachtnahme der „Wirklichkeit". Diese Wirklichkeit ist aber 
eher rechtlichen (normativen) als gesellschaftlichen Charakters. Eine rechtliche 
„Tatsache" ist neben der Rechtsnorm auch die Gerichtspraxis, aber die Inachtnahme 
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der außergerichtlichen Rechtspraxis (z. B. Gewohnhei ten , Vertragsregeln usw.) wird 
beinahe in demselben M a ß für außerrechtswissenschaftl iche Soziologisierung gehal-
ten, als zu Zeiten Eugen Ehrlichs. Die einzelnen fachrechtswissenschaftlichen Zweige 
verhalten sich unterschiedlich; an einzelnen Gebieten kommt die Pa rad igma einer 
reinen Rechtswissenschaft fast der kelsenischen Ideologie entsprechend zur Geltung. 
Hauptsächlich k o m m t es im Staatsrecht und Staatsverwaltungsrecht zu einer solchen 
Säuberung. Auch im internationalen Recht , wo angesichts der Unentwickeltheit des 
Normenmater ia ls zu erwarten wäre, d a ß die Synthese de r „Wirklichkeitswissenschaft" 
und der „Normwissenschaf t " zus tande kommt, ist d a s die Haupt tendenz . Diese 
werden durch Politikwissenschaft, Soziologie und Organisat ionswissenschaft abge-
löst, oder sie werden parallel ausgebaut . Das Verwaltungsrecht ist das charakteristi-
sche Gebiet, das während der Herrschaft der rechtlichen Weltanschauung seine Macht 
auf die traditionellen kameralistischen Gebiete erstreckte, und diese d a n n , in der 
Periode der Anforderungen der modernen Verwaltung und des Rückfalls des Rechts, 
neuen Fachwissenschaften — Ökonomie , Soziologie, Organisationswissenschaft — 
abtri t t . In dieser antidogmatischen W e n d u n g spielt der Positionsverlust de r Juristen in 
der Verwaltung eine nicht zu vernachlässigende Rolle (SZAMEL, 1976, 258). In den 
wider auf die traditionelle Dogmatik beschränkten Fachrechtswissenschaften verursa-
chen die — aus wissenschaftssoziologischem Gesichtspunkt „ g e w ö h n t e n " — 
Schwierigkeiten Probleme. Anders verhält es sich bei den zwischen den Rahmen der 
Rechtswissenschaft gebliebenen neuen Wirklichkeitwissenschaften (Rechtssoziologie) 
und der innerhalb der die traditionelle Struktui wahrenden Fachwissenschaften (z. B. 
Zivilrecht) gebliebenen gesellschaftswissenschaftlich orientierten Teilelemente. 
Aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Wirksamkei t der Gesellschaftslenkung ist jedenfalls 
die Inachtnahme gewisser Realitäten unentbehrlich. Diese Wirklichkeitsempfindlich-
keit ist unmittelbar und in erster Linie mit der wissenschaftlichen Begründung der 
Rechtsschaffung verbunden. Wie es KULCSÁR (1976, 103) betont, trat die Behandlung 
des Rechts als Instrumentalproblem in den Vordergrund, wodurch die Rechtswissen-
schaft bedeutend umgestaltet wird, indem, im Gegensa tz zur Ausschließung der 
Rechtspolitik, unter dem früheren N a m e n „ N a t u r r e c h t " und „Poli t ik" nun versucht 
wird diese in die Rechtswissenschaft zu integrieren. Diese wissenschaftliche 
Begründung hat freilich Grenzen, und zwar nicht nu r infolge der wissenschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, sondern auch wegen der Erwartungen der Rechtspolitik. Die Rechtspo-
litik beziehungsweise die durch sie beeinflußte Rechtsgestaltung ist näml ich genau so 
eine soziologische Reali tät , wie zum Beispiel die Rechtsanwendung, sie wird also von 
verschiedenen Interessenüberlegungen, oder gar d u r c h irrationale Mechanismen 
ziemlich stark beeinflußt. Dieser U m s t a n d stellt der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis im 
vorhinein schon Schranken. 
Andererseits machten die Bedeutung der richterlichen Rechtsgestal tung 
(beziehungsweise deren Ausbreitung auf dem Kont inent) , und die sich daran 
knüpfenden Interessen die Forschung der gerichtlichen Entscheidungen notwendig. 
Traditionell war es — zumindest theoretisch — zur Entscheidung hinreichend die 
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Rechtsnorm richtig zu kennen. In den zwanziger-dreißiger Jahren erwies sich das im 
ohnehin fallrechtlich eingestellten amerikanischen Rechtsleben für ungenügend, 
beziehungsweise es war die Rechtspraxis, wegen der konservativen, an dem 
Dogmatismus der Begriffsanalyse beharrenden richterlichen Stellungnahme, unfähig, 
sich der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit des Monopolkapital ismus anzuschließen. Das 
führte zu einer Krise im Rechtsleben, die sich dann später, während der großen 
Wirtschaftskrise weiter vertiefte. Unter solchen Umständen wurde die Untersuchung 
des rechtlichen Verhaltens zum unmittelbaren Ziel — wesentlich im Sinne der 
programmgebenden These von Holmes im Jahr 1897 (unter Recht sollen hier die 
Prophezeiungen bezüglich der effektiven Tätigkeit der Gerichtshöfe verstanden 
werden). Die realistische Rechtswissenschaft näherte sich (sowohl in ihrer fakten- als 
auch normenskeptischen Version) in auffallendem Maß dem comteischen positivisti-
schen Wissenschaftsideal, indem sie die Vorhersage in den Vordergrund stellte. 
Auf die Wirkung der erwähnten Bestrebungen bildeten sich Rechtswissen-
schaftsgebiete, die irgendeine Art der Inachtnahme der Wahrhei t vor Augen hat ten, so 
insbesondere die Rechtssoziologie und die Kriminologie. Die nicht Normen, sondern 
die Wirklichkeit forschenden juristischen Wissenschaften entwickelten sich, eben 
wegen ihrer Zugehörigkeit zur Rechtswissenschaft, in einer ziemlich verzogenen Art. 
Gut wahrnehmbar ist das bei der Kriminologie, wenn sie ihre Tätigkeit als eine durch 
die Behörden des Gefängnis, beziehungsweise Justizwesens institutionell beeinflußte 
Wissenschaft ausübt. 
In sonstigen fachrechtswissenschaftlichen Zweigen ist die Trennung entweder 
komplett — wie das beim Staatsverwaltungsrecht der Fall war — oder es ist eine 
zusammenhängende, aus juristischem Gesichtspunkt betrachtete theoretische Inacht-
nahme der Realität in noch minderem M a ß möglich. Das hängt mit den hinter der 
Regelung tätig werdenden gesellschaftlichen Kräften zusammen: ein bedeutender Teil 
der Wirtschaftsverhältnisse und ein sehr bedeutender Teil der politischen Verhältnisse 
wird nämlich in die außerrechtliche Sphäre abgeschoben, sie werden der rechtlichen 
Regelung entzogen. Bei der Untersuchung der Wirtschaft müssen die Grenzen des 
rechtlich geregelten Bereiches wesentlich überschritten werden, wenn wir die zum 
Unsinn führende Isolierung auch nur einigermaßen vermeiden wollen, (wenn wir also 
zum Beispiel beim Vertragsrecht bloß einen an sich unverständlichen Teil des 
Umsatzes in Betracht ziehen würden). Die Untersuchung dieser gehört daher gar nicht 
in den Bereich der juristischen Wissenschaften. Wo jedoch eine umfangreichere 
Analyse innerhalb der rechtswissenschaft vorgenommen wird als es juristisch gegeben 
ist, geht es gewöhnlich im Zeichen der aus der Zeit des großen Durchbruchs nach der 
Jahrhundertwende noch erhalten gebliebenen wissenschaftlichen Vorstellungen und 
des damaligen sozialischen Begriffsystems vor sich. Die Wege der Rechtswissenschaft 
und der Soziologie kreuzten sich damals auf einem verhältnismäßig niedrigem Niveau 
der Entwicklung der Soziologie beziehungsweise der Gesellschaftswissenschaft, zu 
einer Zeit, als deren Begriffsystem noch allgemein verständlich und leicht zu 
übernehmen war. Diese Übernahme vollzog sich, seither aber entwickelten sich die 
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Gesellschaftswissenschaften, so auch die Soziologie, in außerordentl ichem Maß, sie 
wurden mehr komplex und überhol ten sowohl inhaltlich, als auch strukturell ihre zur 
Zeit der ersten Berührung vorhandenen Eigenschaften (LUHMANN, 1872, 201 ). D a v o n 
will aber die Rechtswissenschaft im allgemeinen nichts wissen. Sie glaubt die 
ehemaligen Anforderungen der Soziologie befriedigend, die Wirklichkeit kennenler-
nen, und den Rechtsposit ivismus überholen zu können . Jene rechtswissenschaftlichen 
Werke, die im Geiste des positivistischen Szientismus über die Bewegung des Rechts 
Zusammenhänge festzustellen t rachten, bringen gewöhnlich leere Gemeinplätze. 
Dagegen kann sich auch die sozialistische Rechtswissenschaft nicht währen. Nicht n u r 
die Fachrechtswissenschaften, abe r auch die allgemeinste Rechtstheorie begeht diesen 
Fehler. 
Es liefert kein beruhigendes Ergebnis, wenn sich der Rechtswissenschaftler 
einzelnen „zus tänd igen" Fachwissenschaften zuwendet. Die Fachwissenschaften 
suchen nämlich Antwort auf ihre eigenen Probleme, deshalb können sie k a u m 
adaptiert werden. Eine praktische, jedoch wesentliche Schwierigkeit besteht darin, d a ß 
wenn das Rechtswissenschaftsproblem ein aktuelles gesellschaftliches Problem ist, 
d a n n handelt es sich wahrscheinlich um ein auch fü r die Gesellschaftswissenschaften 
aktuelles, das heißt ungelöstes Problem. Es gibt besonders in de r Rechtstheorie 
Bestrebungen, die die Ergebnisse anderer Wissenschaften in der Rechtswissenschaft 
geltend machen wollen, so wird zum Beispiel sprachwissenschaftliche, semantische 
Analyse oder irgendeine moderne Logik empfohlen . Abgesehen von der Soziologie 
wird die „Verwissenschaft l ichung" der Rechtswissenschaft gewöhnlich von der 
Mitwirkung irgendeines interdisziplinären „al lgemeinen" Wissenschaft erhofft; die 
Fachrechtswissenschaften leisteten diesen Erscheinungen (nicht zuletzt wegen ihrer 
s tark formalisierten, das heißt spezielle Adaptat ionsfachkenntnisse beanspruchenden 
Sprache) Widers tand. LUHMANN'S scheinbar logischer Vorschlag (1972, 204—208), 
wonach die Rechtswissenschaft soll Systemtheorie oder Entscheidungstheorie sein 
(oder die Rückkup lung von Entscheidungsproblemen auf die Systemtheorie) ließ die 
Funkt ion ie rung des Rechts zum größten Teil auße r Acht. 
Wenn aber in den Fachrechtswissenschaften, und zum Teil auch in de r 
Rechtstheorie, die soziologische Betrachtungsweise nur ein Stielmerkmal ist, ode r 
zumindest nicht viel mehr, als die Inbe t rach tnahme von rechtlichen Tatsachen, die 
außerhalb der Gerichtspraxis liegen, wenn t ro tz der gesteigerten Betonung des 
Ins t rumentalcharakters des Rechts die Rechtspolitik noch immer nicht selten eher d a s 
sich den Wer te rn anpassende Naturrecht (Ideologie) und nicht die tatsächlichen 
Zusammenhänge benötigt, so, ist das nicht ausschließlich dem Recht anzurechnen. 
Infolge der speziellen Bewegung der Gesellschaftswissenschaften interessiert sich die 
Soziologie wenig für das Recht. Wissenschaftssoziologisch ist diese Verschließung 
verständlich, da j a die Soziologie eben jene Gebie te zu erobern trachtet, die keine 
eigene Wissenschaft haben. Einzelne meinen, d a ß auch die Verschlossenheit des 
juristischen F a c h s und auch der normat ive Cha rak t e r des Rechts Hindernis bildet. D ie 
traditionelle F rage der Soziologie richtet sich dazu immer noch au f das Informelle, da 
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sie zu erklären wünschte, was noch nicht erklär t ist. (HUNT, 1978. 140). Die 
Rechtswissenschaft läuft nicht der Gefahr du rch die Gesellschaftswissenschaften 
verschlungen zu werden; der „soziologische Imperialismus" (SZABÓ, 1977. 17.) 
verschluckte eher nur die Vorworte und die einleitenden Kapitel, allgemeine 
Grundlagen genannt . Aber die ursprüngliche Frage blieb (ihre „Ursprüngl ichkei t" 
größtenteils wahrend): inwieweit wird die Rechtswissenschaft Wissenschaft , insbeson-
dere Gesellschaftswissenschaft? 
2. „Gesetzmäßigkeiten" 
Im weiteren soll also untersucht werden, inwieweit die rechtswissenschaftliche 
Erkenntnis gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Cha rak t e r haben k a n n . Im Zusammen-
hang mit der marxistischen Rechtswissenschaft ist die Gesellschaftswissenschaftlich-
keit die herrschende wissenschaftstheoretische Standpunkt . Diese Auffassung ist kein 
Privileg der marxistischen Rechtswissenschaft. Diese Annäherung ist mindestens seit 
der Gesellschaftsauffassung von Spencer in der Rechtswissenschaft anwesend. S o g a r 
auch die, die den Standpunkt vertreten, daß die Rechtswissenschaft Normativwissen-
schaft ist, sehen die Gesellschaftlichkeit des Rechts ein, das ungelöste Problem auf de r 
Oberfläche ist nur , was sich aus dieser Gesellschaftlichkeit für die Rechtswissenschaft 
ergibt. Ein passendes Beispiel fü r diese Halbheit gewährt JÖRGENSEN (1970, 13): „ D i e 
Rechtswissenschaft i s t . . . eine empirische Wissenschaft , da sie a u f realen Erscheinun-
gen gründet. Diese empirischen Erscheinungen sind . . . gesellschaftliche Erscheinun-
gen, da sie mit den Mustern des menschlichen Verhaltens verbunden sind. D e r 
Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft sind aber nicht diese . . . sondern die über diese 
herrschenden N o r m e n . " (Derselben Meinung ist z. B. auch ALBERT, 89.) Die Anhänge r 
der positivistischen Wissenschaftstheorie stellen das gesellschaftswissenschaftliche 
Wesen der Rechtswissenschaft in Abrede, aber b loß wegen des Erkenntnisinteresses. 
Cossio zufolge ist die Wissenschaft des rechtlichen Verhaltens, die wir durch N o r m e n 
kennenlernen (KALINOWSKI, 1969, 2). 
Die Klassiker des Marxismus-Leninismus befaßten sich mit dem Staat und d e m 
Recht immer als gesellschaftliche Erscheinung. Sie stellten in Abrede , daß das Recht 
ein abstraktes, willkürliches, mystisches geistiges Gebilde wäre u n d bauten es in ihr 
über die gesellschaftliche Total i tät geschaffenes materielles System ein, in welchem die 
grundlegende Priori tät der Wirtschaftsverhältnisse gegenüber d e m Recht eindeutig 
war. Die marxistische Theoriebildung behandelte — infolge ihres Charakters ( ihres 
Ziels) — das Recht aus dem Gesichtspunkt der grundlegenden Gesellschafts-
verhältnisse, aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Rolle de r staatlichen-rechtlichen Inst i tut io-
nen im Klassenkampf, beziehungsweise ihres Zusammenhangs mi t jenen. 
Gemäß der sozialistischen Rechtswissenschaft der Gegenwar t ist die sich mi t 
dem Staat und dem Recht befassende Wissenschaft , da dieselben gesellschaftliche 
Erscheinungen sind, Gesellschaftswissenschaft. Die Gesellschaftswissenschaften 
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befassen sich mit der Erkennung des gesellschaftlichen Seins u n d gesellschaftlichen 
Bewußtseins, aber nicht allgemein, sondern nach Gegenständen gesondert. Da sich die 
Rechtswissenschaft mit d e m Recht beschäf t ig t , soll die Rechtswissenschaf t 
Gesellschaftswissenschaft sein. Diese Argumentat ion ist bestrei tbar. 
a) Eine „Beschäft igung" mit einer Erscheinung ist noch keine „Wissenschaft" . 
b) Die Aufteilung der Wissenschaften objektmäßig in zwei große Gruppen ist 
schon aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Objekte der Aufteilung nicht ganz überzeugend. In 
neueren, nicht rechtswissenschaftlichen Werken werden z. B. die mit dem D e n k e n 
zusammenhängenden Wissenschaften als eine separate dr i t te Gruppe e rwähn t . 
Abgesehen davon , was ist der Sinn einer solchen Aufteilung? Me ine r Ansicht nach vor 
allem das, d a ß dadurch fü r die mit den gesellschaftlichen Erscheinungen 
zusammenhängenden weniger vertrauenswürdigen Theorien de r wissenschaftliche 
Status zu e rkann t wird ohne gezwungen zu sein den peinlich exakten Maßstab der 
Naturwissenschaft ständig anzuwenden. Die Unterschiede zwischen Na tur und 
Gesellschaft sind natürlich grundlegend u n d das gesellschaftliche Bewußtsein 
erschwert die Erkenntnis des gesellschaftlichen Seins in bedeutendem Maß, desha lb 
weisen die mit der Gesellschaft zusammenhängenden Kenntnisse zahlreiche Sonder -
heiten auf. Nichtsdestoweniger spiegelt, schon angesichts der Einheit der Bewegung 
der materiellen Welt, die Zweiteilung nach obigem Objekt nicht sosehr die inneren 
Probleme der Wirklichkeit, als eher die der Wissenschaft. Aus de r „Gesellschaftswis-
senschaftlichkeit" folgt nämlich — außer der Feststellung, daß die naturwissenschaft-
lichen Methoden und Kriterien unanwendbar sind — überhaupt gar nichts. Es k ö n n t e 
vorgebracht werden, daß die Gesellschaftswissenschaft die gesellschaftlichen 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten kennenzulernen t rachtet , da aber die Kenntnis der 
Gesetzmäßigkeit gemäß der marxistischen Auffassung von der Wissenschaft im 
allgemeinen zu erwarten ist, bedeutet die „Gesellschaftswissenschaftlichkeit" auch 
in dieser Beziehung kein Plus. 
Das Bestreben die Gesetzmäßigkeit zu sichern ist natürlich keine Spezialität der 
Rechtswissenschaft. Die mit de r inneren Krise kämpfenden heutigen Humanwissen-
schaften sind im allgemeinen wegen der Nichterfül lung ihrer nomologischen 
Bestrebungen benachteiligt (GRZEGORCZIK, 183). Nichtsdestoweniger hat die F a h n -
dung nach der rechtswissenschaftlichen Gesetzmäßigkeit, eine derartige Annäherung 
der rechtswissenschaftlichen Probleme, einen sehr speziellen geschichtlichen Hin te r -
grund, ohne welchen die ähnlichen Bestrebungen der Gegenwar t unverständlich 
wären. Die Wurzeln reichen bis zur rechtlichen Krise des vorigen Jahrhundertsende 
zurück, die ja auch eine Krise der rechtpositivistisch gepflogenen, die tatsächliche 
Wirklichkeit auf die Rechtsnormen beschränkenden Rechtswissenschaft gewesen ist. 
Unter diesen Umständen w u r d e auch die Wissenschaftlichkeit der sich auf die 
Paradigma der „rechtlichen Wirklichkeit" s tützenden positivistischen Rechtwissen-
schaft in Frage gestellt. Das neue rechtlich relevante Wirklichkeitsmodell mußte von 
dort genommen werden, w o es schpn bereit lag, nämlich von den Wissenschaften, 
genauer gesagt aus den Gesellschaftswissenschaften, die derzeit durch die die 
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Wirkungen der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis spiegelnde positivistische An-
schauung durchdrungen ist. 
Das Comte'sche (beziehungsweise diesmal das Spencer'sche) Programm faßte 
Pulszky klar zusammen: „Die Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie hat — wie jede 
Wissenschaft — zwei Aufgaben: die Gesamthei t der existenden empirischen 
Erscheinungen zu erklären und das Mögliche, das in der Zukunf t zu Erfahrende 
festzustellen; die über die Verhältnisse herrschenden Gesetze aus der Vergangenheit 
und aus der Gegenwart herauszufinden und die Funktionierung derselben für die 
Zukunft zu berechnen; das Bestehende zu begründen und da raus Folgerungen zu 
ziehen darauf , was sein soll; demzufolge gehören die Probleme des Ursprungs und des 
Künftigen in ihren Bereich." (PULSZKY, 1885, 41). Es ist also die zentrale Bedeutung 
der Gesetzmäßigkeit verständlich; sie wird nach dem'Muster der naturwissenschaftli-
chen Gesetzmäßigkeit gebildet und als grundlegend kausal angesehen. 
Die Fahndung nach der Gesetzmäßigkeit als Kriterium der Wissenschaftlichkeit 
der Rechtswissenschaft wurde aber gleichzeitig die Quelle unermeßbarer Schwierigkei-
ten. Im Sinne dieses Gedankenganges bestünde die Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft in 
der Erkennung der gesellschaftlichen Gesetzmäßigkeiten des Rechts. Wenn wir zur 
Erfassung der gesuchten Gesetzmäßigkeiten des Rechts die tatsächlichen 
Zusammenhänge liefern wollen, müssen wir die streng genommene rechtliche Sphäre 
ununterbrochen überschreiten. In diesen Fällen muß der Rechtswissenschaftler (auch) 
andere Wissenschaften, zum Beispiel die Politik, die Soziologie usw, pflegen, oder 
zumindest die Ergebnisse anderer Wissenschaften gebräuchlich machen, ohne daß da-
durch neue Resultate entstehen würden. In den Fachrechtswissenschaften meldet sich 
diese Schwierigkeit in konkreter Form derweise, daß versucht wird ein gegebenes 
Regelungsobjekt (Institution) mit dem Objekt der Regelung in Verhältnis zu stellen. 
(Zum Beispiel die eigentumsrechtlichen Normen mit dem Eigentum als gesellschaftli-
che Institution.) Diese funktionelle Annäherung bringt aber aus mehreren Gründen 
kein zufriedenstellendes Ergebnis: 
a) Der Rechtswissenschaftler ist nicht im Stande die soziologische usw. Analyse 
durchzuführen. Die faktische Interessenverhältnisforschung zum Beispiel, die die 
Rechtsanwendungsorgane innerhalb der gesetzlich gegebenen Rahmen durchführen, 
entspricht nicht den neuzeitlichen Erfordernissen der soziologischen Erkenntnis 
(LUHMANN, 1974, 10). Das ist es aber gerade, was die theoretische Rechtswissenschaft 
im Laufe der Verarbeitung der Jurisprudenz „ererbt ." . Die theoretische Rechtswissen-
schaft kann sich zweifellos auch kritisch dazu verhalten, indem sie nachweist, wie und 
nach welchen Gesichtspunkten dieses normative „Interesse" von dem soziologischen 
Interesse abweicht (vorausgesetzt, daß ein solches soziologische Material zur 
Verfügung steht und es gehandhabt werden kann). In diesem Fall hat sie sich aber von 
der eng genommenen Rechtswissenschaft sehr weit entfernt, und es ist eben kein 
Zufall, daß derartige Forschungen effektiv kaum existieren. 
b) Die Theorien können auch schon wegen ihres abweichenden Niveaus 
miteinander nicht verbunden werden. Die sich auf die Institution (konkrete Regelung) 
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: eziehende Theorie kann einer auf eine Totalität bauenden gesellschaftlichen Theorie 
nicht angepaßt werden. Die Folge ist im besten Fall eine Einfügung in ein isolierendes 
gesellschaftliches Wirklichkeitsbild, das höchstens die Umrisse einer längst überholten 
soziologischen Theorie ahnen läßt. Man sieht das, wenn zum Beispiel eine 
Rechtsinstitution mit einer mechanistisch aufgefaßten Interessenkonzeption verbun-
den wird, zum Beispiel: das Urheberrecht wird mit den Interessen der Verleger in 
Zusammenhang gebracht. Es wäre allerdings noch eine Möglichkeit, namentlich, d a ß 
die Rechtswissenschaften die Gesetzmäßigkeiten ihrer eng genommenen Untersu-
chungsfelder festlegen, und das wird auch in der Ta t weitgehend angestrebt. In diesen 
Fällen werden die eng genommenen rechtlichen Strukturen und deren 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten untersucht. Formell stellte sich auch VISCHINSKIY (25) auf diesen 
Standpunkt: „Die sowjetische Rechtswissenschaft ist . . . eine die Grundprinzipien 
des Aufbaus des sowjetischen Rechts verallgemeinernde wissenschaftliche Theorie ." 
In dieser Auffassung wären zum Beispiel das Verhältnis der zentralen und der lokalen 
Normen, oder die sich auf die Grundlagen der Gliederung des Rechtssystems 
oeziehende Gesetzmäßigkeit, oder die gemäß der gegebenen Eigentumsregelung 
möglichen letztwilligen Verfügungssysteme usw. Gesetzmäßigkeiten. Unserer Mei-
nung nach ist es zweifelhaft, ob im Zusammenhang mit diesen eine Gesetzmäßigkeit 
feststellbar ist, beziehungsweise das, was festgestellt werden kann , ist nicht sosehr 
rechtlichen, als eher politischen oder wirtschaftlichen Charakters. (Das Verhältnis der 
zentralen und der lokalen N o r m e n ist von dem Verhältnis der zentralen bzw. lokalen 
Gewalt abhängig: die seitens der Anthropologen nachgewiesenen Zusammenhänge 
zwischen dem Eigentums- und dem Erbfolgesystem haben nicht rechtlichen, sondern 
wirtschaftlichen usw. Charakter . ) 
Dieser Standpunkt entspricht aber nicht den Ausgangsanforderungen, er 
entspricht nicht den herrschenden Auffassungen über die Gesellschaftlichkeit des 
Rechts beziehungsweise der rechtlichen Erscheinungen. Demgemäß würde nämlich 
die Nachweisung der gesellschaftlichen Gesetzmäßigkeit des Rechts eine Rückleitung 
auf einen par excellence für „gesellschaftlich" erachteten Zusammenhang, auf e twas 
wesentlich Gesellschaftliches" bedeuten. Das kommt klassisch zum Vorschein, wenn 
die Rechtswissenschaft hinter dem Rechtsverhältnis das entsprechende 
Lebensverhältnis, beziehungsweise Gesellschaftsverhältnis auffinden muß. Eine 
derartige Auffassung der Rechtswissenschaft, beziehungsweise des Rechts wurde von 
PESCHKA ( 1980) auf eine fetischistische Verzerrung einer grundlegenden marxistischen 
Erkenntnis zurückgeführt. Theoretisch handelt es sich hier um eine Mißinterpretation 
der Vorstellung „Recht als F o r m " . Einerseits können nämlich gemäß der marxisti-
schen Gesellschaftsauffassung die gesellschaftlichen Erscheinungen nur ihrer Total i tä t 
richtig interpretiert werden, demzufolge ist jede isolierte Auffassung entstellt und 
falsch. Die sich mit den rechtlichen Erscheinungen befassende Gesellschaftswissen-
schaft darf das Recht nicht isolieren und das gilt auch fü r die durch die 
Fachrechtswissenschaften untersuchten Erscheinungen, (wobei die Isolierung aber , 
angesichts deren Aufgaben, unvermeidlich erscheint). Andererseits ist aber — gemäß 
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den vorhin gesagten — das Recht genauso eine gesellschaftliche Erscheinung, wie alle 
übrigen, sagen wir z. B. die Wirtschaft: sie unterscheidet sich nicht in ihrem 
ontologischen Status. Eine andere Frage ist es, inwiefern sie fähig ist die sonstiger 
Sphären des gesellschaftlichen Seins zu bestimmen, beziehungsweise ob zum Beispie1 
die Wirtschaft über eine ontologische Priori tät verfügt (PESCHKA, 1980, 264). 
Wenn wir mit der Frage der rechtlichen Gesetzmäßigkeit, als der die Erkenntnis 
hemmenden Isolation ab tun , löst sich eine Reihe von aus der gegenwärtigen 
Gliederung stammenden Schwieriegkeiten. Hier soll nur auf eines hingewieser 
werden: Marx stellt fest, d aß das Recht, beziehungsweise das Eigentum keine eigene 
Geschichte hat . Nun aber behandelt die Fachrechtswissenschaft, als sie sich den 
„wissenschaftlichen" Standpunkt zu eigen macht, die Gesetzmäßigkeiten einer 
gegebenen Institution genetisch; sie untersucht wie sich die bezügliche Regelung 
weitergestaltet hat (zum Beispiel das Arbeitsverfahren). Die vorhandenen Formen 
sowie die Funktionierung der Gesamtheit des Rechtsystems bestimmt in bedeutendem 
Maß die Entwicklung der gegebenen Institution (zum Beispiel durch die dogmatische 
Gebundenheit der Rechtsanwendungsorgane). Nachdem das der Fachwissenschaftler 
klar nachgewiesen hat, wird es ihm bange, und er fügt hinzu, daß im Hintergrund 
dieser Änderungen mitunter, oder, was noch schlimmer ist, „im allgemeinen", die 
Änderung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, oder „mehr konkreter" zum Beispie! 
„die Kampferfolge der Arbeiterbewegung" steht. Nun können natürlich diese 
letzteren Feststellungen der Wahrheit entsprechen, nur passen sie nicht in das 
gegebene Niveau der Theorie. Eine derartige Institutionsentwicklung ist zwar in der 
gesellschaftlichen Totalität vorstellbar, und eine derartige Placierung könnte auch für 
die Lösung des Problems notwendig sein, aber in der Darlegung der rechtswissen-
schaftlichen Theorie ist ihre Gegenwart in dieser unauflösbaren metaphysischen 
Allgemeinheit nur durch jenes normative Verfahren begründet, daß hinter dem Recht 
das „wirkliche" gesellschaftliche Verhältnis erfaßt werden muß. Doch ist aber das 
Recht selbst eine verhältnismäßig gesonderte Sphäre des gesellschaftlichen Seins. ír. 
der Theorie der „verhältnismäßigen Selbstständigkeit des Rechts" kommt eben diese 
Bestrebung zum Ausdruck, wenn auch nur halbwegs, als sie die offene Konfronta t ion 
vermeidet. Das hat aber dann zur Folge, daß es über keine hinreichende Durchschlags-
kraft verfügt. Die Momente innerhalb der Sphäre der Fachrechtswissenschaft 
(rechtszweigliche Momente) können untersucht werden, die Erkenntnis ist aber 
infolge der Isoliertheit der Darlegungen eingeschränkt. 
Was uns das Programm der Gesetzmäßigkeitsforschung darbietet ist kaum 
mehr als Deklaration, womit man in der Theoriebildung nicht viel anfangen kann. Die 
Fachrechtswissenschaften tun diese entweder als obligatorisches Pensum ab, oder — 
und das ist der häufigere Fall — sie legen sie stillschweigend zur Seite, nachdem im 
einleitenden Teil deren alleinseligmachende N a t u r anerkannt wurde, und begnügen 
sich mit der Fahndung nach der objektiven Gesetzmäßigkeit. (JOFFE, 20.) 
Aus den vorhin dargelegten ergeben sich zwei für die Rechtswissenschaft 
außerordentlich wichtige Folgerungen: 
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1. Es ist üblich die Suchung der Gesetzmäßigkeit als zentrale Aufgabe der 
marxistischen Rechtswissenschaft aufzufassen (KERIMOW, 1977, 31). In der sowjeti-
schen Rechtswissenschaft ist es aber gleichzeitig eine Streitfrage, ob das Recht 
spezifische Gesetzmäßigkeiten hat , oder ob sie nur der Staat und das Recht gemeinsam 
besitzen (OBTSCHINNIKOW, 71). Aufgrund der Gesamtliteratur können im Zusammen-
hang mit der Entstehung, Entwicklung, Funktionierung und Struktur des Rechts 
grundlegende Gesetzmäßigkeiten unterschieden werden. Davon könnte schon wegen 
ihrer verbalen Na tu r jede höchstens in eine philosophische Theorie eingeordnet 
werden — oder sie sind unbeweisbar. Das zeigt zum Beispiel folgendes Gesetz: „ O h n e 
wechselseitiges Entsprechen des subjektiven und des objektiven Rechts kann das 
Recht nicht funktionieren." 
Die Gesetzmäßigkeitsfindung ist ein äußerliches Ziel; die äußerlichen Aufgaben 
können sich leicht disfunktionell auswirken. Die Rechtswissenschaften, besonders die 
Rechtszweigswissenschaften widerstehen diesem Erfordernis mit ziemlich gutem 
Erfolg, (die Rechtstheorie schon weniger). Der Widerstand ist übrigens der 
traditionellen Struktur der Fachrechtswissenschaften zuzuschreiben. 
2. Wissenschaftstheoretisch genügt jene Voraussetzung, daß die Gesell-
schaftsverhältnisse kennengelernt werden können, und man m u ß nicht glauben, d a ß 
die für die gegebenen Erscheinungen aufgestellten erläuternden Theorien — auch 
wenn diese in dem gegebenen Zeitpunkt aufgetauchte Erscheinungen darlegen würden 
— sich auf das „Wesen" beziehen würde. Auch das ist nicht bestätigt, daß die 
Erfassung des „Wesens" jener Weg ist, der zur Erläuterung führt. Aus dem 
Gesichtspunkt der Theoriebildung genügt die Hypotese erläuternder Kraft. (MERKU-
ROW.) 
In der marxistischen Rechtswissenschaft ist es ziemlich verbreitet, daß aus 
gesellschaftlichen Wesen des Rechts ausgegangen wird. In einem bedeutenden Teil der 
Fälle ist das aber eine falsche Auslegung der marxistischen Methode. Die gesellschafts-
wissenschaftliche Analyse von Marx geht nämlich von dem Abstrakten und nicht v o m 
Wesen aus. Die Forschung des „Wesens" war übrigens charakteristischerweise eine 
bezeichnende Bestrebung der ehemaligen Konkurrenten der modernen Wissenschaft, 
der Magisch-Hermetiker. Der Essentialismus ist nicht so sehr ein Problem der 
marxistischen Rechtswissenschaft als Gesellschaftswissenschaft, sondern viel eher eine 
uralte schlechte Angewohnheit der Rechtstheorie, die seit Piaton versucht und die von 
der Definierung des Wesens oder der Rechtsidee bis zur Debatte der Neokantianer 
entartete. Die Auffassung die das Objekt der Wissenschaft auf die mit der Abstraktion 
identifizierte Wesen reduziert, liegt nicht fern davon, das POPPER (1963, 103) als 
Essentialismus kritisiert. Nach diesem Standpunkt beschreiben „die besten, die 
wirklich wissenschaftlichen Theorien das ,Wesen' oder die wesentliche Natur der 
Dinge, jene Wirklichkeiten, die hinter den Erscheinungen stecken." Popper weist 
daraufh in , daß in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung keine endgültige Erklärung gibt 
und der Essentialismus verbietet jede weitere Frage. Er ist aber auf dem Standpunkt , 
daß dort wo der Zweck der Forschung angeschnitten werden kann, dort mag die 
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Wesensforschung begründet sein. (106.) Infolge der Objektivierung der menschlichen 
Schaffungen tritt anstelle der ursprünglichen Zielsetzung die jeweilige Bedeutung, 
beziehungsweise — geschichtlich rückblickend — die Wirkung; auch diese Art des 
Finalismus scheint nicht berechtigt zu sein. 
Das rechtswissenschaftlich problematische Wesen der Forschung der 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten bedeutet nicht, daß auf dem Gebiet der durch die Rechtswissen-
schaft ansonsten berührten gesellschaftlichen Erscheinungen keine gesellschaftlichen 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten geltend werden. Diese werden aber nicht durch die heutige 
Rechtswissenschaft untersucht. Das ist nicht verwunderlich wenn wir bedenken, daß 
die für Gesetzmäßigkeiten geltenden gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhänge die rechtliche 
Sphäre überschreiten. (KATKITSCH, 127). Das soll nicht bedeuten, daß die Rechtswis-
senschaft nicht fähig wäre erläuternde Theorien darzubieten, oder d a ß sie nicht 
bestrebt wäre dies zu tun. Aber die Erläuterungstheorie der Rechtswissenschaft 
konzentriert in eigenartiger, aber geschichtlich, und auch die Funktionierung der 
Rechtswissenschaft betrachtet, wohlverständlicher Weise auf die Begriffe. „Da 
sich jedoch die subjektive Widerspiegelung der objektiven Gesetze in Begriffen und 
Kategorien realisiert, bilden diese Begriffe und Kategorien die theoretische Grundlage 
der Wissenschaft des bürgerlichen Rechts" — behauptet auch für andere Gattungen 
der Rechtswissenschaften bereichnenderweise JOFFE (21). Als jedoch die 
Gesetzmäßigkeitsforschung effektiv zur Begriffsforschung wird, ist das praktische 
Resultat der Ausbau eines der traditionellen dogmatischen Rechtswissenschaft 
zumindest nahe stehenden, wenn nicht gar identischen Rechtswissenschaft, unter 
ständiger Berufung auf die Gesellschaftswissenschaft. (LÖRINCZ, 24, UGOLOVNOYE. 
2 1 4 , JOFFE). 
3. Welche Möglichkeiten für der Rechtswissenschaft bleiben 
sich zur Gesellschaftswissenschaft entwickeln 
Die Wissenschaft kann als Tätigkeit und als Kenntnissystem ausgelegt werden. 
Diese Differenzierung auch hier angewendet, ergeben sich folgende Widersprüche: 
Es ist für die rechtswissenschaftliche Kenntniserwerbung charakteristisch, daß 
die Rechtswissenschaftler ihren Gegenstand als Wissenschaft kultivieren. Die 
Objektivität der Kenntniserwerbung und ihre direkte Objektgezieltheit wird aber 
durch die Erschlossenheit der Rechtswissenschaft (als rechtswissenschaftliche 
Publikum die Interessen der Juristen, und dessen der politischen Gewalt) deformiert. 
(SAJÓ, 1980). 
Infolge des obigen Widerspruchs weisen auch die für rechtswissenschaftlich 
geltenden Kenntnisse notwendigerweise und zu jeder Zeit eine spezielle Heterogenität 
auf. Wenn wir die als Rechtswissenschaft bezeichneten Kenntnisse untersuchen, stellt 
es sich heraus, daß sie über did Wirklichkeit ein ziemlich ungenaues und 
unvertrauenswürdiges Bild darbieten. An sich ist das aber kein Argument gegen die 
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Wissenschaftlichkeit. In jedem beliebigen geschichtlichen Moment übertreffen die in 
die Rechtswissenschaft gehörenden Kenntnisse das Alltagsbewußtsein, ohne daß das 
in sich zur Erfüllung des Wissenschaftsideals in naturwissenschaftlichem Sinne 
Hoffnung böte. In Wirklichkeit sind aber die Kenntnissysteme nicht bloß wissen-
schaftlich oder bloß alltäglich. 
Die Wissenschaft ist ein Vorgang, ihr Kenntnissystem ändert sich. Es führt zu 
keinem Ergebnis mit einem Meßband zwischen Wissenschaft und alltäglicher Denkart 
herumzumessen und dann die Rechtswissenschaft zu degradieren. Auch in der 
Entwicklungsgeschichte anderer, heute für Hochwissenschaften (leitenden Wissen-
schaften) geltenden Wissenschaften können Abschnitte nachgewiesen werden, wo sie 
das Wissenschaftsideal ihres Zeitalters bei weitem nicht erreicht hatten. Im 
Zusammenhang mit der Rechtswissenschaft ist eher der Umstand denkwürdig, daß 
sich schon lange Zeit vom Wissenschaftsideal ihres Zeitalters immer mehr entfernt, ja 
sogar auch von ihren eigenen theoretischen Möglichkeiten. Wenn sie unseres 
Erachtens auch nicht fähig ist, sich in Tiefe, Objektivität, Verifikabilität bzw. 
Falsifikabilität ihrer Kentnisse mit den exakten Wissenschaften zu messen, könnte sie 
trotzdem die formellen Erfordernisse der wissenschaftlichen Theorie erfüllen (innere 
Widerspruchslosigkeit, Strukturiertheit, Ausschaltung der ideologisch-metaphysichen 
Spekulation, usw.); aber diese Tendenz kommt nicht zur Geltung, ja die Bestrebungen 
in diese Richtung blieben in ihrer Wirkung ergebnislos. 
Es wurde schon erwähnt, daß sich die Wissenschaft von anderen Be-
wußtseinsformen nicht durch den Vollständigkeit der sich auf das zu untersuchende 
Objekt beziehenden Kenntnis unterscheidet. Die überwiegende Mehrheit ihrer 
akzeptierten Thesen muß sich in ihrer Zeit zweifellos bewähren, doch von einem 
späteren Niveau der Wissenschaftsentwicklung zurückblickend scheinen die Kennt-
nisse aber immer ärmlich. 
Wenn wir von dem relativen, sich immer ändernden Kriterium des Kenntnisni-
veaus absehen, wird unser Beurteilungskriterium die Struktur der Wissenschaft sein. 
Kennzeichnend für die Wissenschaft ist, daß ihre Paradigmen, Hypothesen oder 
Begriffe neue Lösungen ermöglichen (RUZAVIN, 101); die Kenntnisse werden 
erweitert, das heißt, die Wissenschaft ist — wenn auch nicht ohne Widersprüche — 
strukturell kenntniserweiternd. Es ist nicht bewiesen, daß die in der Rechtswissen-
schaft gewählten Paradigmen, Hypothesen, Begriffe im allgemeinen kenntniserwei-
ternd wären. Der häufige Paradigmenwechsel hängt eben damit zusammen, daß die 
Paradigma nicht einmal bei jenem Erscheinungsbereich angewendet werden kann, für 
den sie ausgearbeitet wurde. Die rechtswissenschaftlichen Begriffe ändern sich oft 
ohne jedwede wesentliche inhaltliche Änderung der rechtlichen Erscheinungen, bloß 
durch eventuelle Änderungen des Rechtstoffes (des Rechtsregeln). 
Eine gewisse Entwicklung kann bei der methodischen Sorgfalt, bei der 
Bewußtmachung der Methode beobachtet werden, das an sich konnte aber das 
rechtswissenschaftliche System in geringem Maß verändern. Es gibt in der Rechtswis-
senschaft weniger nachweisbar irrtümliche Aussagen, das dem Schein nach auch ein 
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Zeichen der Entwicklung der Rechtswissenschaft sein könnte. Doch der Umstand, d a ß 
es weniger Fiktionen oder solchartige Irrtümer gibt, die durch die Entwicklung 
anderer Wissenschaften ausgeschlossen werden (es gibt zum Beispiel weniger falschen 
Etymologisierungen, die so gerne von den Glossatoren angewendet worden waren), 
bedeutet keinen echten Fortschritt. Die Metaphysik lebt weiter, höchstens wird sie 
weniger ernst genommen, wie das die heutige verringerte Anwendung der Willenskon-
zeption betätigt. Es entstehen auch neue Metaphysiken, es verbreiten sich aus anderen 
Wissenschaften dor t bereits veraltete, abgewetzte Begriffe und Auffassungen, die in 
breitem Umfang und im Vergleich zu ihrer ursprünglichen Bedeutung inadäquat 
angewendet werden (z. B. Interesse). Die fallweise Fortschritte fördern eher die 
Rationalisierung der Rechtswissenschaft als ihre Wissenschaftlichkeit. Das letzte 
Jahrhundert kann aber doch eine grundlegende Besserung vorweisen und das besteht 
in der Erkenntnis der Gesellschaftlichkeit des Rechts. Aber auch da hat sich nicht 
vorwiegend die Rechtswissenschaft verdient gemacht — sie hat davon lange Zeit 
hindurch gar nicht Kenntnis genommen —, sondern sonstige Gesellschaftswissen-
schaften. Eine organische Integrierung dieser Erkenntnis in der Rechtswissenschaft ist 
auch in der Zukunf t unwahrscheinlich. 
Diejenigen die sich zur Wissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft bekennen, 
begründen ihre Meinung heutzutage gerade damit , daß die Rechtswissenschaft 
Gesellschaftswissenschaft sei. (Eine Minderheit hält sie für eine Wissenschaft 
hermeneutischen, eventuell semantischen Charakters.) Man pflegt die Gesellschafts-
wissenschaften im Vergleich zur Naturwissenschaft f ü r eine eigenartige Wissenschaft 
zu nennen, hauptsächlich ihrer niedrigen Genauigkeit, ihrer wissenschaftssprachlich-
formalisierten und ihrer verifizierbar-prädiktiven Eigenschaften halber. Aufgrund 
dieser Faktoren wird behauptet, d aß die Gesellschaftswissenschaften im Anfangssta-
dium ihrer Entwicklung stehen. Der „Anfangsstadium" zeigt an, d a ß die Zeit der 
Wissenschaftsentwicklung nicht mit „absoluter Zeit" gemessen werden kann, sie ist die 
Funktion der jeweiligen gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung. Während die herrschenden 
gesellschaftlichen Interessen, bei einer gegebenen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, die 
naturwissenschaftliche Erkenntnis beanspruchten, widersetzten sie sich der gesell-
schaftswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. „Nicht nur d a r a u f k o m m t es an, ein wie großes 
Erkenntnismaterial und dadurch bestimmt, wie tiefgreifende Fragestellungen eine 
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie darbietet, sondern auch darauf, 
wieweit sie imstande ist, jene Verallgemeinerungen, jene Wahrheiten, die aus diesem 
jeweiligen Stoffgebiet wissenschaftlich gewonnen werden können, ideologisch zu 
ertragen." (LUKÁCS, I. 162) Nun kann aber die Rechtswissenschaft gesellschaftlich 
unerträglich werden, wenn sie die Wirklichkeit der Gesellschaftsverhältnisse ermittelt 
und enthüllt. Nicht nur deshalb, weil die gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeiten die 
herrschende Ideologie kränken würden, sondern weil die Rechtspflege mit diesen 
Mitteln nicht funktionieren kann und weil sie mit den durch rechtliche Mittel 
durchführte Gesellschaftslenkung in Widerspruch steht. 
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Aufgrund der obigen mutet es bestimmt nicht übertrieben an, wenn die 
Entwicklungsfähigkeit der Rechtswissenschaft zumindest widersprüchig bezeichnet 
wird. Es kann eingewendet werden, daß dieser Widerspruch eben dadurch entsteht, 
daß die präwissenschaftlichen Vorstellungen die eng wissenschaftlichen, verläßlichen 
Kenntnisse überdecken. Wenn das der Fall ist, und wenn die Rechtswissenschaft auf 
ihrem Weg in Richtung Gesellschaftswissenschaft weitertreten kann, dann kann ihrer 
Zukunft doch mit Zuversicht entgegengesehen werden. Der Favorit der Wissenschaft-
lichkeit wäre am besten die Rechtssoziologie, oder die nach ihrem Muster und nach 
ihrem Geist kultivierten Rechtszweigtheorien; doch es stellt sich die Frage, o b es nicht 
mehr ist als ein Spiel der Entwicklung, daß die Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtssoziolo-
gie aus ihrem Kommunikationssystem aussperrt und zur Sammelkiste ihrer Schild-
phrasen macht . In der momentanen Lage werden die normativen Elemente der 
Rechtswissenschaft oft nur äußerlich und das theoretische Niveau mit ihrer Kritik 
bloß Fallweise korrigierend ergänzt, im Zeichen der gesellschaftlichen Anschauung. 
Und auch das kann kaum als eine Folge der inneren Entwicklung aufgefaßt werden; es 
ist eher eines Versöhnlertum an den Zeitgeist, an die Entwicklungen außerhalb der 
Rechtswissenschaft. An sich ist das natürlich kein Fehler, entwickelt sich doch das 
Gesamtsystem der Wissenschaften gleichartig derweise, d a ß es jederzeit ein hervorra-
gendes Gebiet gibt, das ein methodisches Beispiel für die anderen darstellt. Es steht 
fest, daß im Falle der — unseres Erachtens leider unumgänglich isolierten — 
Konsideration der Gesellschaftlichkeit die Rechtswissenschaft der willkürlichen 
Begriffsbildung los werden kann. Diese wertvollen, erfreulichen und weiterzu-
stärkenden Elemente ergeben aber keine neue Rechtswissenschaft, sie sind bloß 
Mittel der Anpassungsbestrebungen der Rechtswissenschaft (und ihres Publikums), 
durch welche sie sich einzufügen trachten in eine neue, veränderte gesellschaftliche 
und geistige Umgebung. 
Aus unseren Darlegungen ergibt sich ein eigenartiger Widerspruch. Einerseits 
stellten wir in Zweifel, daß die Rechtswissenschaft, angesichts ihrer gelieferten oder 
lieferbaren Kenntnisse, wirklich eine Wissenschaft ist, andererseits aber setzten wir 
voraus, daß das Recht wissenschaftlich erkennbar ist, ja wir behaupten sogar, daß 
Umrisse der mit dem Recht im Zusammenhang stehenden objektiven Systeme 
entstehen, organisiert durch eine Hypothese, die den Weg zur Vollentfaltung der 
Kenntnisse frei gibt. 
W a r u m sprechen wir von dieser Rechtswissenschaft bloß als von einer 
Möglichkeit? In unserem engeren Fach treffen wir doch Schritt Hinweise, denen 
Glauben schenkend wir über die Festigung der gesellschaftlichen Anschauung 
berichten müßten. „So oft wir aber die Wörter .Recht', ,Politik', Wirtschaftsleben' 
usw. miteinander verbinden, kommt es nie so weit, daß diese von .Wissenschaftlern' 
übernommen werden, die sich mit der Deklinierung und Koppelung der verschiedenen 
Wörter befassen." Mag es noch so überraschend anmuten, dieses Zitat s tammt von 
dem meist charakteristischen Vertreter des sozialistischen Normativismus (WISCHIN-
SKIJ, 31). Diese nutzlose Wortfügung ergibt sich daraus, daß die Rechtswissenschaft 
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ihre gesellschaftliche Funktion gerade als Wirklichkeitreduktion erfüllen kann. Das 
Recht erfüllt ihre gesellschaftliche Aufgabe, die Beilegung der sich im Leben 
ergebenden theoretischen und praktischen Strittigkeiten, die Regelung der 
Lebensverhältnisse in breiterem Sinn und ihre Umformung im Sinne der erwünschten 
Regelmäßigkeit im Grunde nicht auf wissenschaftlicher Basis, auch wenn sie in 
bedeutendem Maß desanthropomorphisiert , das sich aus der zur Regelung der 
einzelnen Teilmomente notwendigen Instrumentalisation ergibt. Das gilt sowohl für 
die Rechtsschaffungs-Rechtswissenschaft, als auch für die Rechtsanwendungs-
Rechtswissenschaft, die sich ja übrigens nicht nur praktisch, sondern schon wegen dem 
Zusammenhang der Rechtsschaffung und der Rechtsanwendung prinzipiell nicht 
scharf trennen. Es ist praktisch variabel inwieweit eine jurisprudentielle Theorie de lege 
lata oder de lege ferenda Thesen enthält. Unter anderen hängt das von dem M a ß der 
erwünschten oder notwendigen Rechtsveränderung und von der gesamten Dynamik 
des Rechtssystems ab. Die deutsche Pandektistik funktionierte aus dem Gesichtspunkt 
des BGB als Rechtsschaffungstheorie. In der Blütezeit des Naturrechts dagegen, 
beziehungsweise seit dem Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts sondert sich im allgemeinen 
„die Wissenschaft der Rechtsschaffung" ab. Gemäß Julius PIKLER entspricht nur dei 
Rechtsschaffungswissenschaft den strengen Erfordernissen der Wissenschaft. Auch 
heute ist es häufig, daß die Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtsschaffungswissenschaft 
angesehen wird; bei dieser Gelegenheit werden die jurisprudentiellen Theorien und 
Tätigkeiten aus der Rechtswissenschaft ausgeschieden. Der Grund dieses Standpunk-
tes ist, daß es sich hier Gelegenheit bietet der Norm los zu werden und, mit Hinsicht auf 
die Rechtsschaffung, kann hier eine gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Erkenntnis 
entstehen. Neuestens entstand anhand der wissenschaftlichen Begründung der 
Rechtsschaffung in der Sowjetunion der Gedanke einer selbständigen Rechtsschaf-
fungswi s senscha f t (POLENJINA). 
3.1. Rechtsanwendungs- Rechtswissenschaft 
Die innere Schranke eines wissenschaftlichen Systems der Rechtsanwendung 
besteht darin, daß die auftauchenden gesellschaftlichen Probleme ebendeshalb 
rechtlich gelöst werden müssen, weil es gesellschaftlich nicht erwünscht ist — und 
angesichts der objektiven Entwicklung der Wissenschaften warscheinlich auch nicht 
möglich wäre — diese wissenschaftlich zu lösen. Die wissenschaftliche Lösung wäre 
hier die systematische und konsequente Anwendung der wissenschaftlichen Kenntnis-
se, das heißt die Regelung der strittigen Situationen durch Anwendung der 
gesellschaftlichen Gesetzmäßigkeiten der gegebenen Situation. Das mag ziemlich 
metaphysisch klingen, und das ist auch kein Zufall, da die rechtlich zu regelnden 
Probleme charakteristischerweise alltägliche Probleme sind. Prinzipiell wäre das kein 
Hindernis, bei einer wissenschaftlichen Handhabung würde sich höchstens das Leben 
desanthropomorphisieren. Solche Wirkungen der Naturwissenschaften werden im 
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alltäglichen Leben zweifellos geltend. Es wäre ein System denkbar, wo bei der 
Beilegung eines Streites die im vorhinein berechenbaren Wirkungen der Entscheidun-
gen auf das Seelenleben der Berührten optimalisiert werden, die Verantwortung wäre 
durch die sich auf die Gestaltung der Psyche des Täters beziehenden wissenschaftli-
chen Gesichtspunkte bemessen, oder es gelänge irgendeine soziologische oder 
volkswirtschaftswissenschaftliche Theorie zur Anwendung, der Rechtsstreit würde 
zum Beispiel in einer die gesellschaftlichen Gesetze unmittelbar geltendmachenden 
Weise entschieden. Wenn beispielsweise gemäß der statistisch geltenden Regel 18% 
der im 28. Lebensjahr geschlossenen Ehen aufgelöst werden, dann würde in einem 
gegebenen Prozeß die Scheidung nur dann ausgesprochen werden, wenn der gegebene 
Fall in dem gesellschaftsgesetzlich geltenden „ R a h m e n " Platz hat. Das System kann 
durch normative Überlegungen noch weiter verfeinert werden. Es kann zum Beispiel 
deklariert werden, daß die gesellschaftliche Anomie über ein bestimmtes prozentuelles 
Vorkommen einer Devianz beginnt, oder daß ein Wirtschaftsrechtsstreit derweise 
gelöst werden muß, daß die durch den Beschluß zustandekommende wirtschaftliche 
Lage Marktgleichgewicht erwirkt, oder daß sie in einer gesellschaftlichen input-output 
Matrix einem beliebigen Wert oder Gleichgewicht entspricht. Die Beispiele könnten 
beliebig vermehrt, ja sogar aus der Rechtsgeschichte ergänzt werden. Der Scheidung 
wurde zum Beispiel zu einer bestimmten Zeit durch das Gericht und durch die 
Rechtswissenschaft deshalb Hindernisse gestellt weil die zahlreichen Scheidungen, laut 
der normativen Anschauungsweise, zur gesellschaftlichen Desorganisation führen 
würden. Jene Regelungsversuche, die bestrebt waren derartige wissenschaftliche 
Überlegungen in das Recht einzuführen — zum Teil mittels rechtswissenschaftlicher 
Vermittlung (und daß es nur zum Teil der Fall war, das ist bei weitem kein Zufall), — 
zeigen, wie das Bestreben des Rechts zur Wissenschaft zu machen, d. h. ihre 
Desanthropomorphisierung, die Rechtsstruktur auflöst. Diese Bestrebungen jedoch 
werden, soweit es heute beurteilt werden kann, nicht allgemein, und zwar nicht nur 
wegen dem Ungenüge der Wissenschaft, sondern vor allem als Folge der Struktur der 
Gesellschaft, als Folge von Gewaltinteressen. (Es ist wieder eine andere Sache, daß 
auch diese gewaltbedingten Überlegungen dem Schein nach wissenschaftlicher 
Formen bedürf ten und nehmen auf gewisse instrumentalen Zusammenhänge 
Rücksicht.) Das Recht und die dem Recht entsprechende gesellschaftliche 
Verhältnisregelung sind grundlegend die Geltungsformen bestimmter Gewalt- und 
Interessenstrukturen, was im Falle einer „wissenschaftlichen" Regelung undenkbar 
ist. Die gegebenen rechtlichen Strukturen aber sichern als entsprechende Ideologie 
(zum Beispiel das Recht als Gerechtigkeit), durch die seitens der Rechtswissenschaft 
gewährten Ideologie ergänzt, die Regelung nach Interessenbereiche. Ein derartiges 
praktisches System als Ideologie unterstützendes und antreibendes, zum Teil darin 
eingebautes System kann letzten Endes nicht zur Wissenschaft werden. Wie es Marx 
behauptet: „Der religiöse Widerschein der wirklichen Welt kann überhaupt nur 
verschwinden, sobald die Verhältnisse des praktischen Werktagslebens den Menschen 
tagtäglich durchsichtig vernünftige Beziehungen zueinander und zur Natur darstellen. 
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Die Gestalt des gesellschaftlichen Lebensprozesses, d.h. des materiellen Produktions-
prozesses streift nur ihren mystischen Nebelschleier ab, sobald sie als Produkt frei 
vergesellschafteter Menschen unter deren bewußter planmäßiger Kontrolle steht. 
Dazu ist jedoch eine materielle Grundlage der Gesellschaft erheischt, oder eine Reihe 
materieller Exis tenzbedingungen. . ." (MARX, 1947, I. 85). 
Die mit der Rechtsanwendung verbundenen wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeiten 
stehen im Dienste des den Klasseninteressen entsprechend funktionierenden Rechts, 
das bedeutet aber nicht, d a ß die derweise zustandegekommenen Theorien ihr Niveau 
und ihren Inhalt betrachtet, sich davon nicht beträchtlich loslassen könnten. Die 
Rechtswissenschaft kann zwar (aus funktionalen G r ü n d e n und infolge ihrer 
Mangelhaftigkeiten) das Recht nicht verwissenschaften, sie kann sie aber in 
bedeutendem Maß rationalisieren. Die Rationali tät istuber ziemlich stark an Zeit und 
Seinsphären gebunden, daher ist die in die eigene Struktur der Rechtswissenschaft 
eingebaute, beziehungsweise die seitens der Rechtswissenschaft vermittelte 
Rationalität gesellschaftlich von wechselnder Bedeutung und vertritt ihre spezielle 
rechtliche Rationalität nur in beschränktem Maß. Am nächsten gelangte dazu die 
deutsche Rechtswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunder ts , die mit Begriffen speziell 
rechtlicher Bedeutung (Geltung) gearbeitet hatte, die es ermöglicht hatten den 
Begriffen Rechnung zu tragen, was — wenigstens in der Auffassung ihrer Pfleger — 
dieser Tätigkeit wissenschaftlichen Charakter verlieh. Später erwiesen sich aber diese 
beschränkten Verfahren nicht nur zur Betreibung einer Wissenschaft, sondern auch 
zur Bedienung des Rechts für ungenügend. An der für fest geltenden Mauer der 
Dogmatik entstanden zahlreiche Nischen, durch welche modernere gesellschaftliche 
und wirtschaftliche Rationalität einsickern konnte. Dieser Vorgang war mit der in der 
Lage des Rechtsanwenders eingetretenen Änderung in engem Zusammenhang. Die 
größere Freihei t des Gesetzgebers bas ier te nur zum Teil auf gesetzlicher 
Ermächtigung, und ein großer Teil der Ermächtigungen wurde nur nachträglich durch 
die Praxis sanktioniert. Die Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft wäre prinzipiell die 
Vermittlung der neuartigen Rationalität gewesen. Es steigerte sich tatsächlich das 
Interesse hinsichtlich der wissenschaftlichen Analyse der Seele oder der Interessen und 
deren rechtswissenschaftlichen Nutzbarmachung, bis diese dann endlich zu frei 
berücksichtigten Kategorien wurden. Nur haben diese „freien Bahnen" weder die 
Wissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft, noch die des Rechts gesteigert, weil statt 
einer begrifflichen Adaptat ion eher eine formelle Übernahme und inhaltliche Fäl-
schung vor sich ging. Die Theorien, die im Zusammenhang mit diesen, zum Teil der 
Rechtsanwendung vorangehend, zum Teil deren Ergebnisse übernehmend, durch die 
Rechtswissenschaft ausgearbeitet wurden, befriedigten größtenteils irgendwelche neue 
gewaltliche, wirtschaftliche oder politische Interessen. Als zum Beispiel das Ungari-
sche staatliche Arbitrage in seiner Urteilspraxis die Planmäßigkeit nach seiner Art 
fördern wollte, hat die bezügliche Jurisprudenz nicht die Möglichkeiten der planmä-
ßigen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung wissenschaftlich analysiert, sondern legitimierte 
nur die fallweisen Entscheidungen mit zeitmäßiger oder eher aktueller Phraseologie. 
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Die par t ikulär geltend gemachte Wissenschaftlichkeit steigert nicht die 
Wissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft. Die Berufung auf die Interessen führte in 
bedeutendem Teil der Fälle nicht zur wissenschaftlichen Analyse der gesellschaftlichen 
Gesichtspunkte, sondern zur unverhalten Geltendmachung der dominanten Machtin-
teressen (oder des für Interesse erachteten Willens), beziehungsweise zum akzeptablen 
Ausdruck einer Reihe von unklaren Wertüberlegungen und organisatorischen 
Aspekten usw. Es ist kein Zufall , daß in der Rechtswissenschaft der BRD die 
wertorientierte Jurisprudenz ebenso verbreitet ist, wie die Interessenjurisprudenz. In 
den Händen des Juristen entwertete sich die Soziologie. (Anstelle der Soziologie kann 
jede beliebige Wissenschaft gesetzt werden.) 
Daraus folgt aber nicht, daß in der Gesellschaft keine Interessen geben würden, 
die in gewissen Fällen eine den jeweiligen Möglichkeiten entsprechende wissenschaftli-
che Objektivität in der Entscheidung beanspruchen würden. Es gibt Auffassungen, die 
meinen, daß der Richter fähig und geeignet ist, den gesellschaftlichen Konsequenzen 
seiner Entscheidung wissenschaftlich begründet Rechnung zu tragen. Es m u ß 
wiederholt da rauf hingewiesen werden, daß die Gestattung einer derartigen Rech-
nungstragung von den Interessen der Gewalt abhängt . Zahlreiche Gegeninteressen 
und institutionelle Innervationen verstellen den Weg, daß der Richter seine 
Entscheidungen wissenschaftlich begründet faßt , unter anderen zum Beispiel der 
Mangel an entsprechenden Fachleuten. Die heutige Juristenbildung und die einen Teil 
des gegenwärtigen Bildungsmaterials darstellende Rechtswissenschaft wäre kaum 
dazu fähig, diese „Fähigkeit der Beachtung der gesellschaftlichen Folgen" zu bieten. 
Es ist charakteristisch, daß die Rechtssoziologie, die — wenn auch nicht die volle 
wissenschaftliche Anschauung — aber zumindest eine Ar t Selbstkritik der 
Rechtsanwendungs- (Rechtsentwicklungs-) Tätigkeit gewähren könnte, bloß Ende der 
60er Jahre ihren Einzug in die Universitäten hielt, wo es heute noch ziemlich 
drittrangig behandelt wird und nicht fähig ist auf die zweiglichen Rechtswissenschaf-
ten und noch weniger auf die Praxis Wirkung auszuüben. (TREVES-FERRARI) 
Ja ist es denn in der Rechtswissenschaft überhaupt der den gesellschaftlichen 
Anforderungen Rechnung tragende Rechtsanwender das so sehr ersehnte lichtbrin-
gende Kind (das Kind der Gesellschaftswissenschaftlichkeit)? Die Vertreter der 
Freirechtslehre wiesen bereits zur Jahrhundertwende nach daß der Rechtsanwender 
mit den Folgen seiner Entscheidung rechnet, damit nämlich, wie sich das auf die 
Parteien auswirkt; sie waren sogar der Meinung, daß der Richter zu den derartig 
vorkalkulierten Folgen die rechtliche Begründung nachträglich sucht. Heutzutage 
geht es aber um gesellschaftliche Folgen, was z. B. von den Gerichtshöfen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland auch gerne erwähnt wird, aber die Begründungen 
entsprechen meistens nicht einmal den minimalen Erfordernissen der folgerichtigen 
Analyse. In Ungarn wird die Beurteilung der Pseudofolgen von den Gerichten zum 
größten Teil den rechtspolitischen Rechtsprinzipien überlassen. 
Aufgrund der obigen bin ich dessen nicht ganz sicher, ob dieses „ K i n d " 
lebensfähig oder gar „lichtbringend" wäre. Die ganze Struktur des Rechts zielt doch 
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auf sozial Komplexitätsreduktion, auf die Erleichterung der Entscheidungslast, auf die 
Abwehr der Verantwortung für die Entscheidung ab. Die Folgenermessung kann aber 
kaum zur angewandten Wissenschaft gemacht werden, nicht einmal zur angewandten 
Rationalität (Praxeologie). PIKLER'S (2) vormalige skeptische Bemerkung macht uns 
aufmerksam: die Jurisprudenz befaßt sich nicht mit Gründen und Folgen, der Richter 
ist in der Anwendung blind, die Kenntnis des Grundes würde ihr nur stören und zu 
Rechtsunsicherheit führen. 
Ungeachtet dessen, ob die Beachtung der gesetzlichen Folgen von Seite des 
Rechtsanwenders stärker wird oder nicht, hat die Rechtswissenschaft wichtige 
Aufgaben zu lösen, nicht aber im Interesse der Konsequenzen, sondern im Interesse 
der zur Entscheidung nötigen Vereinfachung. Das ist nicht zu umgehen, sonst wird das 
zu der immer komplexer werdenden Gesellschaft sich mit gesteigerter innerer 
Komplexheit fügende Recht unmanipulierbar. Die Rechtswissenschaft kann diese 
Aufgabe nur durch Rationalisierung ihrer eigenen Struktur durchführen, und zwar 
derweise, daß sie ihre „blinde" Entscheidung fällende Tätigkeit praktisch stärker 
rationalisiert, beziehungsweise für die zur Beeinflußung der rechtsanwendenden 
Vernunft berufene institutionelle Ordnung derartige Modelle bietet. Ähnliche 
Rationalisierungen lieferte die Rechtswissenschaft auch bisher, nämlich durch die 
Dogmatik. Die Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft kann in dieser Beziehung die 
Rationalisierung der Dogmatik sein, — im Zeichen der größeren „Wissenschaftlich-
keit". KRAWIETZ(1972, 33.) behauptet , daß zur Erneuerung der rechtlichen Dogmatik 
nur die Anerkennung der die Normen zustandebringenden und diese erläuternden 
Interessen als juristisches Problem führen kann. Dazu bedarf es aber einer die 
Dogmatik behandelnden besonderen Theorie. Diese Metatheorie der Dogmatik ist 
eigentlich eine seit der Jahrhundertwende bestehende Forderung, die im Laufe der Zeit 
in vieler Hinsicht in Erfüllung ging. Heute geht die Explizitmachung dieser 
Metatheorie vor sich; wenn das Erfolge zeitigen wurde, könnte sich die Dogmatik in 
eine zeitgemäße Soziotechnik umformen. Da aber die dazu notwendige theoretische 
Arbeit die Leistungsfähigkeit der zweiglichen Rechtswissenschaften übertrifft, und 
zum Teil eine „äußere" Anschauung erfordert, ist es verständlich, daß die Aufgabe 
erwartungsgemäß nur durch die rechtslehreartige Rechtstheorie gelöst werden kann. 
Falls die Konsequenzanschauung stärker wird, muß auch diesbezüglich die zur 
Handhabung nötige Vereinfachung in der Dogmatik durchgeführt werden. Das würde 
die Rechtstheorie unmittelbar berühren: sie selbst würde gesellschaftswissenschaftli-
cher werden, wenn es der Dogmatik überlassen wäre zu bestimmen, auf welchen 
effektiven Bereich der Berührten sich die Inachtnahme der gesellschaftlichen 
Interessen in der Festlegung der Konsequenzen der Entscheidung ausdehnt und wie 
die Interessen der Berührten rational, eventuell quantitativ ausgedrückt werden kann. 
In diesem Fall müßte sich nämlich die durch die Rechtstheorie zu gewährende 
methodologische Rationalisierung auch auf die Rationalisierung der Interessen 
ausbreiten. Daraus folgt aber nicht, daß auf diesem Punkt die Feststellungen anderer 
Wissenschaftszweige angewandt werden müßten, und überhaupt, d a ß die Dogmatisie-
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rung der Konsequenz durch sie selbst durchzuführen wäre. All das ist nur die 
methodologische, rationalisierende Begründung der rechtlichen Vereinfachung der 
Dogmatik. 
Unserer Meinung nach werden — angesichts der obigen — die formellen 
Erfordernisse der wissenschaftlichen Theoriebildung in den Rechtstheorien in 
gesteigertem M a ß geltend werden. Diese Tendenz wird dadurch gesteigert, daß in der 
Rechtssetzungswissenschaft, wie wir sehen werden, ähnliche Bedürfnisse wahrnehm-
bar sind. Es ist auch aus wissenschaftstheoretischem Gesichtspunkt wünschenswert, 
daß die Rechtswissenschaft, soweit es möglich, zur Soziotechnik entwickelt wird, da ja 
die Jurisprudenz als techné, zum Teil eben ihren wissenschaftlichen Ambitionen zum 
Opfer fallend, ihrer Möglichkeiten und der ihr gegenüber gestellten gesellschaftlichen 
Anforderungen nicht gerecht wird. Die soziotechnische Rationalisierung ist 
natürlicherweise auch in rechtlicher Beziehung breiter als die Wissenschaft. (ALBERT, 
110.) 
„(Ein wahrhaft wissenschaftliches Erfassen der objektiven Wirklichkeit nur 
durch einen radikalen Bruch mit der personifizierenden, anthropomorphisierenden 
Anschauungsweise möglich ist. Die wissenschaftliche Art der Widerspiegelung der 
Wirklichkeit ist ein Desanthropomorphisieren, sowohl des Objekts wie des Subjekts 
der Erkenntnis. Des Objekts, indem sein An-sich von allen Zutaten des Anthropomor-
phismus nach Möglichkeit gereinigt wird; des Subjekts, indem es sein Verhalten zur 
Wirklichkeit darauf einstellt, die eigenen Anschauungen, Vorstellungen, Begriffsbil-
dungen ununterbrochen darauf zu kontrollieren, wo und wie anthropomorphisierende 
Entstellungen der Objektivität in die Aufnahme der Wirklichkeit eindringen können. 
(LUKÁCS, I. 145—146.)" 
Insofern diese Rationalisierung die Begründung der Verfahrensvorgänge berührt 
— das angesichts der mit der Erneuerung der Dogmatik und der gesellschaftlichen 
Kontrolle der dogmatischen Gesichtspunkte, beziehungsweise der dogmatischen 
Kontrolle der gesellschaftlichen Gesichtspunkte zusammenhängenden Bestrebungen 
der Gegenwart durchaus vorstellbar ist —, kann die Erneuerung mit der die ,.policies" 
geltend machenden effektiven Verwaltungspraxis Hand in H a n d gehen. Die Behörden 
können nämlich — im Gegensatz zu den zentralen instrumentalen Überlegungen — in 
ihren Entscheidungen nicht bis zum Ausgangspunkt der übergestellten Organe 
zurückgreifen, d. h. sie sind nicht fähig die durch die zentrale Rationalität oft für 
wünschenswert deklarierte radikale „Wurzelmethode" anzuwenden, sondern ändern 
an der gegebenen Situation allmählich. Schritt für Schritt. Dementsprechend ist die 
Entscheidung das Ergebnis einer Wahl zwischen der bestehenden Situation und ihrer 
geringfügigen Variationen, und die Behörden lassen sich nicht auf die Vergleichung 
der Kombinationen und der Zahlenmäßigkeiten der Ziele und Werte und der 
denselben dienenden Mittel ein, was die zentrale instrumentale Rationalismus 
inspiriert. Diese Methode beschränkt natürlich die Invention bedeutend und 
verhindert die Innovation. Eine derartige Verbesserung der Dogmatik entspricht den 
Anforderungen der Formalisierung und Kontrol l ierbarmachung der „aufeinander 
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folgenden beschränkten Vergleichungen" (LINDBLOM, 125), obzwar gemäß LUHMANN 
(1974, 48). „Das Auftauchen von folgenorientierten Scheinkriterien außerjuri-
stischer Provenienz . . . ist ein weiteres Alarmzeichen ersten Ranges." 
Wenn einmal das Recht als Sicherung der Freiheit gegen die Desanthropomor-
phisierung, oder* zumindest gegen die seinen eigenen Bereich überschreitenden 
entfremdenden Wirkung Schutz bietet, mutet es als Widerspruch an, die sich auf das 
Recht auswirkende Rechtswissenschaft als Desanthropomorphisierensbestrebung zu 
rechtfertigen. Da handelt es sich aber um zwei verschiedene Probleme: eines des 
Rechts, und ein anderes der Rechtswissenschaft. Die zur Soziotechnik nötige 
Desanthropomorphisierung sichert nämlich bloß die Möglichkeit zur Handhabung des 
Rechts. Durch ihre eigene Rationalisierung verbessert die Rechtswissenschaft die 
Handhabungsmöglichkeit des Rechts, wodurch wiederum die gesellschaftlich so 
wichtige Berechenbarkeit gefördert wird. 
Es darf aber nicht vergessen werden, daß die Rechtswissenschaft den 
Rationalitätsansprüchen der Wissenschaftstheorie prinzipiell in mehrfacher Art 
entsprechen kann, und es besteht die Gefahr, daß die für die Juristen eine 
Handhabungsmöglichkeit bietende Soziotechnik das Recht von dem alltäglichen 
Leben noch weiter rückt, als es gegenwärtig ist. Mit anderen Worten, wie das bei den 
Werken der instrumentalen Vernunft so oft der Fall ist, wird nur die Entfremdung 
größer. Die Vernunft ist instrumental, wenn die Abstimmung des Subjekts und des 
Objekts falsch ist; Die Vernunft ist hier ein Mittel zur Erreichung des Ziels, wo der 
Wert des Ziels kein Beurteilungsmittel gewährt. (ADORNO, 1970, 12.) Die Gefahr soll 
nicht überwertet werden, da einer immer größeren Anteil der Rechtsanwender — 
„glücklicherweise" — keine Juristen sind, über die Fachgriffe der Handhabung des 
Rechts nicht verfügen und ihre Ansprüche, die nicht ohne Acht bleiben dürfen, sich 
gegen die für das alltägliche Bewußtsein unzugängliche rechtstechnische Rationalität 
auswirken. Am wahrscheinlichsten ist, daß sich das Rechtssystem zerspalten wird: es 
kommt ein traditioneller, in seiner Logik von dem alltäglichen Bewußtsein 
abweichender „juristischer Teil", und daneben ein instrumentales Rechtsmaterial mit 
amorpher Konstruktion zustande, der sich methodisch an die alltägliche analytische 
Denkart anpaßt und auch sonstige fachwissenschaftliche (ärztliche, psychiatrische, 
technische) Kenntnisse umschließt. Aus gesellschaftlichem Gesichtspunkt wird gewiß 
die Wirkung des juristischen Teils geringer sein. 
3.2. Die Wissenschaft der Rechtsschöpfung 
Bezüglich der rechtswissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit im Zusammenhang mit der 
Rechtsschöpfung können wir mit gewissen Ergänzungen dasselbe sagen, daß wir im 
Zusammenhang mit der Wissenschaft der Rechtsanwendung gesagt haben, da doch 
die Rechtsschöpfung aus dem Gesichtspunkt der gesellschaftlichen Funkt ion (in der 
gesellschaftlichen Endleistung) kein Unterschied aufweist und für die Rechtsanwen-
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dung gelten die durch die Rechtsgestaltung vorgeschriebenen Regeln. Es ist also gar 
nicht verwunderlich, wenn wir diese Regeln wissenschaftlich für indifferent erklären. 
Und wie die Rechtsanwendung die zum Teil bereits rechtlich verankerten Interessen 
nachgeben muß, so ist auch die Gesetzgebung den gesellschaftlichen Interessen 
unterworfen. Da aber bei der Gesetzgebung der Glauben entstand, daß hier „die Bahn 
frei sei", daß die Tätigkeit nur den Normen der Rationalität unterliege, wurde — mit 
Montesquieu beginnend wenigstens — die Wissenschaftlichkeit auf diesem Gebiet 
allgemein erwartet. 
Die Regelungsvorschläge der Rechtswissenschaftler und deren Begründungen 
bedienen sich in Wirklichkeit zu jeder Zeit des geltenden rechtswissenschaftlichen 
Argumentationssystems: die Naturrechtsgelehrten leiteten die rechtliche Lösung aus 
der Natur , später aus der Vernunft ab; das Juristenrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts wandte 
sich an die Pseudoanalyse der geschichtlichen Quellen, während die wissenschaftliche 
Vorbereitung der modernen Regelung auf die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse 
konzentrierte. Da aber die Rechtsnormen in politischem Vorgang geschaffen werden, 
erscheinen im Argumentationssystem die politischen und moralischen Berufungen 
und in den Debatten der tatsächlichen Gesetzgeber werden ausdrücklich diese — und 
nicht die wissenschaftlichen Legitimationen — vorherrschend. 
Wenn wir bloß bei der Wissenschaft der Gesetzgebung der Gegenwart bleiben, 
taucht die Frage auf, inwieweit die gesellschaftlichen Probleme und die wissenschaftli-
che Analyse derselben rechtswissenschaftliche Probleme darstellen. Bei der 
Rechtswissenschaft richtet sich die Antwort auf diese Frage grundlegend nach den 
bestehenden normativen Gesichtspunkten: die rechtswissenschaftliche Analyse und 
die Lösung wird in entscheidendem M a ß dadurch beeinflußt, daß das Problem in dem 
Begriffs- und Anschauungssystem untersucht wird, die durch die gegenwärtig 
bestehende Regelung bestimmt ist. D a ß ein Problem seine eigenen Anschauungs-
schranken mit sich führ t , ist eine Eigenart, mit der man rechnen muß, — und mit der 
sich die fachgesellschaftswissenschaftliche Analyse gewöhnlich nicht befaßt. Demzu-
folge wird die Lösung des Problems im Grunde die Reproduktion des bereits 
Bestehenden. Im Zuge der Rechtsgestaltung erblickt die Rechtswissenschaft ihre 
Hauptaufgabe darin, daß sie die Begriffs- und Formstrukturen bestimmt, mit der die 
Lösung harmonisieren muß, das heißt: dadurch wird die als Lösung geltende 
Rechtsnorm durch die bereits gegebenen Rechtsquellen-, rechtssprachlichen und 
rechtslogischen Eigenartigkeiten determiniert. 
In krassem Widerspruch zu den obigen können wir auch sagen, daß eine 
gesetzgeberische Rechtswissenschaft überhaupt nicht existiert, insofern es allgemeine 
Theorien in diesem Zusammenhang gegenwärtig überhaupt nicht darbietet, abgerech-
net die allgemeinen Rechtsschaffungstheorien der Rechtswissenschaft, die aber bloß 
darüber reden, wer das Gesetz verabschiedet. Das ist aber aus wissenschaftlichen 
Gesichtspunkt eine ziemlich eingeengte Annäherung und für den Gesetzgeber darüber 
hinaus auch noch völlig uninteressant, da er es dessen wohl bewußt ist, daß im Moment 
er es ist, der das Gesetz schafft. In Hinsicht auf die rechtliche Objektivation 
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beziehungsweise ihrer Teilsysteme gibt es freilich auch heute zerstreute Thesen, fü r 
Weiterentwicklung geeignete Theorieteile, diese können aber seitens der Rechtswissen-
schaft kaum nutzbar gemacht werden. Aber eine die Rechtschaffung fördernde 
wissenschaftliche Theorie könnte prinzipiell ausgearbeitet werden. Diese Bemerkung 
soll streng als Hypothese aufgefaßt werden, denn es ist kaum ein Zufall, daß die 
wissenschaftlichen Theorien der Gesetzgebung größtenteils darin bestehen, jene 
empirisch kaum zu bestätigende These zu legitimieren, daß die Rechtsnormen durch 
ihr Zustandekommen den Volkswillen oder einen sonstigen Wert representieren. 
Die heutigen instrumentalen Gesichtspunkte der Gesetzgeber, die die Wissen-
schaftlichkeit der Gesetzgebung so sehr unterstreichen, daß wir beinahe schon geneigt 
sind, der Wissenschaftlichkeit Glauben zu schenken, sichern in Wirklichkeit nicht 
automatisch, daß die rechtswissenschaftlichen Theorien wissenschaftlich werden. Der 
Verwissenschaftlichung werden gerade durch das Rechtsgestaltungsinteresse Grenzen 
geboten. Es ist unzweifelhaft, daß in dieser Beziehung der „wissenschaftlichste" Teil 
der Rechtswissenschaft entstehen könnte, wenn die zur Neuregelung notwendige 
Klarsicht zur Geltung käme; aber auch das wäre eine bloß soziotechnische Tendenz. 
Die hierher gehörenden Theorien könnten taxonomisch die strukturell-formellen 
Bewegungseigenheiten der rechtlichen Objektivation bestimmen, und der so erarbeite-
te Instrumentenvorrat könnte durch die Gesetzgebung zur Einführung von durch 
andere Wissenschaften vorgeschlagenen inhaltlichen Lösungen verwendet werden. 
Diese attraktive Lösung ist aber vermutlicherweise irreal; es ist unwahrscheinlich, d a ß 
ein derartiges Zusanimenheften der Form und des Inhalts ertragreich wäre. Die reinen 
Formlehren erweisen sich — nach Kelsens Beispiel geurteilt — nicht für befriedegend. 
Auch diese Rechtswissenschaft könnte nicht über ihren eigenen Schatten treten: ihre 
induktive Grundlage ist bloß in den gegebenen rechtlichen Formen zu finden, 
demzufolge ist die durch die Änderung des Inhalts geforderte qualitative Entwicklung 
ausgeschlossen. Eine These derartigen Charakters, wie zum Beispiel die der Bewegung 
vom Status zum Kontrakt — vorausgesetzt hier und diesmal deren Akzeptibilität — 
wird nur dann anwendbar (operabel) sein, wenn sie in die Totalität versetzt würde; 
dann würde es sich herausstellen, wo die gegebene Epoche und das gegebene Problem 
tatsachlich ihrem Platz hat, und was im Sinne der erwähnten These die geeignetste 
Regelungsart sei. Diese Totalitätsanschauung sprengt aber die Rahmen der Gesetzge-
bungswissenschaft, da sich die Totalitätsanschauung, gegenüber der bestehenden 
Rechtsordnung, wenn auch nicht unbedingt gesellschaftlich, jedoch aus dem 
Gesichtspunkt des Publikums der Rechtswissenschaft sicherlich respektloser be-
nimmt, als es ideologisch ertragbar ist. 
* 
Es ist zweifellos, daß die aus der gesellschaftlichen Totali tät ausgehende 
Anschauung des Rechts, die die rechtlich-geistigen Bildungen, so auch die Rechtswis-
senschaft selbst kritisch untersucht, existiert. Diese kritische gesellschaftliche 
Totalitätsanschauung ist von den neuen linksorientierten rechtswischaftlichen Ideen 
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zu unterscheiden, die vor allem die geistigen Kinder von 1968 sind. In der Auffassung 
der Rolle des Bewußtseins besteht ein grundlegender Unterschied in den beiden 
Schulen trotz einer gewissen textuellen Gemeinschaft , die ohne Zweifel existiert zum 
Beispiel wenn Marx im Geiste des Werkes von Lukács' Geschichte und 
Klassenbewußtsein gelesen ist. Diese Wendung nach dem Bewußtsein ist notwendig, 
wenn sich die gesellschaftlichen Kräfte der Änderung am Horizont nicht abzeichnen, 
oder wenn sich der Denker mit diesen nicht solidarisch fühlt . In dem westdeutschen 
Positivismus-Streit wurde es offenbar, d a ß die Gesellschaftswissenschaft entweder als 
Soziotechnik behandelt wird, wobei im besten Fall eine für einen Teil der Gesellschaft, 
und für eine kurze Zeit geltende (middle-range-artige) Theorie zustande kommt , oder 
es wird als kritische Gesellschaftswissenschaft kultiviert. In dem letzten Fall die 
kritische Reflexion vermindert aber die logisch-erklärende Kra f t der Theorie, die das 
verwirklicht (HABERMAS, 1973, 305—308). 
Die kritische Anschauung übt zwar eine — nicht gerade ohne Widerspruch 
stehende — Wirkung auf die Rechtswissenschaft aus, kann aber mit ihr nicht 
identifiziert werden. Eine derartige, charakteristisch widerspruchsvolle Wirkung ist die 
die Gesellschaftswissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft anerkennende Auffas-
sung, im Zeichen dessen die Rechtswissenschaft von Zeit zu Zeit von pseudosoziologi-
schen Wellen überschüttet wird. Die Wirkung ist in der Tat entwaffnend. Wenn die 
sich an die rechtlichen Normen bindende Rechtswissenschaft eine deklarierte kritische 
Funktion ausübt, bleibt das, trotz jeder ihrer eventuellen wertwahrenden Funkt ion, 
grundlegend nach den Ansichten der Anhänger des status quo 's kontrollierbar. Es ist 
zweifellos, daß auch die außerhalb der Rechtswissenschaft bleibende kritischen 
Bestrebung bloß innerhalb der Rahmen der Spielregeln der repressiven Toleranz 
existiert d. h. die Beschränktheit ihrer Wirkung ist „vorweg" präsumiert. In einem 
Gesellschaftssystem aber, in dem ein Bestreben besteht, daß die Mitglieder der 
Gesellschaft, gemäß des erwähnten Marx-Zitats über den Alltag Herr werden, und wo 
die Möglichkeit dieser Bestrebung material gegeben ist, dor t wird die Rolle dieser 
Wissenschaft, und in ihr die Rolle der sich auf das Recht beziehenden wissenschaftli-
chen Annäherung wichtiger werden. 
U n d auch umgekehrt, die Existenz einer solchen Wissenschaft und ihr 
gesellschaftlicher Einfluß ist ein sicherer Maßs tab zur Beurteilung der Gesellschaft. 
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Юридическая наука может ли быть общественной наукой? 
А . Ш А Й О 
В различных отраслях континентальных и социалистических юридических наук 
заимствование современных обществоведческих знаний в различной мере продвинулось вперед. 
Заимствование осуществилось в различных исторических условиях и, соответственно этому, в 
правовых отраслях сохранились требования общественных наук, господствовавшие во время 
заимствования. Препятствием превращения юридической науки в действительную общественную 
науку является и социальная функция, для выполнения которой призвана юридическая наука. 
Понимание научности как изыскание закономерностей представляет трудности для 
образования юридических теорий. Ведь в интересах этого юристу пришлось бы быйти за пределы 
своей профессии же загородиться в стерильном мире юридических конструкций. С точки зрения 
теории науки достаточно, если имеются гипотезы с пояснительной силой и не нужно искать 
«сущности» правовых явлений. В юридической науке программа поиска «сущности» ограничивает-
ся. как правило, исследованием понятий. 
Становление юридической науки общественной наукой имеет свои имманентные пределы 
(например, антропоморфизм). Зто, однако, не меняет того, что юридическию науку нужно 
культивировать как науку (т. е. знания развиваются интеракцией открытой научной общественнос-
ти), что юристы не могли бы не продвигаться в области образования теорий. 
Can the law of science become a social science? 
A . S A J Ó 
In the different branches of the continental and the socialist legal sciences the adaptation to modern 
social science informations happened in various pace. The interiorization took place under different 
historical conditions, therefore the social science expectations of the given era were embedded in the legal 
science branches. In the way of becoming a social science there is an obstacle for the legal science, namely the 
very social function, which it ought to fulfill. 
The notion of scientific merit as seeking regularities makes difficult to create legal theories. This 
process requires that the jurist should look beyond his own profession or have to close in himself to the sterile 
world of legal structures. As far as scientific theory is concerned it is enough to have explanatory hypotheses 
and we should not seek for the „substance" of legal phenomena. In the legal sciences the program of 
surveying "substance" is oversimplified to searching for terms. 
There are immanent obstacles o f legal sciences to become social sciences (e.g. anthropomorphism). 
This fact does not change that the legal science must be cultivated as science i.e. the knowledge is developed 
by the interaction o f an open public) and there is a possibility to have progress in the way of creating theories. 
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Grundsätze der Strafzumessung 
К . GYÖRGYI 
Dozent 
Eötvös Loránd Universität, 
Budapest 
Die Abhandlung befaßt sich mit den Fragen der gesetzlichen Regelung der 
Strafzumessungsgrundsätze im ungarischen Strafrecht. 
Die Prinzipien der Strafzumessung wurden im ungarischen Strafrecht zuerst durch das 
Gesetz Nr II v. J. 1950 geregelt. Diese Regelung hat sich in der Praxis bewährt, sie wurde daher — mit 
kleineren Änderungen — auch in die Strafgesetzbücher 1961 und 1978 übernommen. D a s System 
der Grundsätze der Strafzumessung besteht nach dieser Regelung aus drei wesentlichen Elementen. 
Das erste ist der Hinweis auf die gesetzlichen Rahmen der Strafe. Das zweite: die Berücksichtigung 
des Ziels der Strafe. Das dritte: die Geltendmachung der mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände, 
von denen das Gesetz die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat und des Täters und den Grad der 
Schuld hervorhebt. Die gesetzliche Festsetzung der Grundsätze der Strafzumessung gewährt des 
gerichtlichen Ermessens einen entsprechenden Raum. Die Strafzumessung als Tätigkeit bedeutet 
zugleich auch Rechtsanwendung, Anwendung der gesetzlichen Grundsätze der Strafzumessung. 
Darauf gründet sich der Standpunkt der Judikatur, wonach die Strafzumessung die diese 
Grundsätze verletzt, die unrichtige Anwendung der materiellen Rechtsnorm bedeutet, die das 
Gericht zweiter Instanz beheben kann. 
In Bezug der Strafzumessungsumstände, bemängelt die Abhandlung die im ungarischen 
Schrifttum sowie in der Rechtsprechung vorhandene Begriffsbestimmung, wonach diese als 
„Schuldumstände" genannt werden. Strafzumessungsumstand ist jeder Umstand, den das Gericht 
— innerhalb der gesetzlichen Rahmen — bei der Bestimmung von Art, Maß und Vollstreckungswei-
se der anzuwendenden Strafe berücksichtigt. 
Die Abhandlung stellt nach einer Analyse dieser Umstände fest, daß die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat in dieser Hinsicht von primärer Bedeutung ist. Ein Strafmaß 
jedoch, das der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat entspricht, bedeutet kein festes Maß, 
sondern vielmehr einen Spielraum, in der die Strafzumessung konkret erfolgt. Die Beurteilung des 
Schuldgrades, der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters und der sonstigen erschwerenden und 
mildernden Umstände kann innerhalb der Rahmen durchgeführt werden, die die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat bestimmt. Im Kreise der Strafzumessung stellt die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat denjenigen Vergleichungspunkt dar, auf den bezogen die 
anderen Strafzumessungsumstände als mildernde bzw. erschwerende Umstände zu beurteilen sind. 
Zur Einteilung der Strafzumessungsumstände hebt die Abhandlung hervor, daß diese 
Konzeption sowohl bei der Bestimmung des Bereichs dieser Umstände, wie auch für die Vermeidung 
der Doppelverwertung von Umständen des Tatbestandes, sogar von Strafzumessungsumständen 
von Bedeutung sein kann. 
Unter den Umständen der Strafzumessung widmet die Abhandlung dem Begriff der Schuld 
und der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit sowie deren Verhältnis zueinander besondere 
Aufmerksamkeit. Sie stellt fest, daß diese zwei Begriffe sowohl in der Theorie, wie auch in der Praxis 
konkurrieren. Nach dem Standpunkt der Abhandlung ist die persönliche Gesell-
schaftsgefährlichkeit ein Begriff der Prognose; sie weist darauf hin, was für ein Verhalten in 
der Zukunft vom Täter zu erwarten ist, bzw. welche Chancen die anzuwendende Sanktion zur 
Beeinflussung seines Verhaltens haben kann. Die Beurteilung der persönlichen 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit kann aber nur im Rahmen erfolgen, die die schuldhaft begangene 
gesellschaftsgefährliche Straftat bestimmt. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 
358 К. Györgyi 
1. Die gesetzliche Regelung der Grundsätze 
Die Grundsätze der Strafzumessung wurden in unserem Strafrecht zuerst im 
Gesetz Nr II v. J. 1950 (StGB allgemeiner Teil, im weiteren = StGA) bestimmt. Diese 
Regelung hat sich so bewährt, daß das StGB v. J. 1961 daran nur kleine Änderungen 
vornahm. Die allgemeine Festlegung der Grundsätze der Strafzumessung stellt also 
eine Neuerung unseres sozialistischen Strafrechtes dar . Der Entwurf v. J. 1843 gab 
noch umfangreiche Aufzählungen der erschwerenden und mildernden Umstände. Das 
S tGB v. J. 1878 warf demgegenüber die Spezifizierung dieser Umstände weg, und 
schrieb ziemlich mechanische Regeln der Strafzumessung vor: „bei der Strafzumes-
sung hat das Gericht die den Schuldgrad beeinflussenden mildernden und erschweren-
den Umstände zu beachten", und von deren Zahl oder Gewicht abhängig die 
gesetzliche mindeste oder schwerste Strafe anzuwenden, bzw. dieser oder jener Grenze 
des Strafmaßes nahezukommen. 
Die Frage, welche Lösung richtiger ist, die Formulierung von allgemeinen 
Grundsätzen, ode r die exemplifikative (oder sogar taxatíve) Aufführung der 
Strafzumessungsumstände, ist in dem internationalen Schrift tum strittig, und 
auch die Gesetzgebungen der verschiedenen Staa ten regeln diese Frage unter-
schiedlich.1 
In unserer Literatur hat nach der Befreiung SCHULTHEISZ allein eine exemplifika-
tive Aufführung der mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände in 12 Punkten 
vorgeschlagen.2 N a c h dem StGA verbreitete sich die Auffassung, daß eine taxatíve 
Aufzählung der mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände unmöglich, ihre exemplifi-
kative Aufzählung aber unnötig sei.3 KÁDÁR schlug die Weglassung einer gesetzlichen 
Regelung der mildernden und erschwerenden U m s t ä n d e mit der Begründung vor, daß 
diese zufolge der Wandlungen der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse ständigen Änderun-
gen unterworfen sind; etliche treten neu auf, andere verschwinden, derselbe Umstand 
kann einmal mildernd, ein anderes Mal erschwerend sein, und auch die gesetzlichen 
Tatbestandsmerkmale können als mildernde oder erschwerende Umstände gelten, 
wenn sie in wesentlich erhöhtem G r a d e verwirklicht werden.4 Nicht einmal während 
der Vorbereitung des Gesetzes N r IV v. J. 1978 (im weiteren neues StGB) tauchte ein 
1
 Zum Beschluß angenommen am Kongreß der Association Internationale de Droit Pénal, im Haag 
1 9 6 4 s. K Á D Á R , M . : A súlyosító körülmények. (Die erschwerenden Umstände) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1 9 6 5 .  
p p . 1 3 2 — 1 4 1 . 
1
 S C H U L T H E I S Z , S . : A Btk reformjára vonatkozó elgondolások. (Ideen zur Reform des StGB) 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1949. p. 241. 
3
 K Á D Á R , M . : A büntetőtörvénykönyv általános része. (Allgemeiner Teil des Strafgesetzbuches) 
Az 1950. évi II. törvény. AZ 1950. évi 39. sz. törvényerejű rendelet. (Gesetz II v. J. 1950. Gesetzesverordnung 
39. v. J. 1950.) Budapest, Jogi- és Államigazgatási Könyv- és Folyóiratkiadó 1951. p. 140. 
4
 KÁDÁR, M.: A súlyosító körülmények. (Die erschwerenden Umstände) p. 138.; RÁcz, GY.: A 
büntetéskiszabás elvi kérdései. (Grundsätzliche Probleme der Strafzumessung) Magyar Jog, 1968. p. 200.; 
FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. 1970. p. 192. 
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Antrag auf, der anstatt Festlegung der Strafzumessungsgrundsätze eine andere 
Lösung bevorzugt hätte.5 
Das neue StGB hat die gesetzliche Bestimmung der Strafzumessungsgrundsätze 
an dem früheren Recht unverändert übernommen. Diese Regelung besteht aus drei 
wesentlichen Elementen. Das erste: der Hinweis auf die gesetzlich bestimmten 
Rahmen der Strafe. Das zweite: die Berücksichtigung des Ziels der Strafe. Das drit te: 
die Geltendmachung der mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände, von denen das 
Gesetz die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters und den Schuldgrad hervorhebt. 
Der Hinweis auf die gesetzlichen Rahmen der Strafzumessung stellt einen 
breiteren Begriff dar als der „Strafsatz" der für die Bezeichnung der Rahmen im 
besonderen Teil vorbehalten wird. Die im Gesetz verankerten Rahmen der Strafe 
umfassen alle im allgemeinen Teil enthaltenen Bestimmungen, die die Übertretung der 
unteren und oberen Grenze des Strafsatzes zulassen. Man hat also bei der 
Strafzumessung von dem Strafsatz auszugehen, die „im Gesetz bestimmten R a h m e n " 
sind jedoch breiter. Diese Rahmen können ansonsten so breit sein, daß das Gericht 
anstatt Strafe eine entsprechende Maßnahme (z. B. Verweisung zur Probe) anwenden 
kann. Dies fällt zwar außerhalb der Strafzumessung, deren Grundsätze jedoch 
trotzdem auch in einem solchen Fall zur Bedeutung kommen. 
Im Kreise der Grundsätze der Strafzumessung ist das Ziel der Strafe von großer 
Bedeutung. Die Problematik der Strafzwecke steigt jedoch hier von den Höhen der 
Philosophie, Ethik und Kriminalpolitik ab und wird zu einer Frage der Rechtsanwen-
dung vereinfacht. In Verbindung mit der Strafzumessung muß nicht die Frage erörtert 
werden, was soll oder kann das Ziel der Strafe sein und was nicht, sondern welche Rolle 
die im Gesetz bestimmten Zielsetzungen der Strafe bei der Strafzumessung zu spielen 
haben. In Bezug der Strafzumessung bedeutet das Ziel der Strafe für das Gericht 
diejenigen im Gesetz bestimmten, vom Gesetzgeber als wünschenswert betrachteten 
Wirkungen der Strafe, deren Erlangung das Gericht durch die Bestimmung von Art 
und Maß (eventuell Vollstreckungsart) der Strafe zu fördern hat. Das Gericht selbst ist 
natürlich nur sehr selten in der Lage sich der Erreichung des Zieles vergewissern zu 
können. Die allgemeine Vorbeugung kann sogar nicht die Wirkung des Einzelurteils 
sein, sondern vielmehr die der ganzen Strafrechtspflege. 
Von den Umständen, die in den gesetzlich bestimmten Strafzumessungs-
grundsätzen aufgeführt werden, mißt FÖLDVÁRI dem Strafziel die größte Bedeutung 
bei, indem er meint, dieses spielt bei der Bestimmung der Strafart und des Strafmaßes 
die wichtigste Rolle.6 Die Bedeutung des Zieles bei der Strafzumessung erkennen wir 
5
 M O L D O V Á N Y I , G Y . : A büntetés kiszabásával kapcsolatos kodifikációs javaslatok. A büntetett élethez 
fűződő hátrányok alóli mentesítés új szabályozásával kapcsolatos elképzelések. (Kodifikationsvorschläge zur 
Strafzumessung. Die Neuregelung der Befreiung von den nachteiligen Folgen des bestraften Vorlebens 
betreffende Vorstellungen.) Magyar Jog, 1976. p. 939. 
6
 FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) p. 204.; RENDEKI, S.: A büntetés kiszabása. Enyhítő 
és súlyosító körülmények. (Die Strafzumessung. Mildernde und erschwerende Umstände.) Budapest, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1976. pp. 23. ff. 
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natürlich an; wenn wir dies nicht täten, würden wir mit dem Gesetz in Konflikt 
geraten. Nur auf einen Gesichtspunkt möchten wir die Aufmerksamkeit lenken. 
Darauf nämlich daß den direkten Zusammenhang zwischen den Strafzielen und der 
zur Anwendung gelangenden Strafe herzustellen nicht nur daher unmöglich ist, weil 
die gesetzlichen Rahmen für den Richter verbindlich sind, sondern auch weil das StGB 
die Zumessung einer sich nach den Umständen richtenden Strafe vorschreibt, die in 
den Strafzumessungsgrundsätzen aufgeführt werden. Die der Verwirklichung des im 
StGB im allgemeinen bestimmten Strafzieles dienenden Mittel fallen also unter eine 
doppelte Einschränkung. Erstens zufolge des proportionellen Systems der Strafsätze, 
zweitens der gesetzlichen Bestimmung, die eine sich unter den festgelegten Rahmen 
nach der konkreten Straftat und dem Täter, sowie den Strafzumessungsumständen 
richtende Strafzumessung vorsieht. 
Unsere Vorstellungen über die Gerechtigkeit im Strafrecht knüpfen sich an die 
Proportionalität der Strafen; wir könnten daher sagen, daß man die Anforderungen 
der Zweckmäßigkeit mit Rücksicht auf die Gerechtigkeit erfüllen kann. Wir stimmen 
mit Tibor KIRÁLY überein, da er schreibt: „Die für die einzelnen Verbrechen gesetzlich 
bestimmten Strafen werden vielmehr durch die Proportionalität charakterisiert, als 
durch die Zweckmäßigkeit, obgleich wir damit keinesfalls die Zweckmäßigkeit der 
proportionellen Strafe leugnen."7 
Wir sind andererseits mit FÖLDVÁRI darüber vollkommen einig, daß die im 
Gesetz umrissenen Strafzumessungsumstände mit dem Ziel der Strafe in enger 
Verbindung sind, und auch die Auffassung für richtig halten, daß die subjektiven 
Umstände für die Zielsetzung der individuellen, während die objektiven Umstände für 
die der allgemeinen Vorbeugung von größerer Bedeutung sind.8 
Die Weglassung einer detaillierten gesetzlichen Aufführung der mildernden und 
erschwerenden Umstände heißen wir selbst auch gut,9 das macht jedoch die 
Ausarbeitung der allgemeinen Sätze zur Strafzumessung nicht überflüssig. In dieser 
Hinsicht stellt die Richtlinie N r 12 des Obersten Gerichtes10 die als Zusammenfassung 
früherer Einzelentscheidungen und Stellungnahmen auf Teilgebieten erlassen wurde, 
einen verbindlichen Leitsatz für die Gerichte dar. 
Das Fehlen der ausführlichen Regelung von mildernden und erschwerenden 
Umständen und die im Gesetz bestimmten allgemeinen Strafzumessungsgrundsätze 
nähren die Ansicht in unserem Schrifttum, die die Bedeutung des freien Ermessens in 
der richterlichen Strafzumessung hervorheben. 
7
 K I R Á L Y , T . : Büntetőítélet a jog határán. (Strafurteil an der Grenze des Rechts.) Budapest, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1972. p. 238. 
8
 F Ö L D V Á R I , J.: A büntetés tana.'(Die Straflehre) pp. 2 0 4 — 2 0 6 . 
9
 GYÖRGYI, К.: A büntetéskiszabás elvi kérdései és a kodifikáció. (Grundsätzliche Probleme der 
Strafzumessung und die Kodifikation.) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1977. p. 133. 
10
 Bírósági Határozatok, 1977/2., S. noch RÁcz, GY.: A Legfelsőbb Bíróság 12. sz. irányelve 
(Richtlinie Nr. 12. des Obersten Gerichts.) Magyar Jog, 1977, pp. 289—301 
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Wir wollen nicht bestreiten, d a ß „der am wenigsten exakt begründbare Teil des 
gerichtlichen Urteils die Strafzumessung, darin die Bestimmung des S t ra fmaßes ist ."1 1  
Trotzdem können wir die Ansicht nicht teilen, die in der Strafzumessung das freie 
Ermessen sieht. GYÖRGY RÁCZ schreibt: „Die Strafzumessung ist das Ergebnis einer 
freien Erwägungstät igkeit , eine selbständige, gerichtliche Bewer tung." 1 2 Diese 
Tätigkeit des Gerichtes ist darin gewiß frei, d a ß das Gesetz die Strafzu-
messungsumstände und deren Erwägungsrichtungen nicht vorschreibt. Die Grund-
sätze der Strafzumessung werden jedoch im Gesetz bestimmt, deren Anwendung 
nicht die Gel tendmachung der selbständigen Bewertung des Richters, sondern eben 
die des Gesetzes voraussetzt. Die Strafzumessung stellt also selbst eine Art Rechts-
anwendung dar , obgleich die Beurteilung und Erwägung des Gerichts im Zuge dieser 
Rechtsanwendung zu größerer Bedeutung gelangt, als bei der Qualif izierung der 
Hand lung nach dem Strafgesetz. W e n n wir im prozeß der Strafzumessung keine 
Rechtsanwendung sehen, könnten wir von der zugemessenen Strafe k a u m sagen, d a ß 
sie gesetzwidrig ist. Das wird aber in unserer Rechtsprechung in j edem Fall festge-
stellt, wenn das M a ß der zugemessenen Strafe abstechend schwer ode r mild ist.13 
2. Die Umstände der Strafzumessung 
Das neue S t G B besagt, d a ß die zugemessene Strafe sich nach der Ge-
sellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straf ta t und des Täters, dem Schuldgrad, ferner den 
anderen erschwerenden und mildernden Umständen richten soll. Diese Bestimmung 
wird schon seit den Diskussionen, die dem StGB v. J. 1961 vorangingen, einheitlich im 
Schrif t tum und in der Rechtsprechung in der Weise ausgelegt, daß diese alle mildernde 
und erschwerende Umstände sind; d a s Wor t „andere" deutet ja da rau f hin, daß die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der S t raf ta t und des Täters , sowie der Schuldgrad in diese 
Kategorie fallen. Die gesetzliche Formul ie rung der im S tGA bestimmten Grundsätze 
der Strafzumessung hat schon zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß die „Gesellschaftsge-
1 1
 W I E N E R , I . : A tipikus eset szankciója a büntetési keretben. (Die Sanktion des typischen Falles im 
Strafrahmen.) Magyar Jog, 1971. pp. 592—595. 
12
 RÁcz, GY.: A büntetés kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung.) In: HALÁSZ, S.: (Red.): A büntető 
törvénykönyv kommentárja. Bd. I—II (Kommentar des Strafgesetzbuches.) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, 1968. Bd. I. p. 310. Die Wurzeln dieser Auffassung liegen in früheren Zeiten. Angyal und Rácz 
gingen 1937 davon aus, daß der damals geltende Kodex „lange entstanden und in vielen Hinsichten überholt 
ist", sie schlugen daher vor, daß das Gericht „bei der Bewertung der Umstände, die als Grundlage der 
Strafzumessung dienen" nicht das gesetzte Recht, „sondern die Lebensauffassung der Gesellschaft, ihren als 
gemeinnützig qualifizierten Gerechtigkeitssinn und ihre sozialethische Beurteilung direkt verwende". 
ANGYAL, S. P .—RÁcz, GY.: A büntetés kiszabása bírói gyakorlatunkban. (Die Strafzumessung in unserer 
Rechtsprechung.) Budapest 1937. Verlegt durch Attila-nyomda Részvénytársaság, p. 18. 
13
 Neuestens die Stellungnahme Nr. 27 des Straf- und Militärkollegiums des Obersten Gerichts. 
Bírósági Határozatok, 1979/6. Vgl. noch KELEMEN, G.: Mikor lényegesen enyhe vagy aránytalanul súlyos a 
büntetés? (Wann ist die Strafe wesentlich mild oder unangemessen schwer?) Magyar Jog, 1957. pp. 184— 
187. 
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fährlichkeit der Straf tat" , die „aus der Persönlichkeit des Täters auf die Gesellschaft 
fallende Gefahr" und die Schuld des Täters ebenso „die Strafe erschwerende und 
mildernde Umstände" darstellen, wie die besonders hervorgehobenen „herbeigeführte 
Schädigung" und „die sonst zu beachtenden" Umstände. Der Motivenbericht zum 
Entwurf des StGA hat auch gesondert festgestellt: „Diejenigen Umstände, die im 
Sinne des § 50. Abs. 2 bei der Strafzumessung zu beachten sind, werden im StGA die 
Strafe erschwerende bzw. mildernde Umstände genannt ." 1 4 
In der Rechtsprechung kam trotzdem eine Auffassung zur Geltung, die auch im 
Schrifttum vertreten wurde, wonach das Gericht im Zuge der Strafzumessung zuerst 
das Maß der objektiven Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat, und der aus der 
Persönlichkeit des Täters auf die Gesellschaft fallende Gefahr beurteilt, und erst 
danach die erschwerenden und mildernden Umstände, die „Schuldumstände".1 5 
Der Motivenbericht zum Gesetzesentwurf des S tGB von 1961 hat dann noch 
eindeutiger erklärt, daß „jeder Umstand, den das Gericht bei der Entscheidung der 
Frage beachtet, welche Strafar t im Falle eines alternativen Strafsatzes gewählt, ferner 
in welchem Maße die konkrete Strafe zwischen der unteren und oberen Grenzen des 
Strafsatzes bestimmt werden soll, stellt einen erschwerenden oder mildernden Um-
stand dar . " 1 6 
Diese Formulierung ist aus dem Gesichtspunkt tadellos, daß sie der Trennung 
der im Gesetz hervorgehobenen Umstände von den mildernden und erschwerenden 
Umständen vorbeugt. Sie ist aber insofern von formellem Charakter, daß sie keinen 
Anhaltspunkt dafür gibt, welche andere Umstände bei der Strafzumessung außer der 
im Gesetz hervorgehobenen zu beachten sind. Es ist der Verdienst von FÖLDVÁRI in 
unserem Schrifttum, d a ß er nachwies, bei der Strafzumessung müssen diejenigen 
1 4
 K Á D Á R , M . : A büntetőtörvénykönyv általános része. (Allgemeiner Teil des Strafgesetzbuches) 
p. 140.; Zu den Grundsätzen der Strafzumessung im StGA vgl. die interessante Artikelserie von Székely. 
SZÉKELY, J.: A motívum vizsgálatának jelentősége a büntetés kiszabásánál. (Die Bedeutung des Motivs bei der 
Strafzumessung.) Magyar Jog. 1 9 5 4 . pp. 3 9 — 4 2 . ; Az előélet tisztázása és ennek jelentősége a büntetés 
kiszabásánál. (Untersuchung des Vorlebens und deren Bedeutung bei der Strafzumessung) Magyar Jog, 
1 9 5 5 . pp. 3 5 — 3 6 . ; A bűncselekmény társadalomra veszélyességének vizsgálata és a büntetéskiszabás. 
(Untersuchung der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat und die Strafzumessung.) Magyar Jog 1955.  
pp. 1 3 2 — 1 3 6 . ; A bűncselekménnyel okozott sérelem. (Schädigung durch die Straftat) Magyar Jog. 1 9 5 5 .  
p p . 2 6 0 — 2 6 3 . 
15
 Zsámár erwähnte z. В. in Bezug von § 50. StGA den Strafsatz, die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit und 
die Schuldumstände als selbständige Elemente der Verfügung. S. Z S Á M Á R , G Y . : A büntetéskiszabás időszerű 
kérdései. (Aktuelle Fragen der Strafzumessung) Magyar Jog, 1 9 5 9 . pp. 2 0 2 — 2 0 7 . S. noch RÁcz, G Y . : A 
büntetlen előélet értékelése rehabilitáció esetén. (Die Bewertung des unbestraften Vorlebens im Falle der 
Rehabilitation.) Magyar Jog, 1 9 5 9 . p. 8 . Diese Auffassung wird kritisiert durch: M O L N Á R , L . : A büntetést 
meghatározó tényezők. (Bestimmende Faktoren der Strafe.) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 
1961. p. 18. Nach Schultheisz: „Als Folge dieses Verfahrens von zwei Ebenen sind zwei miteinander 
unvergleichliche Kategorien entstanden: einerseits die erschwerenden und mildernden Umstände, 
andererseits zweierlei Maß der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit." S C H U L T H E I S Z , S . : A Z új büntető törvénykönyv 
tervezetének általános részéről. (Über den allgemeinen Teil des Entwurfs des neuen Strafgesetzbuches.) 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1960. p. 658. 
16
 A Magyar Népköztársaság Büntető Törvénykönyve. (Strafgesetzbuch der Ungarischen Volksrepu-
blik) (Veröffentlichung des Justizministeriums) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1962. p. 129. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 24. 1982 
Uber die Strafzumessung 363 
Umstände beachtet werden, die aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Verwirklichung des 
Strafziels von Bedeutung sind.17 Die im Gesetz betonten Umstände: die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat und des Täters, sowie der Schuldgrad sind 
gewiß von solcher Bedeutung, das hat der Gesetzgeber im voraus entschieden. Das 
Erkenntnis von FÖLDVÁRI hat daher seine Bedeutung außer diesem Kreis, bei der 
Beachtung der anderen mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände. Das Ziel der Strafe 
spielt aber auch bei der Feststellung der Erwägungsrichtung dieser Umstände eine 
bedeutende Rolle. 
Der Motivenbericht des neuen StGB konzipiert die erschwerenden und 
mildernden Umstände — nach FÖLDVÁRI — folgendermaßen: „Erschwerend und 
mildernd ist jeder Umstand, der bei der Strafzumessung im Interesse der Verwirkli-
chung des Zieles der Strafe zu beachten ist."18 
Für die Bezeichnung der im Zuge der Strafzumessung zu berücksichtigenden 
Umstände sind in unserer heutigen Rechtssprache mehrere Ausdrücke üblich. Sie 
werden „erschwerende und mildernde Umstände genannt", MOLNÁR schrieb mit einer 
zusammenfassenden Benennung von den „die Strafe bestimmenden Faktoren" diese 
wird auch bei RENDEKI verwendet1 9 im neuen StGB §45. Abs. 2. finden wir die 
Bezeichnung" bei der Strafzumessung maßgebende Umstände" , es ist auch der 
Wortgebrauch „Strafzumessungsumstände" bekannt, sowohl im Schrifttum, wie auch 
in der Rechtsprechung hält sich jedoch auch der Terminus „Schuldumstände" 
hartnäckig.2 0 
So schrieb z. B. der Motivenbericht des StGB v. J. 1961 an einer Stelle: „was für 
eine Strafe zur Anwendung kommen soll . . . das hängt von den Schuldumständen 
ab ." 2 1 Diese Bezeichnung blickt auch in der Richtlinie Nr 12 des Obersten Gerichts 
zurück.2 2 
FÖLDVÁRI läßt sich, die erwähnte Wendung des Motivenberichtes wortwörtlich 
auffassend, mit der — ansonsten und durch andere tatsächlich vertretenen — Ansicht 
in meritorische Diskussion ein, die bei der Strafzumessung dem Schuldgrad die 
entscheidende Rolle zuschreibt.23 
11
 FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) p. 264. 
1 8
 K Á D Á R , К . — M O L D O V Á N Y I , G Y . I Büntető Törvénykönyv (Strafgesetzbuch) Budapest, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1979. p. 127. 
1 9
 M O L N Á R , J . : A büntetést meghatározó tényezők. (Die bestimmenden Faktoren der Strafe.); 
RENDEKI, S.: A büntetés kiszabása. Az enyhítő és súlyosító körülmények. (Die Strafzumessung. Die 
mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände.) pp. 45—47. 
2 0
 GYÖRGYI, К.: A büntetéskiszabás elvi kérdései és a kodifikáció. (Prinzipielle Fragen der 
Strafzumessung und die Kodifikation.) 1977. p. 134. 
21
 A Magyar Népköztársaság Büntető Törvénykönyve. (Strafgesetzbuch der Ungarischen Volksrepu-
blik) p. 128.; RENDEKI, S.: A büntetés kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung) p. 317.; RÁcz, GY.: A 
büntetéskiszabás elvi kérdései. (Grundsätzliche Probleme der Strafzumessung.) p. 200. 
22
 Bírósági Határozatok, 1977/2. 
2 3
 F Ö L D V Á R I , J . : A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) pp. 2 5 3 — 2 5 6 . ; richtig weist auch Rendeki darauf 
hin. RENDEKI, S.: A büntetés kiszabása. Enyhítő és súlyosító körülmények. (Die Strafzumessung. Die 
mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände.) p. 4 6 . ; G Y Ö R G Y I , К . : A bűncselekmény büntetőjogi 
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Der Hinweis auf die Schuldumstände will aber weder im Motivenbericht zum 
S t G B v. J. 1961, noch anderswo zum Ausdruck bringen, d a ß nur der Grad der 
subjektiven Schuld bei der St rafzumessung von Bedeutung wäre, 2 4 sondern es handelt 
sich hier einfach um eine unrichtige Bezeichung für die Strafzumessungsumstände. 
Diese Benennung hat selbstverständlich ihre eigene Wurzel, die in die Vergangenheit 
zurückreichen. 
Der Entwurf v. J. 1843 enthiel t noch Bestimmungen über die „Zurechnung" 
mildernden, bzw. erschwerenden Umstände . Nach dem sog. CsEMEGi-Kodex (StGB 
N r . V. v. J. 1978) § 89 aber sind bei der Strafzumessung „die den Schulgrad 
beeinflussenden mildernden und erschwerenden U m s t ä n d e " zu berücksichtigen. Es 
g a b zwar im Schr i f t tum auch einen Versuch, der diese auf den Schuldgrad Einfluß 
habenden mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände — kurz die Schuldumstände — 
tatsächlich auf den Grad der subjektiven Schuld einschränken wollte, mit der 
Begründung: der Gesetzgeber ist gezwungen „auf G r u n d von eminenter objektiven 
Merkmale vorzugehen" , und die v o n ihm bestimmten Merkmale selbst „den Grad der 
subjektiven Schuld nicht vertreten",2 5 aber der Schuldgrad hängt einerseits mit der 
G r ö ß e der objektiven Rechtsverletzung zusammen, andererseits die Praxis faßte die 
Schuldumstände von Anfang an in breitem Sinne auf , und zog sowohl die den Täter, 
wie auch die H a n d l u n g betreffenden Umstände in diesem Kreis zusammen. 2 6 ANGYAL 
und RÁcz haben den Wor tgebrauch des CsEMEGi-Kodex § 89. heft ig kritisiert, und die 
Möglichkeit der Auslegung aufgeworfen , „wonach ausschließlich die mit der Schuld in 
direktem Zusammenhang s tehenden, aus der psychologischen Eigenschaft des Täters 
ableitbaren subjektiven Ums tände zu beachten s ind ." 2 7 
Die Verwendung des Ausdruckes „Schuldumstände" stellt heute das Weiterle-
ben des Wortgebrauchs des allgemeinen Teiles des nunmehr vor 28 Jahren außer Kraf t 
gesetzten CSEMEGI-Кodex dar und hat weder im positiven Recht, noch in der Theorie 
irgendeine annehmbare Grundlage . Die Strafzumessungsgrundsätze des neuen StGB 
nennen den G r a d der Schuld einen mildernden oder erschwerenden Umstand , und es 
k a n n nur Verwirrung entstehen, wenn man zur Bezeichnung des alle diese Umstände 
következményei. In: PINTÉR, J. (Red.): Büntetőjog. Altalános rész. (Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil.) Bd. II. 
Zweite (umarbeitete) Aufl., Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1977. p. 229.; VÁGÓ, T.: A büntetés kiszabásánál 
értékelhető körülmények, különös tekintettel a közlekedési bűncselekményekre. (Die bei der Strafzumessung 
bewertbaren Umstände, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Verkehrsstrafsachen) Magyar Jog, 1976. pp. 
273—282. 
24
 Die Konferenz der Senatspräsidenten des Strafkollegium des Obersten Gerichts wies in ihrer 
Stellungnahme Nr. t /1970 ausdrücklich daraufhin, daß „die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat einen 
an der objektiven Seite primär erscheinenden Schuldumstand bildet." Birósági Határozatok, 1970/8. 
2 5
 K A U T Z , G Y . : A magyar büntetőjog tankönyve. (Lehrbuch des ungarischen Strafrechts.) Budapest, 
Buchhandlung Eggenberger, 1881. p. 359. 
2 6
 E D V I - I L L É S , К . : A büntetőtörvénykönyv magyarázata. (Kommentar des Strafgesetzbuches.) 2 . 
Aufl. Bd. I. Budapest, Verlag Révai Testvérek R. T. 1894. p. 327. 
11
 ANGYAL, S. P.—RÁcz, GY.: A büntetés kiszabása bírói gyakorlatunkban. (Die Strafzumessung in 
unserer Rechtsprechung.) p. 25. 
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umfassenden Begriff denselben Terminus verwendet. Diese Benennung ist daher nicht 
nur „irreführend"2 8 , sondern, wie wir schon bemerkt haben, einfach unrichtig. 
Die Benennung: erschwerende und mildernde Umstände ist demgegenüber 
nicht nur allgemein gebräuchlich, sondern sie entspricht auch dem Gesetz. Eine 
zusammenfassende Bezeichnung ist trotzdem unverändert notwendig, daher haben 
wir für diesen Zweck die Bezeichnung: Strafzumessungsumstände vorgeschlagen.29 
In Verbindung mit den erschwerenden und mildernden Umständen taucht noch 
ein Problem auf. Das lautet ganz einfach so: in welchem Verhältnis ist ein Umstand 
mildernd oder erschwerend? Die mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände bilden ja 
eine relative Kategorie von solchen Umständen, die in einem gewißen Vergleich, an 
irgendetwas bezogen die Strafe erschweren oder mildern. Diese Frage führ t zum 
Problem der mittelmäßigen Strafe. Nach den mathematisch erklügelten Formeln des 
CSEMEGI-Kodex: im Falle, „wenn weder erschwerende noch mildernde Umstände 
vorhanden sind, oder diese einander gegenseitig ausgleichen, wird das Mittelmaß 
zwischen Maximum und Minimum für die Strafe festzustellende Zeitdauer bilden."3 0 
Wenn aber „die Schuldumstände" alle Umstände umfassen, die bei der Strafzumes-
sung zu berücksichtigen sind, ist einfach nicht möglich, daß solche Umstände nicht 
vorhanden sein, wenn wir die erschwerenden und mildernden Umstände nicht so 
auslegen möchten, wie EDVI ILLÉS nach CSEMEGI vorschlug. Nach seiner Auffassung 
sind mildernde Umstände diejenigen, die die Minderung unter den Mittelwert bis zum 
Minimum begründen, erschwerende Umstände aber, die die Strafe über den 
Mittelwert, gegebenenfalls bis zum Maximum erhöhen.3 1 
Wodurch aber die der Straftat entsprechend zugemessene Strafe mittelmäßig 
sein wird, davon erfahren wir nichts. Abgesehen jedoch diesmal von der Möglichkeit 
der Milderung, scheint diejenige Hälfte der Ausgangsformel richtig zu sein, wonach im 
Falle wenn die mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände einander ausgleichen, eine 
Strafe um die Höhe des Mittelmaßes begründet ist. Nur dann aber, wenn wir den 
Begriff der mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände richtig auffassen. 
All das ist deswegen einer Untersuchung wert, weil SCHULTHEISZ den 
Standpunkt vertrat, daß als mildernde oder erschwerende Umstände „nur solche 
Umstände in Betracht kommen können, die vom Durchschnitt nach oben oder nach 
unten eine starke Abweichung verursachen, d. i. die Schwere der Gesellschafts-
gefährlichkeit in großem Maße erhöhen, bzw. vermindern."3 2 Nach FÖLDVÁRI sind 
2 8
 RENDEKI, S.: A büntetés kiszabása. Enyhítő és súlyosító körülmények. (Die Strafzumessung. Die 
mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände.) pp. 46—47. 
2 9
 G Y Ö R G Y I , К.: A büntetéskiszabás elvi kérdései és a kodifikáció. (Prinzipielle Fragen der 
Strafzumessung und die Kodifikation) p. 134. S. noch: G Y Ö R G Y I , К.: A bűncselekmény büntetőjogi 
következményei. (Strafrechtliche Folgen der Straftat.) p. 229. 
3 0
 Löw, T.: A magyar büntetőtörvénykönyv a bűntettekről és vétségekről (1878:5. tcz.) és teljes 
anyaggyűjteménye. (Das ungarische Strafgesetzbuch über die Verbrechen und Vergehen (Gesetz Nr. 5. v. J. 
1878) mit vollständiger Materialsammlung.) Budapest, Verlag Pesti könyvnyomda r. t., 1880. Bd. I. p. 71 
3 1
 E D V I - I L L É S , K : A büntetőtörvénykönyv magyarázata. (Kommentar des Strafgesetzbuches) p. 327. 
3 2
 S C H U L T H E I S Z , S.: A büntetés kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung.) Budapest, Jogi és Államigazgatási 
Könyv- és Folyóiratkiadó, 1953. p. 9. 
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aber solche Umstände zu beachten, die „ein viel größeres oder viel milderes Gepräge 
der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit als regelmäßig ergeben." 3 3 Wenn wir die Ansicht von 
FÖLDVÁRI annehmen würden, hinge der Vergleichsgrund von den Strafsachen ab, die 
vor das Gericht gelangen. Wenn wir andererseits die Auffassung von SCHULTHEISZ 
gutheißen, könnten wir leicht zum Punkt gelangen, wo die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit 
der Straftat weder nach unten, noch nach oben eine „starke" Abweichung zeigt, also 
da wir wedereinen mildernden noch einen erschwerenden Umstand feststellen können, 
und mit der These nichts anfangen können, wonach als mildernder oder erschwerender 
Umstand alles betrachtet wird, das das Gericht bei der Strafzumessung berücksichtigt, 
weil es hier nichts zu berücksichtigen wäre. Wir möchten dabei nicht glauben, daß z. B. 
die mittelmäßige Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straf tat kein Strafzumessungsum-
stand wäre. 
Wir haben aber noch ein Bedenken. W a r u m wäre nur die wesentliche 
Abweichung zu beachten? Eine wesentliche Abweichung in der Gesellschaftsge-
fährlichkeit der Handlung muß offensichtlich — in irgendeinem Verhältnis — eine 
wesentliche Abweichung im Maße der Strafe selbst ergeben. Eine Strafe die weniger 
wesentliche Abweichung aufweist, kann offensichtlich eine weniger wesentliche 
Abweichung in der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit begründen. Kann das kein mildernden 
oder erschwerenden Umstand bilden? 
Nach alledem sind wir der Meinung, daß der Begriff der mildernden und 
erschwerenden Umstände eine nähere Erklärung beansprucht. 
Im System des neuen StGB kann dieses Problem durch die Zugrundelegung des 
Begriffs der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straf tat gelöst werden. ^Л^ 
3. Die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat 
Das neue S tGB mißt der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat eine große 
Bedeutung bei. Der Motivenbericht zum Gesetzesentwurf erwähnt, daß eine 
Handlung, die einen Tatbestand im besonderen Teil verwirklicht, keine Straftat 
darstellt, wenn sie „zufolge der konkreten Umstände der Begehung nicht 
gesellschaftsgefährlich ist."34 
33
 FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) p. 251. 
3 4
 K Á D Á R , К - - M O L D O V Á N Y I , G Y . : Büntető Törvénykönyv. (Strafgesetzbuch) p. 47. Zur Vorge-
schichte s. FÖLDVÁRI, J.: Az egység és a halmazat határesetei a büntetőjogban. (Grenzfragen der Tateinheit 
und Konkurrenz im Strafrecht.) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1962. p. 110.; KÁDÁR, К.: 
Megjegyzések a társadalomra nem veszélyes vagy csekély fokban veszélyes cselekmények problémájához. 
(Bemerkungen zum Problem der nicht gesellschaftsgefährlichen oder wenig gefährlichen Handlungen.) 
Magyar Jog, 1972. pp. 561—567.; S Z E D E R , G Y . : Néhány érv a bűncselekmény-fogalom teljessége mellett. 
(Einige Argumente für die Vollständigkeit des Begriffes der Straftat.) Magyar Jog, 1973. pp. 644—647.; 
K Á D Á R , К.: A bűncselekmény-fogalom teljessége védelmében. (Zum Schutz der Vollständigkeit des Begriffes 
der Straftat.) Magyar Jog, 1974. pp. 483—486. 
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Wenn aber die Handlung gesellschaftsgefährlich ist, jedoch in so geringem 
Maße, daß auch die laut Gesetz anwendbare mildeste Strafe als unnötig erscheint, liegt 
ein Strafausschließungsgrund vor, und in diesem Falle ist nur eine Verwarnung 
anzuwenden. Wenn keine solche Fälle vorhanden sind, bestimmt das Gericht die 
Strafe im Sinne der anzuwendenden Strafzumessungsgrundsätze. 
Das Gericht hat die Strafe in der Weise zuzumessen, daß diese sich nach der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat und des Täters, dem Schuldgrad und anderen 
erschwerenden und mildernden Umständen richte. FÖLDVÁRI meint, daß die 
Vorstellung „keinen prinzipiellen Grund ha t" , wonach wir einen beliebigen Fak to r 
von diesen herausheben und vor die anderen setzen, weil die Faktoren bei der 
Strafzumessung nicht allein für sich zur Bedeutung gelangen, sondern nur über die 
Vermittlung der Zielsetzung der Strafe.35 Eine solche Heraushebung hat unserer 
Meinung nach ihren prinzipiellen Grund. 
Den Grund der im Gesetz bestimmten Strafsätze bildet die allgemeine 
Beurteilung des Gesetzgebers von der schuldhaft begangenen gesellschaftsgefähr-
lichen Handlung. Die Strafzumessungsumstände aber stellen die Anforderung, daß die 
zugemessene Strafe mit den angegebenen Strafzumessungsumständen im Verhältnis 
stehe. Diese Proportionalität kann einfach keinen anderen Grund haben, als die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat. Weder die Schuld des Täters, noch dessen 
persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit kann an und für sich nicht existieren, sondern 
nur im Zuge der begangenen gesellschaftsgefährlichen Straftat. Andererseits wenn wir 
die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Handlung mit dem bei uns vorherrschenden 
Standpunkt als eine objektive Kategorie auffassen,3 6 ist diese von beiden anderen 
Umständen unabhängig. 
Bei der Strafzumessung kann man im gesetzlich bestimmten Rahmen nicht von 
einer abstrakten, von der konkreten gesellschaftsgefährlichen Handlung losgelösten 
Schuld oder Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters ausgehen, sondern nur aus der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat. Die durch die Straf ta t herbeigeführte 
Verletzung des Rechtsgutes oder dessen Gefährdung bedeutet für das Gericht die 
Berücksichtigung der in der Außenwelt wahrnehmbaren und mit annähernder 
Genauigkeit feststellbaren Wirkungen der Straftat . Daran, als zu einem Bezugspunkt 
knüpft sich die Beurteilung des Schuldgrades und der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des 
Täters. Wir sind daher der Meinung, daß das Gericht sowohl theoretisch wie auch 
methodologisch bei der Strafzumessung als erste Aufgabe den Grad der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat festzustellen hat. Die Bestimmung des 
Gefährlichkeitsgrades zieht jedoch nicht die Feststellung eines bestimmten Maßes 
einer bestimmten Strafart nach sich. Nicht nur weil — wie es aus der Natur der 
35
 FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) p. 250. 
36
 VISKI, L.: Tézisek a bűncselekményfogalom felépítéséhez. (Thesen zum Aufbau des Verbrechens-
begriffs.) Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1974. pp. 383. ff.; FÖLDVÁRI, J.: Az egység és a halmazat határesetei a 
büntetőjogban. (Grundfragen der Tateinheit und Konkurrenz im Strafrecht.) pp. 82. ff. 
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gerichtlichen Strafzumessung folgt, — ein exakt verifizierbares Quan tum eine irrreale 
Forderung wäre,3 7 sondern auch weil die Strafe nach den Grundsätzen der 
Strafzumessung sich nicht b loß nach der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straf tat , 
sondern außerdem nach dem Schuldgrad, der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters 
und den anderen mildernden und erschwerenden Umständen richten soll. Das der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat entsprechende Strafmaß bedeutet innerhalb 
des Strafsatzes einer weiteren Spielraum, in der wir sagen können, daß die Strafe mit 
der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat in richtigem Verhältnis steht, oder mit 
einer anderen Formulierung: „die Beurteilung der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefähr-
lichkeit kann im Zuge der Strafzumessung von der Bewertung der Gesellschafts-
gefährlichkeit der Straftat nicht getrennt werden. Die Bedeutung der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat kann nie verschwinden."38 
Wie auch das Maß der richtigen Strafe mit mathematischer Genauigkeit nicht 
feststellbar ist, wäre ebenso ein Fehler von uns Rechenschaft darüber zu verlangen, wo 
die exakten Grenzen des Rahmens liegen, der dem Grad der Gesellschaftsgefährlich-
keit der St raf ta t entspricht. D a s kann man zahlenmäßig nicht bezeichnen, nur die bei 
der Strafzumessung zu befolgende grundlegende Anschauung wird dadurch bestimmt. 
Diese schließt die Möglichkeit solcher Feststellungen aus, wie: „die objektiven 
Faktoren sind mehr untergeordnet".3 9 D a m i t wir die Bedeutung der von uns 
vertretenen Anschauung mit einem von weitem stammenden, vielleicht nicht genug 
zutreffenden Beispiel veranschaulichen: nicht so, wie ein Autor vor einem Viertel-
jahrhundert , halte ich es fü r unvorstellbar, „daß man einen Täter, dessen 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit überdurchschnittlich ist, — nehmen wir an, er wurde z. B. 
in den letzten 5 Jahren zehnmal, darunter siebenmal wegen Diebstahls gegen das 
gesellschaftliche Eigentum bestraft , — wegen eines einzigen gestohlenen Glases zu 
zwei oder drei Jahren verurteilt ."4 0 
Unsere Auffassung bedeutet nicht — und möchten es besonders betonen — daß wir 
den Schuldgrad und die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters als Strafzumessungs-
umstand mißachten; sie bezeichnet bloß die gesetzlichen Rahmen der Beurteilung 
dieser Umstände . Die ausschlaggebende Bedeutung der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit 
der Straftat im Zuge der Strafzumessung ist eine wichtige Folge und zugleich 
Erfordernis der tatstrafrechtlichen Anschauung. Die letztere kam in der Stellungnah-
me der Hauptkommission während der Vorbereitung des neuen StGB entschieden 
37
 BAGI, S. D.: Mikor lényegesen enyhe vagy aránytalanul súlyos a büntetés? (Wann ist die Strafe 
wesentlich mild oder unangemessen schwer?) Magyar Jog, 1957. pp. 244—247. 
3 8
 GYÖRGYI, К.: A büntetéskiszabás elvi kérdései és a kodifikáció. (Prinzipielle Fragen der 
Strafzumessung und die Kodifikation.) p. 1 3 3 . M O L D O V Á N Y I , G Y . : A büntetés kiszabásával kapcsolatos 
kodifikációs javaslat. (Kodifikationsvorschläge zur Strafzumessung.) p. 939. 
3 5
 So die Richtlinie Nr. 6. des Obersten Gerichts. Büntetőjogi Döntvénytár, 3887. Budapest, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1968. 
4 0
 OLTI, V.: A büntetőtárgyalás vezetése. (Die Verhandlungsleitung in Strafsachen.) Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1952. p. 270. 
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zum Ausdruck,4 1 und wurde nach dem Inkrafttreten des StGB in der Richtlinie Nr 14 
des Obersten Gerichtes bestätigt: „Die Grundlage der strafrechtlichen Verantwort-
lichkeit ist die schuldhaft begangene gesellschaftsgefährliche und strafbare Handlung, 
die objektive Schwere der Straftat und der Grad der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des 
Verhaltens sind daher auch in dem Falle von grundlegender Bedeutung, wenn der 
Täter rückfällig ist."4 2 
Das Gesagte zusammenfassend meinen wir, daß der Grad der Gesellschaftsge-
fährlichkeit der Straftat bei der Strafzumessung von entscheidender Bedeutung ist. Die 
Beurteilung des Schuldgrades und der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters und der 
anderen mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände kann innerhalb der Rahmen 
erfolgen, die durch die Gesellschaftsgefährliehkeit der Straf tat bestimmt werden.4 3 
Nach diesem in die Länge gezogenen Abstecher können wir zum Begriff der 
mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände zurückkehren. Wir glauben, daß es aus dem 
gesagten klar hervorging, daß wir den Bezugspunkt bei der Strafzumessung in dem 
Grad der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat finden können; die anderen 
Umstände sind darauf bezogen als mildernde und erschwerende Umstände zu 
beurteilen. Diese Auffassung hat gleichfalls ihre eigene Schwäche. Den Grad der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat setzt sie als gegeben voraus, obgleich auch 
dieser nach dem StGB einen mildernden oder erschwerenden Umstand darstellt. Der 
Richter müßte hier theoretisch so verfahren, daß er die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der 
konkreten Straftat auf die Skala setzt, die die unterschiedlichen G r a d e der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Handlungen, die in den Kreis des Tatbestandes fallen 
oder fallen können, ausdrückt, und die Strafe in diesem Verhältnis feststellt. Der 
Vergleichsgrund bei der Feststellung des Grades der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der 
Straftat ist also der Umfang der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit, die durch den Tatbestand 
4 1
 M O L D O V Á N Y I , G Y . : A büntetés kiszabásával kapcsolatos kodifikációs javaslatok. 
(Kodifikationsvorschläge zur Strafzumessung.) pp. 937—944. Imre Markója hat in seinen Bericht zur 
Gesetzesvorlage im Parlament betont: „die Feststellung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung richtet sich vor 
allem nach der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Tat." MARKÓJA, I.: Az új Büntető Törvénykönyv. Magyar 
Jog, 1979. p. 251. 
4 2
 Igazságügyi Közlöny, 1979. p. 251. 
4 3
 Unsere Ansicht kann daher mit der „Richtschnur-Theorie" von Miklós Kádár und György 
Kálmán nicht identifiziert werden. In dieser Theorie entspricht ein klar erkennbares Maß der 
Gesellschaftsgefahrlichkeit der Straftat. S. KÁDÁR, M.—KÁLMÁN, GY.: A büntetőjog általános tanai. 
(Allgemeine Lehren des Strafrechts.) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1966. p. 783. Daß die 
Straftat ihre Grenzen hat, haben wir natürlich nicht erfunden: „Wenn der Verbrechensbegriff die Strafe 
erfordert, wird durch die Realität der Straftat das Strafmaß erfordert. Die wahrhafte Straftat ist umgrenzt. 
Die Strafe soll auch umgrenzt sein, damit sie reell gestaltet wird, während die Umgrenzung nach einem 
Rechtsprinzip begrenzt sein müssen, um gerecht zu sein. Die Aufgabe besteht darin, die Strafe zur wirklichen 
Konsequenz des Verbrechens zu machen. Sie muß dem Verbrecher also die notwendige Wirkung seiner 
eigenen Tat, daher als seine eigene Tat erscheinen. Die Grenze seiner Strafe muß also die Grenze seiner Tat 
sein. Der bestimmte Inhalt, der verletzt ist, ist die Grenze des bestimmten Verbrechens." M A R X , K.: 
Debatten über das Holzdiebstahlsgesetz, in: M A R X , K . — E N G E L S , F.: Werke. Band 1. Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 
1958. p. 114. S. noch BERNER, A. F.: Lehrbuch des deutschen Strafrechts. Leipzig, 1857. pp. 19—21. 
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umfaß t und im Strafsatz ausgedrückt wird. Bei den Rechtsgütern, die stufenweise 
verletzbar sind, k a n n man dies durch die Größe des verursachten Schadens oder des 
materiellen Nachteils ziemlich genau messen. Es würde trotzdem sonderbar klingen, 
wenn der Täter einer Unterschlagung von Ft. 300000 diese Summe selbst als 
mildernden Umstand in der Urteilsbegründung Wiederhören würde, nur aus dem 
Grunde , daß noch auch die Summe von 1 Million als bedeutender Wert qualifiziert 
wird. 4 4 Es ist j a sicher, daß der erste Fall aus dem Gesichtspunkt der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der S t ra f ta t eine mildere Strafe erfordert, als der zweite. 
Hier gibt es zwei mögliche Lösungen. Entweder akzeptieren wir den durchschnittli-
chen Fall von SCHULTHEISZ45, — gemeint damit die mittelgradig gefährliche Straftat 
— und verwenden den Ausdruck: mildernder oder erschwerender Umstand damit 
verglichen obgleich der Begehungswert von Ft 300000 auch auf dieser Grundlage 
einen mildernden Umstand bildete!), oder begnügen uns damit, daß das Urteil mit 
dem Hinweis auf die Strafe begründet wird, die sich nach der Gesellschaftsgefährlich-
keit der Straftat richtet, und in diesem Vergleich angemessen ist. Das schließt natürlich 
bei den Straftaten mit hervorragender Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit die Berufung auf 
den erschwerenden Umstand nicht aus, wie man dies auch bei einem geringfügigen Fall 
mildernder Umstand nennen kann. Dadurch wird aber nicht nur die „bedeutend" 
abweichende Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit zum Strafzumessungsumstand — zum mil-
dernden oder erschwerenden Umstand , — sondern jeder beliebige Grad der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit. 
Es ist unvorstellbar, daß irgendein Grad der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der 
Straf ta t nicht festzustellen wäre, und daher für die Strafzumessung nicht zu 
entscheidender Bedeutung gelange. Andererseits ist es leicht vorstellbar, und in der 
Praxis kommt es tatsächlich vor, d a ß kein mit dem Schulgrad, bzw. mit der 
persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters zusammenhängender mildernder 
oder erschwerender Umstand auf taucht . Meistens sind jedoch solche Umstände 
vorhanden, und der Grad und Charak te r der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit 
des Täters k o m m t oft bei der Wah l der Strafar t , bei der Bestimmung der 
Vollstreckungsart, sogar auch bei der Entscheidung für die Anwendung von einer 
Maßnahme anstatt oder neben einer Strafe zur Bedeutung. 
Vom Begriff der mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände können wir 
schließlich feststellen, daß diese in der Praxis öfters nicht geeignet sind die Beurteilung 
der Strafzumessungsumstände zu bezeichnen. In diesen Fällen ist es richtig, wenn das 
Gericht daraufhinweist , daß die festgesetzte Strafe der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der 
Straf ta t , bzw. den anderen Strafzumessungsumständen angemessen ist. 
4 4
 S. Strafrechtliche Grundsatzentscheidung Nr. II des Obersten Gerichts. Igazságügyi Közlöny, 
1979. Nr. 7. 
4 5
 S C H U L T H E I S Z , S . : A büntetés kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung) p. 9. 
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Eine der strittigsten Fragen in Bezug der Strafzumessungsumstände stellt deren 
Gruppierung dar. 
Neben der Verbrechenslehre ist das ein zweites wesentliches Gebiet, wo das 
juristische Denken die im Leben einheitlich erscheinende Straftat zergliedert, und alles, 
was eine mildere oder schwerere Strafe begründet, an deren Bestandteile zu knüpfen 
wünscht. Während aber die Person des Täters im allgemeinen von der Verbrechensleh-
re ausgeschlossen wird,46 gelangen bei der Strafzumessung auch solche Umstände zur 
Bedeutung, die außerhalb der Begriffselemente der Straftat fallen. 
Die Gruppierung der Strafzumessungsumstände bietet sich als einfachste 
Methode die Distinktion zwischen Umständen, die sich auf die strafbaren Handlun-
gen, und denen, die sich auf den Täter beziehen. Auf diesem Grund hat schon PAULER 
„subjektive und objektive Schwere der Schuld" unterschieden,47 EDVI ILLÉS Umstände 
die sich „auf den Straftäter und auf die strafbare Handlung beziehen"48, MOLNÁR die 
„zur subjektiven Seite" bzw. „zur objektiven Seite" gehörenden mildernden und 
erschwerenden Umstände. 4 9 Oder neuestens die Richtlinie Nr 12 des Obersten 
Gerichtes die Schuldumstände „subjektiver" und „objektiver" Natur.5 0 Die Absonde-
rung von Umständen subjektiver und objektiver Natur ist auch dort bedeutend, wo 
man eine mehr spezifizierte Gruppierung anstrebt. In unserer Literatur unterscheidet 
FÖLDVÁRI auf der Grundlage des allgemeinen Begriffes des Tatbestandes Umstände, 
die mit dem Objekt, der objektiven Seite, dem Subjekt und der subjektiven Seite der 
Straftat in Verbindung sind.51 
Andere Gruppierungen sind auch bekannt. Z. B. in unserer früheren Literatur 
haben ANGYAL und RÁcz Umstände unterschieden, die mit der Person des 
Verbrechers, den sozialen, kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Faktoren der Kriminalität, 
mit den subjektiven und objektiven Elementen des Tatbestandes zusammenhängen, 
4 6
 F Ö L D V Á R I , S . : Az egység és a halmazat határesetei a büntetőjogban. (Grenzfragen der Tateinheit 
und Konkurrenz im Strafrecht); I . B F K É S : A gondatlanság a büntetőjogban. (Die Fahrlässigkeit im 
Strafrecht.) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1974.; VISKL, L.: Tézisek abűncselekményfogalom 
felépítéséhez. (Thesen zum Aufbau des Verbrechensbegriffs.); a. A.: TOKAJI, G.: Adalékok a 
büncselekménvfogalom felépítéséhez. (Beiträge zum Aufbau des Verbrechensbegriffes.) Szeged, Hungaria, 
1972. 
4 7
 P A U L E R , T.: Büníetőjogtan. (Strafrechtslehre) Bd. I — I I Pest, Verlag Pfeifer Ferdinánd, 1864. Bd. I 
p. 260. 
4 8
 E D V I - I L L É S , К . : A büntetötörvénykönyv magyarázata. (Kommentar des Strafgesetzbuches.) 1894. 
pp. 327—328. 
4 9
 M O L N Á R , J . : A büntetést meghatározó tényezők. (Die bestimmenden Faktoren der Strafe.) p. 2 7 . ;  
ebenso RENDEKI, S.: A büntetés kiszabása. Enyhítő és súlyosító körülmények. (Die Strafzumessung. 
Mildernde und erschwerende Umstände.) pp. 6 2 — 6 3 . 
50
 Bírósági Határozatok, 1977/2. 
51
 FÖLDVÁRI, J.: Az enyhítő és súlyosító körülményekről. (Über die mildernden und erschwerenden 
Umstände.) Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1960. pp. 16. ff.; FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) pp. 
266 ff. 
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sowie subjektive u n d objektive Umstände , die der Begehung entstehen, schließlich 
andere Umstände, die aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Zumessung von Beddiitung sind.5 2 
Es sind auch solche Gruppierungen bekann t , die anstatt der inhaltlichen 
Kriterien der S t rafzumessungsumstände deren Bewertungsrichtungen zugrunde legen. 
Die klare Verwirklichung dieser Idee ha t der Entwurf von 1843 geboten, der schwerere 
u n d mildere Zurechnung ergebende Umstände unterschied. Dieser Gedanke ist mit der 
Unterschiedung zwischen objektiven und subjektiven Umständen kombiniert in den 
Werken zurückgekehrt , die den CsEMEGi-Kodex analysierten,5 3 sogar auch in neueren 
Studien. 5 4 
Das S tGA und die danach folgenden Gesetze haben bei der gesetzlichen 
Bestimmung der Strafzumessungsgrundsätze von den Strafzumessungsumständen die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der S t r a f t a t und des Tätprs sowie den Schuldgrad 
hervorgehoben, i ndem sie auch au f andere mildernde und erschwerende Umstände 
hingewiesen haben . Es wäre auf de r Hand gelegen, d a ß die im Gesetz bestimmten 
Gesichtspunkte a u c h im Schrifttum gewürdigt werden. Freilich finden wir auch solche 
Gruppierungen, vor allen Dingen bei SCHULTHEISZ,55 aber auch bei KÁDÁR56 und 
spä te r auch bei anderen . 5 7 
Für TOKAJI scheint es gerade unbegreiflich zu sein, „warum die Systematisierung 
der erschwerenden und mildernden Umstände nach den vier Bestandteilen des 
gesetzlichen Tatbes tandes im Rechtsschrif t tum fü r lange Zeit konserviert wurde, und 
zwar trotz den Bestimmungen des S tGA, die die Grundsä tze der Strafzumessung im 
wesentlichen r icht ig zusammenfaß t " . Nach SCHULTHEISZ meint er, daß „de r 
Verbrechensbegriff die allein richtige Grundlage des Systems der erschwerenden und 
mildernden U m s t ä n d e bietet".58 Diese Auffassung teilen wir auch mit der kleinen 
52
 ANGYAL, S. P.—RÁcz, GY.: A büntetés kiszabása bírói gyakorlatunkban. (Die Strafzumessung in 
unserer Rechtssprechung.) Im wesentlichen folgt Rácz dieser Einteilung auch in seinem Kommentar zum 
StGB. S. RÁcz: A büntetés kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung) pp. 324. ff. 
53
 EDVI—ILLÉS, К.: A büntetőtörvénykönyv magyarázata. (Kommentar des Strafgesetzbuches) pp. 
327—328. 
54
 MOLNÁR, J.: A büntetést meghatározó tényezők. (Die bestimmenden Faktoren der Strafe.) p. 27. 
5 5
 S C H U L T H E I S Z , S.: A büntetés kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung) 1953. 
56
 KÁDÁR, M.: Magyar Büntetőjog. Általános rész. (Ungarisches Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil.) 
Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1953. pp. 270—271. Nach der Klassifizierung folgt eine eklektische Aufzählung 
der mildernden und erschwerenden Umstände, wodurch diese Auffassung mehr an die — schon erwähnte — 
Loslösung der im Gesetz hervorgehobenen Umstände von den mildernden und erschwerenden Umständen 
erinnert. 
5 7
 G Y Ö R G Y I , К.: A bűncselekmény büntetőjogi következményei. (Strafrechtliche Folgen der Straftat.) 
pp. 219. ff. 
38
 TOKAJI, G.: Adalékok a bűncselekményfogalom felépítéséhez. (Beiträge zum Aufbau des 
Verbrechensbegriffes.) p. 58. Das ist ansonsten die Projektion desselben Problems in der Straflehre, das auch 
unsere Literatur der Verbrechenslehre beschäftigt: was soll die Grundlage der wissenschaftlichen 
Systematisierung sein, der Begriff der Straftat oder der des gesetzlichen Tatbestandes. Daß die Wissenschaft 
auf diesem Gebiet gewissen Schwierigkeiten entgegensieht, wird auch dadurch bewiesen, daß Tokaji gewisse 
Probleme der Verbrechenslehre auf Grund des einen, andere Fragen mit Hilfe des anderen Begriffes zu lösen 
versucht. 
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Korrektion, daß wir die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters nicht als ein 
Merkmal des Verbrechensbegriffs betrachten.59 
Wir sind der Meinung, daß die Definition, die im StGB v.J. 1961 formuliert u n d 
durch das neue StGB übernommen wurde, bringt zugleich die grundlegenden 
Gesichtspunkte der richtigen wissenschaftlichen Gruppierung der Strafzumessungs-
grundsätze zum Ausdruck. Das macht die Aufdeckung des Inhaltes von einzelnen 
hervorgehobenen Strafzumessungsumständen natürlich nicht überflüssig die eine 
nähere Gruppierung beansprucht. 
Die richtige Gruppierung der Strafzumessungsumstände ha t ihre Bedeutung 
sowohl für die richtige Bestimmung des Kreises der zu beachtenden Umstände, wie 
auch die Vermeidung der Doppelverwertung der Tatbestandselemente und der 
Strafzumessungsumstände zugleich. 
Auf Grund des geltenden Rechtes aber gibt es nach unserer Meinung einfach 
keine andere Grundlage zur Gruppierung der Strafzumessungsumstände, wie 
diejenige, die im § 83 StGB formuliert zu finden ist. In dieser Hinsicht stehen noch die 
Rechtsprechung ebenso, wie die Pfleger der Rechtsliteratur vor bedeutenden 
Aufgaben. Die Umstände aus dem Leben muß man nicht direkt mit den Zielen der 
Strafe in Zusammenhang bringen, sondern über die Vermittlung der im S t G B 
bestimmten Strafzumessungsumstände. 
Die in der Praxis ausgestalteten Bewertungen — deren Grundlagen aufdecken 
eine selbständige Analyse könnte, — sind nicht immer leicht an die im Gesetz 
bestimmten Strafzumessungsumständen anzuknüpfen. Ein Beispiel dafür ist die 
Richtlinie Nr 12 des obersten Gerichtes, der mitunter nur die Beurteilung enthält o h n e 
überzeugende Gründe dafür geben zu können.6 0 
Jede Gruppierung birgt viele Widersprüche in sich und es ist kaum möglich ein 
tadelloses System zu schaffen.61 Bei jeder dieser Gruppierungen taucht als allgemeines 
Problem auf, wie die die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit beeinflussenden Faktoren den 
Grad der Schuld und der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters selbst beeinflussen, 
und wie die Doppel Verwertung dieser Umstände vermieden werden kann. 
5 9
 Später hat Tokaji die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters „unregelmäßiges" Merkmal des 
Verbrechensbegriffs genannt. S. NAGY, F.: Uber die Diskussion der Kandidaturthesen v. Géza Tokaji: 
,.Beiträge zum Aufbau des Verbrechensbegriffes". Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1973. p. 283. S. noch TOKAJI, G.: 
Fejezetek a büntetőjog általános része köréből. (Fragen zum allgemeinen Teil des Strafrechts) 2. Aufl. Szeged, 
1976. p. 49. 
6 0
 So ist z.B. der bedingte Vorsatz nach der Richtlinie im allgemeinen ein mildender Umstand, 
während der direkte Vorsatz im allgemeinen keinen erschwerenden Umstand bildet. Erschwerende 
Umstände sind: die sehr schwer aufdeckbare Art der Begehung, die Begehung in größerer Zahl zu einer 
gegebenen Zeit, usw. Bírósági Határozatok, 1977/2. 
61
 So werden z.B. bei Földvári die die eigene Person des Täters betreffenden schädlichen 
Auswirkungen zu den Umständen eingeordnet, die mit dem Objekt der Straftat in Verbindung sind, unter 
den Umständen die mit dem Subjekt und der subjektiven Seite zusammenhängen, erwähnt er die Fähigkeit 
zum Ertragen der Strafe, usw. S. FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) pp. 290. und 329. 
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DEMETER62 und RENDEKI,63 sowie MOLNÁR haben ANGYAL und R Á c z m i t Recht 
kritisiert, weil sie außer der mildernden u n d erschwerenden Umstände auch die 
Kategorie der „gleichgültigen" Umstände eingeführt haben. Was gleichgültig ist, kann 
freilich kein Strafzumessungsumstand sein, trotzdem ist diese Kategorie in der Praxis 
von großer Bedeutung, weil sie dazu Hilfe leistet, daß die Beurteilung sich in ein 
uferlosvulgäres Moralisieren entartet64, andererseits kann man im voraus nicht 
wissen, ob irgendein Umstand im Zuge der Strafzumessung nicht gleichgültig wird. 
Was die gesetzliche Bestimmung der Strafzumessungsumstände betrifft, wurde 
diese seit dem StGA in der Literatur im allgemeinen mit Billigung empfangen, es kam 
jedoch auch zu kritischen Wahrnehmungen. 
Das Hervorheben des verursachten Schadens neben der Gesellschaftsgefährlich-
keit der Straftat in der Bestimmung des S tGA 6 5 erwies sich im Spiegel unserer späteren 
Gesetzgebung als überflüssig, obgleich seinerzeit eine separate Ideologie zur 
Absonderung dieses Faktors entstanden ist .6 6 Heute ist es eine allgemein akzeptierte 
Meinung, d a ß der Begriff der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat die Verletzung 
und Gefährdung der Rechtsgüter gleichfalls umfaßt.67 Die Stelle des Begriffs der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit unter den Strafzumessungsumständen war bei keinem 
Autor strittig. Umsomehr war der Begriff und Daseinsberechtigung der Schuld und 
der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters umstritten. 
5. Die Schuld und die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters 
Darin, daß das StGA die Schuld des Täters , das StGB v.J. 1961 und das neue 
StGB den G r a d der Schuld in die bezügliche Regelung einbeziehen, kann m a n keinen 
wirklich wesentlichen Unterschied sehen. Die Formulierung des dritten Faktors 
gestaltete sich andererseits sehr interessant. D a s StGA sprach von der „Gefahr , die aus 
der Persönlichkeit des Täters der Gesellschaft zufällt", der Entwurf zum S tGB v.J. 
62
 DEMETER, V.: A súlyosító és enyhítő körülmények a bírói gyakorlatban. (Die erschwerenden und 
mildernden Umstände in der Rechtssprechung.) Magyar Jog, 1965. p. 289. 
63
 RENDEKI, S.: A büntetés kiszabása. Enyhítő és súlyosító körülmények. (Die Strafzumessung. 
Mildernde und erschwerende Umstände.) pp. 66—67. 
64
 Mit Recht macht Bruns auf dessen Gefahr aufmerksam. BRUNS, S. H.-J.: Strafzumessungsrecht. 
Allgemeiner Teil. Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München, Karl Heymanns Verlag K. G„ 1967. p. 39. 
6 5
 V I S K I , L . : Büntelöpolitika és büntető törvényhozás. (Strafpolitik und Strafgesetzgebung) Magyar 
Jog, 1960, p. 66. 
66
 Székely meinte, daß darin die Unterscheidung der Gefährdung des Rechtsgutes und der 
Schädigung des Rechtsgutes erscheint, und kam zum Schluß, daß die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der 
Straftat kleiner oder größer sein kann, als der zugefügte Schaden. Er brachte die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit 
mit dem „Verteidigungsprinzip", den verursachten Schaden mit dem „Vergeltungsprinzip" in Zusammen-
hang. SZÉKELY, S. J.: A bűncselekménnyel okozott sérelem. (Der mit der Straftat verursachte Schaden.) p. 
262. 
6 7
 V I S K I , L . : Tézisek a bűncselekményfogalom felépítéséhez. (Thesen zum Aufbau des Verbrechens-
begriffs) p. 387. 
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1961 von der „Persönlichkeit des Täters"; seit dem StGB v.J. 1961 aber enthält das 
Gesetz eine Bestimmung über „die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters". 
Zur Zeit der Vorbereitung des StGB v.J. 1961 wurde der Begriff der persönlichen 
Gese l l s cha f t sge fäh r l i chke i t von VISKI u n d ANDRÁS SZABÓ angegr i f fen , i n d e m sie 
verlangten, daß die Einstellung des Täters auch weiterhin im Rahmen der Schuld, in 
dem Momenten des Täterbewußtseins untersucht werde."6 8 VISKI schlug vor, daß der 
Begriff der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit — wie ein Element der kriminolo-
gischen Prognose, zu dessen Feststellung die kriminologischen Erforschungen 
genügende Aufklärung zu bieten nicht imstande sind, — durch den Begriff des 
„Grades der Erziehbarkeit der zu verurteilenden Person" ersetzt werde. Als 
Begründung bemerkte er: „das ist kein prognostisches Urteil, weil es nur solche 
Tatsachen, die sich in der Vergangenheit abspielten, bzw. zur Zeit der Begehung und 
der Beurteilung gegebene Umstände berücksichtigt.69 Gegen die „ausdrückliche 
Erwähnung" der Persönlichkeit des Täters äußerte sich auch SCHULTHEISZ.70 
Darin hatte Bócz gegen VISKI recht, daß „der Grad der Erziehbarkeit" um kein 
Haar besser ist, als die Persönlichkeit oder Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters. 
Noch mehr hatte er recht, da er meinte, daß die Theorie die Erklärung des 
Begriffsinhaltes schuldig blieb. Der Vorschlag von Bócz ging jedoch über die Kritik 
von VISKI hinaus und schlug vor, mit der Aufnahme der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit 
des Täters in das Gesetz zusammen, daß die separate Beurteilung der Schuld 
weggelassen werde, indem er meinte, daß die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefahr-
lichkeit die Zurechnungsfähigkeit voraussetzt, die Schuld der persönlichen 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit entwächst, das ist ja die Ursache der schuldhaften 
Handlung, so ist die separate Erwähnung der Schuld überflüssig. Nach Bócz stellt die 
persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit einen breiteren Begriff dar, der das Subjekt 
und die subjektive Seite in eine Einheit umfaßt. Als Schlußfolgerung schlug er vor, daß 
nur die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat und ihrer Täter von den 
Strafzumessungsumständen im Gesetz erwähnt werden.71 Der Einfall von B ó c z hat 
einen Anhänger unter den Autoren des Strafrechtes geworben. DEMETER hat einige 
Jahre später geschrieben, daß die Schuld keine besondere Kategorie neben der 
persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit bedeutet, „die Schuld (Vorsatz und 
Fahrlässigkeit) gehört ja zur subjektiven Seite".72 
6 8
 S Z A B Ó , A . — V I S K I , L . : A .,társadalomvédelem" kriminálpolitikai elmélete. (Die kriminalpolitische 
Theorie des „Gesellschaftschutzes".) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1960. p. 162. 
6 9
 V I S K I , L . : Büntetőpolitika és büntető törvényhozás. (Strafpolitik und Strafgesetzgebung.) Um 
konsequent zu sein, hätte Viski auch die Zwangsheilbehandlung vom Strafrecht hinausfegen müssen. 
Warum wäre die Prognose nur im Falle der Geisteskranken möglich? 
7 0
 Damit entfernte er sich auch vom Täterstrafrecht, das er 1949 noch vertrat! S . S C H U L T H E I S Z , S.: 
Az új büntető törvénykönyv tervezetének általános részéről. (Über den allgemeinen Teil des Entwurfs des 
neuen Strafgesetzbuches.) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1960. p. 659. 
71
 Bócz E.: Észrevételek a büntető törvénykönyv tervezetének általános részéhez. (Bemerkungen zum 
allgemeinen Teil des Entwurfes des Strafgesetzbuches.) Magyar Jog, 1961. p. 6. 
72
 DEMETER, V.: A súlyosító és enyhítő körülmények a bírói gyakorlatban. (Die erschwerenden und 
mildernden Umstände in der Rechtsprechung.) p. 291. 
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Es ist nicht schwer die Vorgängerin dieser Auffassungen in einer früheren Schrift 
von HUSZÁR ZU erkennen, die in den Grundsätzen des StGA die Verwirklichung des 
„Täterstrafrechtes" feierte, in dem die auf die Gesellschaft fallende Gefahr zum 
dezisiven Faktor wird, und „die in der Person des Täters vorhandene Schuld und 
andere Umstände . . . nur dann unter Beurteilung fallen, wenn man aus diesen für die 
bei dem Täter vorliegende Gemeingefährlichkeit, als die Zukunf t betreffendes 
Werturteil, Folgerungen ziehen kann . " 7 3 
Was noch die Vorschläge zu den Strafzumessungsumständen betrifft, ist es 
offensichtlich, daß kein Platz mehr für die „anderen" Umstände bei Bócz geblieben 
ist. Dieselbe Idee ist im Zuge der Vorbereitung des neuen Kodex bei SZÉKELY 
zurückgekehrt, mit dem Unterschied jedoch, daß er die Schuld von den 
Strafzumessungsumständen nicht verbannen wollte.74 
Die Frage blieb ansonsten durchgehend strittig, was wir unter persönlicher 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit verstehen sollen. 
Die aus der Persönlichkeit des Täters auf die Gesellschaft fallende Gefahr ist 
zuerst im StGA als ein Strafzumessungsumstand erschienen. 
Die wissenschaftlichen Veröffentlichungen die das StGA zum Gegenstand 
hatten, gaben diesem Begriff ziemlich verschiedene Auslegungen. KÁDÁR hob in 
seinem Kommentar zum StGA vor allen Dingen das Verhältnis des Täters zur Arbeit 
hervor.7 5 SZÉKELY nannte die Arbei t des Angeklagten, sein Verhältnis zur Gesell-
schaft , zu seiner Klasse76 andernor ts die schadhafte Eigenschaft, feindliche Einstel-
lung, Charakterschwäche, morale Mängel die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit 
des Täters.77 
In den 50er Jahren hat man praktisch als bestimmenden Fak tor der persönlichen 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit die Klassenzugehörigkeit betrachtet. Nach OLTI „ist die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit eines proletarischen Täters im allgemeinen anders, als die 
eines dieselbe Straf tat begehenden Kapitalisten, Kulaks oder beliebigen Verlusttra-
genden des alten Systems".78 Diese Anschauung hat die Persönlichkeit des Täters in 
7 3
 H U S Z Á R I.: A magyar szocialista büntetőjog büntetésfogalma. (Strafbegriff des ungarischen 
sozialistischen Rechts.) Jogtudományi Közlöny 1950. p. 384. 
1 4
 S Z É K E L Y J.: Enyhítő és súlyosító körülmények. (Erschwerende und mildernde Umstände.) Magyar 
Jog, 1977. pp. 796—798. 
7 5
 K Á D Á R , M . : A büntetőtörvénykönyv általános része. (Allgemeiner Teil des Strafgesetzbuches.) p. 
141. 
76
 SZÉKELY, J.: Az előélet tisztázása és ennek jelentősége a büntetés kiszabásánál. (Untersuchung des 
Vorlebens und deren Bedeutung bei der Strafzumessung.) p. 35. 
77
 SZÉKELY, J.: A bűncselekmény társadalomra veszélyességének vizsgálata és a büntetéskiszabás. 
(Untersuchung der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat und die Strafzumessung.) Magyar Jog, 1955. pp. 
134. 
78
 OLTI, V.: A büntetőtárgyalás vezetése. (Verhandlungsleitung in Strafsachen.) pp. 204—205. Aus 
dem Gesichtspunkt der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit hat er den folgenden Umständen 
Bedeutung beigemessen: die Beschäftigung des Bruders des Beschuldigten, wer floh von den Familienmit-
gliedern des Beschuldigten nach dem Ausland, wer war von seinen Familienmitgliedern interniert, sogar 
auch der Frage, ob die Kinder des Beschuldigten begeisterte Jungpioniere sind, und dem Umstand, daß der 
Beschuldigte Blutspender des Roten Kreuzes ist! Gegen diese Auffassung s. S Z A B Ó I.: Jogalkalmazás és 
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den Mittelpunkt der Strafzumessung gestellt und diese als „entscheidenden Fak to r der 
Strafzumessung" betrachtet. Die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefahrlichkeit spielte auch 
in der Differenzierung zwischen dem Klassenfeind bzw. dem klassenfremden Element 
und den beirrten Werktätigen eine bedeutende Rolle.79 
Nach dem Lehrbuch von KÁDÁR verbreitete sich die „reflex"-artige Auffassung 
der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit. Die Thesen von Kádár sind: 1. das 
Subjekt ist bei der Begehung immer gesellschaftsgefährlich, 2. die Gesellschaftsge-
fährlichkeit des Täters stellt die Folge der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straf ta t 
dar, 3. diese Gefährlichkeit kann nachträglich sogar bis zur Beurteilung aufhö-
ren.80 Diese Auffassung ist bis heute wirksam. Nach VERMES Z. B. „wird die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters in der begangenen Straftat manifestiert, die 
Folge der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der Straftat ist also die Gesellschaftsge-
fährlichkeit des Täters" .8 1 Nach dem Motivenbericht des neuen StGB: „Die 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters stellt die Folge der durch ihn verwirklichten 
Straftat dar . Der Täter ist also nicht im allgemeinen, sondern zufolge der Begehung der 
Straftat auf die Gesellschaft gefährlich."82 In einer anderen Formulierung: „Die 
persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit ist im Grunde genommen die Folge der 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit der begangenen Straftat ."8 3 
Die garantielle Bestrebung dieser Auffassung ist die Anpassung des strafrechtli-
chen Verantwortungsgrades an das M a ß der begangenen Straftat, mit anderen 
Worten, daß die strafrechtliche Verantwortung sich von der Gesellschaftsgefähr-
lichkeit der Straftat nicht loslösen kann. 
Wenn wir aber die Begriffe ernst nehmen, ist die Folge dieser Auffassung, d a ß die 
persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit ist im Grunde genommen die Folge der 
selbständig zu sagen haben wird. Sie wiederholt bloß die in Bezug der Straf ta t 
vollbrachte Bewertung, jetzt schon auf die Person des Täters reflektiert. Eben aus 
szocialista törvényesség. (Rechtsanwendung und sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit. Magyar Jog, 1956. pp. 129— 
1 3 1 . 
79
 S. NON, GY.: A Központi Vezetőség határozata után. (Nach dem Beschluß des Zentralkomi-
tees.) Magyar Jog, 1 9 5 6 . pp. 2 2 5 — 2 2 6 . : V Á G Ó , T.: A ..megtévedtség" fogalma. (Der Begriff „Irregeführt".) 
Magyar Jog, 1 9 5 6 . pp. 1 0 1 — 1 0 2 . 
V I D A F.: Az ítélkezés eszmei színvonalának emelése és a perek osztálytartalmának vizsgálata. 
(Erhöhung des ideologischen Niveaus der Strafrechtsprechung und die Untersuchung des Klasseninhalts 
der Prozesse.) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1 9 5 6 . pp. 4 0 9 — 4 2 0 . ; V Á G Ó T.: A büntető ítélkezés néhány időszerű 
kérdése. (Einige aktuellen Fragen der Strafrechtsprechung.) Magyar Jog, 1 9 6 2 . pp. 6 . — 1 0 . ; S Z É N Á S I , G . :  
Jogpolitikának időszerű kérdései. (Aktuelle Fragen unserer Rechtspolitik.) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1962. 
p p . 6 1 — 6 7 . 
80
 KÁDÁR, M.: Magyar Büntetőjog. Általános rész. (Ungarisches Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil.) p. 
1 8 3 . 
81
 VERMES, M.: A kriminológia alapkérdései. (Grundfragen der Kriminologie.) Budapest, 1971. 
Akadémiai Kiadó.; VERMES, M.: A bírói individualizáció a büntető joggyakorlatban. (Die gerichtliche 
Individualisierung in der Strafrechtsprechung.) Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1972. pp. 1—6. 
8 2
 K Á D Á R , M . — M O L D O V Á N Y I , G Y . : Büntető Törvénykönyv. (Strafgesetzbuch) p. 127. 
8 3
 G Y Ö R G Y I , К.: A bűncselekmény büntetőjogi következményei. (Die strafrechtlichen Folgen der 
Straftat.) p. 223. 
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diesem Grunde halten auch die Anhänger dieser Auffassung für zulässig, daß — neben 
der Betonung des grundlegenden und bestimmenden Zusammenhanges — auch 
andere Umstände die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters erhöhen können, bzw. 
vermindern.84 Darauf weist auch der Motivenbericht des neuen StGB.8 5 
Die andere Auffassung der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit legt diesen 
Begriff als eine entscheidend prognostisches Urteil aus. Nach SCHULTHEISZ bedeutet die 
Gefährlichkeit der Person, daß wir bei einem Individuum mit größerer Wahrschein-
lichkeit die Begehung einer Straf ta t erwarten können, als bei dem Durchschnitt der 
Menschen."8 6 Diese Definition kehrt bei FÖLDVÁRI zurück. Nach seiner Ansicht: 
„Unter subjektiver Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit verstehen wir einen solchen Zusam-
menhang der Vorstellungen, solche Denkweise einer gewißen Person, zufolge deren 
voraussichtlich ist, daß diese Person in der Z u k u n f t die Interessen der Gesellschaft 
schädigendes, oder gefährdendes Verhalten bezeigen wird."87 In prognostischem Sinn 
faßte auch VISKI die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit auf; darum hat er die 
Verwendung des Begriffes im Strafrecht verworfen.8 8 
Schließlich sind auch solche Auffassungen bekannt, die durch die Untersuchung 
der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters seine morale Qualifikation angeben. So z. B. 
bedeutet nach MOLNÁR die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit die gesellschafts-
feindliche Einstellung des Täters.8 9 Nach PATERA: „Unter subjektiver Gesellschaftsge-
fährlichkeit verstehen wir eine solche Persönlichkeitsstruktur, in deren Wertordnung 
die durch die Strafrechtsnormen geschützten, bestimmten, konkreten gesellschaftli-
chen Bedürfnisse, Interessen, Erfordernisse überhaupt keine, oder nur untergeordnete 
Rolle spielen."9 0 Dieser Ansicht nähert auch die Auffassung von Böcz: „die 
gesellschaftsgefährliche Persönlichkeit: eine Person, die eine gesellschaftsgefährliche 
Tätigkeit ausüb t . " 9 1 
8 4
 K Á D Á R , M . : A súlyosító körülmények. (Die erschwerenden Umstände.) p. 1 3 4 . ; V E R M E S , M . : A 
bírói individualizáció a büntető joggyakorlatban. (D ie gerichtliche Individualisierung in der 
Strafrechtsprechung.) p. 2.; G Y Ö R G Y I , К.: A bűncselekmény büntetőjogi következményei. (Die strafrechtli-
chen Folgen der Straftat.) pp. 223. 
8 5
 K Á D Á R , M . — M O L D O V Á N Y I , G Y . : Büntető Törvénykönyv. (Strafgesetzbuch) p. 127. 
8 6
 S C H U L T H E I S Z , S . : A büntetés kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung) p. 17. 
8 7
 F Ö L D V Á R I , J . : Az egység és a halmazai határesetei a büntetőjogban. (Grenzfragen der Tateinheit 
und Konkurrenz im Strafrecht.) p. 83. Ebenso F Ö L D V Á R I , J . : A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) p. 241. 
Demgegenüber glauben wir nicht, daß es „keine objektive Gesellschaftsgefahrlichkeit ohne subjektive 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit gibt." So F Ö L D V Á R I , J . : AZ egység és a halmazat határesetei a büntetőjogban. 
(Grenzfragen der Tateinheit und Konkurrenz im Strafrecht.) p. 84. 
88
 VISKI, L.: Büntetőpolitika és büntető törvényhozás. (Strafpolitik und Strafgesetzgebung.) p. 67. 
8 9
 M O L N Á R , J . : A büntetési meghatározó tényezők. (Die bestimmenden Faktoren der Strafe.) p. 28. 
9 0
 P A T E R A , A . : A visszaeső bűnözők társadalomra veszélyességének felderítéséről. (Über die 
Aufklärung der Gesellschaftsgefahrlichkeit der Rückfälligen.) Belügyi Szemle, 1971/7. p. 39.; B O D N Á R , Ö . : 
Gondolatok a személyi társadalomra veszélyességhez. (Gedanken zur persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlich-
keit.) Magyar Jog, 1972. pp. 229—231. 
91
 Bócz E.: A személyi társadalomra veszélyesség fogalma, összetevői és ériékelése a büntetőjogban. 
(Begriff, Komponenten und Bewertung der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefahrlichkeit im Strafrecht.) 
Kandidaturthesen, Budapest, 1975. p. 11. , 
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Die reflexartige Auffassung der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters ist 
deswegen mangelhaft, weil sie die Verantwortung durch die künstliche Einengung des 
Begriffes der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit einschränken will, obgleich die 
persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit und die Bedeutung die im Zuge der Strafver-
folgung dieser zukommt, zwei verschiedene Dinge sind.92 
Die Ansicht, wonach die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit eine morale 
Momentaufnahme ist, qualifiziert nur die Gegenwart und gibt keine Antwort auf die 
Frage, welches Verhalten seitens des Täters fü r die Zukunft d roh t , und dann ist ja die 
Verwendung des Begriffes der Gefährlichkeit unbegründet. 
Als richtig können wir die prognostische Auffassung der persönlichen 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit betrachten, undzwar damit, d a ß der Grund dieser 
Folgerung in erster Reihe im früheren Verhalten des Täters zu suchen ist, und im 
Bewußtsein dessen, daß wir für die Zukunf t nur beschränkt geltende Erklärungen 
geben können, wie auch nur beschränkte Möglichkeiten zur Aufdeckung der 
persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit im Strafverfahren vorhanden sind. FÖLDVÁRI 
schrieb über die subjektive Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit," daß deren Berücksichtigung 
eine sehr tiefgreifende Persönlichkeitsprüfung voraussetzt."93 Richtig stellt Gabriella 
RASKÓ fest, daß „die Persönlichkeitsuntersuchung nur durch einen Fachmann: 
Psychiater oder Psychologe durchgeführt werden kann, so ist sie als eine 
Sachverständigenuntersuchung zu qualifizieren."94 Wir müssen auch mit der Meinung 
von Frau János ZSIGA einverstanden sein, nach der „die Möglichkeiten einer 
Persönlichkeitsuntersuchung von genügender Intensität und Wirksamkeit ziemlich 
begrenzt s ind," 9 5 wie auch die Mahnung von TOKAJI ernst zu nehmen ist: „je mehr wir 
uns von der Straftat entfernen, sowie von der Persönlichkeitsstörung, die darin 
realisiert wird, und von den nachträglichen Äußerungen, die die begangene Handlung 
betreffen, — in der Richtung der Untersuchung der Persönlichkeit des Täters und des 
Entwicklungsvorganges der Persönlichkeit mit prognostischem Ziel, werden wir 
solche Ergebnisse erzielen, die im Mißverhältnis wenigstens zur Arbeitsaufwendung, 
meistens aber auch sonst von abnehmendem Wert sind."96 Die heute verwendeten 
Prognosen gründen sich mehr auf Lebenserfahrungen, Intuit ion, als auf ein 
92
 Überzeugend wird es bewiesen in: Bócz, E.: A személyi társadalomra veszélyesség fogalma, 
összetevői és értékelése a büntetőjogban. (Begriff, Komponenten und Bewertung der persönlichen 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit im Strafrecht.) 
9 3
 F Ö L D V Á R I , J . : A büntetés tana. (Die Straflehre) p. 2 4 2 . ; s. noch RÁcz, G Y . : A büntetéskiszabás elvi 
kérdései. (Grundsätzliche Fragen der Strafzumessung.) p. 202. 
9 4
 R A S K Ó G.: A személyiség feltárása a nyomozás során. (Aufdeckung der Persönlichkeit im Zuge der 
Ermittlung.) Belügyi Szemle, 1971/12. p. 94. 
9 3
 F R A U Z S I G A J.: A bűnelkövetéshez kapcsolódó személyiségi sajátosságok büntetőjogi megítélése. 
(Strafrechtliche Bewertung der sich an die Straftatbegehung knüpfenden Persönlichkeitsmerkmale.) 
Magyar Jog, 1974. p. 519. 
9 6
 T O K A J I , G . : Adalékok a bűncselekményfogalom felépítéséhez. (Beiträge zum Aufbau des 
Verbrechensbegriffes.) p. 56. 
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wissenschaftlich begründetes Verfahren. 4 1 Das Gericht ist imstande festzustellen, wie 
die Begehung der Straftat mit de r Lebensführung des Täters zusammenhängt, mit 
anderen Worten: wieweit die Straf tat die Offenbarung der mehr oder weniger 
ausgestalteten Denkweise, Gewohnheiten, Wertordnung sei,98 andererseits welche 
Wirkung von der Bestrafung auf das zukünftige Verhalten des Verurteilten zu 
erwarten ist. 
Die persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit ist von Anfang an ein mit der Schuld 
konkurrierender Begriff. Die Reformschulen haben an die Stelle der Schuld die 
Gefährlichkeit der Person gestellt, aber der Schuldbegriff trachtete auch sich an die 
neuen Erfordernisse anzupassen, so ist der Begriff der sogenannten Lebensführungs-
schuld entstanden.9 9 VISKI versuchte die Konkurrenz zugunsten der Schuld auf-
zulösen. Die prognostischen Beziehungen der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlich-
keit als Wahrsagung vom Kreis der die strafrechtliche Verantwortung beeinflus-
senden Faktoren verbannand schrieb: „Was aber im Begriff der persönlichen 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit keine Wahrsagung, keine Prognose, sondern Diagnose, 
d.i. die Prüfung der sich in der konkreten Straf tat manifestierenden Einstellung 
bedeutet, deren Beurteilung k a n n in richtiger Weise nur bis zu solchem Maße erfolgen, 
in dem diese Einstellung in der Straf tat durch die Momente des Täterbewußtseins (so 
auch durch die Absicht und das Motiv) tatsächlich zum Ausdruck gekommen ist ."1 0 0 
Nach Bócz ist andererseits die Separathaltung der Schuld daher unbegründet, weil 
diese aus der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit hervorwächst, die die Ursache 
des Verbrechens darstellt.101 Andere aber bekennen sich für das Umgekehrte dessen, 
indem sie meinen: wer schuldhaft eine gesellschaftsgefährliche Straftat begeht, „ist 
eben zufolge seiner Schuld, seines Bewußtseinsinhaltes . . . aktuell auch in seiner 
Person gesellschaftsgefährlich."102 
Wenn wir die Schuld mit der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters identifizie-
ren, oder die Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit in der Schuld, bzw. die Schuld in der 
9 1
 V I G H J.: Kauzalitás, determináció és prognózis a kriminológiában. (Kausalität, Determination und 
Prognose in der Kriminologie.) Thesen einer Doktorarbeit. Budapest, 1975. pp. 23—26. Er ist der Meinung, 
daß „das Niveau der Humanwissenschaften und der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung die Ausarbeitung 
der mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit geltenden kriminologischen Prognosen ermöglichen." Zu den rechtlichen 
Gesichtspunkten s. K I R Á L Y , T.: Büntetőítélet a jog határán. (Strafurteil an der Grenze des Rechts.) p. 279. 
98
 Darauf gründen sich die Bestrebungen zur Typisierung der Täter. S . S I M O R P.: A büntetés 
kiszabása. (Die Strafzumessung) In: V. Kongreß des Ungarischen Juristenverbands, Siófok, 1958. 7—19. 
Mai 1958. Budapest, 1959 pp. 231. ff.; B A K Ó C Z I A.: Az élet elleni bűnözés tipizálási és osztályozási kérdései. 
(Fragen der Typisierung und Klassifizierung der Verbrechen gegen das Leben.) In: Studien zur 
Kriminologie und Kriminalistik, Bd. XV. Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1978. pp. 5—79.; 
G Ö N C Z Ö L К.: A visszaeső bűnelkövetők tipológiája. (Typologie der rückfälligen Täter.) Kandidaturthesen, 
Budapest. 1978. 
99
 VISKI, L.: Szándékosság és társadalomra veszélyesség. (Vorsätzlichkeit und Gesellschaftsgefähr-
lichkeit.) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1959. pp. 25., 202—204. und 223. 
100
 VISKI, L.: Büntetöpolitika és büntető törvényhozás. (Strafpolitik und Strafgesetzgebung.) p. 67. 
101
 Bócz , E.: Észrevételek a büntető törvénykönyv tervezetének általános részéhez. (Bemerkungen 
zum allgemeinen Teil des Entwurfes des Strafgesetzbuches.) pp. 7—8. 
1 0 2
 K Á D Á R , M.: A súlyosító körülmények. (Die erschwerenden Umstände) p. 134. 
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Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters auflösen wollen, wird die Separathaltung der 
beiden Begriffe gewiß nicht notwendig sein. Das StGB andererseits erwähnt diese zwei 
Umstände unter den Strafzumessungsumständen abgesondert und die Bedeutung 
dieser Regelung wird auch durch die Klassifikation geschwächt, die die Schuld und die 
persönliche Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit in der Kategorie der „Schuldumstände 
subjektiven Charakters" zusammenschmelzt. 
Die besondere Hervorhebung des Schuldbegriffes ist nicht daher notwendig, 
damit dieser Hilfsbeweise zur Feststellung der persönlichen Gesellschaftsgefahrlichkeit 
biete, sondern weil die schuldhaft begangene gesellschaftsgefährliche Straftat die 
Grundlage der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung, und die wichtigste Determinante des 
Maßes dieser Verantwortung bildet. Diese Grundlage und Determinante fordert nicht 
von dem Lebensweg des Individuums, sondern von der begangenen Straftat Rechen-
schaft. Das sich an die konkrete Straftat knüpfende psychische Verhältnis103 soll nicht 
im Rahmen der Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters, sondern als Grad der Schuld 
beurteilt werden. Die Schuld stellt nur eine partikulare Erscheinung der Gesamtper-
sönlichkeit dar, die Strafe gegenüber berührt die ganze Persönlichkeit. Darum hat man 
aus dem Gesichtspunkt der voraussichtlichen Wirkung der Strafe auch die persönliche 
Gesellschaftsgefährlichkeit des Täters zu berücksichtigen. Das Gesetz läßt dies jedoch 
nur in den durch die Straftat bestimmten Rahmen zu, weil — wenn es nicht so erfolgen 
würde — gäbe es keine Anpassung zwischen der Strafe und der schuldhaft begangenen 
gesellschaftsgefährlichen Handlung, die aber das Gesetz erfordert. 
Принципы назначения наказания 
К . Д Ь Ё Р Д Ь И 
Статья посвяшена вопросам регулирования законом принципов назначения наказаний в 
венгерском уголовном праве. 
Принципы назначения наказаний впервые в венгерском уголовном праве были регулированы 
законом №11/1950 г. Данное регулирование оправдало себя на практике, поэтому с небольшими 
изменениями его позаимствовал УК 1961 г . ,атакжеУК 1978 г. Настоящее регулирование состоит из 
трех существенных элементов. Первый: ссылка на законные пределы наказания; второй: учет цели 
наказания; третий: учет смягчающих и отягчающих обстоятельств, среди которых закон 
подчеркивает общественную опасность совершителя и преступления и степень виновности. 
Закрепление в законе принципов назначения наказаний дает простор судебному рассуждению. В то 
же время деятельность по назначению наказаний представляет собой и применение права — 
применение предусмотренных законом принципов назначенуя наказаний. На этом основывается 
позиция судебной практики, по которой назначение наказания, нарушающее принципы назначения 
наказаний, означает неправильное применение материально-правовой нормы, которое может быть 
обжаловано в суде второй инстанции. 
1 0 3
 VISKI, L.: Szándékosság és társadalomra veszélyesség. (Vorsätzlichkeit und Gesellschaftsgefahr-
lichkeit.) p. 24. 
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В связи с обстоятельствами назначения наказаний автор подвергает критике понятийное 
определение, существующее в венгерской специальной литературе и правовой практике, которым 
эти обстоятельства называются «обстоятельствами виновности». Обстоятельством назначения 
наказания является всякое такое обстоятельство, которое — в рамках закона — учитывается судом 
при определении вида и меры применяемого наказания и способа его исполнения. 
Говоря об обстоятельствах назначения наказаний автор устанавливает, что преимуще-
ственное значение имеет общественная опасность преступления. Однако мера наказания, со-
ответствующая общественной опасности преступления, не означает зафиксированной меры, а 
только лимит. Оценка степени виновности, общественной опасности совершителя и иных 
смягчающих и отягчающих обстоятельств может иметь место лишь в пределах, определенных 
общественной опасностью преступления. В области назначения наказания общественная опасность 
преступления является таким пунктом сопоставления, по сравнению с которым другие 
обстоятельства назначения наказания могут быть оценены смягчающими или отягчающими. 
В связи с группировкой обстоятельств назначения наказаний автор обращает внимание на то, 
что она имеет значение как в правильном определении круьа таких обстоятельств, так и в избежании 
двойной оценки обстоятельств состава, даже обстоятельств назначения наказания. 
Среди обстоятельств назначения наказаний автор и особо занимается понятияму виновности 
и общественной опасности личности и их соотношением. Автор устанавливает, что эти два понятия 
конкурируют друг с другом в теории и практике. По мнению автора общественная опасность 
личности является прогностическим понятием и это означает, что в будущем какое поведение 
ожидается от совершителя, каковы шансы применяемой санкции в отношении воздействия на его 
поведение. Оценка общественной опасности личности совершителя, однако, может быть 
осуществлена только в пределах, определенных виновным общественно опасным деянием. 
Les principes de l'infliction de la peine 
K . G Y Ö R G Y I 
L'étude s'occupe des questions en connexion avec la réglementation légale des principes de 
l'infliction de la peine dans le droit pénal hongrois. 
Les principes de l'infliction de la peine ont été réglementés pour la première fois dans le droit pénal 
hongrois parla Loi № II de l'an 1950. Cette réglementation a soutenu l'épreuve dans la pratique ainsi le Code 
Pénal hongrois de l'an 1961 et celui de l'an 1978 l'ont emprunté aussi — avec des modifications de moindre 
importance. Cette disposition se compose de trois éléments essentiels. Le premier en est: le renvoi aux cadres 
légaux de la peine. Le deuxième en est: ne pas perdre de vue le but de la peine. Le troisième en est: prendre en 
considération des circonstances atténuantes et aggravantes parmi desquelles la loi met en relief le caractère 
dangereux de l'infraction et celui de l'auteur de l'infraction emportant à la société et le degré de la culpabilité. 
La fixation légale des principes de l'infliction de la peine assure un domaine convenable à l'appréciation du 
tribunal. L'activité de l'infliction de la peine signifie en même temps une application de droit, l'application 
des principes de l'infliction de la peine par voie légale. Est basé sur celle-ci le point de vue de la pratique 
judiciaire à savoir que l'infliction de la peine heurtant les principes de l'infliction de la peine signifie 
l'application incorrecte de la règle juridique matérielle laquelle situation peut être remédiée par le tribunal de 
deuxième instance. 
En connexion avec les circonstances de l'infliction de la peine l'étude adresse une critique à la 
désignation notionnelle existant dans la littérature juridique et dans la pratique juridique hongroises laquelle 
appelle ces circonstances en tant que «circonstances de culpabilité». Toutes circonstances peuvent être 
considérées en tant que circonstances de l'infliction de la peine lesquelles sont prises en considération par le 
tribunal — das les cadres de la loi — lors de la détermination du genre, de la mesure et du moyen de 
l'exécution de la peine à appliquer. 
En mentionnant des circonstances de l'infliction de la peine, l'étude constate qu'une importance 
primordiale est signifiée par le caractère dangereux de l'infraction emportant à la société. La mesure de la 
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peine convenable au caractère dangereux de l'infraction à la société ne signifie cependant pas une mesure 
fixée mais seulement une certaine latitude. L'appréciation du degré de la culpabilité et du caractère 
dangereux de l'auteur de l'infraction emportant à la société ainsi que des autres circonstances aggravantes et 
atténuantes peut avoir lieu dans des cadres déterminés par le caractère dangereux de l'infraction emportant à 
la société. Dans le cadre de l'infliction de la peine, le caractère dangereux de l'infraction emportant à la 
société est un tel point de rapport au fur et à mesure duquel pourront être appréciées les autres circonstances 
de l'infliction de la peine en tant que circonstances atténuantes respectivement aggravantes. 
En connexion avec le groupement de la circonstance de l'infliction de la peine, l'étude invite 
l'attention à remarquer au fait à savoir qu'il a de portée soit dans la désignation correcte du cadre de telles 
circonstances soit à l'évitement de l'appréciation répétée des circonstances de l'exposé des faits soit même des 
circonstances de l'infliction de la peine. 
Parmi des circonstances de l'infliction de la peine, l'étude traite à part la notion de la culpabilité et du 
caractère dangereux de l'auteur de l'infraction emportant à la société, ainsi que, avec les rapports d'échange. 
Elle constate que ces deux notions font la concurrence soit dans la théorie soit dans la pratique. Selon le point 
de vue de l'étude le caractère dangereux personnel emportant à la société est une notion pronostique ce qui 
signifie que de la part de l'auteur de l'infraction quelle sorte de comportement est-elle à envisager et quelles 
sont les chances de la sanction à appliquer à influencer son comportement. Cependant l'appréciation du 
caractère dangereux personnel de l'auteur de l'infraction emportant à la société ne pourra avoir lieu que dans 
des cadres déterminés par l'acte emportant danger à la société commis comme coupable. 
6* Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 

Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. Tomus 24 (3—4), pp.385—394 ( 1982) 
Informationes 
Die Stellung der Wirtschaftsassoziationen im System 
der ungarischen Wirtschaftsorgane 
1. Die Wirtschaftsassoziationen sind Institutionen der Volkswirtschaft, die mit beinahe 
sämtlichen Elementen des Wirtschaftslenkungssystems und des Wirtschaftsmechanismus in engster 
Verbindung stehen. Irgendwelche Formen der Assoziationen, (eher die landwirtschaftlichen 
Produktionsgenossenschaften und weniger die Assoziationen der staatlicher Unternehmer) sind in 
der Wirtschaft sämtlicher sozialistischen Länder anzutreffen. Die speziellen Züge der Wirtschaftslen-
kungssysteme der einzelnen Länder machen die Errichtung spezieller Institutionen und Koopera-
tionsformen notwendig, demgemäß sind die Assoziationen, infolge ihrer engen Verbindung mit dem 
Wirtschaftsmechanismus, sozusagen konzentrierte Träger des Wirtschaftslenkungssystems der 
betreffenden Staaten. 
Die grundlegenden Charakterzüge des ungarischen Wirtschaftslenkungssystems sind dem 
ungarischen Leser bekannt, deshalb will ich hier nur zwei, aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Entstehung und 
Entwicklung der Assoziationen bestimmende Spezifika hervorheben. Das eine ist, daß zufolge der 
Reform des Wirtschaftsmechanismus im Jahr 1968 die wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit der 
Wirtschaftsorgane — staatliche Unternehmen und Genossenschaften — in bedeutendem Maß 
zunahm. Diese größere Selbständigkeit machte es notwendig, daß auch die Wirtschaftslenkung und 
die rechtliche Regelung die Fortsetzung der wirtschaftenden und unternehmenden Tätigkeit dieser 
Organe zwischen neuen Organisationsrahmen und auf einer breiteren Sphäre sicherstelle und 
ermögliche. Der andere wichtige Charakterzug der Wirtschaftsreform war, daß das System der auf die 
Unternehmen aufgegliederten obligatorischen Plananweisungen eingestellt wurde. Durch die 
Aufhebung dieses Systems verringerte sich im wesentlichen die koordinative Tätigkeit einer Art des 
zentralen Plans gegenüber den Wirtschaftsorganen, und so mußte diese Koordination auf die Ebene 
der effektiven Entscheidungen nämlich auf die Unternehmenebene übertragen werden. 
Bezüglich der Realisierung des organisatorischen Rahmens dieser Aufgaben entstanden im 
Zuge der Vorbereitung der Reforme keine endgültige Beschlüsse. Der Beschluß der Ungarischen 
Sozialistischen Arbeiterpartei vom Jahre 1966, die die Grundprinzipien der Reform niederlegte, 
enthielt nur ziemlich unbestimmte Hinweise auf die Notwendigkeit solcher Kooperationsformen, die 
geeignet erschienen den organisatorischen Rahmen der erwähnten Wirtschafts- und 
Koordinationstätigkeiten zu bilden. Die in 1968 im Kraft getretene Rechtsnormen ermöglichten aber 
bereits ausdrücklich die Errichtung von Assoziationen zur Erfüllung dieser Aufgaben. 
2. In den vergangenen Jahren bildete sich in Ungarn eine ziemlich ausgeprägte Theorie der 
Assoziationen heraus, die hinsichtlich der Entwicklung der rechtlichen Regelung nicht unwirksam 
blieb, und auch nicht unwirksam bleiben konnte. Den Ausgangspunkt dieser Theorie bildet, daß die 
Assoziation eine spezielle Kooperationsbeziehung Warencharakters zwischen den Wirtschaftsorga-
nen ist, die in jedem Fall eine komplexe Einheit von rechtlichen und wirtschaftlichen Elementen 
darstellt. Die Beachtung der rechtlichen und wirtschaftlichen Spezifika ist sowohl bei der 
Untersuchung der Regelung, als auch ihrer Funktionierung unumgänglich notwendig. 
Von rechtlicher Seite ist das grundlegende Charakteristikum der Assoziationen, daß sie eine 
durch Verträge aufstehende Kooperationsbeziehung verkörpern. Im Gegensatz aber zu anderen mit 
Namen versehenen Verträgen die zwar auch Kooperationselemente aufweisen —, wird die 
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Kooperation zum bestimmenden Faktor des Charakters des Vertrags, macht sich von den konkreten 
Warenaustauschbeziehungen los, das primäre Objekt der Leistung ist die Kooperation selbst. Aus 
dem Charakter des Vertrags folgt es, daß die Assoziation in allen Fällen eine in Gleichordnung 
stehende Beziehung ausdrückt. Diese Gleichordnung ist in der Beziehung der an der Assoziation 
Beteiligten untereinander geltend, da die Assoziation selbst unter der Leitung der Beteiligten steht, sie 
entwickelt denen unterstellt ihre Tätigkeit. Die Assoziation kann also nie zum Leitungsorgan der 
Teilnehmenden werden, da sie einerseits nicht im Wege der öffentlichen Gewalt, sondern durch 
Beschluß der Beteiligten zustande kommt, andererseits sind die Beziehungen der Gleich bzw. 
Unterordnung gerade umgekehrt, als bei den Lenkungsorganen. 
Den ökonomischen Inhalt der Assoziationen stellen die beiden vorhin erwähnten grundlegen-
den Funktionen der Assoziationen, die Koordination und die wirtschaftliche Unternehmung dar. 
Die Koordination bedeutet die Abstimmung und Harmonisierung der Tätigkeiten, das dort 
notwendig ist, wo wir voneinander mehr oder minder unabhängige Funktionen nach einem 
gemeinsamen Ziel lenken wollen. Die Volkswirtschaft besteht aus Wirtschaftseinheiten, die ihre 
Aufgaben voneinander gesondert jedoch in Verbindung miteinander, und einander ergänzend 
versehen. Die in breitestem Sinne verstandene Koordination der Tätigkeit der Wirtschaftsorgane 
bildet einer Teil auch der wirtschaftslenkenden Funktion des Staates. Die Koordination ist aber ein 
Teil auch der Selbstregelungstätigkeit der Unternehmen. Die Kooperation unter den Unternehmen 
kann über zahlreichen Vertragsformen ausgebaut werden, zur Koordination wird aber die 
Kooperation nur bei den Assoziationen, wo die Kooperation organisationsmäßige Formen annimmt, 
selbständige Organisations- und Geschäftsführungsformen erhält. Diese Tätigkeit der Assoziatio-
nen richtet sich immer „nach innen", sie zielt auf die Beteiligten an der Assoziation. 
Die wirtschaftliche Unternehmung ist ein traditionelles Objekt der Tätigkeit der Assoziatio-
nen, dessen Charakterzug ist, daß die Beteiligten ihre Tätigkeit nicht gesondert, sondern gemeinsam 
entwickeln. Das erfordert die Vereinigung einzelner Funktionen der Mitglieder, oder eines Teils ihrer 
Mittel. Diese Vereinigung bringt auch das gemeinsame Risiko mit sich und bedeutet auch, daß die 
Mitglieder auch an dem Gewinn oder an dem Verlust gemeinsam beteiligt sind. 
Die Koordination und die wirtschaftliche Unternehmung ist in irgend einer Form das Element 
sämtlicher Assoziationen, da einesteils die gemeinsame wirtschaftliche Unternehmung die Abstim-
mung wenigstens dieser Tätigkeiten der Beteiligten notwendig macht, andererseits ist auch das ein 
primäres Ziel der Koordination im Rahmen der Assoziation die wirtschaftliche Unternehmungstätig-
keit der Beteiligten zufördern. Das Volumen dieser beiden Elemente in der Assoziationstätigkeit, ihr 
Verhältnis zueinander bildet die grundlegende Differenz zwischen den einzelnen Assoziationen. 
Neben den beiden erwähnten Hauptfunktionen können noch die Funktionen im Zusammen-
hang mit der Strömung der Mittel, die Konzentrations-Integrationsfunktion, sowie die die 
Unternehmen- und Unternehmenleitungsstruktur modifizierende Funktion erwähnt werden. Diese 
Funktionen kommen aber meist den beiden Hauptfunktionen untergeordnet zur Geltung. 
3. Bei der Einführung der Wirtschaftslenkungsreform konnte sich noch kein prinzipiell 
einheitliches, wohl aufgebautes Assoziationsrecht herausbilden, obzwar die rechtliche Regelung 
bestrebt war, die Gründung der Assoziationen zu fördern. Die einfachste Lösung war jene Formen 
anzuwenden, die bereits fertig dastanden wenn auch nicht nach dem Maß der sozialistischen 
Unternehmen geschnitten. So wurde es möglich, daß die Unternehmen, den Regeln des ZGB 
entsprechend, zivilrechtliche Gesellschaft gründen. Diese waren Assoziationsformen ohne Rechtsper-
sönlichkeit mit Vermögensvereinigung, deren den staatsbürgerlichen Verhältnissen angepaßte Regeln 
sich eher zurückhaltend, als präferierend auswirkten. Als gemeinsames Unternehmenkonstruktion 
konstituierte die rechtliche Regelung zwei Institutionen des alten Handelsrechts aus der bürgerlichen 
Gesellschaftsordnung, die Aktiengesellschaft und die GmbH. (Die Regeln der AG sind in einem Gesetz 
vom Jahr 1875 enthalten, während die Regeln der GmbH, aus 1930 stammen). Als neue 
Assoziationsform wurde durch die rechtliche Regelung die Vereinigung als koordinative Assoziation 
ohne Rechtspersönlichkeit eingeführt, deren inhaltliche Regeln aber nicht mit der erwünschten 
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Ausführlichkeit ausgearbeitet wurden. Neben diesen blieben auch weiterhin die speziellen 
genossenschaftlichen Assoziationsformen stehen. Diese „Hals über Kopf durchgeführte Regelung 
hatte zur Folge, daß aus der den Assoziationen zugedachten beiden Hauptfunktionen nur die 
gemeinsame Wirtschaftung realisiert werden konnte, da die Mehrzahl der Formen eine Vermögenver-
einigung erwünscht und die Koordination nur über dieselbe zur Geltung kommen konnte. Es stimmt 
zwar, daß die Vereinigungen ausgesprochen mit koordinativem Zweck ins Leben gerufen wurden, ihre 
Tätigkeit deformierte sich aber bald beträchtlich. Der Grund dafür war in erster Linie die 
Großzügigkeit der Regelung, andererseits aber, daß ein großer Teil der Vereinigungen aus den Trusts 
umgestaltet wurden. Dementsprechend wahrten sie in ihrer Tätigkeit zahlreiche Charakteristiken der 
Trusts, wozu ihnen auch die Ministerien Unterstützung boten. Das Ergebnis war, daß die 
Vereinigungen als Trust zu schwach, als Assoziationen zu stark geworden sind. 
Die rechtliche Regelung der Assoziationen hatte seither mehrere Etappen, unser derzeitiges 
Recht der Assoziationen wird durch die Normen aus 1978 geregelt, und zwar auf mehreren Ebenen. 
Der Ausgangspunkt der Regelung ist das ZGB, das aus seinem Character folgend selbstredend bloß 
die bürgerrechtlichen Bezüge des Assoziationen regelt.Die zweite Ebene der Regelung — durch 
Gesetzesverordnung—ist bereits eine komplexe Regelung — da hier auch über einzelnen finanziellen, 
staatsverwaltungs- und arbeitsrechtlichen Fragen der Assoziationen verfügt wird. Die Teilvorschrif-
ten sind dann in den Durchführungsverordnungen der Ministerien des Finanz, Arbeits-, und 
Außenhandelswesen enthalten. Als erstes Charakteristikum der Regelung und als ihr wichtigstes 
Verdienst kann also die rechtszweigliche Komplexität erwähnt werden. Eine andere wichtige 
Errungenschaft, wichtiges Ergebnis der neuen rechtlichen Regelung ist, daß als Ergebnis langwieriger 
Debatten die Sonderstellung der Regelung der genossenschaftlichen Assoziationen aufgehoben 
wurde, und es kam das einheitliche, für sämtliche Wirtschaftsorgane — staatliche Unternehmen und 
Genossenschaften — gleicherart geltende Recht der Assoziationen zustande. Drittens muß als sehr 
wichtiger Charakterzug des neuen Rechts der Assoziationen hervorgehoben werden, daß die 
Assoziationen koordinativen und wirtschaftenden Charakters bei jeder einzelnen Formation 
konsequent voneinander unterschieden werden, ihnen überlassend, ob sie als Rechtspersonen, oder 
als Assoziationen ohne Rechtspersönlichkeit funktionieren wollen. 
Die Assoziationsform ohne Rechtspersönlichkeit, die Wirtschaftsgesellschaft ist im besonde-
ren Teil des ZGB, unter den einzelnen Verträgen geregelt; diese Regelung faßt, entsprechend den 
früher erwähnten, zwei Grundkonstruktionen in sich. Teils ist es die traditionelle, auf eine 
gemeinsame wirtschaftliche Unternehmung gerichtete vermögensvereinende Assoziation, bei denen 
entscheidend ist, daß sich die Beteiligten zu eine gemeinsame wirtschaftliche oder eine auf ein 
gemeinsames wirtschaftliches Ziel gerichtete Tätigkeit vereinbaren, wobei die dazu nötigen 
materiellen Mittel zur gemeinsamen Verfügung gestellt werden. Andererseits ist es aber auch möglich, 
daß die Beteiligten die Assoziation zwecks Förderung ihrer wirtschaftlichen Interessen und zur 
Abstimmung ihrer darauf gerichteten gemeinsamen Tätigkeit errichten. In diesem Fall ist die 
Zurverfügungstellung der materiellen Mittel keine Vorbedingung der Abschließung des Vertrags 
mehr. Es ist natürlich auch möglich, daß ein Gesellschaftsvertrag die beiden erwähnten Aufgaben, die 
gemeinsame wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit und die Koordination gemeinsam enthält. Ein Mangel der 
rechtlichen Regelung ist, daß die Teilvorschriften über die Wirtschaftsgesellschaft im wesentlichen 
nur für die Gesellschaften wirtschaftenden Charakters angewendet werden können, bezüglich der 
koordinativen Gesellschaften beinhalten sie, außer der Definition, beinahe überhaupt keine Regeln. 
Der Grund dafür ist aber der Mangel an Erfahrungen bezüglich der Funktionierung der 
Gesellschaften derartigen Charakters. 
Die Gesetzesverordnung über die Assoziation regelt auch eine mit Namen versehenen Formen 
der Wirtschaftsgesellschaft. Bei einer Außenhandelsgesellschaft vereinbaren sich zur Betreibung von 
Außenhandelstätigkeit berechtigtes Unternehmen und eine andere Wirtschaftsorganisation 
(inländisches Produktions-Handelsunternehmeri), zwecks Förderung ihrer gemeinsamen wirtschaft-
lichen Interessen, daß sie einerseits auf dem Gebiet der Außenhandelstätigkeit, andererseits auf dem 
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Gebiet der damit zusammenhängenden Produktion, eventuell auch des inländischen Umsatzes 
kooperieren, sich an dem Gewinn gemeinsam beteiligen und auch den Verlust gemeinsam tragen. 
Diese Konstruktion erübrigt also die Vermögensvereinigung, schafft aber eine Risikogemeinschaft 
unter den Teilnehmenden, darum kann die Gesellschaft als eine spezielle Form der im Grunde 
genommen koordinativen Assoziation angesehen werden. Bei einer Forschungs-Entwieklungsgesell-
schaft schließen die Beteiligten einen Vertrag darüber, daß sie im Interesse der Erreichung, 
Einführung oder Realisierung von bestimmten Ergebnissen der Forschung und Entwicklung 
zusammenwirken und sich an dem erzielten wirtschaftlichen Ergebnis gemeinsam beteiligen. Auch 
diese Assoziationsform ist also nicht unbedingt vermögensvereinend, hat aber auch einen 
Risikogemeinschaftscharakter. (Die Durchführungsverordnung erstreckte den Umfang der Koope-
ration auch auf die Produktion, und machte es möglich, daß auf diesem Gebiet solche Assoziationen 
gegründet werden können, die über Rechtspersönlichkeit verfügen und in From von Vereinigungen 
funktionieren.) 
Unter den über Rechtspersönlichkeit verfügenden Assoziationsformen ist die Vereinigung eine 
grundlegend koordinative, zwecks Förderung der Wirtschaftsinteressen der Mitglieder und 
Abstimmung ihrer darauf abgerichteten Tätigkeit gegründete Organisation. Mit Aushilfscharakter 
kann sie grundlegend für die daran Beteiligten auch wirtschaftliche und dienstleistende Tätigkeit 
ausüben und kann auch über ein zu ihrer Tätigkeit notwendigen Vermögen verfügen. Für die 
Schulden der Vereinigung haften die Beteiligten als Bürgen. An der Leitung der Assoziationen 
nehmen die Beteiligten im allgemeinen im Verhältnis ihres Vermögensbeitrags teil. Die Vereinigung ist 
keine gewinnorientierte Form, die Einnahmen oder der Verlust ihrer wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit 
verringern oder erhöhen die durch die Beteiligten zu deckenden Erhaltungskosten. (Unabhängig von 
den typischen Vereinigungen funktionieren in Ungarn, aufgrund spezieller Rechtsnormen, mit 
experimentellem Charakter, auch sogenannte Agrarindustrievereinigungen.) 
Das gemeinsame Unternehmen ist ein ausdrücklich zur Ausübung einer Wirtschaftstätigkeit 
gegründetes sekundäres Unternehmen, dessen Vermögensmittel die gründenden Wirtschaftsorgane 
sicherstellen. Der Gewinn und der Verlust des Unternehmens teilt sich unter den Gründern im 
Verhältnis ihres Vermögensbeitrags, für die Schulden sind sie aber als Bürgen haftbar. Das ist jenes 
Moment, das diese Gesellschaft von der im wesentlichen ebenfalls sekundären Kommanditgesell-
schaft unterscheidet. In diesem Fall sind nämlich die Beteiligten für die Schulden der Assoziation nur 
bis zur Höhe ihrer Vermögenseinlagen verantwortlich. Aus der Unterschiedlichkeit der Verantwor-
tungskonstruktion unterscheidet sich auch die rechtliche Regelung des Anfangsvermögens der beiden 
Formen. Während das gemeinsame Unternehmen über ein Anfangsvermögen verfügen muß, das eine 
ungestörte Funktion für ein Jahr sicherstellt, bestimmen bei der Kommanditgesellschaft die 
Finanzorgane bei der Gründung den Betrag des Anfangsvermögens individuell. 
4. Die Mehrzahl der die Assoziationen betreffenden Verwaltungsvorschriften bezieht sich 
hauptsächlich auf die Assoziationsformen mit Rechtspersönlichkeit, weil bei den Wirschaftsgesell-
schaften — aus ihrem grundlegend Vertragscharakter folgend — weder ein spezielles Genehmigungs-
verfahren, noch, im Laufe ihrer Funktionierung, eine staatliche Aufsicht notwendig ist. (Eine 
Ausnahme bildet der Kreis der durch die Staatsbürger in Gesellschaftsform gegründeten 
wirtschaftlichen Arbeitsgemeinschaften.) 
Die Staatsverwaltungstätigkeit gegenüber den Assoziationen mit Rechtspersönlichkeit ist im 
wesentlichen eine spezielle, komplexe, staatliche Gesetzmäßigkeitsaufsicht, die die entsprechend der 
Tätigkeit der Assoziationen zuständigen Staatsverwaltungsorganen ausüben. Einzelne Elemente 
dieser Aufsicht — Fachlenkung, finanzielle Kontrolle — weisen bezüglich der Assoziationen keine 
besonderen speziellen Züge auf. Eine ausdrücklich mit den Assoziationen verbundene 
Staatsverwaltungstätigkeit ist aber das Genehmigungsverfahren. Bezüglich der Genehmigung der 
Tätigkeit der Assoziationen haben sich zwei Systeme entwickelt: das normative, beziehungsweise das 
Konzessionssystem. Im ersten Fall wird nur untersucht, ob bei der Gründung einer gegebenen 
Assoziation die Rechtsvorschriften eingehalten worden sind, oder nicht, während bei dem anderen — 
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aufgrund individueller Beurteilung — auch die Zweckmäßigkeit der Funktion der Assoziation 
untersucht wird. Das ungarische Recht hat grundlegend das Konzessionssystem akzeptiert, die 
Bestätigung der Verträge kann aber nur dann verweigert werden, wenn der Vertrag rechtsnormwidrig 
ist, oder die Interessen der Volkswirtschaft verletzt werden. Interessenverletzend für die Volkswirt-
schaft ist der Vertrag dann, wenn die darin vorgesehene Tätigkeit den im Volkswirtschaftsplan 
bestimmten Zielsetzungen widerspricht, sich auf die Beschränkung des Wirtschaftswettbewerbs 
richtet und dadurch fremde Interessen gefährdet, oder wenn das Vermögen der Gesellschaft zur 
Gründung einer bestimmungsmäßigen Funktion nicht hinreichend zu sein scheint. 
Betreffend die finanzielle Regelung der Assoziationen kann bloß das gemeinsame Unterneh-
men in Frage kommen, da sowohl die Wirtschaftsgesellschaft, als auch die Vereinigung durch ihre 
Wirtschaftstätigkeit die Ergebnisse der Beteiligten beeinflußt, für sie aber die allgemeinen finanziellen 
Vorschriften gelten. Für die finanziellen Verhältnisse der gemeinsamen Unternehmen sind dieselben 
Bestimmungen anzuwenden, wie für die eine identische Tätigkeit betreibenden staatlichen 
Unternehmen. 
5. Es kann aufgrund der seit der neuen rechtlichen Regelung der Assoziationen gesammelten 
Erfahrungen festgestellt werden, daß sich infolge dessen, daß die für die Wirtschaftsorgane zur 
Verfügung stehenden freien Entwicklungsmittel ziemlich eingeengt sind, sich eher die eine 
Vermögensvereinigung nicht beanspruchenden koordinativen Assoziationen verbreiteten; zwecks 
Vermeidung der administrativen Gebundenheiten werden auch bei diesen Assoziationsformen bei der 
Gründung die Form ohne Rechtspersönlichkeit, also die viel elastischeren Form gewählt. Die 
Gründung der koordinativen Wirtschaftsgesellschaften ist neuerlich hauptsächlich in der Bauindu-
strie zu beobachten. 
6. Schließlich soll betont werden, daß wenn auch die Assoziationen geeignet sind zahlreiche in 
der Volkswirtschaft mangelnde Funktionen zu erfüllen, Wundermittel sind sie doch nicht. Sie sind 
Teile des Institutionssystems der Volkswirtschaft, sie sind Instrumente der Durchführung der 
Aufgaben der Volkswirtschaft, und können letzten Endes weder besser noch schlechter funktionieren, 
als die Gesamtheit der Volkswirtschaft. Ebendeshalb aber, weil sie komplexe Rechtsinstitutionen sind 
und beinahe sämtliche Elemente des Wirtschaftslenkunssystems aufweisen, kann ihre Untersuchung 
— eventuell ihre vergleichende Untersuchung — zur Weiterentwicklung der Wirtschaftslenkungs-
systeme anderer sozialistischen Länder mit gewissen Erfahrungen dienen. 
Rechtsnormen 
Gesetz Nr. IV vom Jahre 1977 Über die Änderung und den einheitlichen Text 
des Gesetzes Nr. IV vom Jahr 1959 über das 
Zivilgesetzbuch der Ungarischen Volksrepu-
blik. 
GVO Nr. 4 v. J. 1978 
Ministerratsbeschluß Nr. 9/1978 (1. II.) 
Über die wirtschaftlichen Assoziationen. 
Über die Durchführung der Gesetzesverord-
nung Nr. 4 v. J. 1978 über die wirtschaftlichen 
Assoziationen. 
Vorordnung des Ministers für Finanzen Nr. 
22/1978 (19. IX.) PM. sz. 
Über die finanziellen Bedingungen der 
Gründung und Tätigkeit der wirtschaftlichen 
Assoziationen. 
Verord. des Ministers für Arbeitswesen Nr. 
12/1978 (5. IX.) MüM sz. 
Über die Arbeitsfragen der wirtschaftlichen 
Assoziationen. 
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Regierungsverord. Nr. 32/1967 (23. IX.) 
Korm. sz 
Über die inländischen Verträge der eine 
Außenhandelstätigkeit betreibenden Unter-
nehmen (modifiziert durch Ministerratverord. 
Nr. 54/1978 (7. XII.) Mt. sz.) 
F. Fábián 
Neue Rechtsnormen im Bereich 
der Erweiterung der Möglichkeiten der Wirtschaftung 
von Privatpersonen 
1. Verordnung des Ministerrates Nr. 25/1981 (5. IX.) über die Kleingenossenschaften 
Aufgrund der Modifizierung des Gesetzes Nr. III v. J. 1971 über die Genossenschaften wurde 
der Ministerrat ermächtigt die Kleingenossenschaften und die gewerblichen und dienstleistenden 
genossenschaftlichen Fachgruppen zu regeln. 
Im Rahmen dessen kam bezüglich der Kleingenossenschaften folgende Regelung zustande: 
Die Gründung und Funktionierung der Kleingenossenschaften — im Rahmen deren höchstens 100 
Mitglieder arbeiten dürfen — hat den Zweck, daß die genossenschaftlichen Gemeinschaften der 
Staatsbürger, im Rahmen der sich der kleineren Mitgliederzahl anpassenden einfacheren Selbstver-
waltung und Arbeitsorganisation durch größere Vermögensbeteiligung und persönliche Mitwirkung 
Produktions-, Dienstleistungs- oder sonstige gesellschaftlich nützliche Tätigkeit entfalten. Im 
Rahmen von Kleingenossenschaften können sämtliche wirtschaftliche Tätigkeiten getrieben werden, 
die durch Rechtsnorm nicht einer staatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisation ausschließlich zugewiesen sind. 
Zur Gründung der Genossenschaft bedarf es eines mindestens so großen Anfangsvermögens, das zum 
Beginn der im Statut der Genossenschaft bestimmten Tätigkeit und zur laufenden Funktionierung 
über ein Jahr notwendig ist. In das Statut der Kleingenossenschaften muß alles aufgenommen werden, 
was das Gesetz über die Genossenschaften, beziehungsweise die Gesetzesverordnung Nr. 32 v. J. 1971 
über die Gewerbegenossenschaften deklariert, sowie die Hauptformen der Vermögensbeiträge der 
Mitglieder und die sich auf diese beziehenden Vereinbarungen der Mitglieder, es muß ferner jene 
Wertgrenze angegeben werden, über welche hinaus zur Abschließung von Verträgen die vorherige 
Zustimmung der Generalversammlung notwendig ist. Die Kleingenossenschaften müssen verkürzte 
Selbstverwaltungsordnungen setzen, in denen die Regel der Funktionierung der Selbstverwaltungsor-
gane, der Aufbau der Arbeitsorganisation, die Ordnung der inneren Kontrolle, sowie die mit der 
Verrichtung der Arbeit und der Verteilung des Einkommens zusammenhängenden Regel, die im 
Statut nicht enthalten sind, niedergelegt werden müssen. Außer den hauptberuflichen Mitgliedern 
kann ein mit einem anderen Arbeitgeber in Arbeitsverhältnis stehender Arbeitnehmer im Rahmen 
einer Arbeitsverrichtung außerhalb der Arbeitszeit seiner Hauptbeschäftigung Mitglied der 
Kleingenossenschaft werden; Mitglieder können sein auch Personen in Ruhestand, sowie Studenten 
der Hochschulen im Direktstudium mit Zustimmung der Institution. Über die Aufnahme der 
Mitglieder entscheidet die Leitung; bei der Aufnahme wird eine Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarung 
geschlossen, deren Hauptpunkte sind: die individuelle Form und das Maß des Vermögensbeitrags des 
Mitglieds, die Arbeitszeit, sowie die Festlegung der Art der persönlichen Mitwirkung und der 
persönlichen Grundgehalts, das bei der Verteilung des persönlichen Einkommens maßgebend ist. Die 
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Vermögensbeiträge der Mitglieder müssen nicht durch Zeichnung von Anteilscheinen erbracht 
werden, sondern es kann auch z. B. aus Eigentumsübertragung von Produktionsmitteln, Gebäuden, 
Werkstätten oder Personenkraftwagen bestehen. Das obligatorische Maß der Vermögensbeiträge 
macht einen Betrag aus, der einem zwei monatigen Grundarbeitsgehalt des Mitglieds entspricht und 
ist durch Zeichnung eines entsprechenden Anteilscheines zu erstellen. Das Mitglied kann für 
Entwicklungszwecke, die durch die Generalversammlung bestimmt wurden, freiwillig Zielanteilschei-
ne zeichnen; die Art dpr Zeichnung wird durch die Generalversammlung bestimmt. Aufgrund der 
persönlichen Mitwirkung und des Vermögensbeitrags in Form von Anteilscheinen kommt dem 
Mitglied vom verteilbaren Einkommen der Genossenschaft ein persönliches Einkommen zu. Wenn 
die Genossenschaft verlustbringend ist fällt den Mitgliedern verringertes Einkommen zu; der 
entsprechende Teil der bereits behobenen Einkommen muß zurückgezahlt werden. Falls die 
Genossenschaft ein Mitglied nicht dauernd vereinbarungsgemäß beschäftigen kann, kann die 
Generalversammlung die Mitgliederschaftsvereinbarung einseitig kündigen. Gleichzeitig ist die 
Genossenschaft verpflichtet, dem Mitglied seinen Vermögensbeitrag herausgeben. Das die staatliche 
Gesetzlichkeitsaufsicht ausübende Organ ist nur infolge von Anmeldungen, die auf Verletzung der 
Rechtsnormen, des Statuts oder der Selbstverwaltungsordnung hinweisen, verpflichtet eine 
Untersuchung durchzuführen. Die Genossenschaft ist — außer der vorhergehenden Information über 
den Zeitpunkt der Generalversammlung und deren Tagesordnung — nicht verpflichtet dem die 
Aufsicht ausübenden staatlichen Organ sonstige schriftliche Informationen zukommen zu lassen. Die 
verwaltungszweiglich-fachliche Aufsicht der Genossenschaft wird durch das entsprechende Fachver-
waltungsorgan des nach dem Sitz der Genossenschaft zuständigen Rates versehen. Die Verordnung 
ist am 1. Januar 1982 in Kraft getreten. 
2. Verordnung des Ministerrats Nr. 26/1981 (5. IX.) MT. sz. über die gewerblichen und dienstleistenden 
genossenschaftlichen Fachgruppen 
Die gewerbliche (baugewerbliche) Produktionsbez. Dienstleistungsgenossenschaftsfach-
gruppe ist eine in genossenschaftlichem Rahmen funktionierende, über bestimmte autonome und 
wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit verfügende Organisation der Staatsbürger, mit wirtschaftlicher 
Rechnungsführung, aber ohne Rechtspersönlichkeit. Ihre Tätigkeit richtet sich in erster Linie auf 
Dienstleistungen und Warenerzeugung für die Bevölkerung, ferner auf Herstellung von Produkten für 
eigene Zwecke und für andere Wirtschaftsorgane und auf Dienstleistungen für dieselben. Eine 
Fachgruppe kann durch mindestens fünf eintrittsfertigen Mitgliedern gegründet werden. Zu ihrer 
Gründung bedarf es einer Gründungsmitgliederversammlung, ferner der Sicherstellung der zur 
ungestörten Funktionierung nötigen materiellen Mittel und der Bestätigung der General- oder 
Delegiertenversammlung der Genossenschaft. Die Genossenschaft und die Fachgruppe regeln ihre 
Beziehungen — entsprechend den maßgebenden Rechtsnormen durch Vereinbarung. In der 
Geschäftsordnung der Fachgruppe muß unter anderen der Name und Sitz der Genossenschaft im 
Rahmen welcher die Fachgruppe funktioniert, angegeben werden, ferner es sollen bestimmt werden 
die wesentlicheren Regeln bezüglich der Beziehung der Genossenschaft und der Fachgruppe, die sich 
auf die Organisation und ihre Tätigkeit beziehenden wesentlicheren Prinzipien, sowie die Prinzipien 
der Herausformung und Entwicklung ihrer Tätigkeit unter Festlegung jener Wertgrenze, über welche 
hinaus nur aufgrund einer vorherigen Genehmigung der Genossenschaft im Namen derselben für die 
Fachgruppe Verpflichtungen übernommen werden können. Es müssen schließlich die Rechte und 
Pflichten der Mitglieder festgelegt werden. In den Angelegenheiten der Fachgruppe entscheidet die 
Mitgliederversammlung, ausgenommen jene Fälle, in denen der Entscheidung — im Sinne der 
Geschäftsordnung — einem Leitungsorgan (Präsident, Verwaltungsausschuß oder sonstiges) zufällt. 
Die zur wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit der Fachgruppe nötigen materiellen Mittel werden zum Teil durch 
den Vermögensbeitrag der Mitglieder, zum Teil durch die seitens der Genossenschaft oder eines 
anderen Wirtschaftsorgans zur Nutzung überlassenen Mittel sichergestellt. Die Genossenschaft und 
die Fachgruppe schließen über die Übergabe der Vermögensmittel und über deren Bedingungen eine 
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Vereinbarung. Das aus dem Vermögensbeitrag der Mitglieder und aus der Wirtschaftung der 
Fachgruppe stammende Vermögen muß von dem der Fachgruppe überlassenen Vermögensmittel 
getrennt in Evidenz gehalten werden. Bei der Fachgruppe muß ein für die Evidenz- und 
Rechnungsführung verantwortlicher Fachmann beschäftigt werden. Die Tätigkeit der Fachgruppe 
wird von der Leitung der Genossenschaft laufend mit Aufmerksamkeit verfolgt und unterstützt. Die 
Mitglieder der Fachgruppe haften bloß mit ihren Vermögensbeiträgen für die mit der Tätigkeit der 
Fachgruppe zusammenhängenden Schulden; die Genossenschaft haftet aber vor allem mit der für die 
Fachgruppe in Evidenz geführten Vermögen und mit den übergebenen Vermögensmitteln, für die 
diesen Rahmen übersteigenden Schulden aber mit ihrem vollen Vermögen. Jede das 15. Lebensjahr 
vollendete Person kann Mitglied der Fachgruppe sein. Jedes beitretende Mitglied ist verpflichtet einen 
Vermögensbeitrag zu leisten; dessen Maß wird durch die Mitgliederversammlung bestimmt. Falls das 
Mitgliedschaftsverhältnis aufhört, muß der Beitrag rückerstattet werden. Die Mitglieder beteiligen 
sich an dem Ergebnis der Wirtschaft der Fachgruppe aufgrund ihrer persönlichen Mitwirkung und 
ihrer Vermögensbeiträge; das Verhältnis der Beteiligung wird — innerhalb der Rahmen der 
Rechtsnormen und der Geschäftsordnung — durch die Mitgliederversammlung jährlich bestimmt. 
Das Mitgliedschaftsverhältnis hört auf, wenn das Mitglied aus der Fachgruppe austritt, wenn die 
Fachgruppe aufhört zu bestehen, oder wenn die Fachgruppe das Mitgliedschaftsverhältnis aufhebt; 
das kann dann geschehen, wenn das Mitglied der Fachgruppe absichtlich Schaden verursacht, oder 
wenn es seinen aus dem Mitgliedschaftsverhältnis stammenden Verpflichtungen aus vorwerfbaren 
Gründen dauernd nicht genügeleistet. 
Ähnlich den obigen Verfügungen wurde auch die Gründung der landwirtschaftlichen 
Fachgruppen innerhalb der Rahmen von sämtlichen zur Landwirtschaft gehörenden Genossenschaf-
ten und staatlicher Güter geregelt (Verordnung Nr.) (27/1981 (5. IX.) MT über die landwirtschaftli-
chen Fachgruppen. Die Verordnungen über die Fachgruppen sind am 1. Januar 1982 in Kraft 
getreten. 
3. GVONr. 15 v.J. 1981, sowie RVO. Nr. 28/1981 (9. IX.) MT (Durchführungsverordnung) über die 
wirtschaftlichen Arbeitsgemeinschaften. 
Im Zivilgesetzbuch wurden von der für die zivilrechtliche Gesellschaft maßgebende Regelung 
abweichende Normen zur Regelung der wirtschaftlichen Arbeitsgemeinschaften geschaffen. 
Privatpersonen können zur Verrichtung von Konsum- und sonstigen Dienstleistungen, zur 
kleinbetrieblichen Produktion und zur Leistung von Tätigkeiten, die die Tätigkeit der Wirtschaftsor-
ganisationen ergänzen, sowie zu deren Organisierung und Förderung wirtschaftliche Arbeitsgemein-
schaften gründen. Die Gründung geschieht durch Abschließung eines Gesellschaftsvertrags; die Zahl 
der beteiligten Personen ist mindestens zwei, höchstens dreißig. Die wirtschaftliche Arbeitsgemein-
schaft ist keine Rechtsperson. Zur Gültigkeit des Gesellschaftsvertrags bedarf es einer behördlichen 
Bestätigung. Die Bestätigung des Vertrags kann nur dann abgewiesen werden, wenn der an Vertrag 
der Rechtsvorschrift zuwiderläuft. Die behördlichen Befugnisse erster. Instanz werden von dem 
entsprechenden Fachverwaltungsorgan des Exekutivkomitees des nach dem Sitz der wirtschaftlichen 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft zuständigen Rates ausgeübt. Nach der Bestätigung des Gesellschaftsvertrags 
nimmt das Fachverwaltungsorgan die Arbeitsgemeinschaft in Evidenz; die Arbeitsgemeinschaft muß 
auch in das Firmenregister eingetragen werden (— bei der Eintragung müssen die für die 
Kompetenz eines staatlichen Wirtschaftsorgans zugewiesen wurde. An eine Qualifikation gebundene 
derartige Tätigkeit ausüben, die durch eine geltende Rechtsnorm nicht der ausschließlichen 
Kompetenz eines staatlichen Wirtschaftsorgans zugewiesen wurde. An eine Qualifikation gebundene 
Tätigkeit kann die Arbeitsgemeinschaft nur dann ausüben, wenn sich unter den Mitgliedern eine 
Person befindet, die den in den speziellen Rechtsnormen niedergelegten Qualifikationsbedingungen 
entspricht. Zur Führung der Geschäfte der Arbeitsgemeinschaft und zu ihrer Vertretung sind eine 
oder mehrere im Gesellschaftsvertrag bestimmte Personen berechtigt; diese Beauftragung kann durch 
die Mehrheit der Mitglieder entzogen weiden. Die Mitglieder sind verpflichtet an der Tätigkeit der 
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Arbeitsgemeinschaft persönlich teilzunehmen. Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft kann mithelfende Familien-
mitglieder, Angestellte, Heimarbeiter und Facharbeiterlehrlinge beschäftigen; Kleingewerbebetrei-
bende können, unter Beibehaltung des Mitgliedschaftsverhältnisses, auch als Handwerker tätig sein. 
Die Angestellten des Handwerkers zählen in die der Angestellten der Arbeitsgemeinschaft nicht mit 
hinein, aber der Gesamtstand kann 30 Personen nicht übersteigen. Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
wirtschaftet mit den aufgrund der Zustimmung der Mitglieder in gemeinsamen Eigentum stehenden 
Mitteln. Zur Verrichtung ihrer Aufgaben kann sie in staatlichem und genossenschaftlichen Eigentum 
befindliche Mittel mieten, pachten oder benützen darunter auch solche, deren Nutzung laut der 
Rechtsnormen für Privatpersonen nicht gestattet ist. Über die Tätigkeit der Arbeitsgemeinschaften 
wird die Kontrolle durch die Fachverwaltungsorgane der Räte geübt. Das Fachverwaltungsorgan 
kann die Arbeitsgemeinschaft auflösen, wenn diese die Rechtsnormen schwer, oder trotz Warnung, 
verletzt, oder wenn sie ihre Arbeit unfachmäßig verrichtet und darauf innerhalb eines Jahre 
wiederholt aufmerksam gemacht wurde. 
Die Wirtschaftsorganisationen und die Haushaltsorgane des Staates können die durch ihre 
Werktätigen und Pensionisten gegründeten Arbeitsgemeinschaften durch Überlassung von Mitteln. 
Sicherstellung von Räumlichkeiten und auch in anderer Weise unterstützen. Die wirtschaftliche 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Betriebes — die ausschließlich aus den Werktätigen und Pensionisten 
desselben Betriebes besteht — verwendet vor allem die Mittel des Betriebes, und für ihre Tätigkeit 
haftet der betreffende Betrieb. Für die Arbeitsgemeinschaften dieser Art sind die allgemeinen Normen 
betreffend die Arbeitsgemeinschaften anzuwenden. In diesem Fall bedarf es der behördlichen 
Bestätigung des Gesellschaftsvertrags die vorherige Zustimmung des Betriebsleiters; die Zustimmung 
kann an Bedingungen gebunden werden. Im Falle der Widerrufung der Zustimmung ist die 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft die durch das Fachverwaltungsorgan aufzulösen. Die wirtschaftliche Arbeitsge-
meinschaft des Betriebes kann mithelfende Familienmitglieder. Angestellte, Heimarbeiter und 
Facharbeiterlehrlinge nicht beschäftigen. Die Mitglieder der wirtschaftlichen Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
des Betriebes haften für die Verpflichtungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft bloß mit der ihrerseits erstellten 
Beitrag und mit ihrem in der Arbeitsgemeinschaft erzielten Einkommen; für die diese Rahmen 
übersteigenden Verpflichtungen haftet der Betrieb. Die Verordnung ist am 1. Januar 1982 in Kraft 
getreten. 
4. Verordnung des Ministerrates Nr. 29/1981 (14. IX.) über die Miete einzelner Gewerbe- und 
Dienstleistungseinheiten. 
Die Wirtschaftsorganisation kann solche kleinbetriebsartigen Gewerbe- oder Leistungseinhei-
ten, die vor allem die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung befriedigen, an Privatpersonen vermieten. Mieter 
können wirtschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaften oder Kleingewerbebetreibende sein (beziehungsweise 
solche Personen, die zwar über keine Gewebeberechtigung verfügen, deren Erteilung jedoch bean-
tragt wurde und die die dazu nötigen Bedingungen erfüllen. Die Miete kann sich neben den Räumlich-
keiten und dem Gebiet der Industrie- oder Dienstleitungseinheit auch auf die zur Inbetriebhaltung 
nötigen Grundmittel erstrecken. Die Wirtschaftsorganisation kann sich mit dem Mieter über die 
Sicherstellung sonstiger zur Verrichtung der Tätigkeit nötigen Bedingungen (z.B. systematische 
Materiallieferung, Übergabe von technischen Fachkenntnissen usw.) vereinbaren. Die Vermietung 
der Einheit geschieht durch öffentliche Ausschreibung, in Gegenwart eines öffentlichen Notars; 
darüber muß mindestens 30 Tage vorher in den zentralen oder Komitatsmedien eine Publikation 
veröffentlicht werden. Die Wirtschaftsorganisation schließt den Mietvertrag mit demjenigen ab, der 
die höchste Mietgebühr anbietet. Im Mietvertrag ist unter anderen die Mietgebühr (die später nicht 
verringert werden kann), sowie die Zeitspanne der Miete, die höchstens 5 Jahre ausmachen darf, 
festzulegen. Der Mieter dort die gemietete Einheit oder die Grundmittel nicht in Untermiete oder in 
Nutzung von dritten Personen geben. Der Mietvertrag kann von beiden Seiten gekündigt werden, 
wenn die andere Partei die im Vertrag für ihn vorgeschriebenen Verpflichtungen nicht erfüllt. Die 
Verordnung ist am 1. Januar 1982 in Kraft getreten. 
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5. Verordnung des Ministerrates Nr. 30/1981 (14. IX.) MT über die vertragliche Inbetriebhaltung 
einzelner Betriebsahteilungen und die gemeinsame Verordnung des Ministers für Finanzen und des 
Ministers für Arbeitswesen Nr 24/1981 (14. IX.) PM-MüM über deren Durchführung. 
Die Betriebe können ihre — Industrieproduktion, Konsum- und sonstige Dienstleistung, 
Produktionsmittelhandlung, sowie Abfallsammlung betreibenden — Abteilungen mit höchstens 15 
Werktätigen auch im Vertragssystem inbetriebhalten. Es können Abteilungen, deren Tätigkeit durch 
geltende Rechtsnormen ausschließlich staatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisationen zugewiesen wurde nicht 
vertraglich inbetriebgehalten werden. Der Betrieb schließt mit der sich zur vertraglichen Inbetriebhal-
tung bereit erklärenden Privatperson, entsprechend den Regeln des Zivilrechts, einen Vertrag. Die 
Zeitspanne des Vertrags kann höchstens 5 Jahre lang dauern. Der Betrieb ist verpflichtet den Vertrag 
mit derjenigen Person abzuschließen, von der an der vorangehend bekanntgegebenen öffentlichen 
Ausschreibung das günstige Angebot stammt. Vertrag kann nur mit demjenigen geschlossen werden, 
der mit dem Betrieb in Arbeitsverhältnis steht, über entsprechende Fachqualifikation verfügt und 
nicht unter in einer Sondernorm bestimmten Beschäftigungsverbot steht. Der Vertrag kann auch mit 
5, miteinander eine zivilrechtliche Gesellschaft gründenden Personen geschlossen werden. Der Leiter 
kann das Recht der Inbetriebhaltung der Abteilung keiner anderen Person übertragen. Der Leiter 
organisiert und lenkt im Namen des Betriebes, jedoch auf eigene Verantwortung und eigenes Risiko 
die Produktion, beziehungsweise die Dienstleistung. Der Betrieb übernimmt vertraglich die 
Bürgschaft für die durch die Abteilung im Bereich ihrer Tätigkeit verursachten Schäden. Die in der 
Abteilung beschäftigten Werktätigen stehen mit dem Betrieb in Arbeitsverhältnis; ihre Zahl und ihr 
Arbeitslohn ist im Vertrag festzulegen. Der Leiter verfügt über das aus der Tätigkeit der Abteilung 
stammenden Einkommen, nach Erfüllung der in den Rechtsnormen und dem Vertrag bestimmten 
Verpflichtungen, frei; er kann von dem Einkommen auch über den im Arbeitsvertrag festgesetzten 
Lohn hinaus den Werktätigen der Abteilung Zuteilungen zukommen lassen. Der Vertrag kann 
beiderseitig unter den in der Rechtsnorm festgelegten Bedingungen gekündigt werden. Bei der 
Beendigung des Vertrags sind die Parteien verpflichtet miteinander zu verrechnen. Der Betrieb ist 
verpflichtet die bestimmungsgemäß nutzbaren, beziehungsweise verwertbaren Vorräte rückzukaufen. 
Die Verordnung ist am 1. Januar 1982 in Kraft getreten. 
Gleichzeitig mit den oben bekanntgemachten Rechtsnormen wurde die Gesetzesverordnung 
Nr. 14 v. J. 1977 über das Kleingewerbe (GVO Nr 16 v. J. 1981), und genauso auch die Verordnung 
des Ministerrates Nr. 3/1980 (6. II.) MT über die Benützung von Kraftfahrzeugen durch 
Privatpersonen sinngemäß modifiziert, beziehungsweise ergänzt. (Verord. d. Ministerrates Nr. 
31/1981 (14.IX) MT). 
A. Halustyik 
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PESCHKA, V.: Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen* 
Es ist keine leichte Last die der auch für 
theoretische Fragen empfindliche Leser auf seine 
Schulter nimmt, als er, Vilmos Peschka folgend, 
jenen an gedanklichen Erlebnissen reichen Weg 
betritt, an dessen Ende er — wenn er sich, mit 
genügender Ausdauer von den auftauchenden 
Schwierigkeiten nicht abschrecken ließ —, als 
Lohn seiner Entschlossenheit, fühlen kann; er 
ist am Ende einer gar nicht gewöhnlichen Reise 
angelangt, die ihm zuteil gewordenen Erlebnisse 
verharren in seiner Erinnerung. 
Vom frühesten Anfang der juristischen Stu-
dien gab es für den Rechtsstudenten und später 
für den ausgebildeten Juristen keinen selbst-
verständlicheren Lehrsatz, als die sich auf die 
trichotomische Gliederung der Rechtsnorm be-
ziehende These; als unanfechtbare Tatsache ver-
ankerten sich im Gedächtnis die für die Hypo-
these — Disposition — Sanktion geltenden 
Begriffe und Anschauungen bezüglich der Be-
deutung derselben. Anschauungen deshalb, weil 
eine mit dem Anspruch der Theoriebildung 
ausgestattete, hinter die Elemente der Rechts-
norm blickende, die Kategorien der Rechts-
theorie und Philosophie auf abstraktem 
Niveau anwendende Monographie in der marxi-
stischen Rechtswissenschaft noch nicht veröf-
fentlicht wurde. Das „abgedroschene", bei der 
Begründung sämtlicher Rechtszweige behandel-
te Thema blickt aus einem völlig neuen Aspekt 
auf den Leser und regt ihn an die Dinge aus 
einem neuen Gesichtspunkt durchzudenken. Die 
Schrift setzt eine bestimmte marxistisch-
philosophische Grundbildung voraus; diese als 
Ausgangsbasis verwendeten Begriffe werden 
* Peschka Vilmos: A jogszabályok elmélete. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1979. 228 p. 
nicht erläutert. Um den Gedankengang des 
Werkes zu verstehen ist die einheitliche Deutung 
dieser Begriffe notwendig. Auch der Rezensent 
erachtet nicht als seine Aufgabe, den Inhalt der 
angewandten Kategorien darzulegen. 
Im ersten Kapitel, das den Titel Die Struktur 
der Rechtsnorm führt, werden jene Zusam-
menhänge exponiert, die zwischen dem inneren 
Aufbau, der teleologisch-normativen Struktur, 
beziehungsweise den den Gegenstand der recht-
lichen Regelung bildenden gesellschaftlichen 
Verhältnissen bestehen. Das entscheidende Mo-
ment des zur Entstehung der Rechtsnorm 
führenden gesellschaftlichen Vorgangs ist das 
Lockerwerden des Zusammenhanges zwischen 
Partikularität und Gattung. In den primitiven 
Gesellschaften finden wir eine feste Einheit 
derselben, erst mit der Entwicklung der Arbeits-
teilung, mit dem Erscheinen der Interessen des 
Individuums, der menschlichen Gruppen und 
später dann der Klassen kommt der Wider-
spruch zwischen Partikularität und Gattung zum 
Vorschein. Letztere herrscht nicht mehr bedin-
gungslos über den ersteren, sie unterdrückt nicht 
mehr die Verwirklichung derselben in unbeding-
ter Form. Die Auflösung dieses Widerspruches 
wird nunmehr zur Notwendigkeit, es entsteht 
der Anspruch zur ordnenden Einreihung dieser 
Widersprüche. Es entstehen gesellschaftliche 
Objektivationen, deren wichtigste Funktion 
eben die Bestimmung der Grenzen der Partikula-
rität ist. Die Aussteckung der Grenzen geht aber 
nicht nach beliebigen Gesichtspunkten vor sich, 
sondern das Klasseninteresse wird es sein, das 
den Trend und die Gesichtspunkte der Auflö-
sung der Widersprüche bestimmt. Der Gesetzge-
ber setzt durch die Rechtsnorm sein eigenes 
unmittelbares Ziel zum Ziel anderer Subjekte, 
und zwar jener Subjekte, die fähig sind dieselbe 
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zu verwirklichen. Der Gesetzgeber verwirklicht 
nur sein unmittelbares Ziel, die Schaffung der 
Rechtsnorm, die Realisierung derselben muß 
anderen überlassen werden. Er erfüllt seine 
Pflicht in der Regelung der gesellschaftlichen 
Verhältnisse, in deren Formung auf diese Art. 
Die sich aus der Untersuchung der teleolo-
gischen Zusammenhänge ergebende weitere 
Feststellung — daß diese ausnahmslos auf der 
Kausalität gründen — weist einerseits auf die 
Bedeutung der drei Dimensionen der Zeit in 
Bezug auf die Rechtsnorm hin, andererseits auf 
die Widerspiegelung des philosophischen Zu-
sammenhanges der Kausalität im Recht. 
Dazu, daß die Menschen die kausalen Zu-
sammenhänge erkennen, aufgrund derselben 
Ziele setzen, und dann zu diesen Zielen, ebenfalls 
aus den kausalen Zusammenhängen, die ent-
sprechenden Mittel wählen, ferner daß sie 
Rechtsnormen schaffen, ist es unerläßlich, daß 
sie über die Gegenwart hinaus in die Zukunft 
blicken, das aber nur in Kenntnis der Gegenwart 
und der Vergangenheit möglich ist. Das dritte 
Moment des finalen Verbindungssystems, die 
Realisierung des Ziels durch die gewählten 
Mittel, ist ein Vorgang, die bereits rein kausal ist. 
Die Rechtsnorm „plant" die kausalen Zusam-
menhänge, und zwar dadurch, daß sie das Motiv, 
d. h. das bestimmte, die erwünschten Resultate 
erwirkende menschliche Verhalten zum Ziel 
setzt. Die Rechtsnorm kann ihre Funktion, die 
Regelung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, 
nur dann erfüllen, wenn sie den zwischen dem 
menschlichen Verhalten als Ursache und dem 
herauszuformenden gesellschaftlichen Verhält-
nis als Wirkung bestehenden Zusammenhang 
teleologisch derweise formt daß sie das die 
Gestaltung des gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisses 
in eine bestimmte Richtung lenkendes mensch-
liches Verhalten für die Subjekte des gegebenen 
gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisses zum Ziel setzt. 
Es geht hier eine interressante Metamorphose 
vor sich: das im kausalen Zusammenhang als 
Ursache erscheinendes menschliches Verhalten 
wird zum Ziel, und als dessen Ursache tritt nun 
die Rechtsnorm auf. Das bringt dann eigenartige 
kausale Reihen in Bewegung, da das darin 
bestimmtes menschliches Verhalten und die sich 
dazu gesellende Rechtsfolge ein eigenartiges 
normatives Verhältnis darstellt, das gleichfalls 
über kausale Zusammenhänge in kausale Rela-
tionen zerfällt und sich in diesen realisiert. 
Es wäre theoretisch äußerst lehrreich und in 
der Praxis — besonders für die im Zuge der 
Verwirklichung der Rechtsnorm auftauchenden 
Erscheinungen — erläuternd die Frage gründlich 
zu untersuchen, wie sich die in der Philosophie 
kennengelernten verschiedenen, „Gesichter" der 
kausalen Zusammenhänge (notwendige und 
zufällige, kausal gesetzmäßige und statistisch 
gesetzmäßige Beziehungen) in den Rechtsnor-
men widerspiegeln, oder welche Abweichungen 
eventuell wahrzunehmen sind. Ist überhaupt eine 
weitere, auch auf das Recht übertragbare 
Erschließung des philosophisch durchaus nicht 
homogenen Mittels der Kausalität von 
Bedeutung? 
Eines der interessantesten, spannendsten 
Fragenkomplexe des ersten Kapitels — soviel 
Subjektivität darf doch einer Rezension viel-
leicht zugesprochen werden — ist der die meisten 
Gedanken und Gegengedanken anregende 
Punkt IV. Die Rechtsnorm ist eine eigenartige 
Widerspiegelung der objektiven Wahrheit, in ihr, 
in den speziellen Elementen und in der Struktur 
der Rechtsnorm drücken sich die für ihre ge-
sellschaftliche Funktion, für die Regelung der 
gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse wichtigen Mo-
mente verdichtet und homogenisiert aus. Die 
unmittelbar zum Vorschein kommenden Kate-
gorien, strukturellen Elemente der Rechtsnorm 
verbergen derart ihre echte innere Struktur, das 
nämlich, was die Rechtsnorm als Widerspiege-
lungsform von anderen Widerspiegelungsfor-
men unterscheidet. Indem das Werk in den 
weiteren die unmittelbar zum Vorschein kom-
menden Begriffe und Elemente der Rechtsnorm 
untersucht, läßt es — entsprechend der obigen 
Erkenntnis — die in ihr versteckt anwesenden 
echten strukturellen Zusammenhänge aufblin-
ken. Bevor der Verfasser daran gehen würde, die 
mit den Kategorien der Rechtsnormen zusam-
menhängenden konkreten Forschungsresultate 
bekanntzugeben, exponiert er eine allgemeine, 
mit der Rechtsnorm als Widerspiegelung auf-
tauchende Frage: können sich die Kategorien 
des logisch Wahren und des logisch Falschen auf 
die Rechtsnorm beziehen? Es ist schon deshalb 
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wichtig, sich mit dem Wahrheitswert der Norm 
zu befassen, die Bedeutung dieser Frage zu 
erkennen, da es rechtstheoretische Konzeptio-
nen gibt, deren Argument-Arsenale geeignet sind 
mit ihrer Hilfe harte ideologische Kämpfe auszu-
tragen, und die den Standpunkt vertreten, daß 
wenn die Rechtsnorm keinen Wahrheitswert hat, 
dann kann es auch nicht die Widerspiegelung der 
objektiven Wahrheit sein. Kelsen, der die An-
wendbarkeit der Widerspiegelungstheorie des 
dialektischen Materialismus auf die Rechtsnorm 
in Zweifel zieht und so den Widerspiegelungs-
charakter der Rechtsnormen in Abrede stellt, 
bringt als Argument vor, daß die Rechtsnorm, 
da sie keine Aussage kein logisches Urteil über das 
gegebene Objekt der Erkenntnis ist, weder wahr, 
noch falsch sein kann. Die Rechtsnorm wird 
nicht durch ihren Wahrheitswert, sondern durch 
ihre Geltung charakterisiert. Peschka, die Her-
ausforderung der in Kampfreihe gestellten 
Argumente akzeptierend, beschreitet systema-
tisch, Punkt für Punkt den logischen Weg 
Kelsen's und legt den Standpunkt der marxisti-
schen Rechtstheorie äußerst überzeugend dar. 
Die erste Frage, ob nämlich die Rechtsnorm 
als logisches Urteil, als erkenntnistheoretische 
Kategorie aufgefaßt weiden kann, antwortet er 
mit einem kategorischen Nein, ist doch deren 
gesellschaftliche Bestimmung durchaus nicht die 
Erkenntnis der Wahrheit, sondern ganz im 
Gegenteil, ein Befehl dafür, was sein soll. Daraus 
folgt, daß es völlig unrichtig ist im Bezug auf die 
rechtliche Norm die Frage des logisch Wahren 
und des logisch Falschen aufzuwerfen. Den 
Standpunkt des Verfassers zusammenfassend: 
das Recht hat in erkenntnistheoretischem Sinne 
keinen Wahrheitswert. Gleichzeitig aber muß 
festgestellt werden, daß das logisch Wahre und 
das logisch Falsche — in einem anderen Zusam-
menhang zwar — in Bezug auf die Rechtsnorm 
eine Rolle spielt. Daß die Rechtsnorm ihre 
gesellschaftliche Aufgabe erfüllen kann, dazu 
bedarf es der Kenntnis jener objektiven 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten, die in den gesellschaftlichen 
Verhältnissen zur Geltung kommen. Anderer-
seits kommt in der Rechtsnorm der Willen der 
jeweiligen herrschenden Klasse als Staatswillen 
zum Ausdruck, dazu ist es aber notwendig, das 
im Zuge der Erkenntnis klar wird, was der 
allgemeine Wille der herrschenden Klasse im 
gegebenen Fall ist. All das weist aber eben darauf 
hin, daß die menschliche Erkenntnis bei der 
Entstehung der Rechtsnorm eine wichtige Rolle 
spielt. Unter Betonung dieses Umstandes warnt 
der Verfasser vor unrichtigen Folgerungen, die 
Erkenntnis und Kenntnis der effektiven mensch-
lichen Situationen mit der Rechtsnorm identifi-
zieren. Die Erkenntnis ist ein unentbehrliches 
Moment des die Rechtsnorm gestaltenden Wi-
derspiegelungsvorgangs, erschöpft aber nicht 
das Wesen der Rechtsnorm. Aus dieser Argu-
mentation wird es selbstverständlich, daß die 
Regeln der Logik für die Rechtsnorm nur partiell 
und beschränkt Geltung haben. Letzten Endes 
ist also die Anschneidung der Frage des logisch 
Wahren und des logisch Falschen im Z u s a m m e n -
hang mit der Rechtsnorm nur insofern richtig, 
als sich die Frage auf die in der Rechtsnorm als 
Moment figurierende Erkenntnis, beziehungs-
weise auf die in diesen Kreis gehörenden Feststel-
lungen richtet. Die Geltung der Rechtsnorm 
kann einen Bruch erleiden, wenn sie mit der 
objektiven gesellschaftlichen Wahrheit nicht in 
Einklang steht und das kann eine Folge dessen 
sein, daß die Rechtsnorm auf falschen erkennt-
nistheoretischen Feststellungen gründet, aber 
umgekehrt, die Auflösung der Harmonie der 
Rechtsnorm mit der gesellschaftlichen Wahrheit 
kann nicht auf die im Zuge der Erkenntnis 
auftauchenden Fehler zurückgeführt werden. 
Gewisse Theorien ziehen davon unbegründet die 
Folgerung, daß die Rechtsnorm keine Wider-
spiegelung der wirtschaftlich-gesellschaftlichen 
Verhältnisse ist. Im theoretischen Hintergrund 
dieser Anschauungen steckt jene falsche Voraus-
setzung, die die Widerspiegelungstheorie — 
unrichtigerweise — auf die Erkenntnistheorie 
reduziert. Aus den vorgebrachten Einwendun-
gen folgt aber nicht, daß die Rechtsnorm ein mit 
dem logisch Wahren und dem logisch Falschen 
paralleles Kriterium, eine parallele Geltung hat. 
Denn, während die Wahrheit einer logischen 
Auslage tatsächlich davon abhängt, ob sie der 
objektiven Wahrheit entspricht, kann daß von 
der Geltung einer Rechtsnorm nicht ohne jede 
Bedingung behauptet werden. Eine Rechtsnorm 
kann lange Zeit hindurch in Geltung sein trotz 
dessen, daß sie die wirklichen wirtschaftlich-
gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse versteckt 
ausdrückt. Aber auch für das Gegenteil dessen 
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gab es schon Beispiele, wo nämlich eine die 
gesellschaftliche Wahrheit adäquat widerspie-
gelnde Rechtsnorm nicht gültig gewesen ist. 
In letzter Instanz ist die Geltung der Rechts-
normen geschichtlich davon abhängig, ob sie 
die objektive gesellschaftliche Wahrheit richtig 
widerspiegelt, aber die Geltung der Rechtsnorm 
hängt nicht allein von der adäquaten Form der 
Widerspiegelung ab. es ist nicht das einzige 
Kriterium. 
Jede Rechtsnorm — weil sie die Verbindung 
der Autorität, des Subjekts und des Objekts 
ausdrückt —, muß über drei Elemente verfügen: 
Hypothese, Disposition und Rechtsfolge (Sank-
tion). Der Verfasser nimmt den Kampf mit 
denen auf, die in Abrede stellen wollen, daß die 
Hypothese notwendigerweise ein Element der 
Rechtsnorm ist. Die reale Grundlage dieser 
Auffassungen besteht darin, daß in zahlreichen 
Fällen das Element der Hypothese nur schwer 
oder überhaupt nicht ausfindig gemacht werden 
kann, wenn konkrete, gültige Rechtsnormen 
analysiert werden. Das ist aber nur Schein: 
einerseits kann es sein, daß die Hypothese der 
Rechtsnorm nicht in der konkreten Rechtsnorm, 
zusammen mit der Disposition und Sanktion 
aufscheint, andererseits gibt es zahlreiche 
Rechtsnormen, die die Hypothese gar nicht 
ausdrücken. 
Mit dem Dispositionselement der Rechts-
norm, mit ihrer verbietenden oder gebietenden 
Gattung ist sie fähig eine identische Rechtsfolge 
auszulösen. Aus diesem Gesichtspunkt besteht 
der Llnteschied in der Art der Auslösung. 
Abhängig davon, ob sich die verbietende oder die 
gebietende Disposition realisiert, wird auch der 
Charakter der Rechtsfolge unterschiedlich sein. 
Bei der Verletzung einer verbietenden Disposi-
tion ist die Sanktion wegen der Nichtrealisierung 
des Verbotes, bei der gebietenden Disposition 
infolge der Nichtrealisierung der Disposition 
negativ. Die gemeinsame Eigenheit der beiden 
Typen ist, daß bei beiden die Nichtrealisierung 
eine Sanktion nach sich zieht. Zahlreiche in 
verschiedene Rechtszweige gehörende konkrete 
Rechtsnorm-Beispiele und deren Analysen über-
zeugten uns davon, daß hier gar nicht der 
verbietende oder gebietende Charakter der 
Rechtsnorm das wichtige ist, sondern daß in der 
Rechtsnorm die Rechtsfolge von der Realisie-
rung oder Nichtrealisierung der Dispositionen 
abhängig ist. 
Im dritten Element der Rechtsnorm, in der 
Rechtsfolge erblickt der Verfasser die Grundlage 
des „Sollen" Charakters der Rechtsnorm. Ohne 
die gesellschaftliche Realität der Rechtsfolge 
drückt das in der Disposition umgeschriebene 
menschliche Verhalten des Sollen nur sprachlich, 
nicht aber in seiner gesellschaftlichrechtlichen 
Realität aus. Gemäß der traditionellen und mehr 
oder minder allgemeinen Rechtsnormlehre wird 
die regelnde Rolle der Rechtsnorm dadurch 
erfüllt, daß die Rechtsnorm an das Verbleiben 
des in der Disposition vorgeschriebenen Verhal-
tens, beziehungsweise an das damit in Gegensatz 
stehende Verhalten eine nachteilige Folge, eine 
Sanktion knüpft. Die neueren Auffassungen 
sehen aber klar, daß an die Disposition auch 
Vorteile in Aussicht stellende Rechtsfolgen 
geknüpft werden können. Die Nichtanerken-
nung dieses Umstandes könnte den „Sollen"-
Charakter eines großen Teils der Rechtsnormen 
zweifelhaft machen. Der Verfasser ist auch mit 
den Rechtsnormlehrekonzeptionen nicht einver-
standen, die behaupten, daß es Rechtsnormen 
gibt, die keine Sanktionen haben, beziehungs-
weise viele Rechtsnormen werden durch eine 
andere Rechtsnorm mit Sanktion ausgestattet. 
Deshalb hält er die über keine Rechtsfolge 
verfügenden sanktionierten, und die sogenann-
ten sanktionierenden Normen, als unselbstän-
dige Rechtsnormen, überhaupt nicht für Rechts-
normen. 
Das zweite Kapitel des Werkes behandelt die 
strittigen Fragen und Unklarheiten im Zusam-
menhang mit dem Gegenstand und Wertinhalt der 
Rechtsnorm. Die verschiedensten objektiven 
Vorgänge des alltäglichen Lebens und der Bewe-
gung der Gesellschaft werden durch die drei 
Elemente der Rechtsnorm auf verschiedenen 
Abstraktionsebenen und Kategorien ausge-
drückt. Der Verfasser ist als Ergebnis der 
Synthese von Rechtsnormuntersuchungen der 
Meinung, daß die Hypothese und die Disposi-
tion am häufigsten auf der Ebene des Besonderen 
erscheint, einmal der Individualität, das andere 
mal der Allgemeinheit Platz lassend. Es herrschte 
im Zusammenhang mit der Rechtsfolge Unsi-
cherheit bei der Entscheidung dessen, ob hier 
überhaupt von der Erfassung der Objektivität 
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Rede sein kann. Peschka hält es nicht bloß für 
möglich, sondern auch für reell; der Schlüssel der 
Lösung ist die Erkenntnis, daß hier die Sanktion 
von einer speziellen normativen Inversion ge-
brauch macht: sie dreht einzelne objektiven 
Momente der Wahrheit quasi ins Negative. 
Darin drückt sich die Objektivität der Norm 
meistens in der Sphäre des Allgemeinen und des 
Besondern aus. Der Gegensatz zwischen dem 
konkreten auf Lösung harrenden individuellen 
Rechtsfall und der Rechtsnorm als komplexe 
Allgemeinheit wird durch die vermittelnde mitt-
lere Sphäre, durch die Eigenart des objektiven 
Inhalts der Rechtsnorm aufgelöst. Die Eigenart 
des objektiven Inhalts der Rechtsnorm wird aber 
auch durch das Typische repräsentiert. Dieses 
Typische wird durch zwei Eigenheiten vertreten: 
einerseits durch die begriffliche Definiertheit des 
objektiven Inhalts der Rechtsnorm, andererseits 
durch ihre auf diese Weise gewährte vermitteln-
de Funktion. 
Ein anderes, eine geistige Erregung auslösen-
des Kapitel des Werkes wird durch eine unwider-
legbare Tatsachenfeststellung eingeleitet: alle 
drei Elemente der Rechtsnorm sind Resultate der 
Wertung, daher ist der Inhalt der Rechtsnorm 
Wertinhalt, die Rechtsnorm ist Wertträger. Der 
Umstand aber, daß die Rechtsnorm eine Wer-
tung ausdrückt, bedeutet nicht gleichzeitig, daß 
ihr Inhalt einen Wert verkörpert. Dieses Schein-
dilemma behebt aber der Verfasser, als er die 
ontologische Herkunft des Wertcharakters des 
Rechtsnormeninhalts erfaßt: das ist die prakti-
sche Summierung des gesellschaftlichen Seins, in 
der der Wert ein wichtiges Moment representiert. 
Die Entwicklungsrichtung des gesellschaftlichen 
Seins liegt in der immer vollständigeren Realisie-
rung des menschlich Wesentlichen. Das bildet 
für den Verfasser die Waage, auf welche die in 
der unmittelbaren Praxis des gesellschaftlichen 
Seins erscheinenden individuellen subjektiven 
Wertpräferenzen gelegt und gewogen werden 
und wenn sie der Entfaltung des die objektive 
Entwicklungstendenz der gesellschaftlichen Ge-
samtbewegung zusammenfassenden menschlich 
Wesentlichen entgegenwirken, dann sind sie 
leicht und repräsentieren keinen Wert, im gegen-
gesetzten Fall aber, wenn sie diesen ständig in 
Bewegung befindlichen Vorgang fördern, dann 
stellen sie Wert dar. Die Zunge der Waage, der 
Wertmaßstab ist einerseits die gesellschaftlich-
politische Zielsetzung (die gezielte Gestaltung 
der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse), andererseits 
aber die immanente rechtliche Kohärenz und 
Konsequenz des Rechtssystems. Der Wertinhalt 
der Rechtsnorm ist plural und relativ, ihren Wert 
bestimmen freilich tendenziös die Interessen der 
herrschenden Klasse. Der echte Wert des Inhalts 
der Rechtsnorm wird immer durch die Konkret-
heit, durch ihren in der Totalität der gesellschaft-
lichen Verhältnisse eingenommenen Platz be-
stimmt. Wenn also der Inhalt der Rechtsnorm 
den Interessen der herrschenden Klasse ent-
spricht, sagt das noch gar nichts über den Wert 
dieses Inhalts. Das Interesse der herrschenden 
Klasse und die dieses ausdrückende Rechtsnorm 
kann einen Wert oder eben keinen Wert haben, 
abhängig davon, ob sie mit der Gattungsent-
wicklung des Menschen in Einklang steht, oder 
sich derselben widersetzt. (Peschka ist übrigens 
der Meinung, daß der Wert oder der Unwert des 
Inhalts einer Rechtsnorm auch ansonsten bloß 
nachträglich, post festum festgestellt werden 
kann.) Die vielfältigen Zusammenhänge des 
Wertinhalts der Rechtsnorm werden eindeutig 
klar, wenn wir die abstrakten und konkreten 
Rechtsnormen überblicken. Trotzdem, daß ihre 
Existenz und ihr Verhältnis unter die Fragen der 
Ethik gehören, haben sie auch die Rechtstheorie 
„in Mitleidenschaft gezogen." 
Das Hauptproblem bildet jene Feststellung 
— einstweilen dubiösen Inhalts — daß unter den 
moralischen Normen und Rechtsnormen solche 
gibt, die vom Zeitalter unabhängig sind. Diese 
drücken die „allgemeinen gattungsmäßigen" 
Anforderungen aus, sie tragen „universale Gat-
tungswerte". Die erste Frage, die beantwortet 
werden muß, ist, ob wir hinsichtlich der Rechts-
normen überhaupt von abstrakten und konkre-
ten Normen sprechen können. Die erste Treppe 
der richtigen Annäherung ist es einzusehen, daß 
die Rechtsnormen immer konkret, in einer 
bestimmten geschichtlichgesellschaftlichen 
Totalität erscheinen; gleichzeitig kann aber 
innerhalb einer gegebenen gesellschaftlichen 
Formation bloß eine Art von (konkret-ge-
schichtlichen) Rechtssystem bestehen. Dadurch 
wird es klar, daß eine Abstraktion, die von dieser 
konkreten Geschichtlichkeit und Gesellschaft-
lichkeit des Inhalts abweicht, die Rechtsnorm 
8* Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 24. 1982 
400 Recensiones 
ihres effektiven gesellschaftlichen Sinnes be-
raubt. Und wenn wir, von der Grundlage ausge-
gangen, daß abstrakte Normen existieren, die 
Frage beantworten wollten, welche Objektiva-
tionsformen sie haben, d. h. wo sie erscheinen, 
wird unser Standpunkt noch unhaltbarer. 
Zusammengefaßt, die Verbindung zwischen den 
— (angeblichen) — konkreten und abstrakten 
Normen des Rechts ist ein irreführender Aus-
druck des Zusammenhanges der Rechtsnormen 
und der Rechtsideologie. 
Die zweite — hier aktuelle — Frage ist die 
Qualifizierung des Wertcharakters der abstrak-
ten Rechtsnormen. Die zu widerlegende These 
klingt folgendermaßen: als wertvolle Rechtsnor-
men qualifizieren die abstrakten Rechtsnormen, 
weil diese in den Trend des gattungsmäßig 
Wesentlichen fallen. In dem Gedankengang 
spukt „das Naturrecht mit wechselndem Inhalt", 
das eine beliebige Rechtsnorm nur dann für 
wertvoll hält, wenn darin irgend ein Moment der 
abstrakten Rechtsnormen enthalten ist. Die 
Antithese — gleichzeitig der problematische 
Punkt dieser Auffassung — ist, daß zwischen den 
abstrakten Rechtsnormen und der Gestaltung 
des gattungsmäßig Wesentlichen keine unmittel-
bare Verbindung vorausgesetzt werden kann. 
Die Synthese zeigt genau, daß da die abstrakten 
Rechtsnormen — auch ihrem Inhalt nach — in 
den verschiedensten konkreten gesellschaftlich-
rechtlichen Inhalten erscheinen können, die 
abstrakten Momente werden nur durch den 
konkreten gesellschaftlich-geschichtlichen In-
halt wertvoll, in welchem sie erscheinen. 
Kapitel drei tritt anhand der Geltung der 
Rechtsnorm denen entgegen, die die teologisch-
normative Struktur, den Inhalt und die Geltung 
der Rechtsnorm als synonyme Begriffe auffassen. 
Der objektive Inhalt und der Wertinhalt der 
Rechtsnorm baut sich eigenartig, in normativ-
teleologischer Weise auf, im Grunde auf der 
Ebene und in der Kategorie des Besonderen. Die 
teleologisch-normative Struktur der Rechts-
norm bewegt sich in der durch die Allgemeinheit 
gebotenen Richtung, für die ganze Struktur ist 
die Allgemeinheit bezeichnend. Jener Wider-
spruch, zwischen der Besonderheit des Inhalts 
der Rechtsnorm einerseits, und der Allgemein-
heit der Struktur der Rechtsnorm andererseits 
besteht, wirft auch ein Licht auf die Wichtigkeit 
der Geltung der Rechtsnorm ein. Licht die 
entscheidende Kategorie der Rechtsnorm ist die 
Allgemeinheit, das sie in ihrer Geltung dekla-
riert. Diese Allgemeinheit der Geltung der 
Rechtsnorm wird durch die Allgemeinheit des 
staatlichen Zwangs unterstützt; ihre Geltung ist 
allgemein, weil die Rechtsnorm mit ihren regeln-
den Verordnungen für die ganze Gesellschaft 
gilt. Es versteht sich von selbst, daß der Verfasser 
den rechtlichen Befehl, der durch die Konkret-
heit, Individualität und Unvermitteltheit charak-
terisiert ist, nicht als sog. individuelle Rechts-
norm akzeptiert, da, wenn diese in die über 
Allgemeinheit, Abstraktion, Transmission und 
Vermitteltheit verfügende Kategorie der Rechts-
norm eingebaut würden, wir wiederholt einer 
Abstraktion begegnen würden, die unsinnig 
wäre. Die Geltung der Rechtsnorm ist die 
eigenartige Seinsart der Rechtsnorm, darf durch-
aus nicht abstrakt sein, darf keinen abstrakten 
Inhalt haben. 
Das Problem der Verwirklichung der Rechts-
norm als Problem der Voraussetzung ihrer Gel-
tung berührt zahlreiche auch in der Praxis 
bestehenden Situationen. Nach der Ausgangs-
these des Verfassers ist die Geltung der Rechts-
norm wirksam und die gültige Rechtsnorm setzt 
sich durch. Die Geltung und die Wirksamkeit der 
Rechtsnorm sind also keine synonymen Begriffe, 
obzwar die Verwirklichung der Rechtsnorm 
ohne Zweifel auch deren Geltung beeinflußt. Es 
ist denkbar, daß die Rechtsnorm nicht geltend 
wird, obwohl ihre Geltung noch nicht aufge-
hört hat: Grund der Unwirksamkeit mag sein, 
daß es noch keine Situation gab, die in der 
Hypothese beschrieben wurde, es ist aber nicht 
ausgeschlossen, daß eine solche Situation noch 
entstehen kann. Es ist klar, daß wenn das 
Rechtssystem in seiner Gesamtheit dauernd 
nicht zur Geltung kommt, es gleichbedeutend 
ist mit dem Aufhören der gesellschaftlichen 
Basis desselben, damit nämlich, daß die herr-
schende Klasse ihre Macht eingebüßt hatte, oh-
ne dieser ist aber auch die Geltung des Rechts-
systems unvorstellbar. 
Neben diesem extremen Fall kann es vor-
kommen, daß die Rechtsnorm in spezieller Weise 
nicht wirksam wird: dann handelt es sich um die 
gewohnheitsrechtliche Derogation der Rechts-
norm. 
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Von den im Schlußteil des Werkes berührten 
Fragen will ich diesmal jene hervorheben, die die 
ontologische Widersprüchigkeit der Rechtsnor-
men mit rückwirkender Kraft behandelten, vor 
allem wegen deren ständige Aktualität und 
schneidenden Schärfe. Das in Rechtsnorm mit 
rückwirkender Kraft abgefaßte Verhalten 
konnte für das Rechtssubjekt in der Vergangen-
heit keine Alternative der rechtmäßigen Hand-
lung bedeuten. In Einklang mit dem ignorantia 
iuris-Prinzip muß die Möglichkeit des Kennen-
lernens der Rechtsnorm allgemein gegeben sein, 
und die juristische Präsumption dieser Möglich-
keit kann nicht gestürzt werden (Interessant sind 
die über die Problematik des Rechtsquellencha-
rakters der sogenannten inneren Weisungen 
Geschriebenen). Abhängig davon, ob die igno-
rantia iuris als Fiktion (die Rechtsnorm ist für 
die Adressierten bekannt), oder als unstürzbare 
Präsumption (die Rechtsnorm kann durch die 
Gesellschaft allgemein kennengelernt werden) 
interprätiert wird, werden sich in der 
Zulässigkeit der Rückwirkenden Geltung der 
Rechtsnorm verschiedene Resultate ergeben. 
M. Lehoczky 
HERCZEGH, G.: Évolution du droit international 
humanitaire et ses problèmes actuels* 
On connaît des conventions depuis assez 
longtemps pour l'amélioration du sort des mili-
taires blessés dans les armées en campagne — et 
d'après certaines données entre la fin du XVIe 
siècle et le début du XIXe environ 300 conven-
tions de ce caractère furent conclues1 néanmoins 
l'assistance à l'ennemi en détresse ne devint un 
mouvement international qu'à la deuxième moi-
tié du XIXe siècle, à la suite de l'intervention 
d'Henry Dunant. L'action qu'il avait lancée a 
pris depuis une ampleur notable et pour le milieu 
de XXe siècle s'est créé un domaine spécifique du 
droit international, appelé droit international 
humanitaire. 
C'est cette matière juridique que Géza Her-
czegh a choisi comme sujet de son livre et ce qui 
donne une actualité particulière à l'ouvrage, c'est 
que tout recemment les règles du droit internatio-
nal humanitaire ont été complété. L'auteur, — 
excellent connaisseur des problèmes du droit 
international humanitaire, ayant participé per-
sonnellement, en tant que membre de la 
* A humanitárius nemzetközi jog fejlődése és 
mai problémái. Budapest, 1981. 348 p. (Évolution 
du droit international humanitaire et ses problèmes 
actuels. Editions d'Économie Politique et de Droit.) 
1
 Cf.: F. de Martens: Traité de Droit Interna-
tional. Paris, 1887. Tome III. pp. 240. 
délégation hongroise, à la conférence diploma-
tique sur le droit humanitaire de 1974-1977 — est 
parmi les premiers dans la littérature de droit 
international socialiste à esquisser une image 
d'ensemble des questions d'actualité du droit 
international humanitaire. 
Le premier chapitre du livre traite la forma-
tion des règles de droit international relatives à la 
protection des victimes de la guerre. L'ouvrage 
cite nombreux exemples pris d'époques reculées, 
lesquels illustrent qu'au cours des siècles passés, 
parallèlement à la production de nouveaux 
moyens de destruction, se développaient des 
normes juridiques qui essayent de limiter 
l'emploi de ceux-ci. 
Le chapitre suivant traite l'histoire du droit 
international au service de la protection des 
victimes de la guerre, laquelle — comme il est 
connu — commence par la conclusion de la 
première convention de Genève de l'année 1864 
pour l'amélioration du sort des militaires blessés 
dans les armées en campagne. A propos de 
l'apparition du droit international humanitaire, 
à la deuxième moitié du siècle dernier, la question 
se pose: d'où vient le contenu des normes 
impliquées dans les articles de la convention de 
Genève. En cherchant l'explication l'auteur 
rejette les diverses réponses empruntées de droit 
naturel et montre l'importance du processus de 
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l'évolution sociale qui a élevé la valeur humaine 
et l'estime de l'homme producteur. Dans le cadre 
de ce chapitre l'ouvrage énumère les documents 
les plus importants du droit international huma-
nitaire, notamment la convention de 1864 sur 
« l'amélioration du sort des militaires blessés des 
armées en guerre», la convention de Genève de 
1906, la convention de Genève de 1929 sur les 
prisonniers de guerre, ainsi que les quatre 
conventions de Genève de 1949. L'auteur laisse 
de côté l'exposé en détail des diverses disposi-
tions des documents dans leur majorité assez 
volumineux, et s'attache plutôt à dessiner la ligne 
directrice de la progression de manière qu'à 
propos des divers traités il faut ressortir 
séparément les dispositions caractéristiques, les-
quelles se réfèrent à l'apparition de change 
nouvelle institution du droit humanitaire. Il 
caractérise l'évolution du droit humanitaire en 
faisant remarquer que «. . . . la protection 
concernant au début seulement les soldats blessés 
et malades des forces armées de terre s'étendait 
successivement aux blessés, malades et naufragés 
de la guerre maritime, puis aux prisonniers de 
guerre, et finalement — même si c'est dans 
diverses mesures — à la population civile, 
respectivement aux divers groupes de celle-ci, 
touchés par les conflits armés. » (p. 77.) 
Le chapitre suivant s'occupe de la notion du 
droit international humanitaire et de la place de 
celui-ci dans le système du droit international 
public. A propos du cercle des règles du droit 
international humanitaire et de sa place occupée 
dans le système du droit international, la position 
de la littérature n'est nullement unanime, il y a 
bien d'opinions selon lesquelles cette matière 
juridique est à interprêter largement, en y 
comprenant l'ensemble des règles de droit inter-
national qui sont au service du respect et de 
l'épanouissement de la personnalité humaine. 
C'est-à — dire, cette matière juridique implique-
rait le droit de la belligérance (ius in bello), les 
droits de l'homme et même selon certains, aussi 
les règles dites du« ius contra bellum ». Le «ius in 
bello » — d'après cette conception — se divise en 
deux parties: l'une est le droit de la guerre 
proprement dit, le droit de La Haye, lequel fixe 
les droits et les obligations des parties 
belligérantes concernant les opérations de 
guerre; l'autre partie est le droit international 
humanitaire dans le sens plus strict du mot, c'est 
le droit de Genève que s'occupe de la protection 
des militaires devenus blessés et malades et des 
personnes civiles. Géza Herczegh n'accepte 
l'appellation de droit international humanitaire 
que dans le cas des règles du droit dit de Genève, 
car c'est seulement cet ensemble de règles « . . . . 
qui mérite et porte à juste titre en même temps les 
qualificatifs «humanitaire» et international». 
Nous soulignous : il s'agit de droit international 
humanitaire, c'est-a-dire d'une partie des règles de 
droit international qui ont des mobiles humani-
taires et servent la protection de la personne 
humaine, et non pas d'un droit humanitaire 
international, ce qui supposerait un système 
juridique humanitaire non précisé, lequel aurait 
des règles de caractère international, à côté 
d'autres règles de caractère non international.» 
(page 81.). L'auteur démontre que malgré leurs 
mobiles humanitaires, les droits de l'homme dans 
leur ensemble ne peuvent pas être classés sous la 
notion du droit international humanitaire. C'est 
que la mise en œuvre de la protection internatio-
nale des droits de l'homme ne se fait pas «à 
l'échelle internationale», étant donné que la 
garantie de ces droits se fait finalement par la voie 
du droit intérieur des Etats ; par contre dans le 
cas du droit de Genève, il s'agit de la protection 
internationale directe des personnes appartenant 
à l'orbite de ce droit. 
En analysant le rapport entre les droits dits de 
La Haye et de Genève l'ouvrage insiste sur un 
autre problème théorique particulièrement 
intéressant. Comme il est connu, le droit de La 
Haye dans son essence signifie celui de la 
belligérance, il contient les règles juridiques à 
appliquer en cas de guerre et tout le matériel 
juridique est caractérisé par la conception selon 
laquelle la guerre est le moyen reconnu de 
trancher les litiges internationaux. Par contre, le 
droit de Genève ne réglemente pas la guerre, mais 
se charge de la protection des personnes en 
danger et pour cette raison le droit de Genève est 
entièrement en accord avec le nouveau droit 
international qui interdit le recours à la guerre et 
à la violence. A propos du rapport des deux 
matières de droit — en l'espèce de celui des droits 
de La Haye et de Genève — l'auteur prend la 
position que dans les circonstantes actuelles leur 
distinction traditionnelle perdait sa signification, 
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puisque le droit de La Haye — comme c'est 
montré par l'évolution qui se profile depuis 1907 
— cède progressivement sa place au droit de 
Genève. 
Quant au caractère du droit international 
humanitaire, Géza Herczegh déduit sa position y 
relative en partant de la notion des normes de 
droit international coercitives. Il expose que la 
Charte de l'ONU, certaines decisions de la Cour 
Internationale de Justice et le projet de la 
Commission de Droit International sur la res-
ponsabilité de droit international des Etats, 
présentent les droits fondamentaux de la person-
nalité humaine comme ceux dont le respect est un 
objectif commun des Etats formant la commu-
nauté internationale. En revanche, le droit 
international humanitaire défend les droits fon-
damentaux de la personne humaine, en temps de 
conflits armés. D'après le livre c'est de là que 
découle la tendance à octroyer à ces normes un 
caractère impératif, et les principes fondamentaux 
du droit international humanitaire sont des règles 
de droit international de caractère coercitif. 
« Même si l'on ne peut pas affirmer sans réserve 
et sans explication complémentaire que le droit 
international humanitaire, dans son ensemble, 
ait un caractère contraignant, ses principes de 
base l'ont certainement dès aujourd'hui, et les 
dispositions stipulant les droits des personnes 
protégées — les minima de ceux-ci — ne sont en 
aucun cas dispositives, mais ce sont des règles 
limitant la liberté des Etats de conclure des traités 
et dans ce sens doivent donc être considérées 
comme coercitives. Quant aux tendances 
d'évolution futures, elles feraient probablement 
partie du cercle des règles impératives du droit 
international qui demandent à être appliquées 
inconditionnellement. » (p. 112.) 
Le troisième chapitre de la monographie 
s'occupe de la nécessité de compléter les conven-
tions de Genève et des efforts qui y tendent. 
L'auteur ramène les causes qui rendent 
nécessaire le complètement des conventions de 
Genève à trois facteurs principaux qui sont les 
suivants : 
a) Le caractère spécifique des conflits armés 
d'après 1949, notamment le fait que dans leur 
majorité ces conflits firent partie du processus de 
désintégration du système colonial. 
b) Les opérations de guerrilla étaient 
fréquentes au cours des conflits armés, or le droit 
international ne contient pas de règles qui 
assureraient la protection les personnes qui y 
participent. 
c) « L'érosion » des règles relatives aux 
conflits armés. Le droit de La Haye contenant les 
règles de la belligérance n'a pas progressé pour 
l'essentiel depuis le tournant du siècle, et ainsi, à 
la suite du développement de la technique de 
guerre, il y a des lacunes dans la réglementation 
de droit international. 
Après avoir fait connaître les initiatives 
tendant à confirmer et à développer le droit 
international humanitaire et les \travaux 
préparatoires des deux Protocoles de 1977, 
l'ouvrage passe à la conférence diplomatique de 
Genève de 1974—1977 et aux principaux 
résultats de celle-ci. Pour les nouveaux Etats, au 
fond cette conférence «était une grande école 
pour connaître le droit de Genève et pour ce 
dernier, une nouvelle étape de son évolution, où 
il devint, avec le concours des Etats d'Afrique et 
d'Asie, cette fois-ci effectivement l'expression de 
l'idée humanitaire du monde entier. » (pp. 171— 
172). 
L'auteur fait connaître brièvement le contenu 
des deux Protocoles rédigés à la conférence 
diplomatique et qualifie de particulièrement 
important le passage du Protocole I. de 1977 qui 
étend l'effet des dispositions de l'acte, aux conflits 
armés dirigés contre l'oppression coloniale, 
l'occupation étrangère et les régimes racistes. 
Le cinquième chapitre de l'ouvrage analyse 
un des problèmes le plus actuel et le plus 
important du droit humanitaire, à savoir la 
protection de la population civile face aux 
dangers provenant des hostilités. Cette protec-
tion peut être obtenue, avant tout, par la voie de 
la confirmation du principe de la distinction 
entre biens civils et objectifs militaires, de la 
population civile des combattants, étant donné 
que « l'érosion » des règles de la belligérance met 
en péril précisément ce principe. Cependant la 
question se pose si avec la guerre et la technique 
militaire actuelles au fond, peut-on maintenir les 
distinctions mentionnées. Selon le point de vue 
majoritaire — et c'est ce que reflète le Protocole I. 
— il est toujours nécessaire de faire cette 
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distinction, laquelle se heurte néanmoins à des 
grandes difficultés pratiques. Le Protocole I. de 
1977. réaffirme sans doute le principle de la 
distinction, mais les définitions y attachées sont 
loin d'être irréprochables et l'auteur, de sa part, 
considère comme problématique la définition des 
objectifs militaires, en utilisant la notion des dits 
avantages militaires. 
La question du principe de la dite 
« proportionnalité » se lie étroitement à la règle 
de la distinction. Pour l'essentiel le principe de la 
proportionnalité se réfère à ce qu'il faut mettre 
toujours en rapport les pertes et dommages 
causés éventuellement dans la population civile 
et les biens de caractère civil, avec les avantages 
militaires directs et essentiels attendus et qu'il est 
interdit de causer de trop grands pertes et 
dommages disproportionnés. Géza Herczegh 
analyse en détail le problème de la proportionna-
lité et selon lui ce principe, — lequel ne s'était pas 
avéré un moyen adéquat ni au sujet de la 
légitimité du déclenchement d'une guerre, ni lors 
de l'application des représailles, — selon toute 
probabilité ne répondrait pas à l'attente non plus 
au cours de la mise en pratique des dispositions 
visant à la protection de la population civile. En 
reconnaissant que de toute évidence on ne pourra 
jamais éliminer entièrement les pertes civiles et 
les dommages causés dans les biens civils, des 
conflits armés, il désapprouve que leur mesure 
admissible dépende de la grandeur de l'avantage 
militaire attendu. D'après lui ce sont les disposi-
tions dites de précaution qui auraient été les plus 
propres à limiter les pertes et dommages civils 
éventuellement causés « . . . . lesquelles — 
comme toutes les dispositions des Protocoles 
doivent être appliquées avec bonne foi par les 
parties opposées et dans leur ensemble 
représentent des garanties qui paraissent sensi-
blement plus rassurantes que la formulation citée 
et plusieurs fois contestée de la règle de la 
proportionnalité. » (p. 222) L'insertion du princi-
pe de la proportionnalité dans le Protocole est 
comparée par l'ouvrage à une porte qui peut 
s'ouvrm très large en cas de conflits armés, 
pouvant justifier par la grandeur de l'avantage 
militaire direct et concret attendu les pertes et 
dommages intervenus au milieu de la population 
civile et de ses biens. 
L'auteur voit la plus grande nouveauté du 
Protocole I. de 1977. en ce que celui-ci a 
considérablement élargi le cercle des biens 
protégés, surtout quant aux conditions 
matérielles de la vie digne à l'homme. 
Le chapitre suivant examine le protection de 
droit international des guerrillas ou partisans qui 
a été une des parties les plus problématiques au 
cours de l'élaboration du Protocole I. 
L'ouvrage fait d'abord connaître les proposi-
tions soumises à la conférence diplomatique de 
Genève relatives à la protection des partisans. 
L'auteur démontre qu'au fond une des questions 
centrales de toute la problématique est la recon-
naissance du statut de combattant des partisans. 
C'est-à-dire que ces derniers aient également le 
statut de pouvoir commettre des actes de guerre 
sans qu'ils soient mis en cause ou punis, seule-
ment dans le cas où ils enfreignent au cours des 
actes de guerre les règles du droit de la 
belligérance. 
La conférence diplomatique de Genève a 
admis une large définition de la notion de 
combattant, selon laquelle les partisans, les 
guerrilleros, respectivement les résistants armés y 
sont inclus. Géza Herczegh souligne que cette 
définition a changé aussi le problème juridique 
effectif: c'est qu'alors ce n'est pas Y obtention du 
statut de combattant qu'il fallait régler, mais la 
question: quand se produit la perte de statut de 
combattant. Le livre parle en détail de 
l'établissement de la solution de compromis 
relative à l'article sur les partisans, ainsi que de 
l'approbation et de l'interprétation de l'article. 
L'auteur estime que les dispositions concernant 
les partisans ne sont pas impeccables de point de 
vue juridique, mais il reconnaît en même temps 
l'importance de ce que l'article 43 supprime dans 
le fond toute distinction entre forces régulières et 
irrégulières et de ce fait les guerrillas bénéficient 
de la même protection que les membres des forces 
armées traditionnelles. Les dispositions relatives 
aux guerrillas représentent un développement 
progressif du droit international humanitaire et 
servent les intérêts des peuples combattant pour 
leur droit de disposer d'eux-mêmes, contre 
l'oppression étrangère et les régimes racistes. 
Le septième chapitre de la monographie 
traite le Protocole II. qui s'occupe de la protec-
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tion des victimes des conflits armés de caractère 
non-international. C'est l'article 3.commun des 
conventions de Gençve de 1949 qui avait disposé 
au sujet de cette question, cependant le Protocole 
II. a élargi le contenu de l'article dans une mesure 
notable. L'auteur attire l'attention sur le fait 
qu'en jugeant le Protocole IL, il importe à quoi 
nous comparons ce document: aux dispositions 
du Protocole I. ou bien à l'article 3 commun des 
conventions de Genève. C'est que si nous compa-
rons le Protocole II. aux passages mentionnés en 
premier, il s'avère que le progrès est notable aussi 
dans ce domaine. 
Le dernier chapitre de l'ouvrage analyse les 
rapports entre les représailles, c'est-à-dire les 
mesures de répression et le droit international 
humanitaire. Le livre pose la question si dans la 
phase actuelle de l'évolution du droit internatio-
nal humanitaire les représailles militaires ont-
elles encore leur place. La réponse de Géza 
Herczegh à la question se repose sur les réalités 
de la vie internationale, lorsqu'il écrit qu'à 
l'heure actuelle il serait encore difficile d'éliminer 
les représailles du droit des conflits armés et 
d'interdire absolument leur application. Pour 
l'essentiel c'est le même rapprochement qui est 
reflété par la solution qui ne contient pas de règle 
générale relative à l'interdiction des représailles, 
mais dispose en même temps, à part, de 
l'interdiction d'emploi de mesures répressives 
contre les personnes et les biens protégés. 
Le livre présentant l'évolution du droit 
international humanitaire et les problèmes ac-
tuels de celui-ci est une œuvre de grande valeur 
de la littérature hongroise de droit international 
qui porte non seulement la marque de la connais-
sance supérieure de l'éminent spécialiste, mais 
aussi celle de l'intention sincère du savant et sa 
conviction profondément humaniste, de pro-
mouvoir par cet ouvrage les buts pour lesquels 
Henry Dunant et ses compagnons s'étaient 
entrés en lice au siècle dernier. 
V. Lamm 
PRUGBERGER, T.: Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarungen 
in den Genossenschaften* 
Der Verfasser hat den Zweck seines Werkes 
in den letzten Sätzen des Buches in solcher Weise 
zusammengefaßt, daß er die genossenschaftli-
chen Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarungen aus der 
Peripherie des Rechtslebens herausnehmen und 
in zentralere Gebiete der Aufmerksamkeit stellen 
wollte. Wir sind der Meinung, daß er diesen 
Zweck in vollem Maße erreicht und keine 
überflüssige Arbeit geleistet hat. Sein Werk ist 
vom Standpunkt des Rechts der landwirstchaft-
lichen Produktionsgenossenschaften, des Zivil-
rechts und des Arbeitsrechts beachtenswert. 
Nachstehend möchten wir zunächst einige ar-
beitsrechtlichen Aspekte des Werkes hervorhe-
ben, darüber hinaus werden wir aber eine kurze 
Übersicht des ganzen.Buches geben. 
* Tagsági megállapodások a szövetkezetekben. 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1979. 
438 p. 
Das Buch besteht aus vier Teilen. Der erste 
Teil beschäftigt sich mit den allgemeinen Fragen 
der Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarungen, undzwar in 
zwei Kapiteln. Das erste Kapitel berichtet über 
die Entfaltung, den Begriff und der Systembezo-
genheit der genossenschaftlichen Mitglied-
schaftsvereinbarung, während das zweite Kapi-
tel die Lage der Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarung im 
System des Genossenschaftsrecht erhebt. Der 
Verfasser berührt hier schon zahlreiche, vom 
Standpunkt des Arbeitsrechts aus Interesse be-
anspruchende Fragen. Er geht davon aus, daß 
die persönliche Mitwirkung der Mitglieder in 
Erreichung der wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaft-
lichen Ziele der Genossenschaft bei den Produk-
tionsgenossenschaften sich in erster Reihe in der 
Arbeit der Mitglieder offenbart (p. 65). Das 
Mittel der Konkretisierung der Arbeit der Mit-
glieder ist die Arbeitsvereinbarung, in welcher 
innerhalb durch die Genossenschaftsrechtsnor-
men und innere Vorschrifte bestimmten Rahmen 
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das Verhältnis der Genossenschaft und des 
Mitglieds, die Arbeitsverrichtungsbeziehungen 
im gegenseitigen Einverständnis geregelt werden. 
Darin verpflichtet sich das Mitglied, für die 
Genossenschaft oder im Interesse der Genossen-
schaft gegen Arbeitsentgeld gewisse Arbeit zu 
verrichten, gewisse, durch Arbeit erreichbare 
Ergebnisse zu verwirklichen oder gewissen Ar-
beitsbereich zu bekleiden (p. 71). Die Lösungen 
ergebnispflichtigen Charakters, die sich von der, 
im Arbeitsverhältnis verrichteten Arbeit am 
meisten unterscheiden, sind bei ungebundener 
Arbeitsorganisation vorkommenden Arbeitsver-
richtung zu finden, mit welcher sich der Verfasser 
im weiteren besonders beschäftigt (p. 211 et seq.). 
Bei den aus dem Vertragscharakter der 
Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarung herrührenden 
Eigentümlichkeiten regt der Verfasser die Frage 
des relativ zwingenden Charakters an. Seine 
Ausführungen beziehen sich offensichtlich auch 
auf die Arbeitsvereinbarungen. Der relativ zwin-
gende Charakter bedeutet, seiner Meinung nach, 
daß die Vertragsabschlußfreiheit der Parteien 
gebunden ist und sich nur auf den, durch die 
Rechtsregel zugelassenen Gebiet oder auf solche 
Fragen erstreckt, welche nicht durch Rechtsnor-
men verbindlich geregelt sind (p. 96). Aus dem 
Text der Rechtsregel geht aber nicht immer 
eindeutig hervor, welche Regelungen verbindli-
chen (zwingenden) und welche nachgiebigen 
(dispositiven) Charakter haben. Das ist manch-
mal das Ergebnis der Formulierungs-
unzulänglichkeiten. Deshalb herrscht auch sol-
che Auffassung, daß wo die Rechtsregel die 
Verfügungsfreiheit der Parteien ausdrücklich 
nicht ausschließt, oder umgekehrt, diese 
ausdrücklich nicht zuläßt, die Abweichung von 
der Rechtsregel auch in diesem Falle möglich ist, 
dies aber einen Nachteil für Arbeitnehmer nicht 
mit sich bringen darf, wenigstens nicht im 
Arbeitsrecht. Wir halten es dafür, daß auch bei 
den Mitgliedschaftlichen Arbeitsvereinbarungen 
keine andere Tendenz zur Geltung kommen 
kann. Dazu soll noch hinzugefügt werden, daß 
sich all dies nur auf die praeter legem Vereinba-
rungen bezieht, die contra legem Vereinbarungen 
auch in solchem Falle unzulässig sind: Übrigens 
zieht der Verfasser hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses 
des zwingenden Charakters und der 
Dispositivität, bezüglich der Genossenschaften, 
die allgemeine Schlußfolgerung, daß das positive 
Recht, ähnlich wie bei den, im Arbeitsverhältnis 
stehenden Arbeitnehmern, die berechtigten In-
teressen der Mitglieder gegen die, eine größere 
Wirtschaftsstärke vertretende Genossenschaft 
zu schützen beabsichtigt (p. 116). 
Die mitgliedschaftliche Arbeitsvereinbarung 
ist eingehend im zweiten Teil des Buches darge-
legt. Separate Kapitel erörtern die allgemeinen 
Fragen der Arbeitsvereinbarungen, die in 
großbetrieblichen Organisationsrahmen für kol-
lektive Arbeit abgeschlossenen Mitgliedschafts-
vereinbarungen, die die außerhalb der 
großbetrieblichen Arbeitsorganisation verricht-
bare Arbeit regelnden Vereinbarungen, die 
Mehrzwecksvereinbarungen gemischten Typs 
und die Sanktionssysteme der Mitgliedschafts-
vereinbarungen. 
In diesem Teil legt der Verfasser im Laufe der 
Erörterung der allgemeinen Fragen, den 
ursprünglichen Zweck des Abschlusses der Ar-
beitsvereinbarungen in den Genossenschaften 
plastisch dar (p. 120 et seq.). Er geht davon aus, 
daß früher der Vorstand der Genossenschaft 
einen bedeutenden Teil der Mitglieder den 
konkreten Ansprüchen entsprechend immer ei-
nem anderen Arbeitsbereich einteilen konnte. 
Die ständige Veränderung des Arbeitsbereiches 
durch diesen einseitigen Akt des Vorstandes war 
für die Mitglieder gemeinhin beschwerlich. Des-
halb wurde die Fixierung des stabilen Arbeitsbe-
reichs der Mitglieder erforderlich, die durch den 
Abschluß der Arbeitsvereinbarung möglich ist. 
Im Falle des Abschlusses einer Arbeitsvereinba-
rung hat nämlich die Genossenschaft kein Recht, 
den Mitglied, ohne seine Zustimmung, einseitig 
in eine andere Arbeit als in der Arbeitsvereinba-
rung enthalten ist, einzustellen. Diese Kon-
struktion nähert sich übrigens stark der im 
Arbeitsrecht zur Geltung kommende Vertrags-
konzeption an, obwohl sie nicht als damit 
identisch betrachtet werden kann, wie der Ver-
fasser es nachstehend beweist. Die Arbeitsverein-
barung berührt keineswegs dasjenige Recht des 
Vorstandes der Genossenschaft, daß er die 
Mitglieder vorübergehend zur Verrichtung an-
derer Arbeit verpflichten kann, wenn deren 
Notwendigkeit, besonders bei Spitzenbeanspru-
chung oder bei erhöhten Arbeitsanfall, vor-
kommt. In seinen Ausführungen nimmt der 
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Verfasser den Standpunkt ein, daß in der Verein-
barung auch die vorübergehend verrichtbaren 
Arbeite festgelegt werden sollten (p. 132). Wir 
sind der Meinung, daß mit Rücksicht auf die 
Vielfältigkeit der vorübergehend vorkommen-
den Arbeiten, diese Festlegung kaum möglich 
wäre und auch die arbeitsrechtliche Regelung 
nicht an solche Gebundenheiten denkt. Selbst die 
Kodifizierung vom Jahre 1979 des Arbeitsgesetz-
buches hat nur die. zeitlichen Grenzen der 
vorübergehende Einstellung in eine andere Ar-
beit festgelegt, wenn sie aussagt, daß die zum 
Arbeitsbereich nicht gehörige oder außerhalb 
dem ständigen Arbeitsort zu verrichtende Arbeit 
in einem Kalenderjahr nicht mehr als drei 
Monate ausmachen kann, mit der Ausnahme, 
wenn außerordentliche Umstände eine längere 
Zeit rechtfertigen oder solche im Kollektivver-
trag bzw. in der Arbeitsordnung vorgeschrieben 
ist. 
Nachstehend untersucht der Verfasser die 
subjektive Seite der Arbeitsvereinbarungen vom 
Standpunkt der Mitglieder und von dem der 
Genossenschaft. Er weist darauf hin, daß die 
Mitgliedsvereinbarungen sowohl individuell als 
auch in Gruppenform abgeschlossen werden 
können. Diese Möglichkeit besteht auch bei den 
mitgliedschaftlichen Arbeitsvereinbarungen. 
Diesbezüglich ist übrigens der Verfasser der 
Meinung, daß infolge der Modifizierung der 
Rechtsnormen über die Genossenschaften im 
Jahre 1977 die Gruppenarbeitsvereinbarung zur 
Kategorie der Vergangenheit wird, da ihre Rolle 
stufenweise von den, durch die Kollektive der 
Arbeitstätten gesetzten inneren Regelungen 
übernommen wird (p. 140). 
Im Kapitel über die zur Kollektivarbeit in 
großbetrieblichen Organisationsrahmen 
abzuschließenden Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarun-
gen kann hinsichtlich der Arbeitsvereinbarungen 
und der Arbeitsverträge, die Forschung ihrer 
gemeinsamen bzw. abweichenden Merkmale 
Interesse erwecken. Wir sind der Meinung, daß 
der Verfasser hier auf das Wesen der Dinge 
hinweist, wenn er betont, daß während der 
Arbeitsvertrag hinsichtlich des existentiellen 
Fortkommens ein grundsätzlich bedeutendes 
Rechtsverhältnis begründet, die Arbeitsverein-
barung ein schon begründetes Rechtsverhältnis 
solchen Charakters nur konkretisiert. Was nun 
die Gegeneinanderstellung der mitgliedschaftli-
chen Arbeitsvereinbarungen und den 
Arbeitsverträgen der bei den Genossenschaften 
angestellten Arbeitsnehmer betrifft, weist der 
Verfasser darauf hin, daß die Bestimmung der 
Arbeitsaufgaben bei beiden verträglichen 
Rechtsinstitutionen, sich aus der Gleichartigkeit 
der Arbeitsbereiche ergebend, beinahe gleich ist. 
Unterschiede zeigen sich im allgemeinen nur bei 
der Feststellung des Arbeitsentgeldes, infolge der 
Eigentümerstellung und folgenderweise der 
größeren Risikoübernahme des Mitglieds. 
Trotzdem sind auch bei der Feststellung des 
Arbeitsentgeldes Annäherungsbestrebungen 
von der Seite sowohl der Mitglieder als auch der 
Angestellten zu beobachten, demgemäß, wo die 
Bedingungen günstiger sind. Die Gründe diese 
Annäherungstendenz sind in manchen Bezie-
hungen eben auf die Bestimmungen der Rechts-
normen zurückzuführen. Das ist bei den Gewer-
begenossenschaften beinahe vollkommen, bei 
den landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften ist es 
auch fortgeschritten. Dessenungeachtet stehen 
die Dinge so, daß während die mit den An-
gestellten der Produktionsgenossenschaften ab-
geschlossenen Arbeitsverträge inhaltlich alle 
wesentliche Bedingungen enthalten, die mit 
den Mitgliedern abgeschlossenen Arbeitsver-
einbarungen meistens nur die mit der Ar-
beit enger verbundene Verhältnisse umfassen 
(p. 169). 
Vorangehend wurde es schon darauf hinge-
wiesen, daß die die Arbeitsverrichtung außerhalb 
der großbetrieblichen Arbeitsorganisation re-
gelnden Vereinbarungen auch Lösungen ergeb-
nispflichtigen Charakters enthalten. Damit 
beschäftigt sich der Verfasser eingehender in 
einem separaten Kapitel. Hier — wie er schreibt 
—dringen die „zivilrechtlichen" Lösungen infol-
ge der Einschaltung des unternehmerischen 
Elementes bis zu einem gewissen Grad ein. Seiner 
Meinung nach ergeben sich diese Unterschiede 
gegenüber dem „Arbeitsgesetzbuchmodell" aus 
dem genossenschaftlichen Charakter, aus der 
viel mehr elastischen Annäherung zum Bevölke-
rungsbedarf, in Vergleich, mit den staatlichen 
Unternehmen (pp. 211, 235). Beispiele können 
auch dazu gefunden werden, daß keine gesonder-
te Vereinbarungen bezüglich der innerhalb und 
der außerhalb der großbetrieblichen Arbeitsor-
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ganisationsrahmen verrichteten Arbeit abge-
schlossen werden, sondern die beiden in eine 
Arbeitsvereinbarung gefaßt sind (p. 236). 
In dem Kapitel über das Sanktionssystem der 
Mitgliedschaftlichen Arbeitsvereinbarungen be-
schäftigt sich der Verfasser gesondert mit den 
materiellen Sanktionen der Vereinbarungen 
bezüglich der, in großbetrieblichen Organisa-
tionsrahmen verrichteten Arbeit und der 
bezüglich der außerhalb des Organisationsver-
bandes des Großbetriebs verrichteten Arbeit 
abgeschlossenen Vereinbarungen, danach erör-
tert er die Frage der Disziplinarverantwortung 
im Zusammenhang mit der Vereinbarungsver-
letzung. Die absichtliche oder grob fahrlässige 
Verletzung der Verpflichtungen durch den Mit-
glied erschöpft nämlich den Tatbestand des im 
Genossenschaftskodex und in Zweigverordnun-
gen bestimmten genossenschaftlichen Diszipli-
narvergehens (p. 259). In diesem Abschnitt hat 
der Verfasser zum Schluß seine Aufmerksamkeit 
der Nichtigkeit der Arbeitsvereinbarungen ge-
widmet (p. 259). 
Im dritten Teil des Buches beschäftigt sich der 
Verfasser mit den von landwirtschaftlichen Pro-
duktionsgesellschaften individuellen Hauswirt-
schaftlichen Vereinbarungen und mit sonstigen 
mitgliedschaftlichen Vereinbarungen der Genos-
senschaften. Nach der Feststellung des Verfas-
sers wickelt sich die individuelle Hauswirtschaft-
liche Vereinbarung als eine Tätigkeit vom dare 
und facere Charakter ab. Die Grundform der 
persönlichen Mitwirkung ist zwar auch hier die 
Arbeitsverrichtung, welche aber nicht im Rah-
men der großbetrieblichen Arbeitsorganisation 
der Genossenschaft geschieht. Die Gefahr der 
Tätigkeit ist aber hier größtenteils von dem, die 
Arbeit verrichtenden Mitglied selbst, aufgrund 
des Prinzips „casus nocet domino", getragen, da 
die Tätigkeit bis zum Eintritt des Produkt- und 
Geldaustausch auf Grund des Eigentums, im 
Interessenkreis des Landwirts der individuellen 
Hauswirtschaft geschieht. Das zwischen dem 
Mitglied und der Genossenschaft auf diesem 
Gebiet entstehendes Rechtsverhältnis ist also 
nicht nur durch die Arbeitsbeziehung, sondern 
auch durch die Vermögensbeziehung gekenn-
zeichnet. Diese Beziehung hat also in doppelter 
Richtung gemischten Charakters. Darin offen-
bart sich aber der Vermögensinhalt in größerem 
Maße, als in jedem anderen Falle der Arbeitsver-
einbarungen (p. 298). 
Anschließend an die mit den Arbeits- und 
Organisationsverhältnissen im Zusammenhang 
stehenden Vereinbarungen sind auch interessant 
diejenigen Erörterungen des Verfassers, in wel-
chen er daraufhinweist, daß die, die Hauptkenn-
zeichen von kollektiver Struktur enthaltenen 
arbeitsrechtsähnlichen Arbeitsvereinbarungen 
durch die, die Hauptkennzeichen von autonomer 
Struktur enthaltenen vermögensrechtlichen Ele-
mente beeinflußt sind, während die 
ursprüngliche autonome Struktur der individuel-
len Hauswirtschaftlichen materiellen Vereinba-
rungen durch Institutionen von kollektiver 
Struktur zu eine solche Synthese geformt wer-
den, deren Wesen bei dem Mitgliedschaftsver-
hältnis und bei den Mitgliedschaftsvereinbarun-
gen weder arbeitsrechtlichen, noch zivilrecht-
lichen, sondern einen selbständigen genossen-
schaftsrechtlichen Charakter hat (pp. 379—380). 
Eine der wichtigsten Feststellungen seiner 
zusammenfassenden Feststellungen ist auch die 
oben erwähnte. Der Verfasser lenkt die Auf-
merksamkeit darauf, daß da die durch die 
Vereinbarungen konkretisierten Arbeits- und 
Vermögensverhältnisse der Mitgliedschaftsbe-
ziehung miteinander in Wechselwirkung stehen, 
keine scharfe Grenze zwischen den einzelnen 
Vereinbarungstypen gezogen werden kann. Die-
se Grenzen können sich sogar verschmelzen. 
Überdies tragen aber die Arbeitsvereinbarungen 
bezüglich der Arbeitsverrichtung inhaltlich die-
jenigen meist charakteristischen Züge der rechtli-
chen Regelung welche durch das Arbeitsrecht, 
im Falle der Mitgliedsvermögensvereinbarungen 
aber entsprechend der Regelung der 
Vermögensverhältnisse durch das Zivilrecht aus-
gestaltet sind. Die zwischen einiger Teilbefugnis-
sen des Mitgliedsverhältnisses und in dieser 
Weise zwischen einigen Vereinbarungstypen be-
stehenden nicht scharfen Grenzen oder sogar 
Überdeckungen ermöglichen die Erscheinung 
solcher Kombinationen, in welchen die Vermi-
schung dieser „arbeitsrechts-" sowie 
„zivilrechtsähnlicher". Elemente solches Neue 
schaffen, welches eine, schon vollkommen neuar-
tige, genossenschaftliche Form annehmend, er-
scheint (p. 403). 
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Schon die obige kurze Übersicht des Werkes 
beweist, daß der Verfasser bei der Bearbeitung 
eines verhältnismäßig engen und vernachlässig-
ten Gebiet des Rechts zu nützlichen und 
vorwärtsweisenden Feststellungen gelangen ist, 
undzwar in solcher Weise, daß er die induktive 
Methode gewählt hat, d. h. aus der Praxis 
ausgehend, die verallgemeinernden Schluß-
folgerungen zieht. Sein Fußnotenmaterial be-
weist, daß er eingehende Lokalstudien ge-
macht hat. In dem vorliegenden Falle hätte er 
anders nicht vorgehen können. Ergänzend hat er 
auch die Rechtsentwicklung anderer sozialisti-
schen Länder durchgeblickt, wodurch verglei-
chende Studien ermöglicht wurden. Das russische 
und deutsche Inhaltsverzeichnis kann auch die 
ausländischen Leser in den bearbeiteten The-
menkreisen zurechtweisen. 
L. Trócsányi 
HAMZA, G.: Die gewillkürte Vertretung* 
Trotz seines ziemlich jungen Alters ist der 
Verfasser ein sowohl in Ungarn als auch im 
Ausland bekannter Experte der Rechtswissen-
schaft, hauptsächlich der Rechte der antiken 
Welt, darunter des römischen Rechts. Über seine 
Tätigkeit geben seine zahlreichen bisher veröf-
fentlichten Studien Rechenschaft, daneben hat 
er an mehreren im Ausland veranstalteten wis-
senschaftlichen Kongressen teilgenommen. Ob 
an diesen Kongressen oder auf die Aufforderung 
ausländischer Universitäte in der Organisierung 
der dortigen Institute für römisches Recht gehal-
ten, seine Vorträge haben sich großen Beifalls 
erfreut. Nicht nur die Ergebnisse des wissen-
schaftlichen Lebens in Ungarn sind dadurch 
vermehrt worden, diese Vorträge haben auch zur 
Erweiterung unserer ausländischen Beziehungen 
auf dem Gebiet der Rechtswissenschaften beige-
tragen. 
In seinem neulich veröffentlichten Werk, aus 
dem einige Einzelheiten bereits als Aufsätze 
publiziert worden sind, bemüht sich der Verfas-
ser, die in den Rechtssystemen der verschiedenen 
geschichtlichen Perioden eingenommene Stelle 
der gewillkürten Vertretung zu beleuchten und 
bekanntzumachen. Wie es sogar aus dem Unter-
titel des Werks hervorgeht, beschäftigt sich der 
* Hamza, G.: Az ügyleti képviselet. Dogmati-
kai és elméleti vizsgálatok az antik jogoktól napjain-
kig. (Die gewillkürte Vertretung. Theoretische und 
dogmatische Untersuchungen von den antiken 
Rechten bis zu den modernen Rechten). Akadémiai 
Kiadó, Budapest, 1982. 243 p. 
Verfasser mit den dogmatischen und theoreti-
schen Forschungen bezüglich dieses Rechtsinsti-
tuts sowie mit deren Ergebnissen, um auf diese 
Weise die geschichtliche Entwicklung dieser 
Rechtseinrichtung von der antiken Welt bis zu 
unserem Zeitalter darzustellen. 
In erster Linie stützt sich das Werk auf das 
römische Recht. Der Verfasser schließt sich einer 
wissenschaftlichen Richtung an, die unter 
Berücksichtigung der Rechte der antiken Welt — 
vor allem des römischen Rechts — die Auf-
deckung eines zwischen den antiken Rechten und 
den modernen Rechtssystemen, den heutzutage 
geltenden Rechten bestehenden Zusammen-
hangs in der Entwicklung bezweckt. In diesem 
weitumfassenden Werk wird die geschichtliche 
Entwicklung der gewillkürten Vertretung durch 
verschiedene Rechtssysteme der Vergangenheit 
bis zu unseren Tagen verarbeitet. In dieser 
Hinsicht ist diese Arbeit sogar langentbehrt. 
Während der Verarbeitung stoß der Verfas-
ser auf mehrerer Schwierigkeiten. Eine der 
größten war — wie auch von ihm selbst erwähnt 
— die Tatsache, daß die sich auf die Vertretung 
beziehenden Regeln in keinem der antiken 
Rechtssysteme in einem separaten Abschnitt 
enthalten sind, d. h. es gibt keine das Rechtsre-
gelmaterial einheitlich und übersehbar angeben-
de „sedes materiae", die zur Bearbeitung des 
Themas benötigten Regeln sind aus dem Bereich 
des Personen-, Sachen-, Obligationen-, Erb-
sowie des Prozeßrechtes anzusammeln. Darüber 
hinaus ist neben den juristischen Quellen auch 
die Benutzung von nichtjuristischen Quellen 
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unvermeidlich. Während der Untersuchung und 
Auswertung der lateinischen Quellentexte waren 
ja auch die Ergebnisse der Interpolationenfor-
schungsmethode und über dies alles die grie-
chischsprachigen Papyrusfunde nicht außer 
acht zu lassen. 
Die Forschungsmethode des Verfassers be-
ruht auf der im allgemeinen akzeptierten An-
sicht, daß in der Welt des römischen Rechts die 
indirekte Vertretung zur Geltung kam, während 
die direkte Vertretung dem Reichsrecht unbe-
kannt war und allein bei dem Besitzerwerb 
vorkam. Die Meinung, wonach die direkte 
Vertretung bei den Römern irgendeinem Verbot 
zuwiderlief, wird aber in Abrede gestellt. Der 
Verfasser meint, es gab kein prinzipielles Verbot, 
die direkte Vertretung war jedoch wegen der 
Struktur der römischen Familie und des Rechts-
instituts des Sklavenhaltertums überflüssig. Die 
Entstehung der direkten Vertretung ist der 
Ansicht des Verfassers nach mit den gegebenen 
gesellschaftlich-wirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen 
verbunden. 
Abschnitt I des Buches (pp. 11—52) 
beschäftigt sich mit Fragen, die sich im Zusam-
menhang mit der gewillkürten Vertretung in den 
modernen Rechtssystemen ergeben haben. Es 
handelt sich um sich während der Entwicklung 
der gewillkürten Vertretung erhobene theoreti-
sche Fragen; die indirekte und die direkte 
Vertretung; die betreffenden positiven Rechtsre-
geln und die damit verbundene Rechtspraxis 
sowie alle Probleme, die sich einerseits aus dem 
inneren Verhältnis der betroffenen Parteien, 
andererseits aus dessen Zusammenhang mit der 
Vertretung ergeben; ferner um die Lösungen 
dieser Probleme. In diesem Rahmen werden die 
einzelnen europäischen Kontinentalrechte bzw. 
die anglo—amerikanischen Rechtssysteme un-
tersucht. Aufgrund der Durchsicht der theoreti-
schen und der positivrechtlichen Lösungsvarian-
ten ergeben die in den positiven Rechten gelten-
den Konstruktionen die Ausgangsbasis zur Ana-
lyse der geschichtlichen Entstehung der 
gewillkürten Vertretung und der Entwicklung, 
die das Rechtsinstitut der Vertretung in den 
Rechtssystemen der vergangenen Zeiten über-
standen hat. 
In Abschnitt II (pp. 53—118) untersucht der 
Verfasser auf Einzelheiten eingehend die Ent-
wicklung der gewillkürten Vertretung in den 
Rechtssystemen der antiken Orientalen 
Mittelmeerländer. Hierbei werden die Rechtsin-
stitute der Vertretung im altägyptischen, im 
babylonisch-assyrischen, im antiken griechi-
schen, im hellenistischen ägyptischen sowie im 
koptischen Recht einzeln in Augenschein ge-
nommen. In diesen Teilen seines Werks verarbei-
tet der Verfasser die Ergebnisse jener Forschun-
gen, die auf diesem Gebiet bisher geführt worden 
sind. Über die dafür benutzten Quellen berichtet 
der Verfasser in den Fußnoten, die sich für das 
Thema interessierenden Lesern auch als Infor-
mation für eventuelle weitere Forschungen die-
nen können. 
Wie umfangreich das in der Abhandlung 
bearbeitete Material auch ist, erschöpfend kön-
nen wir es nicht nennen. Über die in der 
Monographie behandelten Rechte hinaus sind 
auch das syrisch-persische, das armenische, das 
äthiopische, das jüdische sowie das muslimische 
Recht zu den Rechten der antiken Orientalen 
Mittelmeerländer zu zählen. Diese Rechte des 
antiken Orients waren nämlich laut des origina-
len Studienplans früher an der neben der juristi-
schen Fakultät der Universität zu Rom orga-
nisierten „Scuola di perfezionamento di diritto 
romano e di diritti orientali mediterranei" vorge-
tragen. Bezüglich all dies steht ein reiches 
literarisches und Quellenmaterial zur Verfügung. 
Es genügt auf folgende Beispiele hinzuweisen: in 
Bezug auf Äthiopien die Sammlung bekannt als 
Fetha Nagasti, die in der ersten Hälfte unseres 
Jahrhunderts noch tatsächlich angewandt wur-
de; bezüglich des jüdischen Rechts die nach der 
Thora entstandenen Mischna, Gemara und der 
Talmud, der eine Zusammenfassung (Kodifika-
tion) des jüdischen Rechts war sowie die 
Tätigkeit der Rabbinerschulen; was die Moslems 
betrifft, der Koran und da» sich danach ent-
wickelte Rechtssystem, worüber auch eine ausge-
dehnte Literatur verfügbar ist. Diese Quellen 
durchstudieren ist selbst dann zweckmäßig, 
wenn wir daraus zur Beleuchtung der Entwick-
lung des Vertretungsrechts vielleicht keine be-
sondere Lehre ziehen können. 
Auf diese Quellen konnte der Verfasser — 
sicherlich wegen des ohnehin großen Umfangs 
des bearbeiteten Materials — nicht eingehen, er 
mußte sich mit jenen Rechtssystemen des antiken 
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Orients begnügen, über die er in seiner Monogra-
phie Rechenschaft gibt. Es waren nämlich diese, 
die in den engsten Kontakt mit der römischen 
Welt kamen, die die bedeutendste Rolle in der 
Entwicklung der Rechte der modernen Welt — 
und darunter des Rechtsinstituts der Vertretung 
— spielte. 
In dem das ägyptische Recht erörternden Teil 
des Buches (pp. 65—74) wird die Ansicht des 
Verfassers zum Ausdruck gebracht, wonach im 
Zeitalter des späten Reiches durch den Vorstoß 
des Geschäftswillens der Grund der Konstruk-
tion der direkten Vertretung geschafft war. Diese 
Feststellung des Verfassers scheint das Ergebnis 
einer zu umständlichen Folgerung zu sein. 
In dem sich mit dem babylonisch-assyrischen 
Recht befassenden Teil des Werks (pp. 74—81) 
stellt der Verfasser fest, daß die neubabyloni-
schen gesellschaftlich-wirtschaftlichen Verhält-
nisse die Entwicklung der direkten gewillkürten 
Vertretung günstig beeinflußten. Die Entwick-
lung war doch nicht möglich, da die Sklaven — 
trotz der Steigerung ihrer finanziellen 
Selbständigkeit — in einer Abhängigkeitsbe-
ziehung blieben. Ihre Aufgabe war demzufolge 
im wesentlichen lediglich Nachrichtenübermitt-
lung. Unter gewaltfreien Personen kam dagegen 
das Surrogationsprinzip zur Geltung, wodurch 
sogar die indirekte Vertretung überflüssig wurde. 
Der Verfasser beschäftigt sich verhältnismäßig 
eingehend mit der Bedeutung des Prinzips der 
notwendigen Entgeltlichkeit sowie des Prinzips 
der Zweckverfügung im Zusammenhang mit der 
gewillkürten Vertretung, jedoch ohne Angabe 
einer kurzen, leicht verstehbaren Definition der 
beiden Prinzipien. 
In dem das antike griechische Recht behan-
delnden Teil der Arbeit (pp. 86—106) bemüht 
sich der Verfasser die zunehmende Bedeutung 
des Willens aufgrund mehrerer Papyri darzustel-
len. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die Aufmerk-
samkeit auf die Rolle der „systasis" gerichtet, die 
ein Mittel der Konstruktion der Bevollmäch-
tigung und dadurch sogar ein Mittel der Ver-
wirklichung der Vertretung sein mochte. Das 
fehlende Definieren des Begriffs „systasis" kann 
auch hier zu Schwierigkeiten führen. Die Nicht-
anerkennung der Bedeutung des Willens muß 
übrigens auch in dem antiken griechischen Recht 
die Entstehung der indirekten Vertretung zur 
Folge haben. 
In dem Teil über das Recht des hellenisti-
schen Ägyptens (pp. 107—112) legt der Verfasser 
dar, daß die in dem modernen Sinne genommene 
gewillkürte Vertretung in diesem Recht unbe-
kannt war und sich auf diesem Gebiet kein 
wesentlicher Fortschritt in der Entwicklung 
zeigte. In dem das koptische Recht erörternden 
Teil (pp. 113—118) stellt der Verfasser — 
aufgrund der Analyse der einschlägigen Papy-
rusfunde — fest, daß da nur die Geltung der 
indirekten Vertretung nachgewiesen werden 
kann und die Geltung der direkten Vertretung 
nicht möglich war. 
Ein besonders wertvoller Teil des Werkes ist 
zweifelsohne Abschnitt III. Auf seine eigenen 
Forschungen gründend befaßt sich hier der 
Autor mit der Entwicklung der Vertretung in 
dem römischen Recht (pp. 119—179). Auf dem 
Gebiet des Rechtserwerbs durch den Vertreter 
und der schuldbefreienden Leistung kam auch in 
dem römischen Recht die Konstruktion der 
indirekten Vertretung zur Geltung. Die Rechts-
folgen der indirekten Vertretung waren aber in 
anderen Bereichen auch nicht grundsätzlich 
ausgeschlossen, sondern eher zwecks Wahrung 
der Interessen der Dritten (D. 14.1.1.18 — Ul-
pian). Die sog. adjektizischen Klagen: die „actio 
quod iussu", die „actio exercitoria", die „actio 
institoria" sowie der Zusammenhang in der 
Entwicklung der beiden letzteren werden hier 
eingehend untersucht. Der Verfasser stellt fest, 
daß die Möglichkeit der Verpflichtung durch 
Personen freier Rechtsstellung zuerst vom „exer-
citor" und dann — wegen handelspolitischer 
Interessen — vom „institor" anerkannt wurde. 
Was die „praepositio" betrifft, deren Grund 
ergab das Über- bzw. Unterordnungsverhältnis 
zwischen dem Unternehmer und dem „praeposi-
tus". Die Tatsache, daß der in der „praepositio" 
zum Ausdruck kommende Wille allgemeiner Art 
konkreter wurde, d. h. die in den einzelnen 
Geschäftsabschlüssen gespielte Rolle dieses Wil-
lens erschuf der Ansicht des Verfassers nach die 
Möglichkeit der Vertretung im Geschäftsab-
schlußwillen (Siehe vor allem pp. 142—157). 
Nach alledem kommt der Verfasser zur 
Behandlung der „procuratio", deren erste Form 
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seiner Meinung nach die „negotiorum gestio" 
(D. 17.1 SO.pr. — Celsus, D.27.3.3., D.34.3.8.6. — 
Pomponius) war, deren Stelle im 2. Jahrhundert 
das „mandatum" einnahm (D. 17.1.41. — Julian, 
D.15.3.17.pr., D.21.1.51.1., D.17.1.34.pr. — 
Africanus). Das „mandatum", das auch 
Ermächtigung bedeutete, stand der „praeposi-
tio" nahe, es drückte das Verhältnis zwischen 
den Parteien freier Rechtsstellung aus, entsprach 
aber auch in der Beziehung von in Über- bzw. 
Unterordnungsverhältnis stehenden Parteien 
seinem Zweck (D.17.1.6.6. — Julian-Ulpian). 
Die im Laufe des 2. Jahrhunderts erfolgte 
Annäherung der sozialen Stellung des „procura-
tor" und des „institor" ermöglichte die Er-
streckung der „actio institoria" auf den „procu-
rator" (actio quasi institoria), was aber der 
Akzeptierung der Konstruktion der direkten 
gewillkürten Vertretung nicht gleich war. 
Als Abschluß dieses Abschnittes wird die 
Beziehung der Rechte der antiken Welt zu den 
modernen Rechtssystemen in Bezug auf die 
gewillkürte Vertretung mit der Darstellung der 
römischen Entwicklung dieses Rechtsinstituts 
veranschaulicht. Auf diese Weise wird der ge-
schichtliche Zusammenhang der antiken 
gewillkürten Vertretung mit dem entsprechen-
den modernen Rechtsinstitut nachgewiesen (Sie-
he pp. 158—179). 
Im Abschnitt IV des Buches geht es um die 
Erscheinung der gewillkürten Vertretung in den 
Rechtsquellen des romanisierten Ägyptens. Das 
Thema wird aufgrund mehrerer, aus diesem 
Zeitalter stammenden Papyri (P. Amh. 90, P. 
Oxy. 501,261,94, 505, P. S. I. 1035, BGU 300, P. 
Mert. 18) analysiert. Auch in diesen kommt die 
„systasis" vor, was der Ansicht des Verfassers 
nach nicht als eine Bevollmächtigung im moder-
nen Sinne zu betrachten ist, da diese lediglich 
eine Empfehlung ist. Die Anerkennung der 
direkten gewillkürten Vertretung hätte trotzdem 
dadurch gesichert werden können, auch wenn es 
nichf dazu kam. Im wesentlichen dienen die 
Auseinandersetzungen im Abschnitt IV zur 
Ergänzung des sich auf die Entwicklung der 
Vertretung bei den Römern beziehenden Ab-
schnitts III und treffen daran. 
Über den in der inhaltlichen Besprechung 
Vorgebrachten hinaus ist noch folgendes zu 
erwähnen: 
Der Feststellung des Verfassers, nämlich daß 
Riccobono hinsichtlich der direkten gewill-
kürten Vertretung zu den Folgern von Savigny 
zu zählen sei (p. 120), müssen wir hinzufügen, 
daß Riccobono die Anerkennung der direkten 
Vertretung mit dem Kognitionverfahren in Zu-
sammenhang brachte (Fasi e fattori 
dell'evoluzione del diritto romano. Mélanges 
Cornil II. 1926. pp. 270—271). 
Bei der Untersuchung der Abstammung der 
„actio exercitoria" und der „actio institoria" 
kommt es zum Vergleich der „praepositio" und 
das „iussum". Aus dem Vergleich zieht der 
Verfasser — Claus' Ansicht bestimmend — die 
Folgerung, daß das „iussum" der modernen 
Bevollmächtigung nahesteht, während die 
„praepositio" im allgemeinen ein sog. „factum 
concludens" ist (p. 182). Im wesentlichen ist die 
Feststellung des Verfassers, daß die „praeposi-
tio" die Gelegenheit der Vertretung hinsichtlich 
des auf den Geschäftsabschluß zielenden Willens 
schafft, damit verbunden (p. 156). Wir müssen 
aber in Frage stellen, ob das Verhalten des 
Unternehmers — ohne eine ausdrückliche, 
diesbezügliche Äußerung — hätte genug sein 
können, um anderen Personen freier Rechtsstel-
lung das Recht einzuräumen, ihn verpflichtende 
Rechtsgeschäfte abzuschließen. 
Wo der Verfasser die „procuratio" dem 
„mandatum" gegenüberstellt (p. 164), ist der 
Unterschied zwischen Beauftragung und 
Bevollmächtigung in seinen Auseinandersetzun-
gen fast verschwommen. Die beiden Rechtsinsti-
tute sollten — obwohl sie in Bezug auf die 
Vertretung zusammen erscheinen — voneinan-
der kategorisch abgegrenzt werden. Die Beauf-
tragung bezieht sich auf das innere Verhältnis 
zwischen dem Auftraggeber und dem Beauftrag-
ten, die Bevollmächtigung ist dagegen eine an 
den Vertreter und an Drittpersonen gerichtete 
Äußerung. Bei der Erörterung der „actio ad 
exemplum institoriae" (p. 165) wird übrigens 
dieser Unterschied vom Verfasser berück-
sichtigt. 
Gelegentlich der sich auf dogmatische Fra-
gen des Rechts der Papyri beziehenden Ausein-
andersetzungen im Zusammenhang mit der 
gewillkürten Vertretung (p. 180 et seq.) läßt sich 
fragen, ob es nicht einfacher gewesen wäre, die 
die aus Ägypten stammenden Papyrusfunde 
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analysierenden Teile des Buches (pp. 107—111) 
in einem einzigen Abschnitt zusammenzufas-
sen. 
Diese Bemerkungen können aber den Wert 
der Arbeit des Autors nicht vermindern. Im Buch 
wird ein aus dem Standpunkt der Rechtsge-
schichte aus besonders interessantes Thema 
analysiert, das in seiner Gänze bisher noch nicht 
bearbeitet wurde. Aufgrund eines weiten Quel-
lenmaterials stellte der Verfasser die Entwick-
lung der gewillkürten Vertretung dar von der 
antiken Welt bis zu unseren Tagen. Als Ergebnis 
seiner Forschungen wird man über die 
gewillkürte Vertretung in der antiken Welt — 
vorzüglich bei den Römern — eine Vorstellung 
haben, die von der aufgrund der bis heute 
vorherrschenden Lehre bisher geltenden Vorstel-
lung in vielen Hinsichten abweicht. Die größte 
Abweichung ist die Feststellung, daß in der 
römischen Welt gar kein rechtliches Verbot 
bestand, das der direkten Vertretung den Weg 
vertreten hätte. 
Nach der Aufdeckung und der eingehenden 
Untersuchung der Quellen legt der Verfasser 
seine eigene Ansicht sicher und in entsprechen-
der Weise dokumentiert dar. Bei der Darstellung 
der geschichtlichen Entwicklung wird auch die 
wirtschaftlich-gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in 
Betracht genommen. Der Verfasser stellt dar, 
was für eine Rolle diese in der Entstehung und in 
der Entwicklung der Vertretung in den einzelnen 
geschichtlichen Perioden spielte. 
Der Verfasser betrachtete die Bestrebung, die 
geschichtliche Entwicklung 'des Rechtsinstitutes 
der gewillkürten Vertretung mit theoretischer 
Reinheit zu bearbeiten und darzustellen, als 
einen Zweck seiner Arbeit. Seine Auseinander-
setzungen können auch hinsichtlich der Anwen-
dung der sich auf die Vertretung beziehenden 
Rechtsregeln in §§ 219—225 des Gesetzes IV vom 
Jahre 1977 über die Modifizierung und den 
Einheitstext des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches bzw. 
hinsichtlich der Entwicklung der mit diesen 
Rechtsregeln verbundenen Praxis gut gebraucht 
werden und als Auskunft dienen. Über seinem 
sich in der Rechtsgeschichte und in der verglei-
chenden Rechtswissenschaft zeigenden Wert 
hinaus mag das Buch deshalb auch die Gestal-
tung der Gerichtspraxis beeinflussen und es ist 
auch in dieser Hinsicht bemerkenswert. 
Das Werk ist mit einer deutschsprachigen 
Zusammenfassung ergänzt, wodurch der Inhalt 
auch den die ungarische Sprache nicht beherr-
schenden Ausländern bekannt werden kann. 
Obwohl die Zusammenfassung verhältnismäßig 
erschöpfend ist, wäre es zweckmäßig, das Buch 
>n einer anderen Fremdsprache zu veröffentli-
chen, damit dieses in seiner Art einzigartige 
Werk auch über unsere Grenzen in seinem vollen 
Umfang bekannt wird. Dadurch ließe sich auch 
die Zusammenarbeit unseres wissenschaftlichen 
Lebens mit dem Ausland vertiefen. 
K. Visky 
The past and trends of development 
of the theory of law in Hungary 
The thorough knowledge of facts is the basis 
of all analyses of actual situations. If we are 
intent to render account of intellectual perfor-
mances embodied by books, papers, etc., their 
proper survey is impossible unless we have 
recourse to an appropriate bibliographical ap-
paratus. On this consideration Hungarian legal 
and administrative sciences may boast of a 
preferential position to an extent of which even 
one does not seem to be fully aware. Legal and 
administrative sciences in Hungary and their 
foremost workshop at the Institute of Legal and 
Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences are not in want of successes 
and may look into the future with full con-
fidence. Still the statement may be made that one 
of the Institute's most lasting enterprise is 
associated with the name and endeavours of 
L. Nagy, who with the series of his biblio-
graphies has become the faithful chronicler of 
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Hungarian achievements in this field in the years 
following upon 1945. With his series he has 
presented works of reference for both Hungarian 
students of law (AIlam- és jogtudományi 
bibliográfia 1945 — Budapest; Közgazdasági és 
Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1954 —) and international 
scientific community (Bibliography of Hungarian 
Legal Literature 1945-1965, Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1966; 'Hungarian legal bib-
liography' Acta Juridica 1964 —). In the long run 
this undertaking is of such a significance in the 
treatment of our intellectual heritage that it is 
only to be regretted that for want of incentive 
and attendance no similar work was complied of 
the achievement of Hungarian legal and admini-
strative sciences in the era preceding the World 
War II. 
The bibliography is not the synonym of 
superfluity, ostensible performance, or negligible 
auxiliary activity, but an indispensable means of 
all research work in want of which actual values 
may be doomed to voidness. It is borne out by 
the total lack of a similar bibliography, e.g., of 
the period between the two world wars. As a 
matter of fact, the compilation of such a biblio-
graphy was in progress after the lapse of scarcely 
a decade following upon the closure of the period 
with the personal aid and assistance of promi-
nent survivors, notwithstanding the work could 
not be completed for reasons beyond the control 
of those taking a part in it. And the result may 
safely be regarded as the burial of values, i.e. the 
consignment to decay of a considerable part of 
our cultural heritage in the field of Hungarian 
legal and administrative sciences. For practical 
purposes, notably, from the rich body of the 
literature published some decades ago only a part 
has been processed, the part which earlier was 
individually entered under catalogues of Hun-
garian professional libraries or was published in 
the form of reprints. Unfortunately even the only 
work which has undertaken the critical survey of 
the heritage is rich of lacks and so cannot be 
considered wholly exceptional to this statement. 
Imre Szabó: A burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet 
Magyarországon, (Budapest: Akadémiai Ki-
adó, 1955 and 1980). 
Now without the background of a pub-
lishing house, a private initiating of a Hungarian 
university has provided the facilities for forming 
a picture of the past three decades of Hungarian 
theory of state and law in the form of a 
bibliography. For the professional the work is a 
uniquely exciting lecture. Anybody interested in 
the subject matter may take in hand a complete 
compilation of the data of the common disci-
pline. Since it is a case of a publication at the 
same time in Hungarian, English and Russian it 
seems to be an appropriate work of reference for 
both the international research centers and 
domestic libraries of social sciences to provide 
reliable information on Hungarian literature. It 
was hardly a spectacular anniversary that 
prompted the chair of jurisprudence of the 
University of Szeged to embark upon this 
venture, filling a gap and arousing the interest in 
Hungarian achievements: thirty years have 
elapsed since, in the wake of a decisive turning 
point in the history of the country, a new 
discipline has sprung up, namely the instruction 
of jurisprudence based on Marxist doctrine. 
The tribute for the initiative of the work is 
due to I. Papp, whereas L. Nagy has contributed 
with his versatility in bibliography to the under-
taking (Magyar állam- és jogelméleti bibliográfia 
— Hungarian Literature of Theory of State and 
Law — Vengerskaya literatura po teorii gosu-
darstva iprava 1950-1980 comp. — I. Papp, ed. L. 
Nagy, Szeged: Chair of Theory of State and Law 
of the Faculty of Law of the University of József 
Attila, 1980, 202 p.). The result is a bibliography 
consisting of a foreword and 1121 entries closing 
with an index of authors with one of their works. 
In this bibliography, literature of three decades 
has been compiled, a literature surveyed neither 
by L. Nagy's earlier English language biblio-
graphy nor by his other series of bibliographies 
as to its more contemporary, i.e. more con-
siderable part. 
Merely turning, the pages of the bibliography 
prompts the reader to survey the situation of the 
discipline. Now I think that if we are to 
characterize the state and tendencies of develop-
ment of the theory of law in Hungary, the 
character of the renewal at any time may best be 
reflected by a division into periods. According to 
it the first one extends from the appearance of 
Marxist legal theory up to the mid-sixties, 
presenting its results in the collection of papers of 
Kritikai tanulmányok a modern polgári 
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jogelméletről — Critical studies of modern bour-
geois theory of law, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 
1963); the second one extends up to the end of 
the seventies with results most adequately em-
bodied by the Állam- és Jogtudományi 
Enciklopédia — Encyclopedia of legal and ad-
ministrative sciences (Budapest: Akadémiai 
Kiadó, 1980.) and the third period lasts to the 
present age and holds out definite aims, traits, 
and promises of future development. 
As regards the first period, its primary task 
was to mark out the dividing line, i.e. the 
departure from the foregoing way of thinking, 
and to lay the foundations of a new one. We 
could hardly disregard, however, that what had 
put the stamp on the legal thinking of the period 
in question was not only an infantile disorder 
associated with the launching of something new 
or a neurotic symptom tempting to exaggeration, 
but also the encounter of all these with the 
political, social and ideological effect summed up 
in the nomination of the 'cult of personality'. 
According to the philosopher Gy. Lukács, this 
development indicated the rock bottom underly-
ing dangerous processes in Marxist thinking, in 
the field of law manifesting itself as the autocracy 
of Vyshinski's normativism. Hence Marxist 
theory of law parted company with the foregoing 
tendencies in a way that its critique too often 
took on a labelling character; it has laid the 
foundation of the system in a way that for the 
analysis searching for the particularity of the 
subject it substituted a method providing 
evidence for a universally approved doctrine; 
instead of a real solution, verbal answers have 
come to the fore; and the outlook to the future 
has been permeated by some sort of utopianism. 
All this has been organized into a theoretically 
coherent entity by the circumstance that accord-
ing to its very core a voluntaristic policy provided 
the foundations. In the field of law this policy 
made use of definite preconditions of legal policy 
and formulated the ancillary role of legal 
thinking to lend these preconditions a theoretical 
framework. Hence legal theory could not ad-
vance any further than waging a battle for its 
relatively autonomous existence and for laying 
the foundations of a relatively independent 
theory. Consequently, its relationship to the 
actual legal policy has become its underlying 
dilemma, namely the tendency to take note of the 
preconditions of legal policy not merely as 
axiomatic starting points but to make these too 
the subject matter of theoretical work. In this 
respect it has produced evidence of its fertility 
and could achieve some successes, first of all — 
even if for the time being merely as an outlook — 
in the recognition of the philosophical approach 
to legal theory and, in an even more accentuated 
manner, in the recognition of the sociological 
approach. 
The most conspicuous characteristic of the 
legal theory of the second period is that 
approaches with backgrounds originating from 
deviating ends have gained recognition within 
the theory of law and also relative autonomy on 
the level of partial analyses. Not only the 
philosophical and sociological investigations, in 
the first period still winging the flight, have set 
out on a path of spectacular growth by shaping 
legal thinking, but also the processing of legal 
problems on logical, cybernetical, or doctrinal 
considerations has made its appearance. Last but 
not least the comparative method has gained full 
rights and become general. This development has 
within the sphere of legal theory entailed the 
claim to shaping a universally valid theory. On 
the whole the outlines of a theory of law begin to 
take shape which, relying on independent re-
search work, presents its subject-matter in its 
logical and historical unity. For the philosoph-
ical approach, so far indistinct vistas open up by 
throwing out the aspect of value. The sociolog-
ical approach to law in the wake of its own 
research work arrives at results which appear to 
be appropriate for both the formation of an 
outlook of its own and leading back to legal 
thinking as a whole. Finally, logical approach in 
the guise of deontic logic begins to develop as a 
separate discipline, at the same time its basic 
problems are discussed as integrated into the 
context of philosophical and sociological 
approach. All this leads within a brief spell of 
time to tendencies towards a comprehensive 
synthesis: partly to the laying of the foundations 
of a social science theory of law, partly to the 
ontological reconstruction of legal phenom-
enon; at the same time sociological approach 
to law develops to a comprehensive system of 
ideas bringing its own synthetizing summation. 
8* Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 24. 1982 
416 Recensiones 
Beyond the creative exploitation of departing 
approaches, this period compared to the one 
before is spectacularly characterized by the fact 
that it makes use of critique as a chance for 
enrichment of ideas rather than for thrusting out 
of their position. The critical overcoming in 
conformity with its principles takes place within 
the framework of discussion, which in its search 
for a solution excercises not merely a delimiting 
function but ensures the development of theory 
itself and the opening of the channels of feed-
back. The bright spots of approaches are want-
ing in a single respect only: in the unrevelling of 
the phenomena in their real historicity and in the 
foundations of historicity of research as a whole 
and so also of the individual approaches. Histor-
icity is though presented unbroken is still often a 
conventional phrase. That theory should be built 
up base historically is often impeded by the 
allurement resting on ingrained habit according 
to which the historical additive should be 
accepted as a colouring, or supplementary, 
material to the intuitively achieved results. 
Essentially the third period is but an attempt 
made for the revival of Marxism as has been laid 
down by the posthumous work of the late classic 
of Marxist philosophy Gy. Lukács, closing down 
his philosophical oeuvre and at the same time 
lending new dimensions to it. If we bear in mind 
that in the Lukácsian meaning this revival is but 
the repetition, on the level of the present age and 
in the possession of the research experiences 
accumulated during a century, of the analysis 
carried out by Marx and Engels and its extension 
to areas left untouched by them—this period 
may in fact be regarded as the beginning of 
research in the truly Marxist sense of the word, 
i.e. as one actually enforcing the unity of logical 
and historical aspects, unrevelling the con-
nections of the phenomena- and their laws of 
motion from their historical context and, in this 
way considering social phenomena in their very 
complexity as made up of mutual connections. 
Thus in theoretical legal thinking research work 
setting out from specific points of view must gain 
in strength by performing partial analysis in a 
way to find yet firmer foundations for their own 
theoretical system and at the same time to 
provide the facilities for synthesis with other 
approaches on yet higher, and more universal, 
standards. In theory of law it presupposes the 
simultaneous reinforcement of all approaches 
referred to earlier, for philosophical foundations 
for any research work proper are indispensable 
which arrive at the analysis of the facts of the 
present by way of the comparative processing of 
the historical empirism of the past, at the specific 
logic of the subject matter from its historicity and 
in the wake of this, at the notional system, too, 
which may be formed into the theory of the 
subject in question. With special regard to the 
social demand of regulation of a new quality and 
the rationality of its theoretical background, in 
the theory of law the laying of the theoretical 
foundations of legal dogmatics and the elabora-
tion of a theory of the basic notions of the legal 
system, providing a systematic synthesis of the 
results afforded by the doctrinal study of law, is 
conceived as the primary ardent task. At the 
same time in the third period not even the 
question is raised as if legal theory were the 
immediate ancillary of legal politics (as was the 
case in the first period); it does not even occur as 
if Marxist legal theory were confined to the 
theory of socialist law (like in the second period); 
a general theory of law, owing exactly to its 
theoretical nature and relative autonomy, may 
advance the laying of the theoretical foundations 
of both socialist legal policy and the theory of 
socialist law. In the concept of the revival of 
Marxism, the revival is in the last resort but the 
continuation of the realization of the early 
promise of the science of history as the sole 
discipline, and may be it is more realistic to-day 
than it was earlier. 
On studying the temporal scattering of the 
litterary product of the theory of law, we have to 
render account of the extraordinary leaps and 
bounds research work has made: 
Years 
Books 1950' I960' 1970' 
5% 30% 65% 
Papers 
law in general 5% 25% 70% 
creation of law 5% 20% 75% 
application of law 5% 20% 75% 
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Of course here we have not the case of works 
but bibliographical items, i.e. the improvement 
of the facilities of publication and translation 
have a substantial role. Still much is betrayed by 
the fact that the product of the second decade is 
five times than of the first only to rise to twice this 
number in the following decade. Even if the 
bureaucratism of the management of science 
may inevitably reckon with formal indices, it is 
obvious that we do not have to strive for a 
growth of the one or the other progression. Still 
the carriers of scientific work are invariably the 
works produced. And yet the works may come to 
life only in an appropriate media, i.e. integrated 
into the discussions going on in international 
forums. The other form of feedback is the way of 
causal participation in legal education the pro-
portional forms of which are not yet properly 
established in Hungary. In this connection 
merely the specific situation is worth mentioning 
that although the bibliography attributes 
30-60% of all the items of the mentioned fields of 
the theory of law research and production to 
three members working on the staff of the 
Institute for Legal and Administrative Sciences 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, their 
participation in the theoretical education of the 
jurists of the future generation is not bearing 
properly solved and waits for a future solution. 
Cs. Varga 
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Varia 
Quelques aspects du rapport entre le développement 
du «droit commercial antique» et l'esclavage* 
1. C'est un des loci communes qu'il n'existait 
pas — au moins au sens de droit modem — une 
branche de droit nommée comme « droit com-
mercial» dans l'antiquité. Mais dans le même 
temps c'est un fait bien connu même reconnu 
qu'il y avait diverses institutions juridiques au 
domain des droits antiques ayant une nature 
pareille aux certains institutions du droit com-
mercial moderne. À titre d'exemple nous men-
tionnons du domain de droit romain le 
procurateur — affranchi omnium bonorum dont la 
position juridique peut être comparée avec celle du 
Prokurist du Code Commercial Allemende. En 
ce qui concerne le procurateur de condition 
«quasi servus» on peut mettre en parallèle 
sa position avec celle du Handlungsbevoll-
mächtigte pour citer de nouveau une caté-
gorie bien connue du Code Commercial Al-
lemand. 
2. Sans entrer dans les détails de cet ensemble 
des problèmes on peut constater d'une façon 
générale qu'il existe une ressemblence assez 
frappante entre les diverses institutions légales 
du caractère commercial des droits de l'antiquité 
et du droit commercial moderne. 
C'est un fait généralement connu — nous le 
mettons en guillemets — « le droit commercial 
antique » de même manière que le droit commer-
cial de nos jours n'a pas un caractère corporatif. 
Corollairement tous les deux se diffèrent 
fondamentalement du ius mercatorum des 
Moyen Ages non ayant ces deux un particu-
* Texte d'une communication présentée à la 
XXXIVe session de la Société Internationale 
« Fernand de Visscher » pour l'histoire des droits de 
l'Antiquité le 17 septembre 1980 à Bruxelles. Le 
texte n'était ni remanié ni élargi sauf les notes les 
plus nécessaires. 
larisme personnel1. Ainsi — nous semble-t-il — 
est bien fondée d'une façon toute théorique la 
comparaison entre ces domains des droits anti-
ques et des droits modernes européens. Cette 
comparaison terminologique est bien sur 
facilitée par le fait qu'il n'y a pas — généralement 
— telles formes de caractère indigène dans cette 
sphère qu'exclurait la possibilité de faire des 
parallèles. Il s'agit ici de cette circonstance que 
les diverses institutions juridiques de caractère 
commercial se sont — par la suite du changement 
des conditions économiques et sociales — 
transformées et adaptées aux tendances 
dominantes de la vie économique. 
L'adaptation du droit à l'économie n'est 
nullement un phénomène moderne, propre à 
notre époque. Cette adaptation continuelle se 
fait visible spécialement dans le domain des 
institutions juridiques de caractère commercial 
dans l'antiquité. La rapidité et la particularité 
seules de l'évolution des institutions commer-
ciales de nos jours et les conséquences qui en 
résultent sont les faits nouveaux. Il faut constater 
que la diversité des institutions antiques de 
caractère commercial dans les conditions 
économiques primitives est infiniment minime 
par rapport aux droits modernes due — selon 
notre avis — au même système sociale. Pour ce 
motif peut être attribué un rôle décisif à 
1
 Cette affirmation n'est pas en contradiction 
avec le fait que quelques institutions — par exemple 
l'arrha et le prêt maritime — apparaissent presque 
exclusivement aux certains domaines. Cf. H. J. 
Wolff, Das Verhältnis von Rechtsordnungen anti-
ker Staaten in: Zur Einheit der Rechts- und 
Staatswissenschaften, Freiburger Rechts- und 
Staatswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen vol. 27. 
Karlsruhe, 1967. pp. 174-175. 
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l'esclavage qui était caractéristique — même en 
considérant les très diverses formes de l'esclavage 
dans les sociétés antiques — pour tous les états de 
l'antiquité. 
3. A titre d'exemple nous voudrons faire 
mention de quelques actes de Babylone où se 
peut constater que c'était souvent l'esclave qui 
traitait les affaires de son maître, qui prête de 
l'argent et qui reçoit des gages2. À Babylone était 
de coutume, d'après les actes, que les banquiers 
eux-mêmes furent des esclaves alors des per-
sonnes de condition dépendente. Le pécule des 
esclaves qu'ils possédaient était administré par 
eux, pour ainsi dire comme un bien propre tant 
qu'il restait entre leurs mains. De cette façon il 
constituait si bien quelque chose de distinct de la 
fortune du maître. Il en résulte, que les esclaves 
étaient à Babylone rélativement — de point de 
vue de l'activité commerciale — indépendants 
de leurs maîtres. 
En étudiant la question de l'esclavage par 
rapport au «droit commercial» — mis de 
nouveau entre guillemets — on peut s'étonner de 
rencontrer les esclaves si souvent agissant eux-
mêmes, soit au nom de leur maître, soit en leur 
propre nom en administrant un pécule. Dans les 
maisons de commerce et dans les banques se sont 
des esclaves qui sont pris très souvent pour 
employés, pour commis et alors s'ils contractent, 
c'est avec pleins pouvoirs, en qualité des 
représentants de la maison. Le droit babylonien 
peut être considéré comme un bon exemple de 
diminution de la différence entre des personnes 
de condition libre et des esclaves à cause de 
l'augmentation du rôle de la sphère économique. 
Les diverses formes de la dépendence — et 
surtout les esclaves mêmes — ont ainsi aussi 
contribué au développement des institutions 
légales de caractère commercial à Babylone. 
4. En analysant le droit grec antique — et 
spécialement le droit attique — on peut sans 
doute constater qu'un des attributs de celui était 
la fléxibilité3. À cause de cette fléxibilité par-
2
 Voir spécialement les actes dans les Archives 
des Murasu datant de l'époque perse (455-403 a. n. 
è.). Cf. G. Cardascia, Les Archives des Murasu, 
Paris, 1951. pp. 72 ss. 
3
 Cf. H. J. Wolff, Griechische Rechtsgeschichte 
als Anliegen der Altertumswissenschaft in: Elle-
ticulière il n'était pas mis un obstacle de caractère 
de principe au développement des diverses 
institutions légales relatives à l'activité commer-
ciale. II était du à cette fléxibilité qu'il n'était pas 
attribué un rôle exclusif à réglementation de la 
loi. Par cette circonstance s'explique la grande 
importance des coutumes à Athènes. C'est ce 
type de réglementation juridique qui favorisait 
par exemple l'activité commerciale que se mani-
festait en premier lieu dans le domain de com-
merce maritime des esclaves à Athènes. C'est un 
fait bien connu que à Athènes comme selon toute 
vraisemblance dans toute la Grèce antique le 
maître pouvait autoriser un ou plusieurs de ses 
esclaves à exercer librement une industrie4. 
Les esclaves qui se trouvaient dans cette 
situation étaient souvent qualifiés de choris 
oikountes parce qu'ils avaient un domicile à eux, 
distinct de celui de leurs maîtres. Ces esclaves 
pouvaient non seulement avoir leur domicile 
séparé à Athènes, mais encore à l'étranger ou ils 
se trouvaient comme représentants-agents ou 
gérants de leurs maîtres5. À titre d'exemple nous 
mentionnons un plaidoyer de Démosthène (C. 
Phorm § 5) ou Lampis comme diopos est chargé 
de commendement d'un navire, dans l'intérêt et 
pour le compte de son maître Dion. Il est aussi 
autorisé de faire des voyages à l'étranger dans le 
but de conclure des contracts avec tiers. À 
Athènes comme dans la théorie c'est admise 
généralement, n'était pas connue la qualité du 
commerçant qu'aurait été attribué à certains 
individus. C'était pour ainsi dire la nature, la 
qualité de l'affaire même qui déterminait son 
caractère de dike emporike et par conséquent il 
importait peu qu'elle ait été conclue par un 
commerçant — emporos — ou seulement par un 
simple citoyen qui importe des marchandises pour 
son usage personnel. Il en résulte aussi — et cela 
doit être considérée comme une circonstance 
nikhé Anthropistiké Etaireia, Dietnes Kentron, 
Anthropistikon Klassikon Eregnon vol. 20. 
Athenai, 1970. pp. 155-156. 
4
 Voir de manière approfondie A. E. 
Röhrmann, Stellvertretung im altgriechischen 
Recht, Diss. Würzburg, 1968. pp. 128 ss. 
5
 Cf. U. E. Paoli, Il prestito marittimo nel diritto 
attico in: Studi di diritto attico, Firenze, 1930. pp. 
105 ss. 
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importante — que même les contracts conclus 
par un doulos emporos alors par un ktema ti 
empsychos, pourvue que ces transactions avaient 
un caractère commercial, appartenaient à la 
sphère des dikai emporikai. S'il en est ainsi 
l'activité bien importante des esclaves ait con-
tribué aussi au développement des emporikoi 
nomoi de droit attique. 
5. Quant au droit romain il est bien connu 
que l'actio exercitoria et l'actio institoria comme 
des actions de caractère commercial — selon Va-
lifio celles seraient des «acciones mercantiles»6 se 
réferaient aussi aux esclaves exerçant une activité 
d'un magister navis ou celle d'un institor. En ce 
qui concerne ces deux actions on peut constater 
que l'actio exercitoria était expressément en 
rapport avec le commerce maritime, tant que 
chez l'actio institoria la seule condition requise, 
pour que cette action s'appliquât, c'est que le 
mandat ou simplement l'autorisation eut un 
caractère professional ou commercial. Ces deux 
actions paraissent, donc avoir été créées vers la 
deuxième moitié du IIe siècle av. n. è. Quant'au 
temps de naissance ou creation de ces actions 
peut être acceptée la priorité de l'actio 
exercitoria7. On y est amené nécessairement par 
ce fait que ce sont régulièrement les règles 
introduites pour le droit maritime qui sont les 
plus anciennes. Originairement étaient le magis-
ter navis et même l'exercitor de condition servile. 
Il en résultait que le tiers ayant conclu un contrat 
avec ses esclaves pouvait intenter une action 
directement contre le maître, le dominus servi. 
De cette façon était construite la base dog-
matique selon laquelle le tier pouvait agir aussi 
6
 E. Valifio, Las « actiones adiecticiae quali-
tatis » y sus relaciónes básicas en derecho romano, 
AHDE (38/1968) p. 356. 
7
 Cf. la littérature bien abondante en cette 
manière : E. Costa, Le azioni exercitoria e institoria 
nel diritto romano, Parma, 1891. pp. 32 ss.; A. 
Claus, Gewillkürte Stellvertretung im Römischen 
Privatrecht, Berlin, 1973. pp. 81 s.; P. Huvelin, 
Études d'histoire du droit commercial Romain, 
Paris, 1929. pp. 181 ss.; G. Pugliese, In tema di 
«actio exercitoria» Labeo 3(1957) pp. 308 s.; S. 
Solazzi, L'età dell'actio exercitoria in : Scritti 
Solazzi, Roma, 1938-1947. pp. 243 ss.; Valifio op. 
cit. pp. 345 ss. 
bien dans le cas s'il lui avait conclus un contrat 
avec un magister ou un institor de condition 
libre. 
En analysant la condition personnelle du 
magister navis ou de l'exercitor navis on peut 
conclure que celui jouissait relativement plus 
d'indépendance que l'institor dont l'activité était 
caractérisé par Livius comme «servile mini-
sterium»8. Par cette condition plus libre et 
indépendante du préposé s'expliquait le fait que 
le préposant pouvait seulement dans les cas plus 
exceptionels acquérir des droits à la base du 
contrat conclu par le préposé avec tiers comme 
nous en témoigne le fragment d'Ulpien (D. 14. 1. 
1.18.). Dans ce fragment de base de l'acquisition 
des droits de l'exercitor ne sert que la décision 
spéciale du praefectus annonae ou praeses pro-
vinciáé en voie de procédure extra ordinem9. 
À la différence de l'actio exercitoria la 
possibilité de l'acquisition des droits — en forme 
d'une action — du préposant — aussi bien que 
son préposé était de condition libre — était 
reconnue plus souvent comme nous en indiquent 
les sources (D. 14. 3. 1. — Marcellus-Ulpianus), 
D. 14. 3. 2. (Gaius) et D. 46. 5. 5. (Paulus). Ce 
phénomène d'importance s'explique selon notre 
avis par le fait que parmi les institores la 
proportion des esclaves était considérablement 
plus grande que celle des personnes de condition 
libre. 
D'autre part n'est pas sans importance qu'on 
peut intenter une actio institoria contre le maître 
d'un institor-esclave qui s'occupe en pratique du 
commerce des céréales même dans le cas — 
comme nous en témoigne le fragment de Paulus 
(D. 14. 5. 8.) — si lui n'est pas autorisé pour cette 
activité selon sa praepositio10. Cette circon-
stance, cette particularité fait soupçonner selon 
8
 Cf. Liv. 22.25.13. («...ipsum institorem 
mercis, filioque hoc ipso in servilia eius artis 
ministerium usum»). 
9
 Voir l'interprétation de ce fragment dans la 
littérature L. Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht bis auf 
die Zeit Diokletians I. Leipzig, 1908. p. 228.; Claus, 
op. cit. pp. 231 ss. 
10
 Voir encore Claus, op. cit. pp. s.; S. Ricco-
bono, Cognitio extra ordinem e caratteri del «ius 
novum» RIDA 1(1949) pp. 288 s. 
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notre opinion quel rôle important était attribué à 
l'activité commerciale par le praefectus annonae 
aussi bien que par l'empereur. 
6. A titre de conclusion nous pouvons dire 
que cette communication ne contient que des 
fragments. Elle ne peut pas tenir compte d'une 
façon approfondie de tous les côtés du sujet. 
Mais les indications fragmentaires pris de la 
sphère des divers droits de l'antiquité montrent 
qu'il existait un rapport plus ou moins étroit 
entre le développement du droit commercial 
antique et l'esclavage. L'esclavage ait pu aussi 
maintes fois influencé les institutions juridiques 
de caractère commercial d'une façon qu'il con-
tribuait à la formation et même au perfectionne-
ment — en voie de sa construction spéciale — de 
ces institutions. 
G. Hamza 
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D ' A G O S T I N O , F R A N C E S C O : Per un' archeologia del diritto (Miti giuridici greci.) (Legal Archeology. 
Hellenic Legal Myths) Université di Catania. Pubblicazioni délia Facoltà di Giurisprudenza. 84. 
Milan, Giuffre, 1979. 164 p. 
Professor D'Agostino has dealt with primarily the ancient and medieval turns of the 
development of legal philosophy in his earlier works. At the same time, the author is connected to 
Heideggerian existentialism and Catholicism (especially to Saint Augustine). In the point of 
intersection of interest and Weltanschauung a quite special legal philosophical work originates and a 
particular, extremely original product thereof is the present volume in which the author offers a 
definitely existentialist legal ontology under the pretext of the analysis of Hellenic myths. More 
precisely, and this is the most attractive intellectual characteristic of the book, D'Agostino does not 
conceal at all which objectives are controlling him in the interpretation of Hellenic myths; he nowhere 
suppresses the possibility of different philosophical interpretation but endeavours to reveal the 
existentialist substructure, the fundamental role of violence and fear behind the existence of law. 
Although the work is primarily a source of historical interpretation for those who, as the writer of this 
review, cannot enter fully in the spirit of the existentialist fundamental experience the general legal 
philosophical importance of the work cannot be contested. 
The author departs from the arche notion of the French structuralism (Foucault) but does not 
apply the structuralist methodology to the legal discussion but investigates the ideas expressed 
therein. The investigation of arche, or primary experience serves the purpose to verify the intuitive 
statement of Heidegger, according to which the transformation of Dasein resulted in the coming into 
existence of the legal phenomenon. The author wants to develop the documentary material from the 
Hellenic myths, namely by the „anti-philological and anti-chronological" application of myths, in 
accordance with his objects. The myths prompt us to meditate on the violence which constitutes the 
foundations of law. In the myth not only the anxiety and fear predominating in the state before the law, 
the uncertainty is expressed but also the cosmic fear. The legally organized society is markedly 
separated from this phase; in spite of this marked separation this previous state further lives and 
affects in the original sin. The violence creates the law, says the author, following Girard, and the 
institutions are broken up by peace. The old rites become customary and banal, their real object seems 
to disappear — then, there is a general disorder and the destructive violence appears. The original, the 
creative violence is to be distinguished therefrom, in connection of which, however, the fundamental 
question seems to be unsolved which has its roots in one of the famous fragments of Heraclitus 
("Polemos is the father and king of all things"). Following Heidegger, D'Agostino comes to the 
conclusion that the break causing the law is a sign for mankind: the stabilization of dike after the rage 
of violence establishes the recognition of mankind in connection with its own ontological status. 
Professor D'Agostino proves his principle by means of fundamental topics taken from the very 
ample and ramifying relations of the Hellenic mythology. He treats the sense of fear and of 
dreadfulness in the man, the cosmicity thereof, the relationship between pudency and sense of justice, 
the presence of violence in the nature of Dionysus, the violence element present in the myths of 
creation, the problems of sensuality and sexuality in the mirror of myths. The most important myths 
treated here are: Antigone (2nd choir: deines and human nature), Oedypus; Plato's Protagoras (it 
brings the pudency (aidos) and the justice (dike) to people without political wisdom); birth of Helene 
according to Kerényi; Dionysus and Pentheus (according to Bacchantes); the myth of androgen in 
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the presentation of Aristophanes (from Symposion); Kaineus (the invulnerable Lapith transformed 
from a boy to a girl). 
The analysis of myths is rendered more difficult (certainly, some objects of the author are 
thereby facilitated) that the myths have survived in a highly fragmented or considerably rewritten 
from (as with Plato), therefore the interpretation is to a great extent a completion, and a re-creation, 
respectively. Otherwise, it is remarkable that the author, though with a high respect, refuses the 
neohumanistic interpretation represented especially by W. Jaeger and follows mainly Kerényi and 
Vernant. 
The author who refuses the old question of what kind of social conditions is reflected in the 
myth, arrives at the conclusion that the law is not the product of human civilization. People living in a 
state without law live more outrageously, but are not less civilized than their descendants who base 
their existence on the law. After all, this conception corresponds to young Nietzsche's statement 
(behind the Hellenic humanism the cruelty crouches as a tiger and the Hellenic legal conception 
developed from the purification of the homicide). The myths lay stress on the sudden break in case of 
the formation of law just as in case of the foundation of towns and of the accession of kings. In our 
times, the research workers are highly declined to demythicization though it may be hardly true the 
particularity of our age would be the demythicization. "If the demythicization means the resignation 
from the sacral attitude of the reality, the first demythicization was carried out in paradoxical manner 
by the creators of myths... " by the separation of the divine from the commonplace. The 
demythicization does not mean a progress if it means the putting aside of the question of origin. 
However, the Hellenic legal myths — expounds D'Agostino — carry the message on the origin. 
Accordingly, the man is not born as a legal being, the law is not automatically given for the man as was 
held by the classical natural law. This does not mean, however, that the law would not be an 
ontologically established reply to such a life which would otherwise stew into the casual empiricism. 
The birth of the god requires therefore an event thereabout the myth gives information. The myth 
calls the attention to the initial state, moving thereby to accept the law, the myth calls the attention to 
the necessity of keeping the aidos and the dike, since when returning to the hybris of the original state, 
repeated wars or the punishment of Zeus are to be awaited. According to Girard the social union has 
taken place as an answer to the original violence. Its form (i.e. universal model) is the ritual sacrifice. 
Which was in the primitive societies the revenge on the scapegoat, is the legal order in the modern 
rationalization. But in both cases the development of a chain of revenges is prevented. As contrasted 
with the conception of Nietzsche, the sense of justice is therefore not the generalization of the 
retributive and synallagmatic mentality of the primitive men but the means of the surmounting of 
violence (though by proceeding to violence). "Law and justice originate from the state of the 
existentialist incapacity in which man finds himself' and in which he hopes that, forced in the net of 
norms, he can moderate the always threatening violence. 
The volume is completed by an elusion ("May the man give up the aidos?") and an Appendix. 
In the Appendix the author applies essentially the method of the analysis of myths for the legal-social 
phenomena in connection with two books (Dahrendorf: Homo sociologicus; Tricaud: L'accusation) 
and with the problems of urban life. 
A. Sajó 
S T R A Y E R , Joseph R.: Les origines médiévales de l'Etat moderne. Paris, Payot, 1979. 159 p. 
The famous researcher of the history of the Middle Ages intends to cro\Vn his long-lasting 
scientific career at the Princeton University by this work which is the summary of his knowledge on the 
nature and functioning of Western European monarchies gathered during several decades. His 
developments made in form of lectures may reckon with the interest of scholars in the field or law and 
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public administration too, who, taking seriously the principle of historicity, characteristic of 
Marxism, want to gather information concerning the questions how the formation, called today the 
modern state, developed, and came into existence under the effect of what kind of incitements. 
To advance some of his final conclusions, he states that— the institution called the modern 
state developed under the conditions of feudalism in 12th century France and England as a real 
alternative succeeding the fictious alternatives of the city-state and the empire. The first constant 
institutions were established as challenged by home affairs and not by foreign ones, i.e. by the 
jurisdiction and the finances, and the bureaucracy established for their management was the media in 
which the institutionalization of the state took place. The modern state could come into existence only 
when the sense and concept of the loyalty to the state developed, subordinating the familiar, local, and 
religious, loyalties. The concentration of human resources was made possible extensively by the 
appearance of the modern state. To its formation the coincidence of several preconditions was 
necessary: (1) some spacial and temporal stability, the existence of a geographical nucleus around 
which a certain political system could be built up. The lack of it may explain that the ancient Greeks 
could not establish a homogeneous state either by the coalition against the Persians or in the 
atmosphere produced by the Olympic Games, just as it could not succeed for the nomads; (2) the 
existence of impersonal, relatively constant political institutions which could survive the changes of the 
sovereign and of those quarreling for the power around him, drawing thereby some specialization and 
a higher efficiency into the political processes, strengthening in this way the political identity of the 
community, too. Finally, each institution being constant might become the fundament of a state 
formation, such as it occurred with the private corporation either of the Massachusetts community or 
the British India; (3) these institutions had to increase their prestige and reputation. The first decree of 
Westminster ( 1275, c. 17) declares that although the royal right is invalid on the territory of the Gauls, 
the king, due to his sovereignty, can do all the same justice to everything. The decisive step is after all 
not the exercise of the monopoly of power but the recognition of the necessity of a superior authority 
which, as theoretically formulated, appeared around 1550; and, finally, (4) the development of the 
loyalty to the state. All these occurred between 1100 and 1600 in Western Europe (pp. 16-22). 
The Greek polis, the Han Empire in China, or the Roman Empire were indisputably states but 
under such remote and different conditions that they could not serve as examples. The state had to be 
re-invented, and as soon as this happened, of functioned much better than the majority of the old 
examples. The empires, e.g., were militarily powerful, the political integration and the concentration 
of human resources were, however, imperfectly realized, consequently, the loyalty to the state could be 
hardly developed. In all these respects the city-states were more successful but they could not solve the 
integration of new territories (pp. 23-25). 
In the opinion of the author, the development of Christianity and the influence of the 
organization of the Church, on the one hand, and the increasing stabilization in Europe, on the other 
hand, were the two factors resulting in the foundation of states. The Church acquired already in 
several respects the properties of state (constant institutions and sovereignty), and, as the main fact, 
according to its dogmas the obligation of governor was to provide for the justice and peace against 
those disturbing them. It was under the effect of such incentives that the institutional system of 
administration of justice developed for ensuring the home security and the financial institutions for 
ensuring the external security (pp. 30-33). 
The consequence of the battle over Investitures was the consolidation of the opinion according 
to which the lay sovereign was the administrator of justice and the jurisdiction justified his existence. 
Consequently, in Western Europe the notions of state and law were interconnected and the concepts 
of law and right began to develop in such a way which was not any more confined to the sole criminal 
law. 
The development of a consolidating-depersonalizing state machinery is closely connected with 
the use of written records since the management resting upon such bases is the guaranty both of 
stability and impersonality. The passing over to the use of written records was, however, connected 
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with formal education. In this system of education legal studies had a considerable part although the 
Roman law had only a negligible effect in the territories north of the Alps. Its benefit was all the same 
considerable since by reference to its categories and notions the elucidation of some new ideas was 
rendered possible. It may be supposed, e.g., that the notion of public welfare and the concept that the 
promotion of public welfare was the obligation of the sovereign, helped in the justification of 
innovations such as the general taxes (pp. 43-44.) 
In the public administration the need for information conduced very soon to a bureaucratic 
explosion. The acquisition and processing of information increased the bureaucratic apparatus. At 
the same time, the information had also political value: somebody possessed the more information the 
greater was his chance to become an independent political factor. The sovereign not being obliged to 
let slip the reins of his hands, institutionalized step by step principle of collegiality which incited to the 
establishment of a managing apparatus according tó special jobs, on the one hand, but without 
rendering them hierarchic to such an extent, that it would limit the survey of the king over the home 
and foreign affairs, on the other. The evidences thereof was the number of positions of under-
secretaries of state which even up to the 18th century in England and France did not combine, e.g., to 
the position of an undersecretary of state for foreign affairs but remained independent provinces of 
undersecretary of state for the administration of foreign affairs of single geographical districts (p. 
146). 
According to the final conclusions of professor Strayer, the European state of 17th century was 
by no means democracy, but due to the institutionalization of the organization of the modern state it 
was not any more such a despotism in which only the personal will of a monarch would exist. The final 
outcome was the practical self-justification of the state which psychologically prepared the ground for 
the further, even increasing strengthening, and for the multiplication, of its functions (p. 156). 
Cs. Varga 
I N Z I T A R I , B R U N O : Autonomia privata e controllo publico nel rapporto di locazione (Private autonomy 
and public control in tenancy) Biblioteca di diritto privato ordinato da Pietro Rescigno Napoli, Casa 
editrice Dott. Eugenio Jovene, 1979. 274 p. 
One of the most current questions of the Italian public life which may have almost 
unforeseeable political consequences, is the rent of flat. This relation attaches from the very first a 
great importance to the present work which can count—with good reason—with the interest of 
Hungarian professionals due to the Hungarian position of tenancies being similar in many respects to 
that in Italy. In addition to the actuality, however, the more general relation treated in the work, the 
Marxist analysis of the concrete process of state intervention means the surplus which makes Inzitari's 
book a valuable scientific work. 
The author proceeds from the historical change of functions of tenancy. He follows the 
development of the relevant institutions from the Roman law up to the classical capitalist codification. 
(The Italian codes vary on the whole the Napoleonic solution.) The difference between the original 
solution of Roman law and the capitalist approach consists, in his opinion, primarily in that in Roman 
law the physical object of legal relation and not the part played by the parties in economic relation was 
considered. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of economic function was not completely stated either in 
the codification of the 19th century, since the legislation was influenced by the striving after the 
typological simplification. This resulted obviously in certain contractions. The codification is, 
however, remarkable not only with respect to typifying but—first of all—to the statement of 
contractual balance. The author will, however, set just this ration of services and the social-economic 
consequences thereof in the centre of his analysis of the legal regulation in force. At the beginning of 
the 19th century, the situation was, of course, essentially simpler: the establishment of balance, and its 
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judicial restoration, respectively, could be imagined only in the line of volitional defect. The 
annullability of the contract in case of serious disproportion was inserted into the rules on the sale of 
immovable in the Code Civil at the explicit request of Napoleon. The reason of the rule may be found 
in that even at this time a fundamental social significance was attributed to the landed property. In 
respect of tenancies of immovables, however, the abrupt acceleration of urbanization proved to be 
decisive. From the point of view of the social mentality in the 19th century, the tenancy was the legal 
relation rendering possible also for the "wider mass" to enjoy the property, even if they had no 
possibility for the acquisition of property for want of financial resources. While, however, in the last 
century the market relations were more or less able to spontaneously arrange the housing conditions, 
at the outbreak of the First World War radical changes occurred. As in several other countries, also in 
Italy measures had to be taken for the arrangement of housing conditions of those social strata whose 
members were called to the arms and being unable to pay the rent. This meant essentially 
wagestandstill, moratorium and interdiction of notice to quit; according to the assumption of 
legislator, of course, only temporarily. The previous anomalies of flat tenancies brought to light just 
due to the war, did not stop at the end of the war and in the new political power relations when the 
interests of workers could not be any more completely neglected the state intervention in flat tenancies, 
meant previously for being temporary, remained further on. The author gives a detailed survey on the 
positive statutory regulation which was modified to a slight extent from year to year. 
In addition to the changes in the positive law, however, neither the consideration of the 
economic consequences of regulation is neglected, namely that partly just under the effect of the 
regulation, the investments in building industry considerably diminished and as a consequence thereof 
the offer of tenement-dewellings recudes i.e., as against the set aim of legal regulation intending to 
settle the housing problem, the upset of market balance becomes more marked. (This leads, of course, 
to the maintenance and intensification of state intervention.) "This drawback appears in each 
situation when the price of product is withdrawn from the market laws. . . The legislation containing 
restrictions was born for the remedy of troubles in balance, actually, however, it reproduces and 
reinforces the conditions under which this trouble in balance took place." According to Inzitari, only 
the law No. 392 of 1978 means a progress since it establishes the fixing of tenancy fees on rational 
calculable and legally guaranteed foundations. 
The author supports the above outlined general development tendency by several precise 
detail-analyses where he finds a chance to display his dogmatic expertness and extensive knowledge on 
the judicial practice. The Marxist demand for locating in the social context is, however, always present 
i.e. the author never taken by the legal notions analyzed by him. 
While analyzing the modern tenancy institutions the author studies three questions of detail in 
one chapter each: the solidification of the principle emptio non tollit locatum, as the expression of 
exchange value of immovable property; the assumption of risk for the damage in fire of immovable 
property (in this respect the change of power relations could be observed already long before the 
outbreak of First World War); the theoretical dispute on the nature of the renter's rights. 
The second part of the book deals with the crisis of the traditional civil law, caused by the state 
control (restriction of contractual autonomy). The traditional subjective-law view protecting the right 
of ownership is replaced gradually by the protection of the use and enjoyment of the hirer. This fact 
leads, however, to the change in the contractual balance since less and less right is due to the renter 
(moreover, the discrepancies of contract are null and void to the prejudice of hirer—disregarding here 
certain differences in the judicial practice). Therefore, also the obligations of the renter are reduced. 
As a consequence of the inner structure of the Italian legal system, the regulation containing 
state limitations seemed to come up constantly against the Civil Code, moreover, eventually against 
the Constitution. In the end the Italian legal-political arrangement is based on the capitalist private 
ownership and the liberal conceptions of the Italian state foundation exert an influence even now on 
the institutional and ideological levels. The author analyzes profoundly also this problem while 
dealing with the practice of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
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According to his final conclusion, in the flat tenancy (and secondarily in the tenancy of land) 
the volition of parties plays an ever decreasing part. Instead of the volition the contract serves as a 
means of the realization of other social objects and these social objects fall beyond the microcosmic 
sphere of individual interests. The tenancy of flat is, instead of being the realization method on the 
market of the use-value of renter, partly the device of the anti-inflationary policy of the state (freezing 
of rent), and partly a social political device (for the solution of flat problems of strata standing in need 
of special protection). 
A. Sajó 
L E I S S , W I L L I A M : Ecology versus politics in Canada. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1 9 7 9 .  
2 7 9 p. 
Politics and ecology? Political ecology? These notions may give the impression of a bizarre 
association of ideas nowadays but two hundred years ago even political economy seemed to be a 
rather modern expression. The present book expounds the environmental problems of the—in terms 
of its territory—second largest country of the world in studies. The work helps to get acquainted with 
the possibilities of society in connection with the protection of the environment and the legal frames 
determining long-term possibilities. Ecology as a science knows interaction patterns expressing the 
connection between the individual man and his environment respectively among the individuals in 
specific parts of the environment (ecosystem). The quantitative and qualitative development of human 
demands manifesting itself in political pressure are harmful to the biosphere of the earth even in such 
a—for the time being sparsely populated—country as Canada having a territory commensurable with 
that of Europe. 
There are two basic questions to be answered in the book: how the people's opinion and 
readiness to act concerning the protection of the environment is influenced by the political and social 
development respectively how the increasing understanding of environmental problems concerns the 
political compromises, which people and society have to make, now under the pressure of 
reasonableness, then of compulsion. 
The book is a joint result of three different investigational efforts. The editors examined the 
social aspects of natural environment for more than three years and utilized the results of 
environmental research of York University. The public opinion is overwhelmed with information 
about the dramatic danger threatening the natural environment that assures the existence of life in 
earth. 
A study is devoted to the insuflficiences of the legal and practical means of the protection of the 
environment and health in Canada and in other countries. It is pointed out that industrial security can 
only be profitable if long-term effects are taken into consideration as momentary rentability is 
threatened by expensive filtering plants. Although the political importance of the environmental 
"lobby" has increased in recent years but the followers of unlimited growth are still superior in 
number both in the legislation and in other domains of political life. State institutions, among whose 
tasks the protection of the environment and health would be of primary importance, are also treated 
in the study, especially those representing up to now unknown branches of industry and particularly 
concerning the sensibility of public opinion (nuclear industry etc.). 
"In the last decade modern society faces more and more crucial questions: the most important 
of them are 'pollution crisis', 'over-population and food crisis', and 'energy crisis'. The public opinion 
could testify that the traditional mechanism of administration with its inflexibility and excess of 
precaution is less and less able and willing to solve these crises or at least to begin solving them 
creatively." According to the study the technical development of the advanced world has reached the 
limits passing which would menace the civilization having created it. The Report of the Club of Rome 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24. 1982 
ínternationalia 429 
titled "Limits of Growth" dramatized this danger—and made it the principal theme of the 70s. The 
effects of its main statements on the legal aspects of environmental protection activity are treated in 
details by the following study scrutinizing the clashing interests of regional development and the 
protection of the environment and the possibilities of a reasonable compromise. 
M. Udvaros 
C L E G G , H U G H : Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining Billing and Sons, London, 1 9 7 8 . 1 2 1 p. 
At the Warwick University, scientific investigations concerning the practical questions of 
labour law have been made since the middle of twenties and in the centre of the studies the trade-union 
activity and the business federation of employers have been standing. This monograph surveys the 
activités of the trade unions in six Western countries—Australia, United States of America. Great 
Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden by means of comparative methods. 
The author points out that so far it did not succeed to theoretically systematize the opinions 
and precepts relating to the trade unions. Sidney and Beatrice Webb have tried to summarize in theses 
the events and changes in Great Britain at the beginning of the century, as well as Perlman and Hoxie 
in the United States of America at the end of the twenties. The changes of trade-unionism, however, 
essentially exceeded these theses and today distinction shall be made among several trade unions in 
order to analyze their activities. In the course of the collective bargainings the employers and 
employees exercise pressure on each other in order to reach a compromise. This compromise is 
favourable to one or to the other party, corresponding to the prevailing power relations. The author 
points out that the state as employer often acts as a "sovereign" and grants to the legislation the 
possibility to decide alone on the salary and working conditions of her employees. Correspondingly, 
e.g. in the United States the federal and state employees are forced to display a lobby-activity among 
the legislators for protecting their interests. 
The work deals also with the relations of the government and the trade unions. The British 
authors generally make distinction between the inner structure of trade unions and the official 
machinery. The work treats also—though briefly—the sociological aspects thereof, in respect of all 
the six countries. The political colour of the individual trade-unionisms as well as the legislative steps 
which contributed to the development of the today lines of force of trade unions are also analyzed. 
A separate chapter deals with the tasks of trade unions of working places, with their role played 
in the preparation of collective bargaining contracts. In Great Britain e.g. rather strict agreement 
exists between the workers and managers of a considerable part of factories, primarily of public utility 
works. The previous monograph on "Working place and trade union" deals with the tendency which 
intends to transfer these comprehensive agreements also to the works in private ownership. In the 
majority of British works the trade-union official of the workshop, the "shop steward" means the 
presence of the trade union. In the United States this duty is performed by the shop committees and 
overseas the activity regulation of trade unions is much more thorough-going and is elaborated more 
detailed than in England. The same is characteristic also for Sweden, where, however, the collective 
bargaining contracts are discussed again from year to year. In the year under consideration, the 
modification of contract may be initiated only in special cases. 
An exhaustive information is given about the conditions of stoppage regulated by statutory 
provision as well as about the strike statistics of the six countries. There is a considerable difference 
between Sweden and France in respect of stoppages since in Sweden the stoppage occurs seldom, 
but—apart from a few exceptions—they are illegal strikes, whereas in France the majority of the 
numerous stoppages are made legally. In Sweden the collective bargaining tends towards the 
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elimination of strikes and as an alternative, comprehensive negotiations replace the stoppage, whereas 
in France the employers do not lay particular stress upon the prevention of strikes. 
Last not least, the volume deals with the various institutions of industrial democracy, with the 
relation of trade unions to the political parties as well as with the relation of the leaders of works to the 
trade unions. 
M. Udvaros 
Wissenschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt — Sozialistisches Recht (red. L I N D E N , W.) I—II, Halle 
(Saale), 1981. 182 + 263 p. 
The work published by the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg contains the lectures 
and discussion of the conference commonly organized by the universities of Halle and Dresden as well 
as the technical college "Carl Schorlemmer" of Leuna-Merseburg in September 1980. In the 
conference placing the relations of scientific-technical progress and the socialist law on the agenda, in 
addition to the wellknown experts of the GDR, representatives of other socialist countries 
(Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union) also participated. Even a schematic 
review of nearly 50 lectures seems to be impossible, only the most important ones will be tried to be 
introduced. 
Volume I contains the opening speeches. The fundamental lecture of W. Linden (pp. 10-113) 
outlines wide-ranging the relations of the field of science and technics and of the law and the— 
primarily theoretical but in some respects also practical—problems related thereto. The rate of 
scientific-technical progress, its qualitative changes, its outstanding and particular function under 
socialist economic-social conditions require the further consideration of several questions concerning 
also the function and possibilities of the law. In spite of the undeniable partial results of legal 
investigations—points out the author—the comprehensive, consequent conception of the legal 
approach is actually wanting. The author outlines a few problems held to be the most important. He 
briefly deals with the questions of legal cybernatics, in connection with the increasing role of cybernetics 
in the system of state planning and management. He refers to such significant and complex fields of the 
scientific-technical revolution (e.g. atomic energy, protection of environment, transplantation of 
organs, etc.) which justify the necessity of international legal regulation, on the one hand, and the 
reform of the structure of traditional legal system, on the other. According to the conception of the 
author, the "law of science and technics" should comprehend the management, planning, 
organization and regulation based on individual responsibility of the scientific-technical intellectual 
(immaterial) activity in the same manner as the realization of the results of this activity. He expounds 
the opinions developed in connection with the character of this legal field, with its proper place in a 
legal branch and with its independence—to be found in the first place in the Soviet and GDR theory. 
In this connection he touches upon the disputes relating to the "commodity character" of the 
intellectual activity and of its result. The legal mechanism has to serve the stimulation of creative 
activity, the provision for the learning and utilization and the effective protection of the achieved 
results. Investigating the single phases of the scientific-technical activity, of the innovation process, the 
author outlines the demands to be set forth the system of legal norms and institutions linked with the 
single phases, as well as their particularities. Thus, he deals with the questions arising in the field of the 
planning, co-operation and organization and in connection with the labour relations, with the 
significance of the contractual methods, of the stimulation and interest, of the risk and liability. He 
emphatically treats the problems related to the legal protection of scientific-technical results, its 
financial and proprietary aspects. As a final conclusion, he points out that the particularities of the 
field in question are in favour of its treatment as independent legal field, as so-called legal complexity 
and even the theoretical consequences of this reality should be drawn. 
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The main report was followed by four additional reports analyzing an important part-field 
;ach of the subject matter. V. A. Rassudovsky dealt with the legal problems emerging in connection 
with the state management and planning of science and technics. He surveyed and evaluated, in 
respect of the Soviet Union, the fundamental organizational conditions and significant legal norms of 
this field, the legal instruments serving the stimulation, the results achieved up to now and the 
problems to be solved. R. Osterland investigated the legal methods and means serving for the 
establishment, protection and realization of scientific-technical results. In this connection he dealt 
comprehensively with the utility and exchange value of the intellectual creations, with the special 
predominance in this field of the commodity-money relations. In connection with the research 
contracts he emphasized the particular problems of liability and guaranty (within it the warranty of 
title). G. Grundmann analyzed the legal consequences of the risk incidental to the scientific technical 
activity, namely the reasons and various forms of appearance of the risk. He pointed out that in the 
scientific-technical activity — though in different way and to a different extent, depending on the 
particularities of the given research field or research level—the risk is an immanent factor. With 
respect to the reduction of risk and the regulation of its consequences, respectively, the suitable 
interest and responsibility should be provided for by legal means, too. H. Pogodda treated in his 
lecture the correlations between the scientific-technical development and the legal protection of results 
obtained therefrom. Surveying the various categories of scientific-technical results and creations 
(discoveries, inventions, designs, trademarks, plant-breeding and animal breeding, technovations, 
know-how, software, etc.), he analyzes the forms of legal protection of such creations, emphasizing 
that the protective form may not be of an exclusive character (with respect to the traditional 
controversy, e. g. to the relation and valuation of the patent and inventor's certificate). Investigating 
the information functions of the protective form, the questions of the harmony of personal and social 
interests, he points out the necessity of legal instruments providing for the preferential management of 
creative activity. 
Volume II. contains the material of discussions in various sections. Only a reference is made 
here thereto. In the section dealing with the general and special legal questions of the scientific-
technical development 8 contributions, in the section dealing with the problems of planning, 
management and cooperation 16 contributions, in the section treating the legal questions of the 
international scientific-technical co-operation 7 contributions, and in the section dealing with the 
scientific-technical risk and—partly—with its labour-law aspects 8 contributions were made. 
The ample material of the work in two volumes elucidates such generalizable theoretical 
questions of the socialist jurisprudence, the further consideration of which is an actual task. By the 
clear wording of questions and by the suggestions for solution supported by appropriate 
argumentation the reviewed work is a useful contribution to the solution of this task. 
E. Lontai 
E M I N E S C U , Y.: Transformarile dreptului civil sub influença revolu(iei technico-s(iintifice (Changes of 
civil law under the effect of scientific-technical revolution) Bucureçti, Edit. St. enciclop., 1979. 136 p. 
The author has published her treaties in a small-from booklet. The author has been directed by 
her interest in novelty towards a certain category of substantive laws, the intellectual laws. Under the 
conditions of our time these laws are recognized for the benefit of creators, discoverers and inventors 
in each field—from the technical up to the esthetical one. The fundamental changes in the life of 
society, being results of intellectual creations, scientific discoveries, technical progress, influence also 
the domain of jurisprudence in such a way or manner that the law loses in a certain sense its legal 
character. 
X 
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In the different articles contained in the book a common notion may be observed, namely the 
retirement of law from some fields of the social conditions, the abandonment of these fields by the law 
which in this way become eliminated from the legal regulation. In the meantime this fact is followed by 
such a phenomenon that in this field a lot of rules of conduct appear which, however, do not belong to 
the law. As formulated by the author: the scientific-technical progress transformed the direct 
educating function of legal norm, this fact is emphasized, consequently it caused the "delegalization" 
to a certain objective statute of the law. Further on, we shall confine ourselves to the publication of the 
titles of articles: 
From the revolt of facts against the law up to the non-law; 
The law becoming diversified; 
Proportions of civil law and appearance of complex branches of knowledge; 
Subject of economic law and the juristic person; 
New contractual technics; 
Protection of consumers and publicity; 
Transformation of intellectual laws; 
New forms of creation, multiplication of intellectual laws; 
International code of conduct; 
New dimensions of comparative law; 
Technics of legal language; 
Legal colour. 
M. Lázár 
M A R I E K A L E N S K Á , E V A N O V O T N Á , M I L A N Z A V A C K Y : Ceskoslovenské pracovni prdvo (Czecho-
Slovakian labour law) Praha, 1980. Panorama, 400 p. 
In the Czech parts of the country this will be the manual of the labour law for a long time, in 
Slovakia a separate manual is prepared which will be issued also in a short time. 
The work of authors, corresponding to the traditional divisions of manuals, is divided into 
general and special parts, the proportioning within the two parts, however, contains also novel 
elements. 
The general part is divided into six chapters the first of which treats the concept, object, 
method, task and system of Czecho-Slovakian labour law. The second chapter deals with the sources 
of Czecho-Slovakian labour law and with their application. In the third chapter the basic principles of 
Czecho-Slovakian labour law are expounded. The fourth chapter deals with the collective term 
domesticated in the Czecho-Slovakian law, with the relations concerning the performance of work 
and summarizes the essential information. Various categories are here investigated. In the first place, 
the individual labour relations, the apprentice relation, the relations established by agreements 
tending to the performance of work beyond labour relation, the relations to the co-operative of 
members of agricultural co-operatives and other relations are dealt with. The relations originating in 
connection with the participation in the management of the organization of the workers, as well as the 
relations between the trade union and socialist organizations belong also to this conceptual range. 
This means that also the relations with the socialist organization belong to the sphere of labour law. 
The authors range to this domain also the so-called sanctional (liability) relations, such relations in 
which norms of other legal branches have a part, labour relations of the members of military corps, of 
public prosecutors, of attorneys-at-law, of some state employees and of other categories. This 
ambiguous conceptual range comprises also the legal relations of social insurance. This chapter deals 
further on with the subject of labour relation, with the problems of representation, with the content of 
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labour relation (rights, obligations, concept of so-called title), moreover, this chapter treats the origin 
and modification of labour relations, the extinguishment of rights and obligations originating from 
labour relations, the provisions for rights and obligations originating from labour relations. In the 
fifth chapter facts relevant as for the labour law are explained. They are primarily the actions relevant 
from the point of view of labour law. The authors outline here the dogmatics of legal actions, and deal 
with the time as legal fact. The subject matter of the sixth chapter is the participation of workers in the 
management of economic, social and cultural life of the society as well as the role and social position of 
trade unions in the socialist countries. 
The special part is actually the elucidation of the fourth chapter of the general part, with several 
sub-headings, within them with chapters. Under the sub-heading of individual labour relation the 
seventh chapter deals with the concept and kinds of labour relations (with the latter among others the 
period of continuance, the range and significance of the labour relation—second employment, 
additional employment, the subject character of employer—socialist, nonsocialist organization, 
individual, etc.). The eighth chapter treats the question of the coming into being, modification and 
extinguishment of labour relation, the ninth chapter the working time, the eleventh one the leisure 
time, the twelfth chapter the wages, the thirteenth chapter the indemnity to be paid in case of stoppage 
of work (idle time) and of other impediments of the performance of work, the fourteenth chapter the 
labour safety and protection of health, the fifteenth one the provision for the workers of the 
organization, finally the sixteenth chapter the special labour conditions of women and juveniles. 
The authors characterize the relations treated under the third-heading as ones forming parts of 
the more important—fundamental—labour relations. The twentieth chapter introduces the relations 
of trade union organs which come into being with the participation of workers in the development, 
management and control of the activity of the organization. The authors emphasize in the first place 
that the workers are entitled to participate in the management of the organization, then they 
enumerate the relations between the trade-union organizations, and organs, respectively, and a 
socialist organization. They investigate the legal regulation, subjects thereof, the forms of the 
participation in the management. The twenty-first chapter investigates comprehensively the 
institution of collective labour contracts, first of all the function and significance of collective labour 
contracts, their subjects, content, form, validity and operation in time. Finally, this chapter explains 
the sanctions becoming operative in case of violation of obligations originating from the collective 
labour contracts. 
The fourth sub-heading enumerates the relations connected with the main—fundamental— 
labour relations. They are primarily the liability (sanctional) relations. Here, in the first place the 
concept of forms of liability resulting from labour law are to be mentioned, being of two kinds, namely 
disciplinary and civil liability. The latter may exist both with the employing organ and with the 
employee. A special type of liability is the liability for unjustified material advantage (Chapter 22). 
Further on, the authors deal with the concept, reasons, prevention, decision of disputes originating 
from labour relations (chapter 23). Subsequently, the control exercised by the trade unions over the 
observance of labour-law provisions and the social control are treated (chapter 24). This chapter is 
finished by the comments on the legal relations occurring at the enforcement of the right to labour— 
the relations originating in connection with the regulation of the rate of employment included—as 
well as on the guarantees of the right to work (chapter 25). 
The fifth sub-heading treats the further legal relations in which—as formulated by the chapter 
of sub-heading—the nationals participate in the social work. The majority of these relations—as may 
be read in the manual—is the political and cultural work in the course of the non-productive activity, 
as well as the legal decision-making activity. To this category of relations belong especially the 
particular cases of labour relations of public functionaries, members of armed forces, public 
prosecutors, members of co-operatives of attorneys-at-law, the crew of sea-going vessels (chapter 26). 
The novel feature of the proportions is in the first place that the authors treat in the framework 
of comments on the labour relation the questions of labour discipline, working time, leisure time, 
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wages, indemnity due in case of stoppage of work, labour safety, care of employees, the special 
working conditions of women and juveniles, whereas the questions of the liability conditions, the 
disciplinary responsibility included, the labour disputes, the labour supervision as well as the 
guaranties of right to work are treated as questions connected with the labour relations. The labour 
relation of public functionaries as such is not separately outlined, the manual deals only with some 
special service relations (service relations of armed forces, public prosecutors, crew of sea-going 
vessels, etc.). 
The manual is traditional in such sense that it places the internal relations of employing 
organization also to the labour law and does not want to separate the internal management relations 
from the subject of labour law. 
The manual is completed with detailed indices. 
The work is theoretically well founded and thorougly edited. It summarizes at a high level the 
fundamental questions of labour law, while taking into consideration also the practical requirements 
by publishing in a separate list the important decisions of Czecho-Slovakian courts, facilitating 
thereby the search. It will certainly render good service as an educational aid. 
L. Trócsányi 
C O M M A I L L E , J A C Q U E S : Le divorce en France. De la reforme de 1975 à la sociologie du divorce. Notes et 
Etudes Documentaires. No 4478, La Documentation Française. Paris, 1978. 148 p. 
A fundamental reform of the legal regulation concerning the divorce took place in 1975 in 
France. From the point of view of the legal sociology it was especially remarkable since the decision of 
the legislation was preceded by a thorough public opinion research and legal sociological analysis, 
moreover, the solutions chosen by the legislator were influenced to a considerable extent by the 
statements of legal sociologists. Among those carrying out the investigations Jacques Commaille, the 
author of the present volume was also to be found. He not only summarizes in this book the results of 
the earlier investigations but outlines the development to be expected on the basis of experiences 
gained since the entering into force of the law. In addition to the clarity, to be always expected from 
Frenchmen, but not always coming into full display, two reasons render the work of Commaille highly 
convincing. One of them is that he does not isolate the divorce and the relevant legal rules but 
considers it in connections of the operation of the institutional system of marriage. The approach is 
also multidimensional as the author is able to treat the legal, demographic and sociological aspects in 
their interrelations, where the sociological aspect becomes dominant. 
In the first chapter of the book the regulation and development of the institution of divorce in 
France and in Europe is outlined. This process is characterized essentially by the switch over from the 
culpability to the objective state of affairs, in the background of which the admission of divorce in even 
increasing range and its social-legal acceptance are to be found. Although France can be considered 
progressive with her laws passed during the Revolution admitting divorce, the Restoration, however, 
was not at all favourable to the admission of divorce and in the last decades of the past century in the 
struggles with the Catholic Church the civil marriage and the admission of divorce resulted after all in 
a rather ambiguous situation. For a long time it was rather the judicial practice which rendered 
possible a certain liberalism, and finally in 1975 a radical change occurred, the most important and 
characteristic feature of which was the admission of divorce by mutual consent. This solution reflects 
essentially the demands of the French society. From legal point of view, however, it may be considered 
as an acceptance of solutions of other countries, since in the United States e. g., in the majority of the 
member states the principle of non-culpability has been accepted in divorce since 1970; in Japan a law 
has been enacted in 1974 according to which on the basis of a common consent of the spouses also the 
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administrative official can dissolve the marriage (and this method is used in 90 per cent of divorces). In 
the Scandinavian countries, non-fault divorce was granted since the Swedish marriage code of 1920, 
moreover, since 1973 Sweden has gone farther, since the spouses willing a divorce are not obliged even 
to disclose their reasons. 
After a survey of the solutions accepted by the positive laws (the divorce process also included 
in which the conciliation (mediation) has an especially important role) the author deals with the 
demographic characteristics of the divorce in France. While in 1900 five of twenty marriages ended in 
a divorce, after 1975 the ratio is one to six. Among the different French districts considerable 
deviations are to be found in respect of the divorce rates which is logically in connection with the 
powerful Catholic influence to be felt in some districts. The ratio of re-marriages is is lower in France 
as compared to the United States and Great Britain and shows a downward tendency. In connection 
with the demographic data of divorcees it is remarkable that although the single greatest cohors of 
divorcees is that of the 25 to 29 years old, the number of divorces among peoples aged 50 to 60 years 
considerably increases. As compared the begetting ration of the divorcees with that of those living in 
marriage it becomes evident that the ratio of premarital pregnancy is higher (corresponding to the 
expectation) with the divorcees, whereas as regards the number of children no significant difference 
may be found. All the more remarkable are the differences in the social-professional composition of 
married and divorced people. To all appearances the employees and middle cadres are for the most 
part inclined to divorce, at the same time among the women lodging a divorce suit the ratio of actively 
employed persons is twice as high as the ratio of employed married women (68 per cent, resp. 34 per 
cent). Surveying the difference in age and employment of spouses it is conspicuous that relatively 
higher is the number of spouses among the divorced peoples where the husband is older by 5 to 9 years 
than his wife. In connection with the differences of occupation the available data do not render 
possible a more exhaustive analysis. 
In his analysis of the social context of divorces the author proceeds from the social concepts 
conceived of the divorce. The everyday presentation of the divorce becomes more and more 
nonchalant, the divorce is less disapproved, less considered deviance. This fact corresponds to the 
general change of conception on the institution of marriage. This latter is characterized by the 
increasing recognition of free contacts of couples. The question is only whether the attitude changes 
the divorce practice or the attitudes transform under the effect of the divorce practice. According to 
the Durkheimian principle of normality, no special deviatory signification may be attributed to this 
attitude in a society where a considerable part, or even the half of the marriages ends in divorce, as e.g. 
in the United States. At the same time, the demographical differences (difference in age, prénuptial 
pregnancy etc.) do not offer sufficient explication in connection with the divorce; the increase in the 
divorce-rates may be understood only through the change of the institution of marriage; behind it, 
however, the specific problems of the middle classes and the influence of the increase of women's 
employment on the divorce are concealed as fundamental sociological determinants. 29 per cent of 
divorced women engage themselves for work after the divorce, i.e. for the majority just the fact of 
employment renders possible the divorce. In this connection the author analyzes the development of 
the ratio of divorces initiated by women, indicating considerable changes since 1884. The essence of 
these changes consists in that in the past 110 years, in the very first period and at present the divorces 
initiated by the wives have amounted to above 60 per cent, whereas after the world wars the divorces 
initiated by the men were characteristic. 
Commaille, however, does not rest satisfied with the changes in the social structure when 
investigating the phenomenon of divorce, but traces the dynamic increase of proportions of divorces 
from the position of the family in modern society and from the particular contradiction between these 
two. With the decrease of the inherent economic definiteness of the marriage, the significance of 
marriage as partnership increases, namely the existence of such a partnership which can be terminated 
at any time. The family as positive emotional community should function in an industrial society 
which is characterized by the ideology of production, by the insistence on the consumption and 
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production. In an industrial society like the present the individualism, the competition and the 
innovation at any rate follow. They restrict, of course, the possibility of the intimate family, as of an 
indissoluble relation. 
The new law on divorce is marked out for satisfying the increasing demand on divorce has been 
effective only for two years at the moment of finishing the volume and under the effect of facilities 
allowed by the legal rule and of tendencies asserting themselves otherwise, too, the number of divorces 
has increased to a considerable extent (apart from a transitional, period of stagnation observable with 
the introduction of all new legal rules). While in the years preceding the enactment of the law the 
number of divorces showed an increase of 5 to 6 per cent, an increase of 10 to 15 per cent was to be 
observed as compared to 1975. As a matter of fact this is, however, lower than that which would have 
been expected according to the experiences gained in other countries e.g. in England after the 
liberalization of divorces. (The prognostication reckoned with about the redoubling of the number of 
divorces for 1976-1977 on the basis of the British model.) 
The increase in Paris of the proportion of divorces by mutual consent is especially remarkable. 
At the same time considerable divergences in the judicial practice and in the divorce procedure chosen 
by the parties are to be experienced in various districts. The judicial practice and the professional 
literature are far from being uniform in the judgement of the new law. Many are afraid of the 
exaggerated power of the judge and regard the conciliation (mediation) process as too long, whereas 
the attorneys at law protest against the possibility of the action of mutually chosen attorney at law. 
In the summary the author points out that on the strength of the elapsed time it may not be 
accurately foreseen which role the new law on divorce will have in the development of the French 
divorces, since it is altogether unforeseeable how the relations of couples in the industrial society 
develop (trial marriage, sequential polygamy, extensive marriage). 
A. Sajó 
L I B Á N S K Y , V . : Mezinárodnísocialistické organizace pro hospodárskou a védeckotechnickou spolupráci 
(International socialist organizations in the field of economic and scientific-technical co-operation) 
S N T L , Praha, 1980. 259 p. 
Only when reading the book, even the persons knowing relatively more intimately the activity 
of CMEA realize what a wide-ranging network of organizations serving for the purpose of socialist 
economic integration has been already built out. Their entering in an inventory alone would be such 
a—useful but arduous—work which commands respect. The systematization according to uniform 
aspects, the concise introduction of these organizations has not yet been done in the socialist 
economic-legal literature, therefore, the reviewed book of V. Libánsky fills a gap, indeed. 
The book is divided into two main parts, namely a "general" and a "special" part. The part I 
(pp. 11-36) introduces three basic types, fundamental categories of the organizational system of 
CMEA and—in broader sense—of the socialist economic and scientific-technical co-operation. They 
are as follows: international economic organizations, inter-state economic organizations and 
international organizations having their own finances. The author—offering a certain historical 
survey and based primarily on the functions and objectives contained in the Complex Program— 
delimits the three categories by comparative analysis, pointing to their particularities, to their 
common and different tasks, to the specialities of their structures and legal characters. 
The "Special part" makes known—on the basis of the above-introduced categories—the 
organizations having a part in the economic and scientific-technical co-operation. The survey is 
extremely facilitated and elucidated by the uniformly used structure. All organizations are 
investigated on the basis of the following points of view: 1) its character (qualified according to the 
above categories and referring to the fact whether it is based on bi- or multi-lateral agreement); 2) date 
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of foundation; 3) headquarter of the organization; 4) range of the membership (the later adherences 
also included); 5) activity of the organization; 6) legal character of the organization (competence, 
questions of representation); 7) the fundamental legal documents (deed of foundation, statutes, 
minutes relating to the important decisions, etc.); 8) organizational structure (authorities and 
methods of the decision-making, operative activity, control, etc.); 9) economic questions (financing, 
share in the result, and bearing of loss, respectively, etc.); 10) working languages used with the activity 
of the organization; 11) relations of the organization to other organizations (e.g. to non-member 
states, etc.). 
As a matter of course, Chapter 4 is the most detailed one, dealing with the CMEA itself as an 
interstate economic organization (pp. 39—59). Within this chapter—according to the sense—the legal 
documents and the questions of organizational structure are most extensively outlined. The author 
introduces the Executive Committee, the permanent committees and the conferences (e.g. Legal 
Conference), as well as the Secretariat of CMEA. 
Chapter 5 offers information about the specialized inter-state economic organizations—taking 
the general model for basis. 17 such organizations are presented, among others the Nuclear Research 
Institute of Dubna, the co-operational organization of railway transportation, the international co-
operation bank, Intermetall, Agromas, Interchim, Intersputnik, etc. 
Chapter 6 presents pictures of 26 international economic organizations, such as Haldex, 
Intransmas, Interatominstrument, Interkomponent, Intertextilmas, referring only to the or-
ganizations well known also for the Hungarian public. 
The concise arrangement easy to survey offers a complete and up-to-date information (up to 
and including 1979) on the diversity and at the same time on the conception of organizational 
frameworks of the more and more wide-ranging socialist integration. This volume of the sedulous 
revealing work by which the author collected the not always readily accessible source-material, may be 
only suspected; in the book only the peak of this iceberg appears. The book containing also tables 
facilitating the survey means an indispensable manual for all those dealing with the legal and 
economic questions of CMEA. The serviceableness of the book would have been increased by 
summaries in foreign languages. 
E. Lontai 
Rechtsfragen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Zusammenarbeit UdSSR-DDR (red. G. S C H Ö N F E L D ) , 
Staatsverlag der DDR, Berlin, 1979. 176 p. 
In the field of the thorough scientific analysis of legal questions of the scientific-technical co-
operation, the legal literature of the Soviet Union and the GDR has achieved considerable results. 
This is hardly separable from the fact that also the practice of the scientific-technical co-operation 
between the two states gives evidence of favourable traditions and intensive development. It is by no 
means a mere chance that the volume reviewed here, dealing with the legal problems of this particular 
field of the co-operation has been also bom in the spirit of co-operation. In the authors' collective both 
the well-known jurists of the GDR (G. Schönfeld, M. Müller, W. Schönrath) and the representative of 
the Soviet jurisprudence (M. M. Boguslavsky) are to be found. 
Chapter I (G. Schönfeld) introduces and illustrates the process and significant results and the 
related particularities of the scientific-technical co-operation of the USSR and GDR. It surveys the 
important legal documents serving for basis of the co-operation, and, with special minuteness of 
detail, the stipulations of the bi-lateral "General Conditions Relating to the Accomplishment of the 
Scientific-Technical Co-operation between the GDR and USSR" approved on June 15, 1973 by the 
government committees. It outlines the actual and perspective tasks of the co-operation as well as the 
consequences resulting therefrom as for the development of legal instruments. It emphasizes the 
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particular features of this field, especially that it is a complex, dynamically developing system 
characterized by elements of uncertainty, of risk (p. 19). It stresses the increasing importance of legal 
norms of macrolevel (inter-state and inter-governmental treaties), further it refers to the significance 
of private international law aspects of the field. 
Chapter II (W. Schönrath) deals with the general questions of the legal mechanism of 
scientific-technical co-operation. Taking the theses of the Complex Program for basis, it defines the 
main fields of the co-operational relations, namely: establishment of scientific-technical results, the 
exchange of the results, the learning of the produced results and their economic exploitation, 
realization. Further on, it investigates three legally significant fields of mechanisms. First, it analyzes 
the legal conditions and methods of the co-operation necessary with respect to the planning, namely 
the variants of planning co-operation (plan co-ordination and common planning), the characteristics 
and tasks of the legal subjects playing a role (in special consideration of the position of international 
organizations), the external phases of the legal mechanism of planning (the most significant phase 
thereof is the co-ordination of the five-year plans). The next range of questions dealt with in more 
details relates to the legal means serving for the learning of produced results. In this connection it 
surveys the variants of the achieved results, the particularities of their legal protection, laying stress on 
that the blocking effect of exclusive title granted to inventions is not compatible with the essence of the 
socialist integration (p. 39). It calls the attention also to the special problems of know-how. Finally, it 
briefly touches upon the solution methods of possible conflicts, namely the arbitration. 
Chapter III ( M. Müller) investigates the legal forms of the co-operation in the field of research. 
It offers a brief survey of the various—mainly contractual—forms of the co-operation, and of the 
agreements entered into in this connection, respectively, as well as of the CMEA documents. Further 
on, it analyzes in details the various forms of co-operation. The so-called elementar, loosest form of 
the co-operation is the co-ordination of researches. In this connection it treats—among other—the 
expedient legal conditions of the drafting of research plans, of the transfer of results, of the financing, 
of the supply of information. The legal form of the closer research co-operation is meant by the 
agreement entered into for the research co-operation. The characteristic stipulations—variants of 
stipulations—of such contracts are analyzed and valuated partly on the strength of the model 
agreements elaborated in the framework of CMEA. The importance of contractual stipulations 
relating to the enforcement of secrecy and the immaterial character of obtained results are especially 
emphasized. Also the system of warranties serving for the real fulfilment of contracts, the rules of 
guarantee and warranty are outlined. With respect to these latters, the observation of research risk is 
emphatically stressed when formulating the reasons of exemption (p. 59). Further on, the legal forms 
of research associations promoting a much closer co-operation, as well as their variants are 
investigated, such as the problems relating to the activity of research collectives, common 
laboratories, as well as the scientific-technical, moreover, scientific productional organizations having 
legal personality. (Namely, the "Assofoto" as proto-type of CMEA-level of the common scientific-
productive organization established on the basis of bi-lateral agreement is introduced.) Finally, some 
conceptions relating to the stipulations of research assignment contracts are outlined. 
Chapter IV analyzes the legal questions of the transfer and exploitation of results obtained in 
the course of the scientific-technical co-operation (M. M. Boguslavsky-G. Schönfeld). The authors 
depart from the conception that the utilization and exploitation in the widest possible range of the 
achieved results is a social necessity, almost an order. The precondition of the realization of this 
requirement is that this approach should come into full display in the co-operational relations both on 
macro-level, inter-state level and on the level of economic organizations. In this connection the 
various contractual forms play important role. In the relation between the GDR and Soviet Union the 
legal principles of onerous exchange of scientific-technical results have been stated on the 5th meeting 
of govermental committee established on the basis of equality. Among the contractual forms, the 
licence agreements are of fundamental importance. Based partly on the model agreements elaborated 
in the framework of CMEA and partly on the practical experiences, the authors set forth the most 
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important problems in connection with licence agreements, namely the problems_x>f contractual 
stipulations relating to the object of contract (e.g. know-how, the variants of the forms of protection), 
to the technical assistance, the improvements, the payment of compensation, the guarantees, the 
warranty, the liability, the secrecy, the provision for legal protection, the settlement of disputes, etc. 
The problems arising in connection with the gratuitous transfer of results, as well as with the licence 
trade carried on in common with third states are separately analyzed. 
Chapter V (M. M. Boguslavsky) investigates the questions related to the legal protection of 
scientific-technical results. Following the general appreciation of the role of legal protection, as well as 
the introduction of the bi- and multi-lateral agreements, namely the Moscow and Havana treaties, 
the author surveys the organizational conditions of the protection. Further on, he treats the questions 
related to the specific protection of various kinds of scientific-technical results, to the variants of 
protection, mentioning especially the protection of inventions but analyzing at the same time the 
questions of discoveries, as well as the possibilities of protection provided for by the norms of 
copyright and the particular problems of the protection of software. 
This comprehensive work of high level, well founded theoretically, (proved by the rich 
documentation based primarily—but not exclusively—on the results of German and Soviet legal 
literature) and extremely useful for the practice furnishes information not only on the bi-lateral 
relations but gives a good basis for each specialist investigating with general character the legal 
questions of CMEA integration. 
E. Lontai 
B O N I N I , R . : Introduzione alio studio dell'età giustiniana (Introduction into the study of the Justinian 
state) Patron Editoré, Bologna, 1977. 130 p. 
In the introduction of the book split up into seventeen chapters, giving motives for the choice 
of subject the excellent Italian romanist ascertains that the notion prevailing in the literature about the 
epoch of Justinianus is generally stereotyped. The fundamental intention of the work is to exceed these 
stereotypes. According to the author the rise of the predominant views can be attributed to the fact 
that the researches until now have approached this era abounding with cultural and political events 
excessively one-sidedly. Even the Justinian codification itself cannot be separated rigorously either 
from the economic and social events or from the intellectual tendencies being concomitants to this era. 
Until now scholars have given attention almost exclusively to the period extending until the 
completion of codification (i.e. till 534) of the epoch mentioned above. Even the significant changes 
appearing in the period following the publication of the Codex Iustinianus repetitaepraelectionis have 
not been taken into consideration. In this way also the codification itself has actually been isolated. It 
is a subsequent problem that the researchers of this period (viz. jurists and historians) have scrutinized 
the characteristics of this time on the basis of a definite range of sources, i.e. that of legal and non-legal 
sources. 
In Chapter One of the book the first period of Justinianus's life and career exceeding until his 
accession to the throne is analyzed. Flavius Petrus Sabbatius Iustinianus (by his full name) was born in 
482, in all probability of a family of Thraco-Illyrian origine. Bonini criticizes the view supposing him 
by reasons of one of the passages of Vita Iustiniani fastened on Theophilus Abbas to be of Slavic 
origine (as recently e.g. Sotiroff). The first information relating to Justinianus dates from 518. The 
deceased Anastasius 1 was namely succeeded on the throne electively by his uncle Justinus I in the 
same year. In the year of Justinus's accession Justinianus is promoted illustris comes (domesticorum) 
and in 521 he is elected consul. The relation between Justinus and Justinianus is problematical among 
historians. The standpoint supposing that Justinianus can be regarded as actual monarch and so the 
beginning of his reign can already be reckoned from his uncle's accession to the throne, is disputed by 
Bonini. Justinianus obtains the dignity of nobilissimus exceedingly late, viz. in 526, and this fact must 
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not be forgotten. Also the title of Augustus he is granted only some months before his uncle's death, 
viz. in April 527. Treating the duration of Justinianus's reigning Bonini emphasizes that this long 
epoch embracing thirty eight years can be divided into several periods. As far as politics is concerned 
two significant eras can be separated. The first phase abounding with campaigns endures till 540. As to 
public administration, the fall of praefectus praetorio Orientis John the Cappadocian in 541 is a 
landmark. The second phase of Justinianus's reigning connects fundamentally with this year. This 
period is by no means abounding with military expansions insomuch as the previous one. Legislation 
fell relatively into the background in this period and this can to a high pitch be ascribed to 
Tribonianus's death in 542, too. This periodization is not necessarily satisfactory in respect of law as it 
does not distinguish on the basis of the Justinian codification. According to Bonini the first phase can 
be divided into two subsequent stages. Inside it the year 534 constitutes a caesura as year of completing 
the codification. The second stage of the first phase extending from 535 approximately to 541-542 is 
the period of creating the Novellae constitutiones and therefore it can be regarded as an independent 
period. The third phase is characterized by being thrust into the background of the legal development. 
The author is of the opinion that the literature has hitherto not given due attention to exploring 
characteristics of the second and third phase. 
In the chapter treating the first Codex Iustinianus for the beginning the circumstances of 
creating the Codex are discussed. The sovereign promulgates his first code in the constitutio "De novo 
codice componendo" (or otherwise " H a e c quae necessario"). The primary purpose of the corpus 
relying on the Codex Gregoriánus, Codex Hermogenianus and Codex Theodosianus is to diminish the 
"prolixitas litium". The composition of persons entrusted with compilation is greatly diversified. 
Among the members of the commission can be found John the Cappadocian, who is the so-called ex 
quaestor sacripalatii at this time, item Tribonianus, as one of the six excellent officials, as simply "vir 
magnificus magisteria dignitate inter agentes decoratus", further Theophilus, who is simultaneously an 
antecessor of Constantinople law school and finally two "lawyers" of the judgement-seat of the 
praefectus praetorio. 
This composition demonstrates definitely the predominance of bureaucratic factor as the 
representatives of theory or those of real legal praxis cannot be regarded to be instrumental in the 
commission. The Codex reached completion in a little over a year and consequently became valid 
already in 529. The author briefly refers to P. Oxy. 1814 published in 1922. Relying upon this we can 
conceive a notion of the conception dominating in the course of compiling the first Codex. This 
conception has not considered yet compiling of the material of the ius. 
In the following chapter Bonini analyzes the history and the main characteristics of creating 
the Digest. The legislative work of the chancellery becomes even more active after the promulgation of 
the constitutio "Summa reipublicae" validating the Codex. The upward trend mentioned above is in a 
great part due to the activity of Tribonianus having meanwhile obtained the office of the quaestor sacri 
palatii. One of the important characteristics of the Digest promulgated by the constitutio "Tanta" 
December 16,533 is the prohibition on commenting already included in the constitutio "Deoauctore". 
The author supposes the number of jurisconsults cited in the Digest to amount to 39 as Venuleius 
Saturninus and Claudius Saturninus must be regarded to be two different persons. At the end of the 
chapter Bonini expresses appreciation for the significance of the littera Florentina among the remained 
manuscripts of the Digest. Analyzing the problem of the interpolations the author refers to the fact 
that the authorization to that was denoted by the well-known place in the constitution "Tanta" i.e. 
" . . . quia multa et maxima sunt, quae propter utilitatem rerum transformata sunt". The method of 
interpolation research goes back to the 16th century, viz. the discovery of the "emblemata Triboniani" 
is due to the French humanists. It is owing to Kaser and Wieacker that the significance of interpolation 
research has to some extent been relegated to the background at the present time. Bonini fully treats 
the thesis put forth by Bluhme in 1820 supposing the particular fragments of the Digest were arranged 
according to a definite system. The fragments connecting with the ius civile constitute the so-called 
Sabinus Body, to the memory of the work entitled "Très libri iuris civilis" of the jurisconsult. The so-
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called Edictum Body indicates the connection with ius honorarium, while finally the Papinianus Body 
relates to the highly respected jurisconsult's writings having a casuistic nature. The less significant 
fourth part is constituted by the so-called Appendix comprising material dating from the period after 
Papinianus. In the early years of our century Bluhme's thesis met with critics mainly in the German 
literature. The common ground of Hofman's, Ehrenzweig's and Peter's opinions is the supposing of 
the existence of a codification having a private character in the 5th century constituting the basis of the 
compilators' work. In the 20s of this, century also the great representatives of Italian romanistics 
(chiefly De Francisci, Arangio-Ruiz and Albertario) take in certain respect the supposition of the 
mentioned German romanists for basis, although they fundamentally remain henceforward followers 
of Bluhme's theory. In the last years, however, the predigest conception is pushed more and more into 
the background and therefore—perhaps apart from Guarino's conception—we may with good reason 
speak about the renaissance of Bluhme's theory. Bonini analyzes with full particulars Honoré's 
conception, which in many respects seems to be well-founded, but still requires further part-
researches. Moreover, Verrey's opinion on the separation of the two stages of the compilation merits 
attention. 
In the following chapters Bonini discusses Justinianus's "classicism", the Institutes and in 
relation to that the reform of legal teaching, the Codex repetitae praelectionis, the Justinian Novels, the 
legal basis of the imperator's power and in relation to that the political ideology. In the subsequent 
chapters the author analyzes the peculiarities of the law of the Justinian epoch not omitting to 
scrutinize even procedure law. The parts of the book examining the work of the sovereign's 
"collaborators" are also highly enlightening. Bonini dissects the activity of John the Cappadocian 
with special circumstantiality, who owes his brilliant career principally to his official relation to the 
heir to the crown and imperátor. The role of the questores sacri palatii holding practically the function 
of the minister of justice is discussed in a special chapter. The author emphasizes Tribonianus's 
insisting on Latin, bringing on the inconsiderable part of the Greek element in the codification. 
Tribonianus's successors in the mentioned function are Iunillus (perhaps Iunilus or Iunilius) 
Africanus being far less learned than his predecessor in his office, and Constantinus, who continued in 
his office probably after Justinianus's death as well. In the lest chapter Bonini reviews the literary 
sources of the Justinian era. 
The book elaborating far-reaching material and manifesting profound knowledge of the 
sources is a valuable contribution to the complex and comprehensive treatment of the mentioned 
epoch. On the basis of Bonini's work supplemented with a valuable bibliography the reader interested 
in the Justinian era obtains a summary rich in ideas about the period in question. The method with 
which the author formulates his conclusions objectively and takes the available sources for basis in 
each chapter of his book is by all means to be lauded. 
G. Hamza 
M E Y E R - T E R M E E R , A. J . М . : Die Haftung der Schiffer im griechischen und römischen Recht. Studia 
Amstelodamensia ad epigraphicam, ius antiquum et papyrologicam pertinentia XIII. Terra 
Publishing Co., Zutphen, Holland, 1978. IX + 290p. 
In Part One of her book the Dutch authoress deals with the perplexed problem of Greco-
Egyptian contracts of shipment, in Part Two the problems of shipment transactions and those of the 
receptum nautarum in Roman law are discussed, finally the relation between the Greco-Egyptian and 
Roman legal regulation is analyzed in Part Three. 
The range of documents, viz. papyri concerning the contract of shipment of Greco-Egyptian 
law, i.e. tuiulitikai syngraphai extends from the middle of the 3rd century B. C. until the 6th century A. 
D. The employer of carriage by ship is either an individual or the state itself. The shipping contractor. 
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i.e. the naukleros appears as agent. It is a part of the duties of the naukleros (who is the ship owner, too, 
in a number of cases) to conclude a contract of shipment with the employer and to assume liability for 
the carriage. His presence in ship is not required because the practical duties are discharged by the— 
using the technical term of Roman law—magister navis (kybernetes), who also subscribes the 
naulitikesyngraphe. Occasionally the naukleros discharges also the kybernetes'duties (see e.g. P. Hib. I 
39). This, however, does not mean that the difference between both functions would fully disappear. 
The author also treats the much discussed question of the mistheprasia concluded for 50-60 years. The 
very reason shy this lease construction—which is reminiscent in terms of its consequences of sale and 
purchase—was applied, could be that the hirer out (i.e. the kyrios), who remained henceforth pro 
forma owner, was exempted from the munera publica. 
As to the problem of liability concerning carriage, it demands an overall regulation. If the state 
itself appears as employer, unlimited liability is ope legis imposed on the shipping contractor. The 
unlimited liability, however, is also often emphasized in a special clause referring expressedly to that, 
viz. in the naulitike syngraphe. This liability of the contractor is confirmed with a special oath, as 
reported on by some sources. Besides the guaranties mentioned above also sponsors appear from the 
epoch of Antonius Pius. Not only the state but also the individual employer stuck to adequate 
guaranties. The clause, which has a preventive and at the same time a repressive effect, takes a great 
part in connection with these contracts, too. There is consequently no difference depending on who 
fills the function of employer, regarding the degree of liability. Analyzing the legal nature of naulitikai 
syngraphai, the author arrives at the conclusion that those come under the category of misthosis. 
According to modern legal terminology misthosis embraces the lease contract, the labour contract, the 
paramone, the so-called locatio conductio operis, the nurse contract and the contract of affreightment. 
The theoretically unlimited liability of the contractor remained unchanged for several centuries. 
Limiting liability as far as the contractor is exceptionally not held responsible for vis maior, the P. 
Oxy. I 144 documents in fact the above thesis. The author criticizes the view in literature (represented 
e.g. by Mitteis, Arangio-Ruiz and Börner) supposing that the contractor's liability was limited 
relating the persons concerned. 
In the introductory part of the chapter analyzing the contract of shipment and the receptum 
nautarum in Roman law the author stresses that in the beginning shipping did not play an important 
role in ancient Rome. From the 3rd century B. C. the significance of maritime trade increased 
considerably in the economic life of Rome. For the oversea carriage of the annona the state needed also 
the services of private persons. The individual shipping contractors obtained important privileges, 
among which the grant of Roman citizenship and the immunitás from munera publica were striking. A 
complete change occurred in the social position of navicularii from the epoch of Diocletianus. In the 
time of the Dominatus there was no word of contractual relation any more between the state and the 
shipping contractor but the subordination became a decisive factor. No doubt, however, the 
navicularii had got certain privileges in this period: so e.g. the lex Papia Poppaea did not pertain to 
them and the vocatio tutelae was due to them. The shipping contractor, i.e. the exercitor, just like in 
Egypt, could be equally the owner or the charterer of ship. It was his duty to employ the magister navis 
and occasionally to enter into a contract of shipment with a third party. If the exercitor navis 
contracted with a third party, in this case according to the nature of contract he was entitled to bring 
actio locati or actio conducti. Further the shipping contractor could make a special guaranty contract 
with the employer in the name of the exercitor, the so-called receptum nautarum. To discharge the 
technical duties, however, was the task of the magister or the so-called gubernátor. Navicularius, 
occurring occasionally in the sources, is a synonymous term with exercitor. 
The shipping contractor's liability conformed to the general rules of locatio, i.e. liability for 
dolus and culpa was imposed on the employer. Strict liability was stipulated with the receptum 
nautarum connected with lease contract being nevertheless independent. The exercitor made the 
receptum "contract" itself or he commissioned the magister navis or accidentally another person, e.g. 
the diaetarius. In this case, too, it was possible to bring actio ex recepto against the exercitor 
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immediately. A certain kind of the transmission of liability is not mentioned in the sources, e.g. if it is 
not the exercitor who contracts directly with the employer. When namely the party adversely affected 
might claim damages against the exercitor by the right of receptum concluded with the magister, there 
was no word of bringing action either against the magister (actio ex recepto) or the exercitor (actio 
[ex recepto] exercitoria). (See Gai. Inst. 4.71.; D.41.1.; C.4.25.) As to the time of the coming into 
being of the receptum nautarum, the authoress ascertains that it is to be dated to the period between the 
appearance of the locatio conductio and the time of Ofilius' activity. It is implausible that this kind of 
receptum would already be known before the 2nd century B. C. Analysing the scope of application of 
the receptum the authoress takes the view that it is not limited to the cases of the locatio conductio 
rerum vehendarum only, as supposed e.g. by Brecht. Mayer-Termeer further opines that this kind of 
receptum was exclusively possible in the case of mandate charged by a private person. As to the degree 
of liability resulting from the receptum, the authoress thinks that liability also embraced the risk of 
damage until Labeo. She considers the expression in D.4.9.3.1. (Ulp.) excluding damnum fatale from 
liability to be a subsequent addition. Labeo excepts only the cases of naufragium and vis piratarum 
from liability. Examining the legal characteristics of receptum the authoress ascertains that it became 
totally independent from the locatio conductio and that is why it did not change into an ex lege 
guaranty clause even in the Justinianean law. That constitutes in fact the basis of the principal 
difference between the Greco-Egyptian and Roman legal regulation on the shipping contractor and 
simultaneously that is why the derivative problem cannot be solved unambiguously and scholarly, as 
explained by the authoress in the last chapter. 
Mayer-Termeer's book is exemplary not only in terms of the elaboration of the ample source 
material but it can also serve as a methodological instruction to writing up similar legal institutions of 
ancient laws, as far as the analysis of a given institution is concerned. 
G. Hamza 
10* Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 24, 1982 
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